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Abstract/resumen
The dissertation analyzes the scope and limits of democracy both historically
and normatively. It has two main goals. First, it historically explains how a num-
ber of institutional devices that had been traditionally seen as limits on the scope
of democracy turned out to be seen not only as consistent with democracy but
actually as necessary for any good-working democratic system. Second, it norma-
tively analyzes two outstanding cases in which the scope of democracy is heavily
limited—constitutional constraints on legislatures and decision-making within the
ﬁrm, a domain that is usually taken to be beyond the scope of democracy.
Part I historically analyzes a two-fold shift in the concept of democracy in the
Early American Republic. First, the increasing acceptance of the idea of democ-
racy—along with the institutional devices traditionally attached to it—due to the
acceptance of disagreement as a legitimate feature of the American society and the
subsequent crisis of the theory of virtual representation, according to which the soci-
ety is an organic entity with a shared set of interests that ought to be insulated from
democratic struggle and partisanship. Second, the shift in the very concept of democ-
racy, by which many of the institutional devices that had been traditionally seen as
constraints on democracy turned out to be seen not only as consistent with democ-
racy but also as necessary for any good-working democratic system. In a nutshell,
democracy gained acceptability as long as the scope of democratic decision-making
was downsized.
The remainder of the dissertation normatively analyzes two outstanding cases
in which the scope of democracy is clearly constrained—namely, constitutional-
ism and decision-making within ﬁrms. Part II addresses several normative theo-
ries of constitutionalism—and, notably, of constitutional rigidity and judicial re-
view—and shows that they all fail to justify constitutional constraints from a demo-
cratic standpoint. Three prominent types of theories are analyzed—pure instrumen-
talist, precommitment-based, and proceduralist. Even though a number of problems
are identiﬁed, a common and central problem is that they all fail to address ade-
quately the fact of disagreement and thus fall into new forms of organicism.
Finally, Part III analyzes another sphere that is usually taken to be beyond the
scope of democracy—namely, the workplace. It addresses the core arguments for
and against extending democratic decision-making to the workplace and develops a
novel, republican case for workplace democracy based on incomplete (labor) contract
theory. Finally, bargaining power asymmetries and moral hazard problems arising
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from the formal separation of ownership and control rights in democratic ﬁrms are
analyzed.
Resumen breve1
La tesis analiza el alcance y los límites de la democracia de forma histórica y
normativa. Tiene dos objetivos principales. Primero, explicar históricamente cómo
una serie de instituciones que habían sido tradicionalmente consideradas como límites
a la democracia fueron incorporadas al concepto de democracia, hasta el punto de
ser consideradas necesarias para su correcto funcionamiento. Segundo, analizar dos
casos especialmente relevantes en los que el alcance de la democracia está fuertemente
limitado: el constitutionalismo y la toma de decisiones en las empresas.
La Primera Parte analiza históricamente el concepto de democracia, y su alcance,
en los Estados Unidos de América en el periodo revolucionario y post-revolucionario.
Se halla un doble desplazamiento. Primero, un incremento en la aceptación de la
idea de democracia debido a la aceptación del desacuerdo político como un fenómeno
legítimo y la consiguiente crisis de la teoría de la representación virtual, según la
cual la sociedad es una entidad orgánica con un conjunto de intereses compartidos
que deben ser aislados de la política democrática y el partidismo. Segundo, un
desplazamiento del concepto de democracia, según el cual muchos de los mecanismos
institucionales que habían sido tradicionalmente vistos como límites al alcance de la
democracia pasaron a ser considerados no sólo consistentes con la democracia sino de
hecho necesarios para su correcto funcionamiento. En resumen, la democracia ganó
aceptación en la medida en que su alcance quedó reducido.
El resto de la tesis analiza normativamente los límites al alcance de la democracia
en relación a dos casos especialmente relevantes: el constitucionalismo y la toma de
decisiones en la empresa. La Segunda Parte analiza las principales teorías normativas
del constitucionalismo —y, concretamente, de la rigidez constitucional y la revisión
judicial de las leyes— y muestra que todas ellas resultan insuﬁcientes para justiﬁcar
los límites constitucionales desde un punto de vista democrático. Se analizan tres
tipos de teorías: instrumentalistas, basadas en precompromisos y procedimentales.
Aunque se identiﬁca toda una serie de problemas, es común a todas ellas su incapaci-
dad para acomodar adecuadamente el desacuerdo político en materia constitucional,
incurriendo así en diversas formas de organicismo.
Finalmente, la Tercera Parte analiza la toma de decisiones en las empresas, un
ámbito que es generalmente considerado ajeno al alcance de la democracia. Se
analizan los principales modelos de democracia en la empresa —cooperativismo y
codeterminación—, así como los principales argumentos a favor y en contra de la ex-
tensión de la toma de decisiones democrática a las empresas. Por último, se presenta
un argumento original, de raíz republicana y apoyado en la teoría de los contratos
(laborales) incompletos, a favor de la democracia en las empresas. Asímismo, se
analizan las asimetrías negociadoras y los problemas de riesgo moral derivados de la
separación formal entre control y propiedad en las empresas democráticas.
1 Véase un resumen extenso en castellano en las pp. 275-295.
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Introduction and summary
Over the last decades we have witnessed two apparently paradoxical political
trends. First, the world-wide extension of democratic institutions and democratic
ideology and, second, the global proliferation of non-majoritarian bodies, such as in-
dependent central banks and constitutional courts, with the consequent downsizing
of the scope of democratic decision-making. In a nutshell, democratic institutions
have recently expanded as much as the scope of democratic decision-making has
been reduced. These two trends have gone hand-in-hand with two parallel yet more
philosophical and long-term trends. First, the crisis of the metaphysical conception
of the society as an organic entity with a “general will,” which has lead to the ac-
ceptance of pluralism and partisanship as legitimate features of politics and, second,
the increasingly inﬂuential view that there are a number of issues that ought to be
insulated from ordinary politics and left to non-elected experts either because they
are beyond dispute (e.g. human rights), or because they are purely technical (e.g.
monetary policy), or yet because they are private (e.g. the family) and should not
be submitted to majority rule.
Consider the ﬁrst two trends. On the one hand, democracy has rapidly expanded
in the West and elsewhere ever since World War II, as ﬁgure 1 shows regarding the
proportion of countries with fully universal suﬀrage. While in 1900 only 6 out of 43
existing states were minimally democratic, and only one had fully universal suﬀrage,
in 1946 20 out of 71 independent states were already democratic. And in the early
1990s the number increased from 48 in 1989 to 77 in 1994, a ﬁgure that grew up to 92
in 2009 and is likely to continue to grow after the so-called Arab Spring.2 Democratic
ideology has also expanded very fast. To the point that blatantly undemocratic
governments have often opportunistically referred to themselves as “democratic,” the
most obvious instances being the Democratic Republic of Germany, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Franco’s “organic democracy,” or Pinochet’s attempt to
“give to democracy an authentically representative dimension.”3
On the other hand, the scope of democratic decisions has been reduced as much
as democracy has been extended. Not only due to the powerful and raising de facto
2 The ﬁgures come from R. A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998),
p. 14; D. Potter, “Explaining Democratization,” in Democratization, ed. D. Potter, D. Goldblatt,
M. Kiloh and P. Lewis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997); and M, G. Marshall and B. R. Cole, Global
Report 2009: Conﬂict, Governance, and State Fragility (Vienna: Center for Systemic Peace, 2009),
pp. 10-11.
3 A. Pinochet, “Chile should Not Fall into the Vices of the Past,” in The Politics of Antipolitics,
B. Loveman and D. Thomas, eds. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997), pp. 248-249.
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presence of international actors, such as transnational corporations or the “gnomes
of Zurich,” as the former British Prime Minister Harold Wilson referred to ﬁnancial
speculators. But also because of the de iure transfer of power from parliaments to
non-majoritarian institutions (i.e. institutions that are neither directly elected by
the people, nor directly managed by elected oﬃcials), such as the European Central
Bank at the supranational level, or constitutional courts at the domestic level. As
Mark Tatcher and Alec Stone Sweet have put it regarding European countries,
In the ﬁelds of utility regulation, telecommunications, antitrust, and media
pluralism, and even in the provision of health and welfare beneﬁts, myriad
independent regulatory bodies have been created and become the loci for
making new rules, or applying existing ones to new situations, at the national
level. At the supranational level, central bankers, insulated from direct polit-
ical control, set monetary policy. In Brussels, European Commission oﬃcials
propose legislation and enforce ever wider European Union regulation. In
Luxembourg, the Court of Justice controls member state compliance with
European law, reviewing the lawfulness of activities of national parliaments,
governments, and administrators.4
Figure 1. Proportion of countries with universal suﬀrage, by year.5
These two trends have gone hand-in-hand with two parallel yet more philosophical
and long-term trends. On the one hand, the acceptance of disagreement and parti-
sanship as legitimate political features vis-à-vis the classic conception of the society
as an organic entity with common interests that parties and partisanship could only
jeopardize. As we shall see in chapter 1, the organic conception of the society was
hegemonic until the late-eighteenth century. This conception can be divided into
two core ideas. The ﬁrst idea is that the society is an organic body with a common
4 M. Tatcher and A. Stone Sweet, “Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian
Institutions,” West European Politics 25 (2002): 1–22, p. 1.
5 A. Przeworski, “Conquered or Granted? A History of Suﬀrage Extensions,” British Journal
of Political Science 39 (2008): 291-321, p. 292.
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set of interests and values that are beyond particular interests and factions. The
analogy with the body appeared in the late medieval period, but even when the
contractual perspective became dominant, parties to a covenant were seen as parts
of a whole. It is not by chance that “the people” has always appeared in the singular,
as le peuple, el pueblo, das Volk, el poble, herria, and so on—as an organic entity with
a uniﬁed will.6 The second idea is that social and political groups advance particular
interests and thus threaten the social unity. As Rousseau clearly put it, “[w]hen
particular interests begin to make themselves felt and sectional societies begin to
exert an inﬂuence ... the common interest becomes corrupted.”7 In the organicist
view democracy is ruled out because it implies political struggle and partisanship
and these, in turn, are taken to be inimical to the pre-political and organic interests
of the society. As Hans Kelsen would rather critically put it in 1929,
[T]he ideal of a general interest superior and transcending interests of
groups, thus parties, the ideal of solidarity of interests of all members of the
collectivity without distinction of religion, of nationality, of class, etc. is a
metaphysical, more exactly, a metapolitical illusion, habitually expressed by
speaking ... of an ’organic’ collective or ’organic’ structure.8
Now, as the nineteenth century progressed, the organicist conception gradually gave
way to an ever-growing acceptance of the fact of disagreement at the levels of both
interests and values, and thus to a more sympathetic view toward political struggle
and partisanship—as inevitable and legitimate means to advance such interests and
values. Of course, the acknowledgment of the existence of disagreement and parti-
sanship was as old as Aristotle, who stated that “the rich and the poor, are held to
be parts of a city-state. Besides ... among the parts of the city-state these two are
opposites.”9 However, political opposition and partisanship would not be taken to
be legitimate—rather than as inimical to the social unity—until much more recently.
Even Marx and Engels, who famously deﬁned “the history of all hitherto existing
society [as] the history of class struggles,” still believed in “the foundation of a new
society without classes.”10 Now, for reasons that will become clear below (§ 1.3.1),
pluralism and disagreement would become more pressing as the nineteenth century
progressed, and the organicist conception could no longer be credibly sustained. As
Schumpeter would conclude in the mid-twentieth century, “[t]here is no such thing
as a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree on or be made
6 See A. Przeworski, “Consensus and Conﬂict in Western Thought on Representative Govern-
ment,” Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010): 7042–7055, p. 7046; and Democracy and
the Limits of Self-Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 19.
7 J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social, in Oeuvres complètes, vol. 3, B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond,
eds. (Paris: Gallimard, 1961). Quoted from J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, M. Cranston,
trans. (New York: Penguin, 1968), p. 99.
8 H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (Mohr: Tübingen 1920). Quoted from H.
Kelsen, La Démocratie. Sa Nature-Sa Valeur (Paris: Economica, 1988), pp. 32-33.
9 Aristotle, Politics, C. D. C. Reeve, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1948), 1291b.
10 K. Marx and F. Engels, “Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei,” in Werke, vol. 4 (Berlin:
Dietz Verlag, 1971). Quoted from K. Marx and F. engels, The Communist Manifesto, S. Moore and
F. Engels, trans. (London: Pluto Press, 2008), p. 33; and “Rules of the Communist League,” art.
1.
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to agree on by the force of rational argument.”11 Accordingly, political struggle
and partisanship would gain legitimacy, and democracy, traditionally despised by
philosophers of all sorts, would eventually obtain a respectable philosophical pedi-
gree. As Habermas would put it more recently, under “conditions of postmetaphysical
thinking” no prepolitical substantive goals can be worked out—they can only be the
upshot of the democratic process, which is the only source of legitimacy.12
On the other hand, as the organic conception was left behind and disagreement
and partisanship characteristic of democratic politics gained respectability, an ap-
parently paradoxical idea emerged—namely, that there are a number of issues that
should not be submitted to majority rule, either because they are beyond dispute,
because they are merely technical, or yet because they are purely private and ought to
be protected from the “tyranny of the majority,” in J. S. Mill’s famous formulation.13
Consider property rights as an instance of this shift. Even though “Democracies [had]
ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property,” as
Madison put it, the entrenchment of property rights is nowadays taken not only
to be consistent with democracy, but often to be necessary for any good-working
democratic system.14 As John Dunn has described it, [n]o one at all in 1750 either
did or could have seen democracy as a natural name or an apt institutional form for
the eﬀective protection of productive wealth. But today we know better. In the teeth
of ex ante perceived probability, that is exactly what representative democracy has
in the long run proved.”15 And, as we shall see in chapter 2, this shift in the scope
and limits of democratic decision-making applied to many other issues, including
representation, constitutionalism, the division of powers or the employment relation-
ship. In a nutshell, the more legitimacy democracy gained and the more democratic
institutions expanded, the more constrained the scope of democratic decision-making
turned out to be.
The upshot of these two trends, both at the political and philosophical lev-
els, is what we usually label as liberal democracy. A political system in which
sovereignty rests on the people and is exercised by the people, either directly or
through their elected representatives, yet the scope of democratic decisions is heavily
constrained by a number of issues that are removed from majority rule and protected
by non-majoritarian bodies, such as constitutional courts and independent central
banks. The two main goals of this dissertation are to historically explain the emer-
gence of these two features of liberal democracy in the case of the Early American
Republic (Part I) and to more normatively analyze two outstanding sorts of liberal
constraints on the scope of democracy—namely, constitutional constraints on demo-
11 J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1942), p. 250.
12 See J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechtes und des
demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992).
13 J. S. Mill, “On Liberty,” in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 18, J. Robson, ed.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
14 J. Madison, “The Federalist no. 10,” in The Federalist, G. W. Carey and J. McCleallan, eds.
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), p. 67.
15 J. Dunn, “Democracy before the Age of the Democratic Revolution,” Paper delivered at
Columbia University, 2003, p. 10.
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cratic legislatures (Part II) and decision-making in the workplace, a sphere that is
taken to be beyond the scope of democracy (Part III).
Part I focuses on the Early American Republic, a period in which the two
above-mentioned trends are outstandingly acute and which world-wide political inﬂu-
ence can be hardly exaggerated. It has two main goals, to which chapter 1 and chap-
ter 2 are respectively devoted. First, to show how democracy, a form of government
that had been despised for more than two thousand years, gained legitimacy and was
increasingly demanded as the fact of disagreement was accepted as an unavoidable
feature of the American society due, among other causes, to the development of the
market economy and the emergence of the ﬁrst and second party systems. Second, to
show that the idea of democracy also went through a dramatic conceptual shift that
made it include a number of elements that had been traditionally seen as constraints
on democracy. This shift helps explain a well-know yet still striking phenomenon.
Namely, that the founders of the American constitutional system openly referred to it
as a non-democratic one and that, only half a century later, virtually everyone—the
heirs of the Federalists included—turned out to refer to very much the same system
as a fully democratic one. In a nutshell, what the Founders meant by “democracy”
in 1787 was not what the term would turn out to mean half a century later. And
the shift also helps explain why a number of limits on the scope of democracy that
will be analyzed in Part II and Part III, and that had been traditionally seen to be
at odds with democracy, turned out to be seen (and are seen nowadays) not only as
consistent with democracy but, in fact, as necessary for any good-working democratic
system.
Part II and Part III more normatively analyze two outstanding instances of such
limits, and show that there are good grounds to call into question the justiﬁcation
of those limits from a democratic standpoint. Even though liberal democracies are
characterized by a large number of spheres that are insulated from the scope of
political decision-making (e.g. religion, sexuality, monetary policy, property rights),
two especially relevant cases are addressed in Part II and Part III—ﬁrst, constitu-
tional constraints on legislative action and, second, decision-making in the workplace.
These two cases are relevant under present circumstances because both constitutional
rigidity and judicial review, on the one hand, and the undemocratic and unpolitical
nature of decision-making in the workplace, on the other, have turned out to be seen
as perfectly natural and legitimate features of our liberal democracies. And they are
relevant to this dissertation because they are both closely related to the period of the
American history studied in Part I. On the one hand, judicial review of legislative
action originated in the Early American Republic—after the Marbury v. Madison
Supreme Court decision of 1803—as a check on democracy that only later turned out
to be considered democratic, as we shall see in section 1.2.2.2. On the other hand, the
employment relationship, which had been traditionally seen as a form of “limited slav-
ery,” as Aristotle put it, turned out be seen as a free and voluntary exchange among
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juridical equals as the market economy expanded in nineteenth-century America and
elsewhere, as we shall see in section 1.3.3.16
Figure 2. Approximate number of countries with a written constitution (A)
compared with the approximate number of constitutional democracies (B).17
Part II will analyze the justiﬁcation of constitutional constraints on legislative ac-
tion—and, more precisely, constitutional rigidity and judicial review—from a demo-
cratic point of view. This is a very pressing issue, given the recent world-wide
expansion of constitutionalism, which has expanded as much as democracy (and ac-
tually more than democracy, as Figure 2 above shows). and that on the reasons for
entrenching institutional arrangements and substantive rights “constitutional theory
remains in a surprisingly primitive state,” as Cass Sunstein has put it.18 Three
prominent attempts to justify constitutional rigidity and judicial review on demo-
cratic grounds are addressed—pure instrumentalist theories, precommitment-based
theories, and proceduralist theories. According to these theories, constitutionalism
need not be at odds with democracy, and is in fact necessary for a good-working
democratic system, because constitutional constraints are necessary to ensure that
democratic procedures bring just outcomes about (chapter 4), or because they are
the upshot of democratic precommitments made by the people themselves (chapter
5), or yet because they set up the procedural rules and preconditions required for
the proper functioning of the democratic system (chapter 6). As Cherie Booth, the
barrister wife of the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, put it,
[R]esponsibility for a value-based substantive commitment to democracy
rests in large part on judges ... [J]udges in constitutional democracies are set
16 Aristotle, Politics, 1260a-b.
17 D. S. Lutz, Principles of Constitutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), p. 4.
18 C. Sunstein, Designing Democracy. What Constitutions Do (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), p. 97.
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aside as the guardians of individual rights ... [and] aﬀorded the opportunity
and duty to do justice for all citizens by reliance on universal standards of
decency and humaneness ... in a way that teaches citizens and government
about the ethical responsibilities of being participants in a true democracy.19
Even though a number of problems of each of these theories will be raised, a problem
common to all of them is that they do not address adequately the fact of disagreement
that, as it should become clear in Part I regarding the American case, turns out to be
a necessary condition of democratic legitimacy. They all assume or end up assuming
that there are a number of political issues that are beyond dispute and that can be
entrenched in a constitutional text and advanced by constitutional means. However,
as it is carefully shown throughout Part II, even though constitutions tend to be
presented as complete contracts which content is beyond dispute, they turn out to
be inevitably pervaded by the fact of disagreement across the board—e.g. at the
drafting stage, as well as during their ratiﬁcation, interpretation, and enforcement.
Even though this problem does not rule out the possibility of these theories being
justiﬁed by other, non-democratic, means, it shows that they cannot be justiﬁed on
democratic grounds.
Part III of the dissertation addresses another outstanding instance in which the
scope of democracy is heavily constrained—namely, decision-making in the work-
place. The possibility of extending democracy to the workplace is especially relevant
to this dissertation because in liberal democracies the workplace is considered a
sphere of voluntary relations among free and equal individuals that falls beyond the
scope of politics. Further, this conception of the workplace as a sphere in which
power relations are absent and employers and employees freely agree to a voluntary
exchange did not emerge until the market economy expanded in nineteenth-century
America and elsewhere, as we shall see in section 1.3.3, turning into dominant ever
since. Hence, in Alchian and Demsetz’s famous description of the employment rela-
tionship,
It is common to see the ﬁrm characterized by the power to settle issues by
ﬁat, by authority, or by disciplinary action superior to that available in the
conventional market. This is delusion ... The ﬁrm ... has no power of ﬁat,
no authority, no disciplinary action any diﬀerent in the slightest degree from
ordinary market contracting between any two people ... Telling an employee
to type this letter rather than to ﬁle that document is like my telling a grocer
to sell me this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread.20
The most prominent arguments for and against workplace democracy will be criti-
cally addressed in chapter 7 of this Part. However, the main contribution of Part III
is to develop a rather original, republican argument for workplace democracy in chap-
19 C. Booth, “The Role of the Judge in a Human Rights World,” Speech to the Malaysian Bar
Association, July 26, 2005. Quoted in R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalim. A Republican Defence
of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 1.
20 Alchian and Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” Amer-
ican Economic Review 62 (1972): 777-795, p. 777.
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ter 8. Since republicanism was the mainstream political philosophy during the Early
American Republic (even though it goes back to Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, and
Harrington, among many other philosophers), this chapter will draw heavily upon
Part I of the dissertation in deﬁning the republican notion of freedom as immunity
from arbitrary interference. The main research question in this chapter is whether
workplace democracy turns out to be a necessary condition if immunity from arbi-
trary interference is to ensured within the ﬁrm. Borrowing ideas from incomplete
contract theory, it will be shown that labor contracts, as well as public attempts
to regulate the workplace by means of labor legislation, are incomplete and thus
open the door to arbitrary interference. Put simply, since it would be impossible
or prohibitively costly for the parties of the employment relationship to make their
contract complete, and for public agencies to completely regulate the relationship,
and since some ﬂexibility is also desirable as to adequately address day-to-day un-
foreseeable eventualities, discretion in the workplace is not only unavoidable but
also desirable. Now, the existence of discretion in the enforcement of employment
contracts and workplace regulation opens the door to disagreement among parties
and to the possibility of arbitrary interference taking place. Thus, if immunity from
arbitrary interference is to be ensured in the workplace, workers are to be given a
say not only at the outset of the employment relationship or over the elaboration
of labor legislation, but also on a daily basis, as the employment relationship goes
along.
Summarizing, as it should be apparent by now, even though the main goal of the
dissertation is to analyze the scope and limits of democracy both historically and
normatively, the three parts in which it is divided are intended to be self-standing and
independent from each other. However, the fact of disagreement and its relationship
with democratic decision-making and democratic legitimacy is common to all of them
and runs through the whole dissertation. In the following sense. Part I of the disser-
tation shows how the fact of disagreement came to be accepted in nineteenth-century
America. And it shows how this acceptance gave way to the crisis of the theory of
virtual representation and to an increasing acceptance of democracy as a means
to make decisions in the face deep disagreements on which course of governmental
action ought to be taken. Put diﬀerently, it shows that the demand for democracy
only triggered once the fact of disagreement had turned to be seen as an unavoidable
and legitimate feature of the American society. As it will be put more analytically
in Part II (sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2), the fact of disagreement turns out to be a
necessary condition of democratic authority being called for, for if all citizens agreed
on what ought to be done across the board, no authority would have to set up in
the ﬁrst place. Thus Part II focuses on how constitutions, which are often presented
as contracts which content is beyond dispute, are unavoidably pervaded by the fact
of disagreement across the board. Accordingly, it argues that there is no reason to
insulate constitutional rules from democratic decision-making by ordinary citizens
and their representatives by means of rigidity and judicial review. Finally, Part III
shows that the workplace, a sphere that is usually taken to be beyond the scope of
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politics, is equally pervaded by the fact of disagreement and provides an argument
for its democratization based on the republican notion of freedom as immunity from
arbitrary interference.
In the remainder of the Introduction, I summarize the main arguments of the
three parts of the dissertation in some detail.
Part I: Democracy
Part I of the dissertation analyzes the use of the term “democracy” in the Early
American Republic from its rather derogatory sense in the constitutional period
to its widely-assumed positive one in the 1830s. It is divided into two chapters,
which respectively account for the two above-mentioned trends. Chapter 1 provides
an explanation for the increasing support of the term, along with the institutional
devices traditionally attached to it. Chapter 2 shows that, besides the increasing
acceptance of the term, the very concept of democracy and its scope also shifted—and
reconstructs the early and later concepts of democracy.
A striking feature of the American constitutional system is that its framers openly
referred to it as a non-democratic one. The Federalists not only blamed “democ-
racy—a Beast without a head ... the Mob ruling.” They also conceived the Federal
Constitution as a means “to restrain” and “to keep down the turbulence of democ-
racy.”21 Not less striking is that, only a few decades after the ratiﬁcation of the Fed-
eral Constitution, virtually everyone—the heirs of the Federalists included—turned
out to refer to very much the same system as a fully democratic one. Thus Jeﬀerson
would conclude in 1826 that “We of the United States ... are constitutionally and
conscientiously democrats.”22 How could it be that a constitutional system formerly
known as nondemocratic had turned in less than half a century into the democratic
system par excellence?
This part of the dissertation shows that, once we realize of the commonly deroga-
tory sense of the term “democracy” in the 1780s, it should not come with surprise
that the Federalists hesitated to use the term to label the political system they were
putting forward. Likewise, we should not be surprised by the fact that virtually
everyone referred to very much the same system as a democracy ﬁfty years later,
when the term gained a widespread positive sense and was used as a battle-cry by
Andrew Jackson ﬁrst and the Whig Party next. Thus Part I focuses on the two main
trends behind this shift, which are analyzed in detail in chapter 1 and chapter 2.
Chapter 1 will show that, despite its rather derogatory sense in the 1780s, the
term “democracy”—along with some of the institutional devices traditionally at-
tached to it—gained increasing support as soon as ordinary people became increas-
ingly aware of the plurality of interests and values across the American society, orga-
nized themselves to advance such interests and the theory of virtual representation
used by the Federalists in the 1780s gradually lost its political eﬃcacy. According to
21 W. Hooper, quoted in F. Dupuis-Deri, The Political Power of Words: The Birth of
Pro-Democratic Discourse in the 19th century in the United States and France (PhD diss., Uni-
versity of British Columbia, 2001); R. Morris, in M. Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), vol. 1, pp. 58 and 517.
22 Quoted in Dupuis-Deri, The Political Power of Words, p. 227.
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the theory of virtual representation, the society was an organic body with a common
set of interests and values that were beyond particular interests and factions. Thus,
however excluded from actual political decision-making, all members of the political
community were represented—if not actually, virtually—by their taking part in such
shared interests and values of the community. Now, as the nineteenth century wore
on, ordinary people became more aware of the plurality of interests and values in
the American society, organized themselves to advance such interests and values,
and virtual representation lost great part of its credibility. Accordingly, actual rep-
resentation through suﬀrage extension and other devices traditionally attached to
democracy were increasingly demanded, and “democracy” lost part of its derogatory
sense and gained wider support.
The chapter is in two sections. Section 1.2 analyzes in detail the theory virtual of
representation, which was hegemonic during the revolution and its aftermath. The
theory can be divided into three tenets—the organicist tenet, the ruling elite tenet
and the independence tenet—, which are analyzed in turn. First, the organicist tenet
is analyzed and its pervasive use is showed during the revolutionary war, during the
so-called “critical period,” and during the Federal convention of 1787. Second, the
ruling elite tenet is analyzed, according to which political decisions should be made
only by those with the expertise and impartiality required to let aside their factional
interests and to represent the organic interests of the community. The alleged rea-
sons behind the ruling elite tenet are analyzed, along with the main institutional
means put forward so as to enact it. Third, the independence tenet is analyzed,
according to which only those who are materially independent (which was identiﬁed
with owning real estate) are impartial enough to represent the organic interests of
the community rather than their particular ones. The three main reasons used to
justify this requirement are analyzed—put brieﬂy, freedom from inﬂuence by those
on whom otherwise it was likely to depend, having the leisure time required to get
informed about and take part in politics, and having a “stake in society” so as to
have proper incentives to take part in politics responsibly. As Kant would put it by
the same time, “[t]he only justiﬁcation required by a citizen ... is that he must be
his own master (sui iuris), and must have some property ... to support himself.”23
Section 1.3, in turn, analyzes the crisis of the three tenets of the theory of virtual
representation and how it made “democracy” lose part of its derogatory sense. First,
three causes are found behind the crisis of the organicist tenet—the development
of the market economy, the inﬂuence of the French revolution and the subsequent
creation of democratic societies across the country, and the emergence of the ﬁrst and
second party systems. Second, the crisis of the ruling elite tenet was to great extent
substituted by the idea that ordinary people rather than impartial experts ought to
be elected, and that institutional devices ought to be enacted so as to ensure that
23 I. Kant, “Über den Gemeinspruch: das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht
für die Praxis,” in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, Königlichen Preußischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, ed. (Walter De Gruyter: Berlin, 1923). Quoted from I. Kant, “On the Common
Saying: ’This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice’,” Political Writings, H.
S. Reiss, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 78.
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representatives were held responsive to the interests of their constituencies. Finally,
two causes are found behind the crisis of the independence tenet. First, that wage
laborers—which wages had been traditionally taken to be “a pledge of the their
slavery,” as Cicero had put it—were now taken to be materially independent, and
thus as worth being granted full citizenship, because they were considered to be
owners—owners of their own labor force, which they were able to freely exchange in
the market.24 Second, because it was increasingly believed that all members of the
political community were worth being granted full citizenship, despite them being
materially independent or not. In short, the combination of all these factors made
the theory of virtual representation lose credibility and democracy, in turn, gain
respectability.
Chapter 2 will show that, besides its increasing acceptance, “democracy” also
went through a notable semantic shift during the decades after the ratiﬁcation of
the Federal Constitution. Although some features of the concept of democracy—and
some of the institutional devices associated to it—remained the same, some others
shifted. This helps explain why the Federalists believed that the representative gov-
ernment they were putting forward was not only diﬀerent from democracy but in
fact a very check against it. As Bernard Manin puts it, “for Madison, representa-
tive government was not one kind of democracy; it was an essentially diﬀerent and
furthermore preferable form of government.”25 And it also helps explain why, only
some decades later, virtually everyone referred to very much the same system as an
openly democratic one. In a nutshell, what the Federalists meant by “democracy”
in the 1780s is not exactly what the term turned out to mean half a century later.
Likewise, the institutional devices attached to the former concept were not the same
as those attached to the latter concept and, in fact, many of the institutional devices
that had been traditionally seen as constraints on democracy turned out to be seen
not only as consistent with democracy but also as necessary for any democratic
system proper.
The chapter is in two sections. Section 2.2 brieﬂy traces the evolution of the
concept from its rather derogatory sense in the 1780s to its virtually undisputed
positive one ﬁfty years later. It does so by analyzing three key steps. First, the
inﬂuence of the classic republicanism of Aristotle, Polybius, and Cicero—on which
the Founders had been intellectually raised—over their conception of democracy.
Second, Jeﬀerson’s presidency and the explicit debate among Pennsylvania Jeﬀer-
sonians over the meaning and implications of democracy. And, ﬁnally, Jacksonian
democracy and the second party system, in which democracy was used as a battle-cry
for the very ﬁrst time. Next, section 2.3 compares the early and the later concepts
as for ﬁve outstanding issues—representation and popular sovereignty, feasibility,
property rights, stability and the division of powers. As we shall see, the shift in the
concept of democracy regarding these issues helps explain why only a few decades
24 Cicero, De Oﬁciis, W. Miller, trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913), I.
XLII.
25 B. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), p. 2.
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after the ratiﬁcation of the Federal Constitution virtually everyone could refer to
very much the same constitutional order as an openly democratic one. As William
Duane wrote to Jeﬀerson in 1824, “Democratic government is no longer Jacobinism;
and those who formerly reprobated now use the language and profess the doctrine
they reviled twenty four years ago.” A “revolution in speech,” as Duane labeled it,
had been produced.26
Part II: Constitutionalism
Part I of the dissertation shows, among other things, how some of the devices that
were originally designed as checks on democracy turned out to be considered not only
as consistent with democracy, but also as necessary for any good-working political
system. Part II focuses on two of the above-mentioned devices—constitutional rigid-
ity and judicial review—and on the very notion of constitutionalism, which recent
world-wide expansion can be hardly exaggerated. In 1802 no constitutional system
proper existed in the world, and in 1978 only 26 percent of constitutions provided for
a constitutional court. By contrast, 101 out of the 106 constitutions ratiﬁed between
1985 and 2008 have included constitutional courts with ﬁnal powers of review of the
legislative action.27
This part is divided into four chapters, which analyze—and criticize—in detail
the most salient normative theories of constitutional democracy. According to these
theories, constitutionalism—including constitutional rigidity and judicial review of
legislation—need not be at odds with democracy, either because constitutional con-
straints are necessary for democratic procedures to bring about just outcomes, such as
the protection of human rights or the improvement of the economic output (chapter
4), or because they are the upshot of commitments that actual citizens have made
democratically (chapter 5), or yet because they set up the procedural rules and
preconditions required for the proper functioning of the democratic system (chapter
6).
Before turning to analyze these theories, chapter 3 provides the analytical back-
ground used throughout Part II. Constitutionalism is deﬁned as the limitation of
the powers of the legislative body entrenched in a rigid document and enacted
through judicial review. Section 3.2 brieﬂy presents the history of constitutional-
ism, compares it with absolutist constitutionalism, the Westminster model of par-
liamentary sovereignty, and the so-called “new commonwealth” model of constitu-
tionalism, and describes the two main sorts of constraining provisions of democratic
decision-making—substantive provisions and procedural ones. In turn, section 3.3
brieﬂy analyzes the diﬀerence between written constitutions and constitutional con-
ventions, along with the role of the latter in constitutionalism.
26 William Duane, “Letter to Jeﬀerson, October 19, 1924,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts
Historical Society 20 (1906-1907), 381-383, p. 382.
27 The ﬁgures come from D. L. Horowitz, “Constitutional Courts: A Primer for Decision Mak-
ers,” Journal of Democracy 17 (2006): 125-137; and A. Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Rights,
and Judicial Power,” in Comparative Politics, D. Caramani, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008).
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The remainder of the chapter analyzes the two main institutional devices of
constitutionalism—constitutional rigidity and judicial review. Section 3.4 deﬁnes
constitutional rigidity as the greater stringency of the constitutional amendment
procedure in contrast to the ordinary legislative procedure, being this stringency
a necessary condition for the normative supremacy of the constitution and, thus,
for constitutionalism. It presents the speciﬁc devices used to enact rigidity and
discusses in some detail the classic philosophical problem of whether a sovereign can
really bind itself for, as Hobbes put it, “he that can bind can release.”28 Put simply,
it is argued that under non-ideal circumstances, constitutional constraints do pose
costs and constraints on ordinary decisions made by the people and the state, and
that it is naive to believe that they do not impose costs at all—just as it is to believe
that constitutions are all-powerful institutional devices. Finally, section 3.5 analyzes
judicial review, which is deﬁned as the authority of courts to assess the constitu-
tionality of legislation, including the ability to decline to apply statutes, to modify
the eﬀect of their application so as to make them compatible with the constitution,
and, in the limit, to strike them down altogether. The section distinguishes strong
from weak judicial review, American-style from European-style judicial review, and
analyzes its eﬀectiveness in the light of the empirical evidence that shows that, on
average, constitutional courts tend not to make decisions against the public opinion.
Chapter 4 addresses instrumentalist theories of democratic legitimacy and their
justiﬁcation of substantive constitutional constraints. According to these theories,
that update the organicist view analyzed in Part I, democratic decision-making has
legitimate authority if and only if it brings about a set of substantive and pre-political
goals, such as the protection of fundamental rights, economic growth, or the stability
of the political system. Thus a trade-oﬀ between constitutionalism and democratic
legitimacy need not arise, for the legitimacy of democracy rests exclusively in its
ability to achieve some substantive goals that are entrenched in the constitution
and thus advanced by constitutional means. The chapter opens by setting up the
structure of instrumentalism in section 4.2, and turns next to two prominent in-
strumentalist accounts of the legitimacy of constitutionalism—namely, that it helps
democratic decision-making protect fundamental rights and that it improves the eco-
nomic output of the system. Finally, the following three problems of instrumentalism
are presented.
Section 4.3.1 argues that instrumentalism is unable to address Wollheim’s para-
dox—the puzzling fact that many citizens whole-heartedly observe the existing legal
order while at the same time considering that many of its laws are blatantly unjust.
Put more formally, the paradox presents a citizen X who both believes that Policy
A ought to be enacted (because A is her preferred option) and that policy B, which
is incompatible with A, ought to be enacted (for she is a democrat and B is the
option backed by the majority). Two previous solutions to the paradox are criti-
cally analyzed—the Rousseauian solution and the Hobbesian solution—and a novel,
two-level solution is put forward. According to this solution the above-mentioned
28 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, R. Tuck, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 184.
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beliefs can be consistently held because they provide an answer to two very diﬀerent
normative questions—namely, to “what ought to be done” and to “what ought to be
done provided that we disagree on what ought to be done and that, nevertheless, we
have to take a common course of action.” Next, it is shown that, once we accept the
two-level solution, pure democratic instrumentalism turns out to be an incomplete
normative account of political authority, for it is unable to address why citizens often
consistently hold not only the former belief but also the latter one.
Section 4.3.2 elaborates on the criticism presented at the end of the previous
section—that pure instrumentalist theories of democratic legitimacy turn out to be
self-defeating because they do not address adequately the existing disagreements on
which outcomes are to be achieved through democratic procedures. It is divided
into ﬁve subsections. The ﬁrst four ones deﬁne the circumstances or politics—which
arise when there is a need for a binding collective agreement on a uniﬁed course
of action yet the parties disagree on which precise course of action ought to be
taken—, along with the scope, causes and implications of such circumstances. The
last subsection explains why pure instrumentalism turns out to be self-defeating
under the circumstances of politics. As Waldron has put it, “any theory that makes
authority depend on the goodness of political outcomes is self-defeating, for it is
precisely because people disagree about the goodness of outcomes that they need to
set up and recognize an authority.”29
Finally, section 4.3.3 shows that pure instrumentalism turns out to be too radical
an account of political legitimacy when we consider it from the point of view of actual
citizens, who tend to take into account not only the outcomes of political decisions
but also the fairness of the procedures employed to bring such outcomes about.
The section reviews the social psychology literature on the topic, which appears to
converge on the centrality of procedural fairness for the perceived legitimacy of the
decisions made.
Chapter 5 analyzes precommitment-based theories of constitutional constraints,
which are justiﬁed for being the upshot of an actual decision made by citizens them-
selves. Thus from a precommitment-based standpoint, constitutional constraints
need not be at odds with democracy when they are adopted—through the use of
equal voting and (perhaps qualiﬁed) majority rule—by those citizens against whom
such constraints are to be enforced, and only by them. As Hayek put it, “Only
a demagogue can represent as ’antidemocratic’ the limitations which long-term de-
cisions and the general principles held by the people impose upon the power of
temporary majorities.”30 The chapter is divided into three sections. First, the struc-
ture of democratic precommitments is outlined. Second, Ackerman’s account of
dualist democracy is presented as the most elaborated and inﬂuential instance of
29 J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 253.
30 F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp.
106-107.
23
a precommitment-based approach.31 Finally, ﬁve diﬃculties of this approach are
analyzed.
Section 5.4.1 argues that precommitment-based theories fall into a categorial
confusion, for political arrangements—including constitutional constraints—do not
turn into any more democratic just because they have been chosen by democratic
means, for a majority of citizens could democratically pass blatantly undemocratic
constitutional provisions without such provisions turning into democratic for that
reason.
Section 5.4.2 analyzes the much-cited analogy between collective commitments
to constitutional rules and individual commitments to personal rules. This is a very
powerful analogy, for self-constraining decisions tend to be seen as more autonomous
than unconstrained ones. As Montesquieu famously put it, “political liberty does not
consist of doing what one wants ... liberty cannot be other thing but to be able to
do what one ought to want.”32 However, the analogy does not hold because, unlike
individual commitments, collective commitments made in constituent moments are
pervaded by the fact of disagreement, at least, for three reasons. First, because if
a consensus existed qualiﬁed majorities could be used for the ratiﬁcation of con-
stitutions, yet simple majority tends to be used, which shows that constitutional
commitments may not always enjoy a wider consensus than ordinary statutes during
ordinary politics. Second, because the circumstances under which constitutions are
adopted or amended (e.g. transition from autocratic regimes, economic crisis, civil
wars) tend not to be the better ones for citizens to leave such disagreements aside.
And, third, because the stakes are too high—due to the immeasurable impact and
hardly amendable nature of constitutions—for parties to let aside their particular
interests. Rather than giving way to wider consensus in which the people speak with
a uniﬁed voice, constitutional moments are better depicted as bargaining processes
and constitutions as equilibria.
Section 5.4.3 shows that, even if fragile equilibria among disagreeing parties,
constitutions can still be democratic commitments as long as the resulting equilibria
are adopted by a majority of citizens. However, it is shown that failures to meet
these criteria are usual both along synchronic and diachronic lines. Three types of
failures are analyzed among the former are analyzed in this section. First, when a
minority of citizens imposes their interests in the constitution against a majority of
their fellow citizens. Second, when a majority of citizens, even a qualiﬁed one, wants
to amend the constitution yet is unable to do so because the amendment is never
carried out or is blocked by the political elites. And third, when an external agent
is able to impose their interests in the constitution against those of the citizenry as
a whole, as it happened to Japan in the aftermath of World War II.
In turn, section 5.4.4 analyzes additional failures to meet the above-mentioned
criteria—only that now across generations. As Thomas Paine pointed out, “Every
31 B. Ackerman, We the People. Foundations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1991).
32 C.-L. Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, Laurent Versini, ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), p.
325.
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age and generation must be free to act for itself, in all cases, as the ages and gen-
erations which preceded it.”33 Accordingly, for a constitution to be fully democratic
across generations founding and amendment costs ought to be symmetric. That is,
the existing provisions ought to be amended by the subsequent generations provided
that the amendment enjoys the support of a majority. However, there is an asym-
metry between adopting and amending a constitution, both formally and informally.
Formally, because, as a general rule, constitutions only require simple majorities for
their ratiﬁcation yet qualiﬁed majorities for their amendment. Informally, because
constitutions tend to be much more resilient to change than what is formally speci-
ﬁed, among other phenomena that are analyzed, due to path dependence, status quo
biases, and the expressive function of law. Further, even though it may be just for
subsequent generations to assume the costs of the burdens assumed by the founding
generation as much as they assume their beneﬁts, from a democratic point of view
what counts is whether such generations can amend the constitution by means that
are not more stringent than those of the adoption process. However, this symmetry
does not apply.
Finally, chapter 6 analyzes proceduralist theories of constitutional constraints.
According to these theories, democratic institutions cannot be said to be really
democratic in the absence of a set of constitutive conditions (e.g. “general elections,
freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of speech,” as Rosa Luxem-
burg put it criticizing the suspension of civil liberties by the Russian Bolsheviks) and
preconditions (e.g. “decent wages and universal reading,” as John S. Mill put it).34
Further, it is also argued that, unless entrenched in a rigid constitution and enacted
by a constitutional court, such conditions and preconditions can be jeopardized by
temporary parliamentary majorities that can gerrymander, disenfranchise minorities,
or ban opposing parties and media. In short, unless constitutionally constrained,
ephemeral parliamentary majorities can downsize or even destroy democracy from
within.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 6.2 brieﬂy analyzes the much
cited instance of a democratic system allegedly destroyed by democratic means—namely,
the fall of the Weimar Republic in the hands of the Nazis. As Goebbles himself liked
to tell, “[i]t will always be one of the best jokes of democracy that it gives its deadly
enemies the means to destroy it.”35 Section 6.3 analyzes preconditions-based theories
of constitutionalism, more speciﬁcally, the rather standard account of Holmes and
Sunstein and Habermas’ more peculiar one, according to which “[a] constitutional
court guided by a proceduralist understanding of the constitution does not have
to overdraw on its legitimation credit.”36 Section 6.4 presents John H. Ely’s (and
33 T. Paine, “The Rights of Man,” Political Writings, B. Kuklick, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), p. 63.
34 Luxemburg is quoted in C. E. Schorske, German Social Democracy, 1905-1917: The Devel-
opment of the Great Schism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 324. Mill is
quoted in Przeworski, Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, p. xiii.
35 J. Goebbles, quoted in A. S. Kirshner, “Proceduralism and Popular Threats to Democracy,”
Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2010): 405-424, p. 405.
36 J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Quoted from J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms,
W. Rehg, trans. (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1996), p. 279.
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Stephen Holmes’, though more brieﬂy) “participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing”
approach to judicial review as the most inﬂuential instance of a purely procedural
account of constitutionalism.37 Ely’s main argument is that courts are provided
with a better institutional position vis-à-vis legislatures to ensure the fairness of the
political process because elected oﬃcials are judges in their own cause when having
to ensure that the political market remains fair and competitive, for they have a
clear incentive to use their position while they are in oﬃce to increase their political
power. By contrast, appointed judges are less prone to conﬂicts of interests of this
sort because their permanence in oﬃce does not depend on the political cycle (even
more when they enjoy life-long tenure).
Four criticisms of proceduralist theories are raised next. Section 6.5.1 argues that
preconditions-based accounts fall into the paradox of preconditions pointed out by
Carlos Nino.38 Put brieﬂy, the more issues are constitutionally entrenched, the better
democracy functions, yet the less issues are left for citizens to decide. And, conversely,
the more issues are left for citizens to decide, the less issues are constitutionally
entrenched and the worse democracy functions. Section 6.5.2 analyzes the view
according to which, although disagreements are inherent to substantive political
issues, they need not pervade the decision-making procedures used to deal with such
disagreements. However, it shown that such disagreements do pervade procedures
at the levels of preconditions, procedures, and values behind procedures. Section
6.5.3 analyzes Stephen Holmes’ conception of constitutions as constitutive rules. In
this view, while substantive rules are regulative and may constrain the exercise of
the democratic power, procedural rules are constitutive—they create and organize it.
We cannot make democratic decisions without democratic rules, just as we cannot
play chess without the rules of chess. However, Holmes’ argument falls into a non
sequitur. Put simply, even though procedural rules are certainly necessary (say,
electoral rules) to arrive at democratic decisions, there is no reason why such rules
ought to be entrenched in a rigid constitution, enacted by courts and be amendable
only by very cumbersome means. Section 6.5.4 closes the chapter by analyzing
Ely’s argument about the more adequate institutional position of courts vis-à-vis
legislatures. The US Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore is analyzed and it is
conluded that, as part of the political system, Supreme Court justices are aﬀected
as much as legislatures by the way the political system is organized and how power
is allocated—let alone the fact that they tend to disagree with each other as much
as MPs and citizens do, as their use of majority rule to reach decisions shows.
Part III: The workplace
Part III of the dissertation analyzes the extension of democratic decision-making
to the workplace, a sphere that is usually taken to be beyond the scope of democracy.
It is divided into two chapters. Chapter 7 introduces and deﬁnes the main forms
37 J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust. A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard
University Press, 1980); S. Holmes, “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy,” in Consti-
tutionalism and Democracy, J. Elster and R. Slagstad, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988).
38 C. S. Nino, La constitución de la democracia deliberativa (Barcelona: Gedisa, 1997).
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of workplace democracy (WD), and reviews the core arguments for and against
this form of managerial organization. Chapter 8, in turn, puts forward an original,
republican case for WD. Since republicanism was the mainstream political philosophy
during the Early American Republic (even though it goes back to Aristotle, Cicero,
Machiavelli, and Harrington, among many other philosophers), this chapter heavily
draws upon Part I of the dissertation.
Chapter 7 provides the analytical and normative framework used throughout
this part. Section 7.2 deﬁnes WD as a form of managerial organization in which a
majority of workers, though not necessarily only them, have equal control rights over
the management of the ﬁrm, and distinguishes between control rights by capital or by
labor and between public and private ownership of the ﬁrm. In the remainder of the
section I focus on private democratic ﬁrms, which are controlled by workers (rather
than by capital) and are privately (rather than publicly) owned. Next, a further dis-
tinction is made based on whether democratic ﬁrms are owned by external investors
or by workers themselves (who may ﬁnance collective asset ownership through debt
contracting or by drawing upon their own savings). The German co-determination
system and cooperativism are taken as the most outstanding instances of the former
and the latter alternatives, and are carefully deﬁned in sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.
Section 7.3 reviews the main arguments for and against WD in some detail. Sec-
tion 7.3.1 tackles its feasibility, considering that the proposal is not in the agenda,
that it does not seem to be supported by workers themselves, and that there may be
more pressing issues right now. Section 7.3.2 addresses a number of eﬃciency-based
arguments for WD (greater eﬀort and information-sharing, lower unemployment out-
put, and better vertical and horizontal monitoring), as well as against WD (greater
decision-making costs, diﬃculties to attract external capital and to diversify invest-
ment, and likely free-riding due to common ownership in large democratic ﬁrms).
In addition, three potential eﬀects of WD are analyzed—over workplace security,
over workers’ political apathy, and over the raising political inﬂuence of corpora-
tions. Sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.4 address in some detail the so-called “epistemic” and
“propertarian” arguments against WD, respectively. According to the former, why
should workers be granted a say when they often lack the expertise required to
make informed decisions about institutions as complex as ﬁrms? According to the
latter, why should workers be granted control rights over the ﬁrm when they are
not its owners? Finally, section 7.3.5 critically analyzes Bowles and Gintis’ theory
of contested exchange, which they use to make a case for WD.
Chapter 8 focuses exclusively on the republican case for WD. Section 8.2 deﬁnes
the republican notion of freedom in contrast to its liberal counterpart—namely, as
immunity against arbitrary interference. Next, section 8.3 shows the forms of ar-
bitrary interference that are likely to appear in the ﬁrm and the problems of two
competing views to WD in addressing them—ﬁrst, that the availability of an exit
option alone ensures workers’ freedom from arbitrary interference and, second, that
ensuring this sort of freedom requires workplace regulation but not WD.
Section 8.3.1 analyzes the exit option argument. According to this argument,
27
in free and competitive markets (and with a proper welfare system, would more
socialdemocratic versions add) workers’ right to quit serves as an ever-present threat
against any ex post managerial decision that could lead to arbitrary interference and
abuse, ruling out the possibility of arbitrary interference taking place. Three objec-
tions are raised. First, both imperfect and perfect labor markets have involuntary
unemployment—an “industrial reserve army,” to use Marx’s famous expression—,
which in turn makes it costly for workers to quit (since they would not be in a
position to ﬁnd another job easily). Second, even if labor markets cleared, there are
additional exit costs, such as workers’ investment in developing ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital, searching and transition costs, and the psychological costs in quitting work
altogether—work being a relevant source of self-respect in itself in capitalist societies.
Third, even if exit were completely costless, job alternatives could still be as despotic,
unregulated and arbitrary as their current job, in which case the exit option would
be of little value.
In turn, section 8.3.2 analyzes the so-called workplace constitutionalism (WC).
Unlike the exit option argument, WC does not attempt to grant workers the right
to costlessly quit, but is rather aimed at regulating the workplace and at setting
clear and speciﬁc standards to which managers have to conform in the exercise of
their authority, thus reducing their discretion and ability to interfere at will and
turning WD into unnecessary. Two concerns are raised. First, WC does not pre-
vent workplace regulation from being arbitrary itself, for it does not guarantee that
workers’ interests are taken into account in its drafting and passing. Second, WC
does not prevent workplace regulation from being arbitrarily enforced to particular
cases and unforeseeable contingencies typical of the economic activity in a complex
economy, since it does not guarantee that workers’ interests are taken into account in
the process of enforcement. As the Spanish Count of Romanones, an early-twentieth
century liberal Minister, put it, “let others do the law, and I will write the rules.”
Section 8.4 puts forward the republican case for WD as straightforward as possi-
ble. From a civic republican standpoint, citizens’ active and continued political par-
ticipation is required not because the political sphere “is the realm where freedom
is a worldly reality,” as Hannah Arendt (and more recently, many communitarian
political philosophers) put it,39 but in order to ensure their own immunity from
arbitrary interference. This is so for at least two reasons—to ensure that law does
not turn into arbitrary itself and to ensure that it is not arbitrarily enforced. Both
reasons apply to labor law. Thus workplace regulation can turn into arbitrary itself
unless those against whom it is enforced also enjoy and exercise the right to inﬂuence
its drafting. Likewise, workplace regulation can be arbitrarily enforced unless those
against whom it is enforced also enjoy and exercise the right to inﬂuence its enforce-
ment. Put simply, since it would be impossible or prohibitively costly for the parties
of the employment relationship to make their contract complete and some ﬂexibility
is also desirable as to adequately address day-to-day unforeseeable eventualities, WC
39 H. Arendt, “What Is Freedom?,” in Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books,
1993), p. 154.
28 Introduction and summary
turns out to be insuﬃcient. Workers are thus to be given a say not only at the outset
of the employment relationship but also as the relationship goes along. The section
closes by discussing two potential objection to WD—namely, that WD adds little to
WC, for in WC workers already enjoy control rights at the political level and that
institutional devices other than WD, such as judicial litigation or unionism, may
often better ensure workers’ immunity from arbitrary interference.
Section 8.5 closes the chapter by analyzing the separation of control rights and
ownership of the ﬁrm from a republican standpoint. The section goes back to the
relationship between ownership and full citizenship presented in Part I, section 1.2.3
of the dissertation. It is conluded that WD requires not only workers’ control but also
workers’ ownership of the ﬁrm due to bargaining power asymmetries and moral haz-
ard problems arising from the formal separation of ownership and control rights. Ac-
cordingly, it is argued that cooperativism is ceteris paribus preferable to other forms
of WD in which ownership and control rights are separated, such as co-determination.
Part I
Democracy

Chapter 1
From demophobia to demophilia
Part I analyzes the shift in the use of the term “democracy” in the early American
Republic—from its rather derogatory sense in the constitutional period to its widely
assumed positive one in the 1830s. The present chapter provides an explanation for
the increasing support of the term, along with the institutional devices attached to it.
In turn, chapter 2 shows that, besides the increasing acceptance of the term, its very
meaning also shifted—and reconstructs the early concept and the later concept. It
shows that the later concept turned out to include a number of institutional devices
that had been traditionally considered to be constraints on democracy and only later
came to be seen not only as consistent with democracy but actually as necessary for
any good-working democratic system. This helps explain why the founders of the
American constitutional system openly referred to it as a non democratic one and
why, by 1830, virtually everyone turned out to refer to very much the same system
as a fully democratic one. In a nutshell, what the Founders meant by “democracy”
in 1787 was not identical to what the term turned out to mean half a century later.
1.1. Introduction
A well-known but still striking feature of the history of the American constitu-
tional system is that its framers openly referred to it as a non-democratic one. The
Federalists did not only blame “the turbulence and follies of democracy,” which “have
ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible
with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in
their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.”1 But they also conceived the
Constitution as a means “to restrain” and “to keep down the turbulency of democ-
racy.”2
Not less striking is that, only a few decades after the ratiﬁcation of the Constitu-
tion, virtually everyone—the heirs of the Federalists included—turned out to refer to
very much the same system as a fully democratic one. “Democracy ... more especially
designates our government than republic,” stated the Jeﬀersonian Aurora in 1802.3
And by 1830, as Tocqueville reported, most Americans claimed that their country
1 J. Madison, in M. Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1911), vol. 1, p. 51 and “The Federalist no. 10,” in The Federalist, ed. G.
W. Carey and J. McCleallan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), p. 46.
2 R. Morris, in Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1, pp. 58
and 517.
3 Aurora, September 18, 1802.
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was a democracy.4 In a letter written right before passing away in 1826, Jeﬀerson
declared that “We of the United States ... are constitutionally and conscientiously
democrats.”5 Even the Whig Party celebrated the American democracy and called
themselves the “true democrats” in 1840.6 How could it be that a constitutional
system formerly known as non-democratic had turned in less than half a century
into the democratic system par excellence?7
Part I of the dissertation argues that, once we realize of the derogatory sense of
the idea of democracy—along with the institutional devices commonly attached to
it—in the 1780s, it should not come with surprise that the Federalists hesitated to
use the term to label the political system they were putting forward. It is obviously
the case that most Federalists were not democrats even according to our current
standards. But it is diﬃcult to understand why they were so categorically opposed
to democracy until we understand what “democracy” meant at their time.8 Likewise,
we should not be surprised by the fact that virtually everyone referred to very much
the same system as a democracy ﬁfty years later, when the term turned out to have
a positive sense and was used as a battle-cry by Andrew Jackson ﬁrst and the Whig
Party next. Such an increasing acceptance of the term is also showed by the use of the
term in the press, which increased dramatically during this period. As Morantz has
shown, no newspaper had “democrat,” “democratic” or “democratic-republican” in its
title before 1800. By contrast, no less than 202 newspapers used the term “democrat”
in their titles between 1820 and 1850.9 Of course, this shift still leaves open why
the term had a derogatory sense in the 1780s and why it became so positive just a
few decades later. A number of political, social, ideological and rhetorical reasons
lie behind the shift. This Part of the dissertation focuses on two of them, which are
analyzed in detail in this chapter and the next one.
The present chapter will show that, despite its rather derogatory sense in the
1780s, the idea of democracy, along with the institutional devices traditionally at-
tached to it, gained increasing support as soon as ordinary Americans accepted
the fact of disagreement at the levels of both interests and values, organized them-
selves to advance such interests and values, and the theory of virtual representation
used by the Federalists in the 1780s gradually lost its political eﬃcacy.10 Accord-
4 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2002).
5 Quoted in F. Dupui-Deri, The Political Power of Words: The Birth of Pro-Democratic
Discourse in the 19th century in the United States and France (PhD diss., University of British
Columbia, 2001), p. 227.
6 J. Giddings, quoted in Regina Ann Morkell Morantz, “Democracy” and “Republic” in Amer-
ican Ideology, 1787-1840 (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1971), p. 259.
7 Exceptions to this consensus existed indeed—just as they do nowadays. See e.g. Robert A.
Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution? (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 2001).
8 Throughout the chapter, “democracy” in inverted commas refers to the term; without inverted
commas, in turn, to the institution and/or concept.
9 Morantz, “Democracy" and "Republic" in American Ideology, pp. 164-165.
10 The expression “the fact of disagreement” comes from Jeremy Waldron, and is part of the
so-called “circumstances of politics,” which are two. First, the need for a binding collective agreement
on a uniﬁed course of action due to the fact that all aﬀected parties would be better-oﬀ than if
no agreement was reached. And, second, the existence of a persistent disagreement on which
precise course of action ought to be taken, i.e. the fact of disagreement. See J. Waldron, Law
and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 101-106. The relationship between the
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ing to the theory of virtual representation, however excluded from actual political
decision-making, all members of the political community were represented—if not
actually, virtually—by their taking part in the shared interests of the community,
which was seen as an organic unity. So, as the market economy evolved, ordinary
people became aware of their idiosyncratic and plural interests and values, started
organizing themselves to advance such interests, and virtual representation became
less credible. In turn, as pluralism of interests and values and political partisanship
were accepted as inevitable and legitimate, representation through suﬀrage exten-
sions and other institutional devices traditionally attached to democracy were in-
creasingly demanded, and “democracy” lost part of its derogatory sense and gained
wider support.11 Even though most Americans—notably, women, blacks, American
natives and paupers—would have to wait long for the franchise, the state constitu-
tional conventions called during the 1820s, ’30s and ’40s partially answered to this
claims.
In addition, chapter 2 will show that, besides its increasing acceptance, the term
also went through a notable semantic shift during the decades after the ratiﬁcation
of the Constitution. In the colonial period the term had been rarely used, and had
a mainly technical sense inherited from the undemocratic branch of the classical
republican tradition of political thought in which the revolutionary gentry had been
intellectually raised. So, when the term began to be more widely used in the 1780s,
this classic sense still had a great inﬂuence, and the Federalists were very successful
in using it to label and criticize the institutional devices of some of the state consti-
tutions of the 1770s, to warn against the events occurred during the so-called critical
period of the 1780s and to discredit the position of the Antifederalists regarding
the ratiﬁcation of the Federal Constitution. This use would go through a dramatic
change in the subsequent decades, not only because of the increasing acceptance of
the idea of democracy, but also due to the shift of the very idea of democracy. This
shift occurred, in turn, due to both its adaptation to changing circumstances and
its rhetorical uses (and abuses) by diverse political actors, as we shall see in section
2.2. As William Duane would write to Jeﬀerson in 1824, “Democratic government is
no longer Jacobinism; and those who formerly reprobated now use the language and
profess the doctrine they reviled twenty four years ago.” A “revolution in speech,” as
Duane labeled it, had been produced.12
Although some features of the concept of democracy—and some of the institu-
tional devices associated to it—remained the same, some others shifted. This shift
helps to explain why the Federalists believed that the representative government
fact of disagreement and democratic legitimacy is more analytically analyzed in section 4.3.2 of the
dissertation.
11 As Robert Dahl points out, no president of the U.S. referred to the American political
system as a democracy in his innaugural address until William Henry Harrison in 1841—they used
“republic” instead. By contrast, in his innaugural addresses, Franklin Delano Roosevelt used the
terms “democracy” or “democratic” twnety times and “republic” not once. Reagan and the ﬁrst
Bush used both terms equally, while Clinton and the second Bush used only “democracy.” R. Dahl,
“James Madison: Republican or Democrat?,” Perspectives in Politics 3 (2005): 446-447.
12 William Duane, “Letter to Jeﬀerson, October 19, 1924,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts
Historical Society 20 (1906-1907), 381-383, p. 382.
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they put forward was not only diﬀerent from democracy but in fact a check against
it, and why, only half a century later, virtually everyone turned out to refer to very
much the same system as an openly democratic one. As Bernard Manin puts it,
“for Madison, representative government was not one kind of democracy; it was
an essentially diﬀerent and furthermore preferable form of government.”13 In short,
what the Federalists meant by democracy was not exactly what the term turned out
to mean half a century later. Likewise, the shift helps to explain why a number of
limits on the scope of democracy that will be analyzed in Part II and Part III, and
that had been traditionally seen to be at odds with democracy, turned out to be
seen (and are seen nowadays) not only as consistent with democracy but, in fact, as
necessary for any good-working democratic system.
This chapter and the next one analyze these two phenomena respectively—namely,
the increasing acceptance of the idea of democracy, on the one hand, and the shift
in the very idea of democracy, on the other, along with the main events behind the
two shifts. After this introduction, section 1.2 reconstructs the theory of virtual rep-
resentation and its relationship with the anti-democratic rhetoric during the 1780s.
Section 1.3, in turn, shows the challenges to this theory and the reasons why actual
representation obtained more support as the nineteenth century progressed and thus
“democracy” turned from being despised to being cherished.
1.2. Virtual representation
This section reconstructs the theory of virtual representation used by many Fed-
eralists to support the central and strong Federal government endorsed in the Consti-
tution and to justify some of its institutional provisions. It also states the relationship
between this theory and the anti- and pro-democratic rhetoric during the 1780s. In
its bare bones, the theory of virtual representation can be outlined in the following
steps:
(A1) Organicist tenet : A political community is an organic entity with a com-
mon set of interests.
(A2) Ruling elite tenet : Political decisions should be made only by those with
the expertise and impartiality required to let aside their private, factional
interests and to represent the shared interests of the community.
(A3) Independence tenet : Not all members of the community have this abil-
ity—notably, those who are materially dependent do not. Nevertheless,
even though they are excluded from actual political decision-making, the
latter are also represented—if not actually, virtually—by their taking
part in the shared interests of their community.
As we shall see in Part II of the dissertation, the two ﬁrst tenets of the theory still
have considerable appealing nowadays, notably, when a political issue is claimed to
be beyond dispute and is insulated from ordinary parliamentary decision-making and
13 B. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), p. 2.
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is entrenched in a rigid constitution that is enforced by judges with ﬁnal powers of
review. The section reconstructs these steps in turn.
1.2.1. Organic society
The theory of virtual representation was much older than the American revolu-
tion, as we have seen above in the Introduction. But it gained a renewed inﬂuence
when the Stamp Act triggered colonial opposition in 1765 and several English pam-
phleteers and politicians set out to justify taxation of the colonies. Their aim was
to reply the colonial claim that taxation was unfair unless consented through parlia-
mentary representation—“no taxation without representation,” in the famous phrase
attributed to James Otis. One line of argumentation stood out. According to it, the
colonies were already represented, if not actually, virtually, by their being part of the
British empire, and thus sharing a common interest with the rest of it. As John P.
Reid has stated, “virtual representation [would be], in the ﬁrst part of the revolution-
ary controversy, the chief legal argument made by imperialists contending not only
that the colonies were bound but also that they were represented in Parliament.”14
Most British citizens were not actually represented in the parliament either, or so
the argument went. But that was because they were already represented virtually,
as the colonists were. The former included not only women and children, but also
an overwhelming majority of adult men. These included the owners of land held
in copyhold rather than freehold, the inhabitants of large boroughs such as Leeds,
Manchester, Halifax and Birmingham that had not been granted franchise, and the
owners of personal property rather than real estate, as well as merchants, manufac-
turers, and other individuals engaged in commerce who might be rich but did not
qualify as electors.15 In an attempt to reduce ad absurdum the claims of the colonies,
Thomas Whateley claimed that
the inhabitants of Leeds, of Halifax, of Birmingham, and of Manchester,
Towns that are each of them larger than the Largest in the Plantations ...
none of them chuse their representatives; and yet are they not represented
in the Parliament? Is their vast Property subject to Taxes without their
Consent?16
According to Watheley,
The Colonies are in exactly the same Situation ... none are actually, all are
virtually represented; for every Member of Parliament sits in the House, not
as representative of his own Constituents, but as one of that august Assembly
by which all the Commons of Great Britain are represented.17
14 J. P. Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 50.
15 See Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 52.
16 Thomas Whateley, The regulations Lately Made concerning the Colonies and the Taxes Im-
posed upon Them, considered (London: J. Wilkie, 1765), p. 107.
17 Ibíd., p. 109
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Note that Watheley’s argument has two diﬀerent parts. First, the function of the par-
liamentary representatives was not to represent the factional interests of the diﬀerent
subjects under the Crown, but to represent their common interests. Second, Ameri-
can colonists shared such interests with the rest of the English subjects. Conclusion:
No particular subject needed to be actually represented because all were virtually so
already. Demanding actual seats in the Parliament and voting rights was therefore
irrelevant. Thus, it is not surprising that, as Wood puts it, “the English defenders of
virtual representation should have denigrated the electoral process by which members
were sent to Parliament. Election in and by itself was not what gave the member
his representative power.”18
The colonists immediately and forcefully rejected the British claim. Some revolu-
tionary leaders even rejected the idea of virtual representation altogether by arguing
that representation ought to be “direct and actual,” as it was often the case in colo-
nial assemblies.19 However, not all of them rejected the theory altogether. On the
contrary, many did accept that, in a country with a common set of interests, the
function of the assemblies was to represent these common interests. That is, they
accepted the ﬁrst part of Whateley’s argument for virtual representation. And they
also assumed that American colonies shared a set of common interests with each
other. What they challenged is the second part of Whateley’s argument, that is,
whether these common interests were coincident with the British ones—which, as
the colonial rebellion progressed, they increasingly thought not to be the case.
Once the British had imposed tax burdens over the colonies that had not imposed
over their own territories, it became clear that the allegedly common interests were
often no more than the particular interests of the British territories. Hence, it was
easy for the rebellious leaders to argue that, even though the organic society was
valid, the tenet did not apply to the relationship between Britain and the colonies
and, accordingly, that the colonies were neither actually nor virtually represented in
the British parliament any longer. As the voters of Salem, Massachusetts resolved,
“if in any sense we are supposed to be represented [in the British parliament] most
certainly it is by such only as have an interest in laying burthens upon us for their
own relief.”20
In short, the uprising against the Crown did not only leave the organicist tenet
18 G. S. Wood, The Creation of the American republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, NC: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1969), p. 175.
19 Baylin also recalls that “there was no theoretical basis for such direct and actual represen-
tation. It had been created and was continuously reinforced by the pressure of local politics in
the colonies and by the political circum- stances in England, to which the colonists had found it
necessary to send closely instructed, paid representatives-agents, so called-from the very beginning.”
Yet some other revolutionaries tried to block the analogy between non-represented British counties
and the colonies by arguing that, unlike the latter, the former had at least the chance to inﬂuence
the decisions made in the House of the Commons and to have actual representatives once their
estate was above the statutory qualiﬁcation—i.e., that it was not the case that non-elected British
counties were not or could not be to some extent actually represented. See B. Bailyn, “Political
Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth-Century America,” The American Historical
Review 67 (1962): 339-351, p. 347; and Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the
American Revolution, pp. 53-62.
20 Quoted in Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution, p.
62.
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unchallenged in the colonies, but actually reinforced the sense of unity among them.
To be sure, the increasing appeal to some allegedly common interests of the colonies
was part of the revolutionary rhetoric aimed at mobilizing the people against a
common enemy. But it helped to justify the existence of a strong set of shared
interests—beyond merely having a common enemy. Likewise, it helped to justify the
sharp distinction between representatives and their constituencies on the basis that
the role of the former was to represent the common interest of the confederation
rather than the particular interests of each constituency. Among the events that
triggered the renewed use of the theory—now, by the former colonists—three stand
out: The so-called critical period, the democratization of the legislatures during the
1770s and 1780s, and the call for a Federal constitutional convention. They are
analyzed in the remainder of the section in turn.
1.2.1.1. The critical period
Even though it might have been partially exaggerated, the so-called critical period
of the American history had two salient eﬀects for present purposes.21 First, it
brought back the use of the term “democracy” to the daily political jargon—through
the continuous condemns of the democratic excesses of the period—and, second, it
served as a rationale for the call for a constitutional convention in which the delegates
would pervasively appeal to the organicist tenet—along with the more broad theory
of virtual representation. A number of economic and political incidents characterized
the period, such as the instability of the state laws, the weakness of the foreign trade
of the Confederation, the increasing conﬂicts among the states, or the printing of
paper money in many states. As Madison wrote to Jeﬀerson, “the evils issuing from
these sources contributed more to that uneasiness which produced the Convention,
and prepared the public mind for a general reform”22 For the moment, let us focus
on the issue of the paper money schemes.
The issue had triggered in the mid-1780s, when a large number of farmer yeomen
who had got themselves into debt were prosecuted and jailed for default in payment.
This was not a new phenomenon indeed, but its frequency raised dramatically in
this period. As Roberto Gargarella reports, “just in the county of Hampshire (be-
tween 1784 and 1786), 2,977 yeomen were brought to trial by their creditors (which
represented an increase of more than 200 percent of the trials happened in a similar
period, between 1770 and 1772). Even worse, in Worcester 4,000 trials occured just
in 1785.”23
21 The label comes from J. Fiske, The Critical Period of American History (Boston and New
York, The Riverside Press, 1888). Fiske’s account has not gone without critiques though. According
to Charles Beard, for example, the critical period was nothing “but a phantom of the imagination
produced by some undoubted evils which could have been remedied without a political revolution”.
However, one need not go so far to accept, as Wood does, that it is “diﬃcult to look back at the
period and not feel that the pessimism and apprehension so widely expressed did not in some way
exaggerate the real problems of the 1780’s.” See C. A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States (New York: MacMillan, 1913) and Wood, The Creation of the
American Republic, p. 395.
22 James Madison to Thomas Jeﬀerson, October 24, 1787, in Ralph Ketchman, ed., The Selected
Writings of James Madison (Indianapolis, Heckett, 1996), p. 80.
23 R. Gargarella, La justicia frente al gobierno. Sobre el carácter contramayoritario del poder
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The situation was dramatic for many ordinary people who had fought in the war,
partly encouraged by promises of future prosperity, and now were seeing themselves
in a critical economic position—if not in jail. Hence, many of them began asking the
state legislatures to print paper money to alleviate their condition. At ﬁrst, most
state assemblies hesitated to do so and, as a consequence, many petty debtors orga-
nized themselves and eventually some rebellions triggered in Northampton, Tauton,
Concord and elsewhere—being Shays’ rebellion, which was leaded by a former colonel
in the revolutionary army, the most outstanding one. But, eventually, some state
assemblies—namely, those of Pennsylvania, South and North Carolina, New York,
Georgia, New jersey and Gerogia—began paying attention to the demands of these
groups of debtors, in part to avoid new rebellions, and passed laws for the printing
of paper money. Furthermore, in Rhode Island Jonathan Hazard, who had served as
the spokesperson of the debtors, was appointed as state governor. In short, the state
legislative assemblies were serving as an eﬀective means for the interests of small
debtors—often even with them being elected and having a seat in such assemblies.
As Wood points out, now “it was the very force of the laws of the states, not anarchy
or the absence of law,” which was making the demands of debtors be met.24
As of mid-1770s the state legislatures had been gradually democratized. As
Main and Bailyn have pointed out, during the colonial period even ordinary people
believed that representatives ought to be “men of birth and fortune, [who] should be
invested with power, and enjoy higher honours than the people,” as a Williamsburg
radical newspaper stated in 1768.25 Not only did an overwhelming majority of the
representatives (at least eighty ﬁve percent of them) belong to the wealthiest ten
percent of the population (those whose property was valued at more than £ 5,000).
But also, when given the right to vote, ordinary people also tended to elect members
of the wealthy elite.26 This had already changed dramatically by 1774, when popular
participation increased and was channeled through the various provincial congresses
and other extralegal organizations.27 In turn, this shift had endogenous eﬀects, for
the more ordinary people began taking part in public aﬀairs, the more they wanted
to do it and the better organized they were. Hence, when thousands of debtors
judicial (Barcelona: Ariel, 1997), p. 21. The references to the critical period in this section rely
heavily on his account.
24 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 406.
25 Even if inmediately before had been said that laws were “for the people, and not the people
for the laws.” Quoted in J. T. Main, “Government by the People: The American Revolution and
the Democratization of the Legislatures”, The William and Mary Quarterly 23 (1966): 391-407, p.
392.
26 See Main, “Government by the People”, pp. 393 and 397. The degree of enfranchisement
had been much larger in the colonies than in England (and larger in New England than in the
southern colonies). By the 1760s an average of 60 percent of adult white men could vote in the
colonies. See A. Keyssar, The Right to Vote. The Contested History of Democracy in the United
States (Philadelphia: Basic Books, 2009), p. 7.
27 According to Main, several reasons explain this shift. First, legal prohibitions on artisans and
farmers sending representatives to the colonial assemblies did not apply to the extralegal congresses.
Second, these congresses were much larger. Third, the interior areas had no real upper class, so they
had no choice but to send men of moderate property to these assemblies. And ﬁnally, as the war
went on, many ordinary people got involved in politics and gained fame. “Voters were ceasing to
elect only men of wealth and family [and] more and more often chose ordinary yeomen or artisans.”
Main, “Government by the People,” p. 404.
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were prosecuted and jailed, many ordinary people began putting pressure on the
legislative assemblies, and the latter eventually agreed to their demands and began
issuing paper money.
Consider now the relationship between these events and the derogatory use of
the idea of democracy. The increasing participation of ordinary people in the leg-
islatures during the revolution had been a frightening experience “not only to the
conservative-minded leaders of the colonies, but to many of the popular leaders
as well.”28 However, when this participation gave way to conﬁscations of property,
suspensions of the ordinary means for the recovery of debts, and paper money
schemes—with the skyrocketing inﬂation produced as a result—, the revolutionary
gentry began talking about a new form of despotism—“democratic despotism,” in
John Adams famous expression. For many, as for James McHenry of Maryland in
1787, America was suﬀering the “disorders of a democracy.”29
Among those who denounced the democratic disorders of the 1780s, many be-
lieved that they were not only due to the increasing participation of ordinary people
in the legislatures but also because of the very structure of the revolutionary state
constitutions, which provided insuﬃcient checks for the legislative assemblies. As a
general rule, they referred to the constitutions of Pennsylvania, Georgia, Vermont,
New Hampshire and Rhode Island, which were considered the more democratic ones.
“Look at the legislature of Rhode Island!,” claimed a politician of that period. “What
is it but the perfect picture of a mob.”30 Yet only in Georgia, Vermont and Pennsylva-
nia would prevail the unicameral legislative branch, which was seen as the democratic
and thus threatening part of the state constitutions. According to McHenry,
Our chief danger arises from the democratic parts of our constitutions. It
is a maxim which I hold incontrovertible, that the powers of government exer-
cised by the people swallows up the other branches. None of the constitutions
have provided suﬃcient checks against the democracy.31
For present purposes, it is important to note that democracy was identiﬁed solely
with the legislative branch. Hence, the more radical state constitutions fueled the
anti-democratic concerns because they were said to have all-powerful legislatures.
Among these, Pennsylvania was the obvious reference, since its constitution was
not only unicameral but also lacked the checks required to control its democratic
part.32 Parliaments were taken to be democratic because they were very represen-
28 M. Jensen, “Democracy and the American Revolution”, The Huntington Library Quarterly
20 (1957): 321-341, p. 328.
29 Quoted in Dupuis-Deri, The Political Power of Words, p. 82.
30 Quoted in Dupuis-Deri, The Political Power of Words, p. 88.
31 Quoted in Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1, pp. 26-27.
32 Apart from having a one-house legislature to be appointed annually, bills could not come into
force until, after having publicized throughout the colony, was discussed and voted in the following
session. The executive was plural, formed of a twelve-person Council, elected for three-year terms,
with one-third rotating every yearand rotation required; no one could serve more than four years
in seven.A Council of Censors popularly elected, and with a seven-year term, was to review the
constitutionality of laws. Other oﬃcials such as justices of the peace, sherrifs and militia oﬃcers
were popularly elected every year. There were no property qualiﬁcations and suﬀrage was open to
all male taxpayers.
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tative of the factional interests of ordinary citizens due to their very nature—they
included hundreds of members and were designed to address disagreement and diver-
sity, ideological confrontation and conﬂict of interests. As Walter Bagehot described
the House of Commons in 1867, “Here are 658 persons, collected from all parts of
England [sic], diﬀerent in nature, diﬀerent in look and language.”33 By contrast,
courts or unipersonal executives were considered to be more independent from such
interests and, accordingly, more suitable to represent the common interests of the
country. For that reason—rather than because democracy was associated with other
parts of the constitutions or with the constitutions as a whole (see infra, §2.3.5)—,
William Hooper of North Carolina could state that Pennsylvania was a “execrable
democracy—a Beast without a head ... the Mob ruling.”34
The problem with these constitutions was not that they lacked representativeness,
but rather the contrary—that they were too representative of the particular inter-
ests of ordinary people. For those who assumed that the American society was an
organic entity with a common set of interests and that the function of the legislative
assemblies was to pursue these interests, rather than the particular interests of the
diverse factions of the society, it was the case that “a spirit of locality” was destroying
“the aggregate interests of the community.”35 The “excess of democracy,” as Elbridge
Gerry from Massachusetts would put it in the Philadelphia Convention, was seriously
jeopardizing the organicist tenet.36
The excessive factionalism of local assemblies and state parliaments was the prob-
lem, for which the strong and centralized government of the Federal Constitution
would be the solution for the Federalists. Hence, in a letter to his friend Lafayette
in May 10, 1786, Washington would write that “It is one of the evils of democratic
governments, that the people, not always seeing and frequently misled, must often
feel before they can act right ... [but] I am not without hopes, that matters will take
a more favorable turn in the foederal Constitution.”37
1.2.1.2. The Federal Constitution
The Federalists were very concerned about the increasing presence of factions—which
Madison deﬁned as a “number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minor-
ity of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion,
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggre-
gate interests of the community.”38 These concerns are clear in Madison’s frequent
references in the Philadelphia Convention to the plurality of interests between the
states, which “have diﬀerent interests and are ignorant of each other’s interests,” be-
tween “the Northern and Southern,” between “the Aristocratic and other,” between
“the landed interest, and the commercial including the stockholders” or, as famously
33 W. Bagehot, quoted in J. Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), p. 34.
34 Quoted in Dupuis-Deri, The Political Power of Words, p. 89.
35 G. S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1991),
p. 251.
36 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol 1., p. 48.
37 Quoted in Dupuis-Deri, The Political Power of Words, p. 91.
38 Madison, “The Federalist no. 10,” p. 44.
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stated in his Federalist no. 10, between “those who hold, and those who are without
property, [who] have ever formed distinct interests in society.”39
But the position of the Federalists in the Philadelphia Convention and the rat-
iﬁcation process was that, despite the increasing factionalism, the states shared a
common set of interests diﬀerent from their factional ones and that a properly de-
signed constitution could overcome the latter by setting a central and autonomous
public authority strictly aimed at the pursue of this common interest. As Wood
points out, contrary to what is sometimes claimed, “Madison and the Federalists
. . . were not modern-day pluralists. They still clung to the republican ideal of
an autonomous public authority that was diﬀerent from the many interests of the
society.”40
Perhaps no document other than Hamilton’s Federalist no. 35 expresses bet-
ter the organic tenet that the Federalists embraced. According to Hamilton, the
interdependency of the parts of the society made absurd the idea of actual repre-
sentation—in which each faction was to appoint and instruct its own representatives
(see infra §1.3). This would be so even from the point of view of the members of the
factions, which would be perfectly well represented through virtual representation.
As an instance of this, he wrote, mechanics and manufacturers
will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to mer-
chants, in preference to persons of their own professions or trades. Those
discerning citizens are well aware, that the mechanic and manufacturing arts
furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise and industry. Many of them,
indeed, are immediately connected with the operations of commerce. They
know that the merchant is their natural patron and friend; and they are
aware, that however great the conﬁdence they may justly feel in their own
good sense, their interests can be more eﬀectually promoted by the merchant
than by themselves ... We must therefore consider merchants as the natural
representatives of all these classes of the community.41
And the same applied to the case of great and petty landowners, whom Hamilton
took
to be perfectly united, from the wealthiest landlord, down to the poorest
tenant. No tax can be laid on land which will not aﬀect the proprietor of
thousands of acres, as well as the proprietor of a single acre. Every landholder
will therefore have a common interest to keep the taxes on land as low as
possible; and common interest may always be reckoned upon as the surest
bond of sympathy.42
As it has been admitted before, the Federalists used the organicist tenet strategically
to deny the Antifederalist demands for actual representation and to advance the
39 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1, pp. 166, 486, 461 and 152;
Madison, “The Federalist no. 10,” p. 44
40 Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, p. 253.
41 A. Hamilton, “The Federalist no. 35,” in The Federalist, p. 170.
42 Hamilton, “The Federalist no. 35,” in The Federalist, p. 170.
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centralized government and the sharp separation between representatives and their
constituents they were for.43 But, however opportunistically used in part, the open,
intensive and very successful uses of the tenet show its widespread acceptance and
normative appeal at that time—an acceptance and appeal that, for reasons exposed
below (infra, §1.3.1), would decrease dramatically in just a few decades.
True, many of the institutional devices proposed—notably, in the Virgina plan—and
some of the ﬁnally adopted ones did not diﬀer much from the ones included in some
of the state constitutions—notably, in the Constitution of Massachusetts drafted by
John adams and approved in 1780. The main innovation introduced by the Federal
Constitution was, rather, that it would reduce dramatically the power of the state
assemblies by transferring a substantial part of it to the federal level. That, in turn,
would make much more diﬃcult for local demands to exercise their inﬂuence over
the political decision-making process. In addition, the amendment the constitution
would be made very cumbersome.
Hence, the Constitution would both transfer key powers to the Federal level and
forbid the states to take actions in a number of fundamental issues. On the one hand,
exclusive power was given to the Congress regarding monetary and ﬁscal policies,
the declaration of war or the raising of national military forces. On the other hand,
states were explicitly prohibited from printing bills of credit, coining anything other
than “gold or silver coin” legal tender for payment of debts, passing laws aﬀecting
the obligation of contracts, imposing taxes on imports or exports or entering into
bilateral agreements (either with each other or with other countries).44
These were issues over which the democratic excesses of the critical period had
been said to have a larger inﬂuence, and they were now under the sole authority of
the Federal government. Interestingly, the Federalists saw this transfer as a key move
away from democracy toward republicanism. “Pure democracy,” Madison famously
warned, “can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.”45 By transferring these
issues from the state level to the federal level, decisions were now guarded from both
“factious leaders” and “the confusion of a multitude.”46 The question now was, of
course, who would qualify to make those decisions instead of the “multitude.”
1.2.2. Ruling elitism
Once the existence of a common set of interests among the states and the advance-
ment of such interests as the proper function of the government had been assumed, it
was required that decisions be made by those with the ability to put aside their fac-
tional interests and pursue such common interests. In Madison’s words, the Federal
government had to be ruled by “some disinterested and dispassionate umpire,” who
could overcome the “disputes between diﬀerent passions and interests in the State”
43 In the case of Hamilton this is especially likely, for he embraced a much more realistic social
ontology than, say, Madison. See T. P. Govan, “The Rich, the Well-born, and Alexander Hamilton,”
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 36 (1950), pp. 675-680.
44 On the the system of check and balances, the relationship between representatives of the
various branches and the people and the devices to ensure accountability, see infra §1.2.2.
45 Madison, “The Federalist no. 10,” p. 46-47.
46 Madison, “The Federalist no. 10,” p. 46-47.
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and could replace the “speciuous, interested designing men,” “men, respectable nei-
ther for their property, their virtue, nor their abilities” that were standing in public
aﬀairs.47 These men would not only represent the organic interests of the nation.
They would also represent such interests better than citizens themselves, for if given
the opportunity the latter would be driven by factional interests and particular val-
ues. Hence, in contrast to a democratic government, a republican government would
not be deﬁned so much by “the total exclusion of the representatives of the people
from the administration of the former,” but rather by “the total exclusion of the
people, in their collective capacity, from any share in the latter ”48
Obviously, the ruling elite tenet did not go without challenge, as it will become
clear below in section1.3.2. But for now, let us make clear the case put forward
by the Federalists, along with the institutional devices aimed at ensuring the rule,
independence, and control of this elite.
1.2.2.1. The case for a ruling elite
The factionalism originated by the “excess of democracy” of the 1770s and 1780s,
as Gouverneur Morris referred to it, served as the main rationale for the demand of
qualiﬁed and unbiased representatives put forward in the Philadelphia Convention
and the ratiﬁcation process. Many were the issues that the Federalists associated to
this factionalism. Among them, the commercial weakness abroad and the insecurity
of Western states at home due to the military powerlessness of the Confederation,
the skyrocketing inﬂation produced by the paper money schemes, the threats to
private property due to the weak authority of the central government, the pervasive
vetoing of the amendments of the Articles of the Confederation by the states, and so
on. The Federalists believed that this factionalism was due to a number of reasons
that could be eradicated through the limitation of the exercise of government to a
ruling elite of impartial and expert representatives. Three of these reasons stand out.
A. Reasons relative to the representatives themselves. As we have already seen (supra,
§1.2.1.1), more and more local and plain men had been seating in the state assemblies
from the mid-seventies onward. These men, or so the argument went, were advanc-
ing the local and short-term interests of their constituencies—and thus pervading
the state assemblies with a “spirit of factionalism” that was contrary to the national
public interest. In order to prevent this factionalism and to “reﬁne and enlarge the
public view,” it was required to pass these interests, as Madison famously put it,
“through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern
the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be
least likely to sacriﬁce it to temporary or partial considerations.”49 For two reasons.
First, a dispositional reason—to have representatives with interests diﬀerent from
those of their constituencies. Second, an epistemic one—to have representatives with
the country-scale and long-term political knowledge required to take into account the
47 Quoted in Wood, The Creation of the American republic, pp. 474 and 477.
48 Madison, “The Federalist no. 63,” in The Federalist, p. 329, italics in the original.
49 Madison, “The Federalist no. 10,” in The Federalist, p. 46.
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wider interests of the country.
B. Reasons relative to the relationship between representatives and their constituen-
cies. According to the Federalists, the state legislatures were too dependent on their
constituents, and thus unable to pursue interests other than local interests. Even if
the proper men—i.e. men with interests diﬀerent from their constituencies and with a
country-scale political view—were often elected, their impartiality and independence
were undermined by a set of institutional arrangements that were in need of reform.
(“Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still
have been a mob,” had written Madison.)50
Consider just three among them. First, the proximity between state legislatures
and ordinary people who, as Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts declared, “[did] not
want virtue.”51. Second, the large number of seats in the legislatures—for “the more
you enlarge the body, the greater chance there is, of introducing weak and unqualiﬁed
men,” as it was addressed to Connecticut.52 Or, as Madison put it, “the more multi-
tudinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake of the
inﬁrmities incident to collective meetings of the people.”53 Third, the pervasive use
of instructions by many local assemblies, which had been a rather common practice
since the colonial period.54.
C. Reasons relative to the relationship between legislatures and other branches of gov-
ernment. In addition to the former two problems, the legislatures were believed to be
too unchecked in many states—most notably, in Pennsylvania (see supra, §1.2.1.1).
And so they were the representatives seating on them who had way too many in-
centives to exceed their authority and control other branches of the government. As
Gouverneur Morris claimed, “The ﬁrst branch, originating from the people, will ever
be subject to precipitancy, changeability, and excess. Experience evinces the truth
of this remark without having recourse to reading.”55
Through which precise devices did the Federalists propose to eradicate this phe-
nomena it will become clear in the section immediately below. For the moment,
it is enough to point out that they could openly and successfully put forward the
idea of a virtuous elite of experts as the general solution for the problem of locality
and factionalism. And that this openness is diﬃcult to understand—moreover, in
an era of democratic revolutions, as Robert Palmer called it,56 in which the old
social hierarchies were supposedly vanishing—without taking into account the sense
of social deference still dominant in the immediate aftermath of the revolution (on
this, see infra §1.3.2.3).
50 Madison, “The Federalist no. 55,” in The Federalist, p. 288.
51 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vo. 1, p. 48.
52 Quoted in Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 512.
53 J. Madison, quoted in J. Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1999), p. 32.
54 See Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution, ch. 8.
55 Quoted in Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, vol. 1, p. 517.
56 R. R. Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1959-1964).
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To be certain, the Federalists enjoyed a number of organizational and economic
resources that the Antifederalists did not. For example, they controlled most newspa-
pers, of which only one dozen supported the anti-Federalist cause.57 This asymmetry
of resources dramatically improved the prospects of the Federalists in the ratiﬁcation
process, as wells as their ability to advance their agenda. However, even though the
Revolution had a profound impact on the understanding of social hierarchy, three
facts show how powerful the demand for impartial and qualiﬁed representatives was.
Firstly, the Federalists could openly set out their ruling elitism, which would have
been strategically unwise if this elitism had a bad press. Moreover, they could do
it even though the ratiﬁcation of the Constitution needed the support of nine out
of thirteenth state legislatures, and these legislatures were supposedly formed by
the plain people that the Federalists had denounced for being inexpert and locally
biased. Finally, as it will become clear below in section1.3.2, the same elitist language
could no longer be used just a few decades later, which shows that, regardless of how
successful the elitist tenet was in absolute terms, it was very successful in relative
terms.
1.2.2.2. Institutional devices
The dispositional account put forward by the Federalists was not a static one.
They did not defend that members of the elite were virtuous ex hypothesi. Quite
on the contrary, according to Madison, they were motivated in variable degrees
by ambition, personal interest and the public good—of which “the two ﬁrst” were
unhappily “proved by experience to be most prevalent.”58 Thus, the Federalists were
well aware of the ever-present threat of corruption, as Pocock has pointed out.59
However, they also believed that a properly designed constitution would reduce the
inﬂuence of the two ﬁrst motivations and give way to the third one. This goal could
be achieved (a) by ensuring that proper candidates were elected as representatives,
(b) by keeping representatives as separated as possible from the short-term and
factional interests of their constituencies, and (c) by designing a system of checks
and balances that would control potential abuses of any branch—and most notably,
of the legislative branch—over other branches of government. As Hume—an author
whim whom the Federalist were very familiar—had famously put it, “If separate
interests be not checked, and not be directed to the public, we ought to look for
nothing but faction, disorder, and tyranny from such government.”60 Similarly, as
Madison would state it in his Federalist no. 51, “you must ﬁrst enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”61 Through
which precise devices though?
As for the discussion over the quality and independence of the representatives,
57 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 498.
58 Quoted in Neal Riemer, “James Madison’s Theory of the Self-Destructive Features of Re-
publican Government,” Ethics 65, no. 1 (Oct., 1954), 34-43, p. 35.
59 See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, chapter 15.
60 D. Hume, “Of Parties in General,” in Perspectives on Political Parties, S. E. Scarrow, ed.
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).
61 Madison, “The Federalist, no. 51”, in The Federalist, p. 269.
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suﬀrage qualiﬁcations, the prohibition of binding instructions, and long-term oﬃce
holding stand out. Regarding suﬀrage qualiﬁcations, it was argued that limitations
on suﬀrage had to be provided, and that these had to aﬀect both passive and active
suﬀrage.
A. Pasive suﬀrage. Even though property qualiﬁcations for eligibility were proposed
for the Congress, the quality and independence of the representatives was eventually
achieved by enlarging the size of the electoral districts and by reducing the size of
the two chambers of the Congress. By downsizing electoral districts, said Madison,
“you render [representatives] unduly attached to [the local circumstances and lesser
interests of their constituents], and too little ﬁt to comprehend and pursue great
and national objects.”62 Large electoral districts, on the contrary, separated rep-
resentatives from of their electors, and their local and short-term interests, making
it easier to focus on the long-term interests of the country. However, large districts
also made much more diﬃcult for plain people to run for oﬃce, as the Antifederalists
immediately protested. In small electoral districts no great resources were needed
to run for oﬃce, since it was likely for the candidate to be already well known by
the electorate. In large districts, by contrast, running for oﬃce was only available in
practice for those who had the economic resources and spare time required to cam-
paign. The same logic applied also to the size of the legislatures. Thus a maximum of
one representative for every thirty thousand (article 1, section 2 of the Constitutions)
was endorsed in the Constitution.
B. Active suﬀrage. Property qualiﬁcations were also proposed—e.g. by Governeur
Morris, who proposed that only land owners should be granted voting rights. Madi-
son agreed with Morris in principle.63 However, he recalled that freeholders had pre-
cisely elected most of the state assemblies which democratic excesses they attempted
to check now.64 Furthermore, he also suggested, in response to a similar proposal,
that “landed possessions were no certain evidence of real wealth [since] many enjoyed
them to a great extent who were more in debt than they were worth.”65 Finally,
the great diversity of suﬀrage qualiﬁcations among the states made it diﬃcult for
the delegates to arrange an unitary suﬀrage disposition on which all the states could
agree. Accordingly, delegates eventually decided that members of the House of Rep-
resentatives ought to be elected by electors having “the qualiﬁcations requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature” (art. 1, section 2 of
the Constitution). Qualiﬁcations were limited thus to those already in force in each
state not so much “due to reasons of principle, but of expediency,” as Manin points
62 Madison, “The Federalist no. 10,” in The Federalist, p. 47.
63 “Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the safest
depositories of Republican liberty,” in Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol.
2, p. 203.
64 For further problems with limiting property qualiﬁcations to land ownership, see infra
§1.3.3.1.
65 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 2, p. 123.
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out.66
C. Binding instructions of the constituents. Even though the practice of instructing
representatives had been a common practice in the colonies,67 it was categorically
ruled out in the Philadelphia Convention. This practice, said Noah Webster, rested
on the belief that “the constituents, on a view of their local interests ... or very imper-
fect information, are better judges of the property of a law, and of the general good,
than the most judicious men are ... after attending to the best oﬃcial information
from every quarter, and after a full discussion of the subject in an assembly, where
clashing interests conspire to detect error and suggest improvement.”68 In short,
binding instructions were contrary to the very idea of a ruling elite of representatives
in three senses. They denied (a) that they knew better than ordinary electors, (b)
that they were independent from them and, (c) that they had the capacity to change
their minds through public deliberation.
D. Term in oﬃce. Proposals for long and, in some cases, life-long terms aimed
at ensuring the independence of the representatives were made. As for the House
of Representatives, the Antifederalists had appealed to the Whig motto that “when
annual elections end, tyranny begins” to denounce two-years terms. Madison replied
in the Federalist no. 53 justifying the length of the House of Representatives terms
not only as a guarantee for the independence of the congressmen but also as neces-
sary to enable them to acquire the “knowledge of the subjects on which [they are]
to legislate.”69 As for other chambers, though, Federalist did propose not only that
Supreme Court justices had life-long appointments—which was ﬁnally included in
the Constitution—, but also the presidency and the senate. “The second branch
ought to be composed of men of great and established property—an aristocracy,”
claimed Robert Morris. “And to make them completely independent they must be
chosen for life, or they will be a useless body. Such an aristocratic body will keep
down the turbulency of democracy.”70
Regarding the system of checks and balances, the control and limitation of the
democratic branch—the House of Representatives—pervaded the discussion. Al-
though the threat of a tyranny of the few—i.e. of the British Crown—had dominated
the debates during the revolution, now the threat of a tyranny of the many replaced
it. As Robert Dahl pointed out, “Neither at the Constitutional Convention nor in the
“Federalist Papers” is much anxiety displayed over the dangers arising from minority
tyranny; by comparison, the danger of majority tyranny appears to be a source
of acute fear”71 A system of checks and balances—rather than a mere separation
66 Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, p. 107.
67 See Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution, chapter 8.
68 N. Webster, “Government. The Practice of Instructing Representatives Absurd and Contrary
to the True Principles of Liberty,” American Magazine 1 (1787-188), p. 206.
69 Madison, “The Federalist no. 53,” in The Federalist, p. 278.
70 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1, p. 517.
71 R. Dahl, A Preface to Democractic Theory, expanded ed. (Chicago and London: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 9.
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of powers, as Madison put it in the Federalist no. 48 criticizing Jeﬀerson and the
Constitution of Virginia—was required to balance the democratic tendencies of the
House of Representatives. A number of such checks were discussed but, for the sake
of brevity, let us mention only three of them—the senate, the presidency, and judicial
review of legislation.
E. The senate. The upper chamber of the Congress was conceived as accomplishing
two tasks. First, it was to represent proprietors’ interests in a speciﬁc chamber. As
Abraham Baldwin of Georgia said, the task of the Upper House “ought to be the
representation of property.”72 Second, it was supposed to check the potential abuses
of the ﬁrst chamber. “In tracing these evils to their origin every man [has] found it
in the turbulence and follies of democracy,” said Madison, and he added that “some
check therefore [is] to be sought for agst. this tendency of our Governments [and] a
good Senate [seems] most likely to answer the purpose.73 Hence, the senate was not
only considered a non-democratic institution but, actually, a check on democracy.
Edmund J. Randolph also insisted that it was required “such a check as to keep
up the balance, and to restrain, if possible, the fury of democracy.”74 And Robert
Morris concluded that
the second branch ought to be a check on the ﬁrst—for without its hav-
ing this eﬀect it is perfectly useless.—The ﬁrst branch, originating from the
people, will ever be subject to precipitancy, changeability, and excess ... This
can only be checked by ability and virtue in the second branch. On your
present system, can you suppose that one branch will possess it more than
the others? The second branch ought to be composed of men of great and
established property—an aristocracy ... Such an aristocratic body will keep
down the turbulency of democracy.75
F. The presidential oﬃce. The role of the presidency was partly modeled out of the
British Constitution, which many Federalists admired as the most perfect institu-
tional arrangement ever.76 True, some Federalists hesitated to see the president as
an “elective king”—Madison denounced “the gross pretence of a similitude between
a king of Great Britain, and ... the president of the United States.” 77 But for many
others the presidency was deﬁned as the monarchical branch of the Constitution,
which was much more suitable to represent the organic interests of the country,
rather than the particular interests of the existing factions. Parliaments were plural,
and could hardly avoid disagreement and conﬂict. In clear contrast to parliaments,
the presidency was unipersonal and, accordingly, could not disagree with itself. As
Hobees had put it, “the legislator is he ... a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe,
72 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1, pp. 469-470.
73 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1, p. 51.
74 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1, p. 58.
75 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1, p. 517.
76 This was not as odd as it could ﬁrstly appear, since the revolution had not been carried out
against the British constitutional system but on its very behalf—due to its pervasive violation by
the British crown.
77 Madison, “The Federalist no. 67,” in The Federalist, p. 348.
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out of envy, or interest; but an Assembly may.”78 Hence, the executive was not
only deﬁned as unipersonal—in clear contrast with the executive of Pennsylvania,
which was plural—and granted a powerful veto capacity, but it was also suggested by
some Federalists that the president should should enjoy life-long tenure. The reason,
according to Robert Yates of New York, was “that an executive is less dangerous to
the liberties of the people when in oﬃce during life.”79 Eventually, four-year terms
of oﬃce and the possibility of being reelected indeﬁnitely were adopted. According
to Madison, these were necessary conditions to “act his own opinion with vigour and
decisions [to] contend ... the humours of the legislature.”80
G. Judicial review. Even though judicial review was not included in the Consti-
tution and would not begin to be used until 1803, after the Marbury v. Madison
Supreme Court decision, it was widely discussed in the Philadelphia Convention, as
well as in the years following the adoption of the Constitution. Only two thirds of
the ﬁfty-ﬁve delegates took active part in the deliberations, and at least twenty-ﬁve
among these stood up in favor, either directly or indirectly, of judicial review.81
During the ﬁrst Congress after the Constitution had been ratiﬁed, the discussions
over the desirability of judicial review continued. For example, Fisher Ames claimed
that it was the task of the judiciary to make ﬁnal decisions about legislation, so if
courts found a clause unconstitutional, they ought to highlight it.82 On the other
hand, the Antifederalists denounced the institution of judicial precisely because “the
judicial under this system have a power which is above the legislative”83
To be sure, there were a number of decisions before Marbury v. Madison in which
the judiciary had already expressed the normative superiority of constitutional law,
to which statutes had to conform, and in which the judiciary had expressed its
own role in highlighting potential incompatibilities. However, Marbury v. Madison
would establish the ﬁrst serious precedent. The case began with a petition to the
Supreme Court made by William Marbury, one of the so-called “midnight judges”
appointed by John Adams right before handing over the presidency to Jeﬀerson.
Marbury claimed that he had been appointed by President Adams as Justice of the
Peace in the District of Columbia but his commission had not been subsequently
delivered by James Madison, Secretary of State under Jeﬀerson. Marbury petitioned
the Supreme Court to force Madison to deliver the documents. However, the Court
held that the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that enabled Marbury to bring his
claim to the Supreme Court was unconstitutional, because it purported to extend the
Court’s original jurisdiction beyond that which article 3 established, and turned it
down. With this clever move, Chief Justice John Adams ensured both the support of
78 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 185
and 132. Quoted in Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, pp. 30-31.
79 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1, p. 300.
80 Madison, “The Federalist no. 71,” in The Federalist, p. 461.
81 See Gargarella, La justicia frente al gobierno, pp. 40-41; and C. Beard, The Supreme Court
and the Constitution (Englewood Cliﬀs: Prentice-Hall, 1962).
82 Gargarella, La justicia frente al poder, pp. 44-45.
83 Brutus, “The Anti-Federalists no. 15,” in The Essential Federalist and anti-Federalist Papers,
D. Wootton, ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2003), p. 92.
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President Jeﬀerson to the decision and enormously increased the power of the Court
by setting the precedent of judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes—which
from that moment on could be turned down by the Court however democratic could
they be—for the ﬁrst time.
1.2.3. Material independence
The end of the revolutionary war by no means eliminated property qualiﬁcations
for voting. Even though delegates in the Philadelphia Convention eventually decided
to limit qualiﬁcations for active suﬀrage to those already enforced in the states (see
supra, §1.2.2.2), the latter would long maintain previous qualiﬁcations and, in some
cases, new ones would be added to the old ones—e.g. in Massachusetts. These
property qualiﬁcations referred mainly to the ownership of real estate—a deﬁnition
of property that made perfect sense in an eminently agrarian society as the late
eighteenth-century America was. This deﬁnition of property and the very idea of
material independence would go through major modiﬁcations in the early nineteenth
century, as it will become clear below in section 1.3.3.1. And these modiﬁcations,
in turn, would have an enormous inﬂuence over the deﬁnition of the employment
relationship.
For present purposes, these modiﬁcations are relevant for two reasons. First,
because they help to explain the increasing demand for suﬀrage extensions and demo-
cratic participation. A demand that would be met in a number of state constitutional
conventions called in the 1830s, ’40s and ’50s that were aimed, among other things, at
removing some qualiﬁcations—notably, to wage laborers. And, second, because they
help to explain the increasingly extended liberal view of the employment relation-
ship—which had been traditionally seen as a form of “limited slavery,” as Aristotle
put it—as a free and voluntary exchange among juridical equals.84 In turn, the
reasons behind this view will be key to Part III of the dissertation, for they help to
explain why the workplace tends nowadays to be seen as a sphere in which power
relations are absent and that is, accordingly, beyond the scope of politics, including
democratic politics, as we shall see in section 1.3.3.
Now, before turning to the shift in the conceptions of property, material indepen-
dence, and wage labor in nineteenth-century America, let us consider the three main
reasons that were put forward to justify the requirement of material independence
for being granted full citizenship in the late-eighteenth century America—(a) the
lack of an independent will, (b) the lack of the leisure time required to get informed
about and take part in politics and (c) not having a “stake in society.”85 Let us see
them in turn.
A. Independent will. The Federalists were hardly original when they claimed that
“such is the fragility of the human heart, that very few men who have no property,
have any judgment of their own”, and can thus take part in politics autonomously.86
84 Aristotle, Politics, C. D. C. Reeve, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1948), 1260a-b.
85 For the application of these ideas to the case of workplace democracy, see section 8.5 below.
86 John adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776.
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This view was inherited from the classical republican tradition in which they had
been intellectually raised. As current neorepublicans have emphasized and we shall
see in some detail below in section 8.2, classic republicans had deﬁned freedom as
non-domination or, in other words, as the absence of arbitrary interference.87 Rela-
tionships of domination included the relationship between masters and slaves. But
they also included a large number of relationships that, during the American colonial
period, had been referred to with the euphemism of relations of “friendship.” Fathers
were “friends” with their sons, men were “friends” with their wives and patrons were
“friends” with their journeymen.88 Unlike the former, the latter were in position to
arbitrarily interfere—i.e., with no other restriction than their own will—in the courses
of action of the former. As Sir Robert Filmer had declared in the seventeenth century
regarding marriage and fatherhood, “The father of a family governs by no other law
than by his own will.”89
What made the former dominate the latter is that, unlike the latter, the former
owned property, which was seen as the main source of domination. “Domination”
comes from “dominium,” which in classical Latin means both “property” and “the
ability to make free use of this property.”90 It is hardly surprising thus that, within
the republican tradition, it was believed that those who lacked property or dominium
were (almost as a matter of deﬁnition) in all likelihood to be dominated by those
on whom they depended to make a living. Property was seen as the main source
of having an independent will, free from the inﬂuence and domination of third par-
ties—it represented “the attributes of a man’s personality that gave him a political
character.”91 Slavery, parenthood, marriage and wage labor were thus relationships
were those who lacked property—slaves, children, viwes and journeymen—were dom-
inated by those on whom they materially depended—masters, fathers, husbands and
patrons. Unlike the former, the latter owned property and were thus able to interfere
the actions of the former with no other restriction than their own and arbitrary will.
The main reason for not enfranchising those who lacked property was, thus,
that their will could be easily inﬂuenced by those on whom they depended. Had the
dependents been enfranchised, the only beneﬁciaries would have been those on whom
they depended—the aristocracy. In a passage very often quoted by those supporting
suﬀrage restrictions in the Early Republic, Blackstone had argued that
The true reason of requiring any qualiﬁcation, with regard to property, in
voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that they are
esteemed to have no will on their own. If these persons had votes, they would
be tempted to dispose of them under some undue inﬂuence or other. This
87 See paradigmatically P. Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1997); and Q. Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999).
88 See Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, p. 58.
89 Quoted in Wood, The radicalism of the American Revolution, p. 49.
90 See A. Domenèch and D. Raventós, “Property and Republican Freedom: An Institutional
Approach to Basic Income,” Basic Income Studies 2 (2007): 1-8.
91 Quoted in Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 219.
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would give a great, an artful, or a wealthy man, a larger share in elections
than is consistent with general liberty.92
And, as Gouverneur Morris put it,
Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to
the rich ... The time is not distant when this country will abound with me-
chanics and manufacturers, who will receive their bread from their employers.
Will such men be the secure and faithful guardians of liberty. Will they be
the impregnable barrier against aristocracy.93
This idea had been so deeply rooted that even some British Levellers had defended
it during the Putney debates in 1647. For example, Petty, a Leveller spokesman
had defended that “the reason why we exclude apprentices, servants and beggars is
because they depend on the will of other men and they would be fearful of disgusting
them.”94 It is noteworthy that, even though the disenfranchisement of those under
inﬂuence is justiﬁed above on behalf of the common interests of the Republic, jus-
tiﬁcations were provided also on the very behalf of the disenfranchised. Since they
were not materially independent, granting them a say in public aﬀairs would serve
as a way to strength the power of their masters, husbands and patrons and therefore
would harm not only the interests of their communities but also their actual interests.
According to Blackstone,
As to qualiﬁcations of the electors. The true reason of requiring any qual-
iﬁcation ... in voters is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation
that they are esteemed to have no will of their own. If these persons had
votes, they would be tempted to dispose of them under some undue inﬂuence
or other. This would give a great, an artful, or a wealthy man, a larger share
in elections than is consistent with general liberty.
B. Leisure time. In addition, it was argued that owning real estate provided the spare
time required to get informed about and take part in politics in a meaningful way.
James Harrington had expressed this idea quite clearly when he stated, regarding
mechanics, that “till have ﬁrst feathered their nests, like the fowls of the air, whose
whole employment is to seek their food, are so busied in their privates concernments
that they have neither the leisure to study the public, nor are safely to be trusted
with it.”95 It is important to note that taking part in politics was not seen only as
a privilege for those who owned property enough to be leisured, but also as a duty
that they were expected to fulﬁll. Benjamin Franklin provides the most well-known
92 Quoted in Robert J. Steinfeld, “Property and Suﬀrage in the Early American republic,”
Stanford Law Review 41, (1989), 335-376, p. 340.
93 Quoted in Keyssar, The Right to Vote, p. 18.
94 Quoted in A. de Francisco, Ciudadanía y democracia. Un enfoque repulicano (Madrid: Los
Libros de la Catarata, 2007), p. 139.
95 J. Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics, J. G. A. Pocock,
ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 138. For the inﬂuence of Harringtonian
republicanism over the late eighteenth-century America, see. J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton
Unievrsity Press, 1975), esp. ch. 14.
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instance of this, for he stopped working as soon as he acquired enough wealth (at
the age of forty-two) and devoted exclusively to public aﬀairs for the rest of his life.
C. A stake in the society. Finally, it was claimed that the ownership of real estate
served as a good indicator of having stable interests in the community—a “stake in
the society”—and thus an incentive to use political rights responsibly. This was so, in
turn, for two reasons. On the one hand, because real estate, unlike personal property,
was not movable and therefore increased the likelihood of staying in the same state,
providing owners with a long-term interest in their prosperity. (However, according
to Jeﬀerson, this requirement could be satisﬁed by “either having resided a certain
time, or having a family, or having property, any or all of them.”96) On the other
hand, because owners of real estate had to feel directly the consequences of the laws,
since they had to pay taxes. Accordingly, they would have an incentive to acutely
monitor the representatives, and prevent them from passing arbitrary statutes.
James Iredell clearly synthesized these three reasons—freedom from inﬂuence,
political competence and stable interests in the community—when he defended in
1774 that, if all men were independent, then everyone could have “an individual vote
for a representative.” But since they were not, “there must be some restriction as
to the right of voting: otherwise the lowest and most ignorant of mankind must
associate in this important business with those who it is to be presumed, from their
property and other circumstances, are free from inﬂuence, and have some knowledge
of the great consequences of their trust.”97 In short, the argument for the exclusion
of the propertyless from full citizenship can be summarized as follows.
(B1) Only those who are materially independent ought to be granted full cit-
izenship.98
But since, as a matter of fact, in the late eighteenth century America
(B2) Not everyone was independent,
It followed that
(B3) Not everyone ought to be granted full citizenship.
1.3. Actual representation
This section presents the challenges to virtual representation by those who de-
fended the alternative theory of actual representation, along with its relationship
96 Quoted in Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 169.
97 Quoted in Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 168.
98 Material independence was considered a necessary condition for full citizenship. But, as
Gundersen points out, it was not considered suﬃcient also, for many single women did own prop-
erty and could meet property qualiﬁcations yet not enjoyed voting rights. See Joan R. Gundersen,
“Independence, Citizenship, and the American Revolution,” Signs 13 (1987): 59-77, p. 65. Harring-
ton had already expressed this non-biconditionality when he stated that “The man that cannot live
upon his own must be a servant; but he that can live upon his own may be a freeman.” Harrington,
The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics, p. 269.
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with the increasing acceptance of “democracy” in American politics in the decades
after the founding. It argues that the increasing acceptance of the democracy was
in part—although only in part, as it will become clear in chapter 2—due to the in-
creasing acceptance of the circumstance of disagreement and conﬂict on interests and
values in the American society, and the crisis of the theory of virtual representation
as a result. The more the fact of disagreement was accepted as a legitimate and
unavoidable feature of the American society, the less credible virtual representation
became, and the more intensely citizens demanded both suﬀrage extensions and the
enactment of some of the institutional devices that had been traditionally seen as
attached to the idea of democracy. In short, the increasing acceptance of “democracy”
and democratic institutions can be partly explained as a consequence of the new and
changing circumstances of the nineteenth century.
Put simply, the theory of actual representation can be presented, in contrast to
the theory of virtual representation, in the following steps:
(C1) Pluralism tenet : A political community is a plural entity with conﬂicting
interests and values.
(C2) Anti-elitism tenet : Political decisions should be made by those familiar
with the interests of ordinary people.
(C3) Irrelevance tenet : Full citizenship is to be granted to every member of
the political community despite of their being materially independent or
not.
Again, the section reconstructs these three tenets in turn.
1.3.1. Plurality of interests
The pervasive use of the theory of virtual representation during the Philadelphia
Convention and the ratiﬁcation process was closely related to the perception of an
increasing factionalism in post-independence American politics. As we have seen
above, this factionalism was denounced by many Federalists as part of the demo-
cratic tendencies of the 1770s and 1780s. Hence, the Federalists defended virtual
representation as a way to overcome the plurality of interests between and within
the states and to put forward a centralized government. And this central government,
as it was eventually endorsed in the Federal Constitution, became a very successful
alternative to more democratic institutional arrangements.
But this perception of an increasing factionalism was also shared by many An-
tifederalists and ordinary people, who became increasingly aware of, and increasingly
accepted, the existence of the fact of disagreement in the American society. As the
nineteenth century progressed, this awareness would make turn the organicist concep-
tion of the society into less credible, and it would ﬁnally undermine the eﬀectiveness
of virtual representation as a rationale for the sharp distinction between virtuous
representatives and ordinary people the Federalists had argued for. As ordinary peo-
ple became more aware of the idiosyncrasy of their interests and values, the demand
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for actual representation became also irresistible and virtual representation could no
longer be used as successfully as the Federalists had used it in the late 1780s.
Of course, plural interests and values, along with the mobilizations aimed at
advancing them, were not new for the American public. As soon as the Stamp
Act riots broke out, many laborers had begun organizing themselves within their
crafts and within their communities against the imports, including the younger and
poorer artisans. True, these workers would still have to wait long to obtain the
franchise. However, pamphlets were read to and by them, outdoor political rallies and
demonstrations were open to them, and organizers of petitions collected signatures
from both voters and non-voters alike, which made them more aware of their interests
and more willing to organize themselves to advance them. As Nash, Smith and
Hoerder have pointed out,
[i]n the course of struggling for non-importation, mechanic consciousness,
already awakened, was transformed. Most striking, artisans began to exert
themselves as a distinct political entity. This is reﬂected in Philadelphia in
the newspaper and pamphlet appeals, beginning in 1767, which were directed
speciﬁcally at the mechanics as a separate interest.”99
The evolution of the market economy, the creation of pressure groups and societies,
and the split of the Federalists and the rise of the ﬁrst and second party systems
would do nothing but make this change more acute. Let us brieﬂy describe these
trends in turn.
1.3.1.1. Market economy
Pluralism of values and interests became more pressing as the market economy
evolved in American cities and ordinary people—mechanics and artisans mostly—increasingly
saw their own interests as idiosyncratic. As Michael Merril has concluded in his sum-
mary of the current state of the art, the consensus among economic historians is that
the transition to market economy in American occurred in the immediate aftermath
of the revolutionary war. This view contrasts to the view of the revisionist historians
of the 1950s, including Louis Hartz and Richard Hofstatder, who challenged the
importance of the transition to capitalism in American history by insisting that the
European settler societies were almost fully capitalist from their earliest days.100
This transition aﬀected ﬁnancial, productive and labor markets. As for capital
markets, by the ﬁrst decades of the nineteenth century more people more often lent
money to more distant debtors, and interest rates and the price of money began to get
rid of their ancient customary restraints and gradually converged. As for productive
markets, although the American society remained mainly rural compared to its Euro-
99 G. B. Nash, B. G. Smith and D. Hoerder, “Labor in the Era of the American Revolution:
An Exchange,” Labor History 24 (1983): 414-439, p. 428.
100 See R. Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York:
A. A. Knopf, 1948); L. Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Hartcourt, Brac &
Co., 1955); and M. Merrill, “Putting “Capitalism” in Its Place: A Review of Recent Literature,”
The William and Mary Quarterly 52 (1995): 315-326.
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pean counterparts,101 most farmers were by 1800 much engaged in commerce and the
exchange of goods; productivity increased fast, more goods were taken to wider and
further markets, and economic inequality enlarged. Finally, as for labor markets, the
ratio of persons engaged in agriculture to those engaged in commerce and manufac-
turers dramatically decreased and the rapid growth caused a greater division of labor
and occupational specialization, mainly in the coastal cities.102 On the other hand,
the master/servant relationship of hierarchical dependence went through a dramatic
legal change and would eventually become a purely contractual engagement between
juridical equals, as we shall see in detail below in section 1.3.3.103 All these trends
would transform dramatically the structure of the American society, promoting a
more self-interested and individualistic behavior, as Max Weber famously captured
in Benjamin Franklin’s advices on investing and proﬁt-seeking.104
As market economy evolved, inequalities enlarged, workers increasingly special-
ized, and the awareness of the plurality of interests in America raised. As Wood
points out,
the interests of the post-revolutionary years were . . . more numerous . . .
more popularly expressive of new widespread economic elements of the society
than the colonial period had been. Americans virtually ceased talking about
the people’s “interest” in the singular; the people’s “interests”—agricultural,
commercial, manufacturing—were all plural now.105
Accordingly, more and more workers and ordinary people organized themselves to
advance their particular interests by a number of means. For example, the printing
of newspapers and pamphlets directed at each craft as a separate interest; the orga-
nization of craft societies and unions, such as the Patriotic Society of the Philadel-
phia mechanics; the arrangement of places to meet, such as the “Mechanics Hall”
bought by the New York mechanics; or public demonstrations and strikes, such
as the twelve major strikes carried out by various journeymen between 1786 and
1816 in Philadelphia—the ﬁrst major strikes by employees against their employers
in American history.106
101 In 1800 nearly 90 percent of workers were still involved in farming, and only thirty-three
towns had a population of twenty-ﬁve hundred or more. By contrast, in 1801 only 36 percent of
English workers engaged in farming, and one-third of the people lived in cities. See G. S. Wood,
The Empire of Liberty. A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1915 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009), p. 318; and C. Clark, Social Change in America. From the Revolution to the Civil
War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 85.
102 See Keyssar, The Right to Vote, p. 328; Nash, Smith and Hoerder, “Labor in the Era of
the American Revolution: An Exchange.”
103 See R. J. Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor. The Employment Relation in english and
American Law and Culture (Chapel Hill: The University of North carolina Press, 1991); and M. J.
Horwitz, The transformation of American law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1977).
104 M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. T. Parsons (New York:
Scribner, 1958), pp. 48-50.
105 Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, p. 247.
106 See among others Wood, The Empire of Liberty, p. 349; Nash, Smith and Hoerder, “Labor
in the Era of the American Revolution: An Exchange;” Staughton Lynn, “The Mechanics in new
York Politics, 1774-1785,” in Class Conﬂict, Slavery, and the United States Constitution (New York,
Cambridge University Press, 1967), 79-108.
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This organizational trend would become more pressing as the nineteenth century
advanced. By the 1820s, it had become clear, as a craft wage-earners group put it,
that “the interests of the journeymen are separate and in some respects opposite of
those of their employers.”107 In Philadelphia, still the leading manufacturing center
in the nation, strikes become regular—no less than ten in 1820—, and journeymen
formed the Mechanics’ Union of Trade Associations—the ﬁrst citywide union in
America—, created the Mechanics’ Free Press, and in 1828 organized the Working
Men’s Party with the goal of electing “men of our own nomination, whose interests
are in unison with ours.”108
1.3.1.2. Republican-democratic societies
The French Revolution brought new uses of political terms to the American
jargon. At ﬁrst, it fueled the anti-democratic rhetoric of many Federalists. “Look at
France!,” claimed Noah Webster. “There you have a picture of real democracy.” “The
French revolution has so discredited democracy,” wrote John Jay in a letter, “that I
doubt its giving you much more trouble.”109 And John Adams took advantage of the
revolution to recall that “I was always for a republic, not a democracy, which is as
arbitrary, tyrannical, bloody, cruel, and intolerable a government as that of Pharalais
with his bull is represented to have been. Robespierre is a perfect exempliﬁcation
of the character of the ﬁrst bellwether in a democracy.”110 Yet the revolution also
animated many discontents to organize themselves and show their opposition to the
Federal government. Since the Federalists had so openly despised democracy and
had used the term very much to discredit their enemies, some of these discontents
were now willing to label themselves, very controversially, as “democrats.”
And so they did. In the mid-1790s, at least forty-two political societies had
appeared—and at least sixteen of them called themselves “democratic.” The ﬁrst
one in doing so was the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, and it was citizen
Genêt, the French minister to America, who suggested the word “democratic” for
their name. In contrast to the craftsmen organizations, though, these societies were
not formed by rank and ﬁle workers but by members of the upper classes. Their
aims were mainly to stimulate discussion, to support the French Revolution, and to
criticize the Federal government. By no means could the Federalist cabinet claim
to be representing the interests of the nation any more, they denounced. And, in
addition to their criticisms to the Federalists, they also supported suﬀrage extensions,
more frequent elections, and more power to the House of Representatives and to the
state legislatures.
By the end of the decade, most of these societies had disappeared, after being
discredited for having supposedly been involved in the Whiskey Rebellion in Penn-
sylvania.111 As president Washington wrote in a letter, “I consider this insurrection
107 Quoted in Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy. Jeﬀerson to Lincoln (New
York and London, W. W. Norton & Co., 2005), p. 282.
108 Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, p. 283.
109 Quoted in Morantz, “Democracy" and "Republic" in American Ideology, p. 149.
110 Baylin, The Ideological Origins of the American revolution, p. 282 n. 50.
111 The Rebellion broke out in 1794, and was carried out by Pennsylvania country farmers
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as the ﬁrst formidable fruit of the Democratic Societies; brought forth I believe
too prematurely for their own views, which may contribute to the annihilation of
them.”112 However, they were very innovative in giving democracy a better name.
1.3.1.3. The ﬁrst and second party systems113
In addition to pressure groups and societies organized to advance their economic
and political interests, Jeﬀerson’s Republican party emerged as a ruling alternative
to the Federalists. The split of the Federalist Party and the emergence of the ﬁrst
party system provoked an increasing partisanship and political participation. Before
turning to this phenomenon, it has to be recalled that by the end of eighteenth
century parties and partisanship were still considered inimical to the organic interests
of the society. As Hofstfader reports, eighteenth-century thinkers had
“often postulated that society should be pervaded by concord and governed
by a consensus that approached, if it did not attain, unanimity. Party, and the
malicious and mendacious spirit it encouraged, were believed only to create
social conﬂicts that would not otherwise occur.”114
On the one hand, the new generations of Federalists surely failed to unseat Jeﬀerso-
nian Republicans—even though they mimicked Jeﬀersonian strategies such as editing
partisan newspapers, arranging social events such as barbecues or campaigning at lo-
cal and state levels. However, their existence promoted political competition, which,
in turn, promoted partisanship in politics and called into question the use of the
organicist conception in American politics. That the word “logrolling” began to be
used to name the daily practice of trading of votes among legislators should not
surprise us.115
On the other hand, the increasing participation was not only due to party com-
petition—actually, the Federalist party was still very active between 1796 and 1799,
when participation increased slowly, and nonetheless moribund between 1804 and
1816, when it increased quickly—, but also due to the members of the Jeﬀersonian
movement itself. The Jeﬀersonians were considered to represent the interests of
against a whiskey excise tax passed in 1791 to pay the war debt. Washington vigorously repressed
for being “subversive of the national interest.” Thus, he ordered the states to call out some 15,000
militiament and twenty rebellious men were charged with high treason, though only two were
convicted. See J. K. Martin, “The Whiskey Rebellion Redivivus,” in S. Boyd, ed., The Whiskey
Rebellion. Past and Present Perspectives (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 3-7.
112 Washington to Henrry Lee, August 26, 1794. Quoted in Dupuis-Déri, The Political Power
of Words, pp. 226-227. By contrast, Jeﬀerson would declare write that “The denunciation of the
democratic societies, is one of the extraordinary acts of boldness of which we have seen so many from
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ordinary people and were commonly known as “democrats”—and the party itself as
the “Democratic” party.116 As expected, this label was ﬁrstly used by the adversaries
of the Jeﬀersonians to discredit them. Hence, during the presidential campaign of
1800, Olivier Ellsworth warned that, in case Jeﬀerson arrived to oﬃce, he would
establish a “Jacobinal democracy.” And, for Hamilton, Jeﬀerson was “too much in
earnest with his democracy.”117 As Morantz points out, the “FederaIists attempted
to “pin” the name “democratic” on their Jeﬀersonian opponents. With considerable
lack of insight, they reasoned that if they could succeed in making the label stick,
the Jeﬀersonians would be emphatically rejected at the polls.”118 However, although
the party would not be oﬃcially labeled as the Democratic Party—as we know it
today—until the Party’s 1840 national convention, the Jeﬀersonians began using
the term, among other reasons, to distinguish themselves from the Federalists—even
though Jeﬀerson himself generally hesitated to do so.
Thus, the split of the Federalist party and the new political strategies used by
the Jeﬀersonians both promoted partisanship in American politics and mobilized the
electorate. The organicist tenet lost credibility and ordinary people gave support to
the Jeﬀersonian Republicans who, in addition to be seen as representing the interests
of ordinary people, were increasingly known as “democrats.” Accordingly, democracy
began to be seen much more favorably.
However, competition among opposed parties with diﬀerent agendas would not be
seen as a perfectly legitimate democratic practice until the emergence of the second
party system. During the ﬁrst party system, both the Federalists and the Republicans
still introduced themselves as the common interests of the nation and accused each
other of betraying the republican principles on which they all agreed. In short, the
acceptance of the fact of disagreement as a legitimate feature of the American society,
along with partisanship and political struggle as the means to advance conﬂicting
interests and values, had not fully arrived yet. And partisanship and political struggle
would not turn out to be seen as a natural and even healthy feature of American
politics until the harsh and very professionalized political competition emerged in
the second party system. Political competition and factionalism would then replace
the organicist tenet. As Morantz puts it,
[the ideal of the Founders had been] an organic society, in which right-thinking
men dutifully united in the sober determination of the good of the whole.
Parties destroyed this harmony.119
116 See D. H. Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism. The Federalist Party in the
Era of Jeﬀersonian Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). Fischer argues that, though
unable to win elections, the Federalists were in this period much more active and eﬀective than is
generally believed
117 Quoted in Dupuis-Déri, The Political Power of Words, p. 227.
118 Morantz, “Democracy” and “Republic” in American Ideology, p. 151.
119 Morantz, “Democracy" and "Republic" in American Ideology, p. 189.
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1.3.2. Ruling anti-elitism
Many of the pressure groups and democratic societies continued the Whig tra-
dition of political thought and called into question the assumptions of the theory
of virtual representation. As we have seen, by pointing out the plurality of in-
terests within the American society against the organic conception put forward by
the Federalists. But also by challenging the idea of disinterested representatives as
the most desirable ones to run the government, and by supporting the opposing
idea that ordinary people should be elected and that institutional devices should
be implemented to make sure that representatives remained as accountable and as
responsive as possible of the interests of their constituents. The latter challenge was
put forward, at least, on three grounds.
1.3.2.1. Interests and self-interest
First of all, the criticism of the impartial and disinterested ruling elite was in
part a logical move once the organicist assumption had been called into question.
Once the plurality of interests was accepted as an inevitable and legitimate feature
of the American society, the call for virtuous representatives with the ability to
overcome such factional interests turned out to be irrelevant if not absurd. Thus,
it was assumed that any imaginable representative would have his own particular
interests to promote, and that so they did the Federalists that had drafted the
Constitution and had ruled the country afterward. In America, as Tocqueville would
write somewhat exaggeratedly in 1840, “the period of disinterested patriotism is
gone by forever.”120 Similarly, as Fischer points out regarding the new generations
of Federalists, “the pervasive holism and the honest undisguised elitism of the old
school had become anachronisms.”121 In fact, part of the old guard acknowledged
this phenomenon. For example, in 1821 Madison called a constitutional convention
in Virginia to extend the franchise to the propertyless because, as he claimed, “there
are various ways in which the rich may oppress the poor ... It is necessary that the
poor should have a defense against the danger.”122
Thus, it is hardly surprising that oﬃcials began to be paid for the ﬁrst time
and increasingly professionalized. In line with the traditional view, the Federalists
had put forward a conception of politics as as a public spirited activity and a non
remunerated one. Washington—one of the wealthiest man in the country at the
time—had famously refused a salary as commander in chief. And Benjamin Franklin
had outrageously opposed any attempt to remunerate public oﬃcials. (Of course,
these attempts were often put forward by representatives who were not as well oﬀ as
Franklin.) This was a conception of oﬃce-holding inherited from the elitist branch
of classical republicanism.123 Thus, when Aristotle had discussed how to implement
his politeia—a model on which many Federalists relied when trying to work out their
120 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, chapter 14.
121 Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism, p. 199.
122 Quoted in Clark, Social Change in America, p. 111.
123 For a historical distinction of the elitist and democratic branches of the republican tradition,
see A. Domènech, El eclipse de la fraternidad (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004).
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ideas of a mixed republic—, he famously called for the abolition of the misthós, the
allowance paid to the members of the Court of the Five Hundred, the People’s Court,
the Assembly and some magistrates of the Athenian democracy. The misthós had
been introduced by Ephialtes in 461 B.C., and had been eliminated and reintroduced
in diﬀerent versions afterward. If we have to believe Aristotle, it had increased the
participation of the free poor citizens and make the upper classes drift away from
political activity, thus turning Athens in a democracy—i.e. the “rule of the poor.”124
It should be noted, however, that those who pointed out the plurality of interests
against the organicism of the Federalists did not necessarily entail that everyone
was by deﬁnition self-interested, but only that parochial interests indeed existed in
America and should be taken into account. These interests included, most notably,
the interests of the members of the ruling elite, who had presented themselves as
disinterested and virtuous, but were now denounced for having particular interests
too—and advancing them when possible—, as many other members of the soci-
ety. To put it clearly, the claim was not so much that everyone was by deﬁnition
self-interested, but rather that the ruling elite, however supposedly disinterested, had
also interests as ordinary people did.
According to Wood, the Federalists rather than the Antifederalists were actually
the ones who were ruling out the possibility of ordinary people being disinterested
(and thus able to take part in politics in a virtuous form) by drawing a clear line
between “the rich and well-born,” on the one hand, and “the mass of the people
[who] seldom judge or determine right,” on the other.125 Eventually, this distinction
would undermine their capacity to attract the support of those who had despised
for being purely self-interested. As Wood puts it, “by resting their government so
completely on the assumption that most people were self-interested and absorbed in
their private aﬀairs, the Federalists laid virtually no civic foundations for their scheme
and weakened their ability to justify their peculiar disinterested leadership.”126
1.3.2.2. Epistemic access
The desirability of a sharp distinction between representatives and their con-
stituencies was criticized not only on logical grounds—once the very possibility of
disinterestedness had been criticized—, but also on epistemic ones. Even if there were
disinterested politicians with the ability to overcome all factional interests—including
their own ones—, they could not speak for ordinary people unless they were familiar
with their “feelings, circumstances, and interests.”127
The point had been already made by the Antifederalists during the ratiﬁcation
124 Aristotle, Politics, in Jonathan Barnes (ed.) The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984); and M. H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of
Demosthenes, trans. J. A. Crook (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991), p. 330.
125 Alxander Hamilton, in Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1,
p. 299. Thomas Govan has called into question, however, whether Hamilton actually said this,
which contradicts Madison’s notes and Hamilton’s own outline of the speech. See T. P. Govan,
“The Rich, the Well-born, and Alexander Hamilton,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 36
(1950): 675-680.
126 Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, p. 264.
127 Quoted in Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, p. 255.
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process, who had claimed that “The well born, and highest orders in life, as they
term themselves will be ignorant of the sentiments of the middling class of citi-
zens, strangers to their ability, wants, and diﬃculties.”128 And it gained a wider
importance as the organicist tenet lost credibility. At a campaign rally in 1810,
Jeﬀersonians advised the assembled mechanics, laborers and farmers to elect men of
their own kind. The reason was an epistemic one: “does a nobleman,” they argued,
“know the wants of the farmer and the mechanic?” Even more interestingly, during
the very same campaign, they attacked Jonas Platt, the Federalist candidate, for
promoting that elected representatives voted their conscience rather than merely
reﬂected the interests of their constituents.129
Once the existence of a plurality of idiosyncratic interests was acknowledged, po-
litical representation turned out to be seen as a means to mirror factional interests in
the legislative assemblies—“descriptive representation,” in Pitkin’s terminology. As
Brutus had claimed in his rejoinder to The Federalist, “The very term, representative,
implies, that the person or body chosen for this purpose, should resemble those who
appoint them ... They are a sing—the people are the thing signiﬁed.”130
As for actual devices to ensure actual representation, besides the size of the
legislatures—which had to be large enough as to ensure that social diversity could
be properly represented—, two means were proposed. First, to guarantee reserved
seats for representatives of the main social groups—so they could actually represent
their particular interests and, therefore, those of their constituents. As Brutus had
put it, “each class ought to have an opportunity of choosing their best informed men
for the purpose.”131 And second, to provide citizens with the legally binding ability to
instruct their representatives. These two means are obviously related and they were
often demanded together indeed. But they can be nonetheless distinguished. On the
one hand, binding instructions would make unnecessary for the representatives to be
actual members of the group they represented. On the other hand, even if the former
and the latter had equal interests, asymmetries in the level of knowledge about how
to advance them, unforeseen contingencies, or mere trust could make the practice of
binding instructions unnecessary or even counterproductive.
1.3.2.3. Common sense
A third reason was put forward against the ruling elite tenet—namely, the priority
of common sense over expertise as a requirement for taking part in politics. As part of
the ideal of equality embraced in the Declaration of Independence, it was increasingly
believed that all men were equal and with an equal capacity to reason about public
aﬀairs. Two implications followed. Firstly, common sense was taken to be a capacity
that, unlike expertise, everyone was in a position to have. Secondly, common sense
128 H. J. Storing, The Anti-Federalist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 123. See
also Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, pp. 108 ss., and T. Ball, “A Republic—If
You Can Keep It,” in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, T. Ball and J. G. A. Pocock, eds.
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988).
129 See H. Strum, “Property Qualiﬁcations and Voting Behavior in New York, 1807-1816,” The
Journal of the Early Republic 1 (1981): 347-371, p. 367.
130 Storing, The Anti-Federalist, p. 123.
131 Storing, The Anti-Federalist, p. 125.
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was increasingly believed to be at odds with the kind of very sophisticated education
received by the gentry.
The Charleston mechanics had already appealed to common sense during the
revolutionary period. When William Henry Drayton despised their right to take
part in political decisions because they lacked the education required to do so, they
appealed to common—a common sense which lack “cannot be compensated by all
the learning of the school.”132 By the early nineteenth century, this view of ordinary
people’s ability to take part in politics independently of their expertise would be so
widely accepted that aristocratic gestures would even have a negative eﬀect over the
candidates who exhibited them. Thus, when Simon Snyder was elected governor of
Pennsylvania in 1808, he refused an honor guard at his inauguration because, as he
claimed, “I hate and despise all ostentation—pomp and parade as anti-democratic.”
And when his adversaries despised his humble origins by calling him and his followers
“clodhoppers,” he and his supporters not only did not try to dismiss the label, but
proudly began to use it to label themselves.133 Eventually, Andrew Jackson would
acknowledge the importance of this trend and would exploit it masterfully during
the 1928 presidential campaign, as it will become clear later.
The revolutionary potential of this view only becomes clear once we recall the
highly hierarchical character of colonial America, a society organized around a com-
plex system of well established ranks, relations of patronage, and “friendships.” Def-
erence to superior ranks had been always present, beginning by the gentry’s wearing
of wigs or by ordinary people’s doﬃng of caps in presence of gentlemen. And dishonor
was often paid with death through the frequent practice of dueling among gentlemen
(Hamilton himself would die shot by Jeﬀerson’s Vice President Aaron Burr). Unsur-
prisingly, this social deference also applied to public aﬀairs, as it is shown by the fact
that, until the 1770s, ordinary people tended to elect members of the gentry when
given the opportunity to vote for public oﬃce, as we have shown above in section
1.2.2.134
1.3.3. Transformations of material independence
The crisis of the ruling elite tenet aﬀected the rationale for property qualiﬁca-
tions regarding both passive and active suﬀrage. More and more ordinary people
demanded suﬀrage extensions so they could choose their own preferred candidates.
Likewise, voting rights were eventually granted—notably, in the state constitutional
conventions called in the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s—, though only gradually. This
challenge aﬀected the three main basis on which material independence had been
defended as a necessary condition for suﬀrage—as a means to prevent the likely
inﬂuence by those on whom otherwise the propertyless were likely to depend, as a
means for political competence and participation, and as a proxy for the attachment
to the interests of the community.
132 Quoted in Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, p. 277.
133 Wood, The Empire of Liberty, p. 331.
134 See Main, “Government by the People,” p. 392.
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As Robert Steinfeld has pointed out, the challenge was developed along two
very diﬀerent, and somehow contradictory, lines. One towards a change in the
way material independence was conceived and another one towards the universal
extension of rights and the abandonment of the requisite of material independence
altogether—call them, for the sake of simplicity, the self-ownership position and the
equality of rights position.135 Since these positions would dramatically shape the
enfranchisement of parts of the population that had been excluded from political
participation—namely, wage laborers—and the very idea of democracy, on the one
hand, and the way the employment relationship was understood (an issue that will
be central to Part III of the dissertation, as we shall see below), let us see them in
turn.
1.3.3.1. Property as self-ownership
Firstly consider the property as self-ownership position, according to which,
Property as self-ownership.—Wage laborers are to be taken as materially in-
dependent, and thus as worth being granted full citizenship, because they are
owners—owners of their labor force.
In an age of commercial growth, property ceased to be identiﬁed with real estate and
to be seen as a long-term attachment to the interests of the community. Rather, it
began to be seen as a commodity to be exchanged in the marketplace. As Morton
Horwitz has put it, “in the early years of the nineteenth century ... the idea of prop-
erty underwent a fundamental transformation—from a static agrarian conception ...
to a dynamic, instrumental, and more abstract view of property that emphasized the
newly paramount virtues of productive use and development.”136
This shift aﬀected wage laborers, who had been seen as propertyless and as being
dependent and not worth being granted full citizenship hitherto. On the one hand,
the number of wage laborers in contrast to farmers increased dramatically, which
made the ideal of a society of yeomen embraced by some—notably, Jeﬀerson—appear
to be less likely to ever occur. On the other hand, journeymen also found increas-
ingly diﬃcult to carry out the three-step climb from apprentice to journeyman to
craftsman, which for an artisan had been the only way to go from servitude to
independence in the pre-revolutionary period.137
By contrast, rather than unpropertied and thus dependent, wage laborers were
increasingly seen now as owners—owners of their own labor force, which could be
rented in the market—and therefore as self-standing economic agents. Accordingly,
employment ceased thus to be seen as a relationship of dependence and turned out to
be seen as a purely contractual engagement between juridical equals. As a member
of the Massachusetts State convention explained in 1853,
135 Steinfeld, “Property and Suﬀrage in the Early American republic.” See also Steinfeld, The
Invention of Free Labor.
136 Horwitz, The transformation of American law, 1780-1860, p. 31.
137 Among Philadelphia cordwainers and tailors, for example, 38 percent of the journeymen
managed in 1756 to become master craftsman within a decade. By contrast, only 3 percent of them
did so during the ﬁve years after 1767. And the tendency persisted. Nash, Smith and Hoerder,
“Labor in the Era of the American Revolution: An Exchange,” p. 426.
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In a free government like ours, employment is simply a contract between
parties having equal rights . . . The employed is under no greater obligation
to the employer than the employer is to the employed . . . In the eye of the
law, they are both freemen—citizens having equal rights.138
Despite this shift, it has to be noted that at that moment employment could hardly
be deﬁned as a purely voluntary relationship between free and equal agents. At least,
while legal sanctions against workers who quit before they had performed their con-
tractual agreement were still into force. But non-pecuniary sanctions progressively
disappeared as the nineteenth century progressed. As a result, workers gained the
right to formally enter and exit their jobs and employment would be more easily
deﬁned as a free and voluntary relationship.139
Hence, wage workers were not acknowledged as independent members of the
community and thus as political equals because the link between property and inde-
pendence dissolved. But rather because they were acknowledged as owners—owners
of themselves and thus as legally entitled to rent their labor force in the labor market
and to enter employment relationships as juridical equals. As Carole Pateman has
pointed out, this kind of ownership rested (and rests) on a “political ﬁction.” Even
though it is the case that parts of that property can be technically separated from its
owner and transferred to the purchaser (e.g., nowadays sperm or some organs), there
are other parts that cannot be technically separated from the owner (e.g., talents or
skills); they can be separated and purchased only as if they were another asset.140
Nevertheless, thanks to this ﬁction wage workers turned out to qualify as owners and
thus as independent members of the community while the link between ownership
and independence remained intact. This shift had an important incidence over two
additional groups—leisured landowners and paupers.
Regarding the former, as the distinction between real and personal property
dissolved and the increasingly extended wage labor gained respectability, landed
property turned out be seen as “only one of the incidental rights of the person who
possesses it,” as the New York Republicans claimed, rather than as “the attributes
of a man’s personality that gave him a political character,”.141 Men who legally
disposed of their own labor and were able to support their families were considered
now as perfectly independent agents. As one reformer in the 1829 Massachusetts
convention said of “laboring men”:
138 Quoted in Steinfeld, “Property and Suﬀrage in the Early American Republic,” p. 351.
139 See Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor, and Horwitz, The transformation of American
law, 1780-1860.
140 C. Pateman, “Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization and a Tale
of Two Concepts,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2002): 20-53. See also Domènech,
El eclipse de la fraternidad, pp. 94-95; C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963); and K. Polany, The Great
Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press,
1957).
141 Quoted in Wood, The Creation of the American republic, p. 219, and in Wood, The Radi-
calism of the American Revolution, p. 264.
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they have no freehold—no property to the amount of two hundred dollars,
but they support their families reputably with their daily earnings.142
As we shall see below in Part III (§§ 7.3.5 and 8.5), this conception of wage labor
contrasted with the classical republican one, which considered it as a humiliating and
dependent form of work. Cicero, for instance, had famously argued that “vulgar are
the means of livelihood of all hired workmen whom we pay for mere manual labor,
not for artistic skill; for in their case the very wage they receive is a pledge of their
slavery.”143
Wage workers were increasingly seen now just as the contrary—as perfectly re-
spectable and self-standing workers. And this shift brought leisured aristocratic
landowners into contempt. Recall that, according to classic republicanism, ownership
of property, and specially of property of land, had been seen as a precondition for hav-
ing the leisure time required to get informed about and take part in politics—besides
serving as a proxy for having stable interests and for having and autonomous will.
The Federalist gentry had thus introduced themselves as owning such property and,
therefore, as being leisured enough to devote their lives to the public realm. Now that
conception had changed dramatically. Not only property of land had lost its aura of
autonomy—let alone the technical problem of measuring who qualiﬁed actually as
economically independent, due to the high degree of indebtedness of many landown-
ers. But it was also the case that work was increasingly celebrated as an indicator of
the commitment to the community. Thus an astonished Tocqueville would report not
only how “honorable” work in America was, but also how honorable it was to “work
to make money.”144 And, as Wood points out, talented workmen and inventors were
now receiving the civic wreaths that traditionally belonged to the virtuous and wise
political elite. The latter, in turn, were now seen as men brought up “in idleness, dis-
sipation and extravagance,” as the Jeﬀersonians referred to the Federalist gentry.145
Leisure was increasingly associated with idleness, rather than with independence and
public spiritedness; and salaried work, in turn, with industriousness rather than with
dependence. Furthermore, many salaried workers in the cities showed to be much
better informed and more engaged in politics than the landowning gentry in the
countryside, despite their not being propertied whatsoever in the classical sense.
Let us turn now to the case of paupers. As wage labor gained respectability
workers began to speak out against census suﬀrage and to claim for suﬀrage ex-
tensions, which were actually granted though only gradually. In numerous states,
constitutional conventions aimed at amending suﬀrage qualiﬁcations and extending
the vote were called in the 1820s, ’30s and ’40s. Eventually, a majority of states
replaced their property owning qualiﬁcations either with taxpaying qualiﬁcations or
with provisions for white manhood suﬀrage. However, except for the new Western
states, most of them also included provisions for pauper exclusion. The rationale
for these provisions was no other than the independence argument. In the 1831
142 Quoted in Steinfeld, “Property and Suﬀrage in the Early American Republic,” p. 364.
143 Cicero, De Oﬁciis, trans. W. Miller (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1913), I. XLII.
144 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, .
145 Quoted in Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, p. 278.
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Delaware convention, for example, the committee which added a pauper exclusion to
the taxpaying qualiﬁcation—in eﬀect since 1792—explained to the convention that
Paupers who live on the public funds and who were under the direction of
others, who might control their wills, ought not to be permitted to vote.146
The same applied to women, native Americans and blacks, who with few exceptions
would still have to wait long to enjoy voting rights. In addition to purely sexist and
racist motivations, the independence argument was frequently used. At the 1821 New
York convention, for example, a delegate opposed black suﬀrage because blacks were
“incapable, in my judgment, of exercising that privilege with any sort of discretion,
prudence, or independence.”147
1.3.3.2. Equality of rights
According to the ﬁrst line of thought presented above, wage workers demanded
suﬀrage not because they claimed to have natural voting rights, but on their being
materially independent. That is, although the notion of material independence was
dramatically restated in the decades after the revolution, it kept its standing as a
necessary condition for enjoying full citizenship. However, the very idea of material
independence as a necessary condition for enjoying full citizenship did not go without
challenge.
The ideal of equality embraced in the Declaration of Independence had such a
powerful normative force and contagious eﬀect that everyone found in it an intelli-
gible language to express their demands.148 Hence, the unpropertied, who had been
considered likely to be inﬂuenced and thus unable to have their own judgment, were
now demanding the franchise not only qua owners of their labor force but just qua
equals. That is, they demanded their rights not only on the basis that having a job
made them independent, or that their paying taxes made them full members of the
community. Rather, they argued that they should be granted political rights despite
their having a job or paying taxes. Put simply,
Equality of rights.—All members of the political community are worth being
granted full citizenship despite their being materially independent or not.
Suﬀrage extensions thus followed the path towards granting full citizenship despite
owning property or not—rather than extending full citizenship by granting property
to everyone, as Jeﬀerson had put forward in the 1770s. The link between property
and democracy would thus dissolve as a consequence of the increasingly widespread
equality of treatment. Likewise, material independence gradually ceased to be seen
as a necessary condition for full citizenship. Even though this did not aﬀect slaves
and native Americans—two issues that would have still to wait long—, once the
suﬀrage had been extended, it seemed increasingly unjustiﬁed to exclude women and
146 Quoted in Steinfeld, “Property and Suﬀrage in the Early American Republic,” p. 362.
147 Quoted in Keyssar, The Right to Vote, p. 45.
148 The beginning of the Declaration read as follows: “We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”
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the poor, as John Adams had anticipated with fear. “The same reasoning which
will induce you to admit all men who have no property, to vote ... will prove that
you ought to admit women and children; for, generally speaking, women and children
have as good judgments, and are as independent minds, as those men who are wholly
destitute of property.”149
Wood reports, for example, that employees increasingly hesitated to call their
employers “master” or “mistress.” Rather, they called them “boss,” a derivation of
the Dutch word for master, as an euphemistic substitute. And this shift also took
place the other way around. For example, a minister of Maine used the euphemism
“help” for a domestic maid because, unlike the word “servant,” it implied “a sense of
independence and hope of rising in the world.”150 Political rights would be claimed
now on the basis of having equal rights rather than on being owner of property.
As we have already seen (supra, §1.3.2.3), the common sense of the many or-
dinary and unpropertied people had been opposed to the political expertise of the
propertied few. Nondemocratic republican political thought had seen the latter as a
model for public spiritedness and virtuous citizenship. And denounced the former,
on the contrary, for their being materially dependent and therefore self-interested
and politically unable. Now, by contrast, property ceased to be seen as a “proof of
superior virtue, discernment, or patriotism” because every man was considered to
have not only a share in the common sense required to take part in public aﬀairs
but also a right to do so, even though the formal acknowledgment of such equality
would have still to wait long.151
1.3.3.3. Two liberal positions
The two changes in the deﬁnition of material independence analyzed in this sec-
tion—the self-ownership and the equality of rights positions—had political impli-
cations that departed from the nondemocratic republican position presented above
(supra, §1.2.3). But they did so very diﬀerently. The proponents of the self-ownership
position still accepted the formal structure of the argument put forward by non-
democratic republicans. Although they redeﬁned what being materially indepen-
dent meant—thus including wage earners as materially independent—, they also
accepted that, as a matter of fact, not everyone was independent—most notably,
paupers, women, native Americans and blacks—and thus worth being granted full
citizenship.
By contrast, the proponents of the equality of rights position departed dramati-
cally from both nondemocratic republicans and the proponents of the self-ownership
position. Contrary to the conclusion reached by both of them, they did accept, as a
matter of principle, that
(B3*) Everyone ought to be granted full citizenship.
149 Quoted in Keyssar, The Right to Vote, p. 1.
150 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 346.
151 Strum, “Property Qualiﬁcations and Voting Behavior in New York, 1807-1816,” p. 359.
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But they did so by dropping premise (B1) altogether—i.e. by defending that full
citizenship be granted to every member of the political community despite their
being materially independent or not.
It is noteworthy that, however separated in this period, proponents of the self-ownership
and of the equality of rights positions, would eventually ﬁnd a path of convergence.
The former had helped restate the notion of material independence so wage workers
could qualify as being independent and thus as worth being granted full citizenship
in contrast to paupers, women, Native Americans and blacks. However, as time went
by, it became clear that their distinction was a weak one—which would be attacked
on two basis. First, the distinction proved to be extremely vague in practical terms.
As Steinfeld points out, the existence of cyclical and seasonal unemployment and of
poor relief made technically diﬃcult to keep the two categories of the propertyless
but independent wage laborers, on the one hand, and of the dependent paupers, on
the other, sharply separated.152 Second, due to the increasing number of women
and blacks entering the labor market as wage laborers, the deﬁnition of material
independence as being actually salaried turned out to apply to virtually all workers.
Thus all workers, including women and blacks, could be said to own their own labor
force. Put diﬀerently, since virtually everyone turned out to be salaried, virtually
everyone could be taken to exchange their labor force in the market. Likewise, since
virtually everyone could be taken to own their labor force, virtually everyone could
be taken as worth being granted voting rights. In short, the link between material
independence and full citizenship gradually dissolved in practice, giving way to the
following uniﬁed tenet:
Equality of rights*.—All members of the political community are worth being
granted full citizenship, either because all of them are materially independent
due to their being owners of their labor force or because their being materially
independent or not is not relevant at all.
1.3.4. Republican democracy
In Gordon Wood’s inﬂuential account, the democratization process in America
can be explained as a shift from a classic and nondemocratic republican society, on
the one hand, toward a more modern and democratic liberal one, on the other. To
be sure, this is an account perfectly consistent with the one developed here. As we
have seen so far, as market economy evolved, ordinary people became more aware of
the plurality of interests within the American society and the theory of virtual repre-
sentation gradually lost its credibility. Once self-interestedness had been accepted as
an inevitable and even desirable economic and political disposition in modern Amer-
ica, it became increasingly diﬃcult for the members of the ruling elite to present
themselves as impartial and virtuous representatives and, in turn, ordinary people’s
demands for being actually rather than virtually represented became irresistible. In
a nutshell, the classical commitment to civic virtue gave way to the acceptance and
152 Steinfeld, “Property and Suﬀrage in the Early American republic,” pp. 370-374.
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even celebration of self-interestedness and, as Wood puts it, “such a view marked
and end to classical republicanism and the beginnings of liberal democracy.”153
However, a third way between nondemocratic republicanism and democratic lib-
eralism can be identiﬁed in the period studied—for the sake of simplicity, call it
democratic republicanism. Although the Federalists had very sharply opposed re-
publican government to democratic government, this distinction was rather artiﬁcial
and contrary to the more traditional view that republics could be either aristocratic
or democratic, as famously stated by Montesquieu.154 “Republics can be divided into
democraticks and aristocraticks,” had a Massachusetts writer put it in the aftermath
of the War.155 So, republican democrats of the period supported democracy without
embracing liberalism and embraced republican political theory without giving up
democracy. And they applied this thinking, at least, to the independence tenet
embraced by the former and rejected by the latter. Consider it in some detail
For democratic republicans the relationship between democracy and material
independence was a two-way one. They believed that, as a necessary condition of
democracy, “no citizen should be rich enough to buy another, and none so poor as
to be forced to sell himself,” as Rousseau had famously claimed.156 Put it simply,
democracy implied that two clauses had to be met, as it is clear from Rousseau’s
statement. Call them the minimum property and the maximum property clauses.
The former clause was deﬁned in absolute terms. For reasons already analyzed in
detail (supra, §1.3.4), democratic republicans accepted that material independence
served indeed as a necessary condition for freedom as non-domination—i.e. premise
(B1) above—, just as nondemocratic republicans, such as the Federalists, did.
(B1) Only those who are materially independent ought to be granted full
citizenship.157
But since, contrary to their nondemocratic foes (but equally to the liberal democratic
ones), they also considered that, as a matter of principle, it should be the case that
(B3*) Everyone ought to be granted full citizenship,
They concluded that
(B2*) Everyone ought to be materially independent.
Hence, the few republican democrats who defended this position stood up against
both democratic liberals and nondemocratic republicans. Contrary to democratic
153 Wood, The Radicalism of the American revolution, p. 296.
154 See C.-L. Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, Laurent Versini, ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1995),
Book 3.
155 Quoted in Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, p. 9.
156 J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968),
p. 96.
157 Material independence was considered a necessary condition for full citizenship. But, as
Gundersen points out, it was not considered suﬃcient also, for many single women did own property
and could meet property qualiﬁcations yet not enjoyed voting rights. See J. R. Gundersen, “Inde-
pendence, Citizenship, and the American Revolution,” Signs 13 (1987): 59-77, p. 65. Harrington
had already expressed this non-biconditionality when he stated that “The man that cannot live
upon his own must be a servant; but he that can live upon his own may be a freeman.” Harrington,
The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics, p. 269.
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liberals, they did accept that material independence was a necessary condition for
full citizenship. And, contrary to nondemocratic republicans, they also accepted
that full citizenship—and thus material independence—should be guaranteed to as
many citizens as possible. Even though it is not easy to apply the category to
actual policies and proposals put forward in the period, redistributive policies put
forward by radical republicans—including Thomas Paine, the Duane-Leib faction of
the Pennsylvania Jeﬀersonians or workingmen intellectuals such as Stephen Simpson
and Thomas Skidmore—could be seen as instances of this position158 Likewise, in her
admonition to her husband John Adams to “Remember the Ladies,” Abigail Adams
accepted the requirement of economic independence for political independence, yet
argued for a revision in married women’s property rights. According to Joan Gun-
dersen, “Because Abigail Adams accepted the belief that a voter needed economic
independence, voting rights were irrelevant to her until the married had control of
her own property.”159 More radically, representatives of workingmen of the like of
Stephen Simpson, Thomas Skidmore, and William Heighton responded to the novel
phenomena of industrialization and wage labor by arguing that no property relations
were legitimate if they allowed some to depend on others and that independence, in
turn, required redistribution of property.160 Hence, the Report of the Committee
of Fifty published in the the Working Man’s Advocate, the main organ of New York
Workingmen’s Party, argued for
‘AN EQUAL AMOUNT OF PROPERTY ON ARRIVING AT THE AGE
OF MATURITY, and previous thereto, EQUAL FOOD, CLOTHING, AND
INSTRUCTION AT THE PUBLIC EXPENSE.”161
But for democratic republicans the relationship between democracy and material
independence also worked the other way around, implying also the maximum prop-
erty clause. This latter clause was not deﬁned in absolute terms but in relative or
comparative ones. It was believed that, in a democracy, inequalities should not be
as large as to endanger political equality in decision making. This latter clause was
acknowledged by William Findley, when he stated in 1786 that Pennsylvania was
“too unequal in wealth to render a perfect democracy suitable to our circumstances
... If our wealth is less equal than our kind of government seems to require . . .
Democracy must fall before it.”162
As Andrew Shankman concludes commenting on Findley, for democratic repub-
licans “Perfect democracy required perfect equality, not just before the law but also
in wealth, in property.”163 It was believed that those concentrating large amounts
158 See Thomas Paine, “Agrarian Justice,” in Political Writings, Bruce Kuklick, ed. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Shankman, Crucible of American Democracy ; and A.
Gourevich, “The Unﬁnished Revolution: Freedom and Property in the Nineteenth Century Repub-
licanism,” unpublished draft, Brown University.
159 Gundersen, “Independence, Citizenship, and the American Revolution,” p. 75.
160 See Gourevitch, “The Unﬁnished Revolution,” esp. section II.
161 The Working Man’s Advocate, Saturday, October 31, 1829, 1.1, page 1. Quoted in Goure-
vitch, “The Unﬁnished Revolution,” p. 34.
162 W. Findley, Address to the Assembly, March 31, 1786, in Mathew Carey, ed., Debates &
Proceedings of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1786), p. 66.
163 Shankman, Crucible of American Democracy, p. 4.
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of property would otherwise be in a bargaining asymmetric position and would be
able thus to dominate the process of political decision-making. The debate be-
tween Robert Morris and William Findley over whether the Pennsylvania legislation
should recharter the Bank of America can be seen, thus, as a struggle between non-
democratic and democratic republicans rather than, as Wood has suggested, as one
between nondemocratic republicans and democratic liberals.164 Put brieﬂy, Findley
believed that, even if Pennsylvania was not perfectly equal in 1786, inequality was
not large enough yet to completely endanger democracy. No individual or group
possessed the wealth required to control the political decision-making process and
shape society to serve their private needs. The Bank of America, by contrast, was a
huge concentration of wealth and would be able thus to threaten democracy.
It is worth mentioning that the reasons put forward by democratic republicans to
embrace the independence tenet were very similar to those put forward by nondemo-
cratic republicans. As William Findley put it, when wealth was distributed in many
hands, “every man in the disposal of his own wealth, will act upon his own principles.
His virtue, his honour, his sympathy, and generosity, will inﬂuence his disposals and
designs, and he is in a state of personal responsibility.”165 Their argument was that,
in case everyone owned property enough not to depend on others to make a living,
they would have an incentive to monitor decisions made in the political sphere, be-
have responsibly toward the commonwealth and ensure the institutional conditions
required for their material independence and equality—among others, agrarian laws
and ﬁscal policies. The society of virtuous yeomen embraced by Jeﬀerson served as
an obvious ideal for them.
Note that, according to this conception, and contrary to what some contemporary
commentators have written about the republican tradition, civic virtue was by no
means intrinsically valued as a part of a broader conception of the good life (in con-
trast to what sometimes has been labeled as civic humanism or neo-Aristotelianism).
Well on the contrary, civic virtue and political participation were valued merely as
a means to secure citizens’ material independence, so they could behave as they
pleased without being under others people’s arbitrary will. As Skinner points out
when discussing this trend within republicanism—and most notably, Machiavelli’s
Discorsi—, “the writers I am considering never suggest that there are certain speciﬁc
goals we need to realise in order to count as being fully or truly in possession of our
liberty.”166
In short, if ownership of real estate was a necessary condition for being materially
independent and this, in turn, for having the epistemic and dispositional capacity
to take part in politics in a responsible way: Why not ensure that everyone owned
164 See A. Shankman, Crucible of American Democracy. The Struggle to Fuse Egalitarianism
& Capitalism in Jeﬀersonian Pennsylvania (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2004), pp.
3-9; Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, pp. 256-259; and Wood, “Interest and
desinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution,” in Beyond Confederation. Origins of the
Constitution and American National Identity, R. Beeman, S. Botein and E. Carter II, eds. (Chapell
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 69-109.
165 Findley, “Address to the Assembly,” March 31, 1786, p. 66.
166 Quentin Skinner, “The Paradoxes of Political Liberty,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human
Values, vol. 7 (Salt Lake City, The University of Utah Press, 1986), p. 233.
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property instead of excluding a large majority of the population from full citizen-
ship? This was the question democratic republicans posed to their nondemocratic
republican foes. And it was the question they attempted to answer by embracing
democracy without giving up the independence tenet, as liberal democrats did. Ob-
viously, this answer would have to be deeply reconsidered when the economic and
social circumstances of the American society dramatically changed as the nineteenth
century drew on and beyond. However, the tradition of democratic republicanism
has survived the test of time and is still well alive, as a number of recent politi-
cal proposals have shown, and as I will try to show in Part III, chapter 8, of the
dissertation as for the case of workplace democracy.167
167 Consider, for example, recent proposals to give a stake to every citizen as she reaches
maturity, or to provide a basic income to every citizen, which have sometimes been conscientiously
related to the tradition of democratic republicanism. As for the former, see B. Ackerman and A.
Alstott, The Stakeholder Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 11. As for the
latter, see Domènech and Raventós, “Property and Republican Freedom;” and D. Raventós, Basic
Income: The Material Conditions of Freedom (London, Pluto Press, 2007).

Chapter 2
Conceptual shift
2.1. Introduction
The previous chapter has attempted to show some of the social, political and
ideological changes behind the increasing acceptance of the idea of democracy, along
with the institutional devices traditionally attached to it, in the later decades of the
ratiﬁcation of the Constitution. These changes can be summarized as a shift from the
theory of virtual representation, still widely accepted in eighteenth-century America
to the theory of actual representation, increasingly supported in the ﬁrst half of the
nineteenth century. However, these changes do not fully explain why the Founders
openly referred to the American constitutional system as an undemocratic system
whereas in less than half a century virtually everyone—the heirs of the Federalists
included—turned out to refer to very much the same system as a perfectly demo-
cratic one. Democracy could have gained increasing support, but the institutional
arrangements included in the Constitution and enacted by the Federal government
were still very much those of 1787. How could it be that very much the same devices
turned out to be considered as perfectly democratic ones in less than half a century?
This chapter shows that, besides its increasing acceptance, the idea of democracy
also went through a semantic shift during the decades after the ratiﬁcation of the
Constitution. Although some features of the concept of democracy—and some of
the institutional devices associated to it—remained the same indeed, some others
changed. This helps to explain why the Federalists believed that the representative
government they put forward was not only diﬀerent from democracy but in fact a
very check against it. And it also helps to explain why, some decades later, virtually
everyone referred to very much the same system as an openly democratic one. In
a nutshell, what the Federalists meant by “democracy” by 1787 is not exactly what
the term turned out to mean half a century later. Likewise, the institutional devices
attached to the former concept and the latter concept also changed.1 This is why
John Adams, a harsh critique of democracy during the 1770s and 1780s, could write
in 1814 that
Democracy ... must not be disgraced; democracy must not be despised.
Democracy must be respected; democracy must be honored; democracy must
1 For full accounts of this shift see Morantz, “Democracy" and "Republic" in American Ideology ;
B. Laniel, Le mot "democracy" aux Etats-Unis de 1780 a 1856 (Saint-Etienne: Publications d e
l’Universite d e Saint-Etienne, 1995); and Dupuis-Deri, The Political Power of Words.
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be cherished; democracy must be an essential, an integral part of the sovereignty,
and have a control over the whole government.2
The chapter is divided into three sections, including this introduction. Section 2.2
shows the inﬂuence of classical anti-democratic republican thought over the use of
the term by the Federalists, its widespread derogatory sense during the 1780s and
the shift in its meaning and in the institutional devices traditionally attached to
it during the Jeﬀersonian and the Jacksonian periods. Next, section 2.3 compares
the early and the later concepts as for ﬁve key issues—representation and popular
sovereignty, feasibility, property rights, stability and the division of powers.
2.2. Brief history of the concept
This section brieﬂy traces the evolution of the concept from its rather derogatory
sense in the 1780s to its celebratory one ﬁfty years later. It does so by analyzing
three key steps. First, the inﬂuence of classic republicanism—on which the Founders
had been intellectually raised—over their conception of democracy (§2.2.1). Second,
Jeﬀerson’s presidency and the debate among Pennsylvania Jeﬀersonians over the
meaning and scope of democracy (§2.2.2). And, ﬁnally, Jacksonian democracy and
the second party system (§2.2.3).
2.2.1. The inﬂuence of the classics
The inﬂuence of the classics in eighteen-century America was everywhere. As
Wood has pointed out, classical inﬂuence was in the names of towns and streets,
such as Syracuse and Troy, the label of political institutions, such as the senates
and capitols, or the political pseudonyms, such as “Publius” and “Brutus.”3 And
so it did classical political thought—notably, classical republicanism—inﬂuence the
revolutionary gentry. They had been educated in a system that gave the classics a
central position and that had taught them how to read and write Latin, and often
also Greek, ﬂuently.4 As Noah Webster put it,
The minds of youth are perpetually led to the history of Greece and Rome
or to Great Britain; boys are constantly repeating the declamations of De-
mosthenes and Ciciero or debates upon some political question in the British
parliament.5
2 Adams to John Taylor. Quoted in Dupuis-Déri, The Political Power of Words, p. 242.
3 G. S. Wood, “Comment on Galston Paper,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 66 (1990): 69-72, p.
72.
4 The medieval “trivium” (rhetoric, logic and grammar) and “quadrivium” (arithmetic, music,
geometry, and astronomy) would dominate Western curricula until the nineteenth century. Far from
abolishing the standard classical studies, the Protestant Reformation had only added programs to
promote literacy in the vernacular languages. See Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the Classics:
Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment (Cambridge, Ma., Harvard University Press, 1994),
p. 20.
5 Quoted in Richard, The Founders and the Classics, p. 13.
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The evidence showing the use of the classics—and notably of the classic republican
authors—by the revolutionary gentry is vast.6 Jeﬀerson shipped from Paris copies of
Polybius and sets of ancient authors to James Madison. While chairing a committee
aimed at suggesting books for the congressmen, Madison put Aristotle’s Politics in
the top of his own list. John Adams insistently repeated that the best of Machiavelli,
Harrington, Sidney, Locke and Montesquieu came from the classics, notably, Aristo-
tle, Cicero and Polybius. James Wilson described the perils of the Shays Rebellion
after Horace, by saying that “We walked on ashes concealing ﬁre beneath our feet.”7
And so on and so forth.
Unsurprisingly, the inﬂuence of the classics also inﬂuenced their concept of democ-
racy. So they inherited the rather derogatory sense that the concept had had for
classic republicans such as Aristotle, Polybius or Cicero. This is relevant for present
purposes. Since their relationship with actual democracies was more theoretical than
practical, the classical inﬂuence provides a key reason to explain why the Founders
could be so hostile toward democracy.
The term had been barely used in the colonies, at least in the daily language of
ordinary people. Only the educated gentry used it, but even in these cases, as “a
technical term of political theory.”8 According to Roy Lokken,
there was no controversy over the meaning of the term “democracy” in
colonial America as there is today. The colonists gave little thought to it,
and the word seldom appeared in their political writings, speeches, sermons,
public papers, and private correspondence ... Their understanding of the term
was derived from classical writers, specially Aristotle and Cicero.9
Now, when the term began to be more widely used in the 1770s and 1780s, the
Federalists took advantage of its derogatory sense and insistently used it to label
and thus discredit their adversaries. The latter, in turn, generally hesitated to use
it to label themselves, and even when they did so—as Wordsworth in 1794 when he
wrote that “I am of that odious class of men called democrats”—, it was used in a
deﬁant manner, which shows how discredited the term was.10
Hansen has attributed this derogatory sense of the idea of democracy to a mis-
characterization of the Athenian democracy inherited from the sources used by the
Founders and other members of the educated gentry of the time. These included,
most notably, Aristotle’s Politics, Plato’s dialogues (specially the Statesman and
the Republic, books 8-9) and Polybius Histories, book 6. As Hansen concludes,
“Aristotle’s misleading and and Plutarch’s distorted picture of Athenian democracy
6 See notably Richard, The Founders and the Classics; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment ;
and Wood, The Creation of the American Republic.
7 R. M. Gummere, “The Classical Politics of John Adams,” Boston Public Library Quarterly
9 (1957): 167–182, and “The Classical Ancestry of the United States Constitution,” American
Quarterly 14 (1962): 3-18.
8 Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution), p. 243. See also R. R. Palmer, “Notes
on the Use of the Word ’Democracy’ 1789-1799,” Political Science Quarterly 68 (1953): 203-226,
pp. 207 and 212.
9 Roy N. Lokken, “The Concept of Democracy in Colonial Political Thought,” The William
and Mary Quarterly 16, no. 4 (Oct., 1959), 568-580, p. 570.
10 Quoted in Palmer, “Notes on the Use of the Word ’Democracy’ 1789-1799,” p. 207.
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obscured the Enlightenment’s understanding of classical Athens.”11 Rome was taken
as a model rather than Athens—and so the Founders set up a Senate that met on the
Capitol rather than a Council of the Aeropagus. And when Athens was mentioned
positively, the reference was Solon—who was considered to had established a mixed
and balanced government—rather than Cleisthenes, Pericles or Demosthenes—who
were held up, as Hansen points out, “as a bugbear to warn popular champions of
popular rule against excesses of democracy.”12
Not until the nineteenth century, with the rise of history as a separate scholarly
discipline, would Athenian democracy be more accurately studied and its previous
mischaracterization gradually abandoned. Then the principal sources referred to
would be no longer Plato and Aristotle, but rather Herodotus, Thucydides, Demos-
thenes and, after its discovery in 1879, Aristotle’s Constitution of the Athenians.
Accordingly, the previous negative view of Athenian democracy would be substi-
tuted by a more positive one. However, in eighteenth-century America, the concept
of democracy was still dramatically inﬂuenced by “the anti-Athenian tradition which
the Founders imbibed at an early age.”13
2.2.2. Jeﬀersonian democracy
A strong opposition to the Federalists and their policies had emerged within
Washington’s government as early as his ﬁrst oﬃce term. An opposition that pro-
voked a crisis within the Federal government, the creation of the Republican party
and, eventually, Jeﬀerson’s presidential oﬃce-holding in 1801. The Federalists re-
acted by labeling the the Jeﬀersonians as “democrats” to discredit them. As an
instance of this, Hamilton denounced Jeﬀerson for being “too much in earnest with
his democracy.”14 However, as we have already seen in section1.3.1.3), far from
rejecting the label, the Jeﬀersonians began using it.
They did so, among other things, to distinguish themselves from the Federalists.
Since “federalism” had become a byword for repression and anti-republicanism, for
elitism and privilege, the latter were now avoiding to refer to themselves as “feder-
alists” and were stressing their republicanism. In 1801 the Federal-Republicans of
Pennsylvania even dropped the term “Federal” from their name and they introduced
themselves merely as “Republicans” from that moment on. As a consequence of this
abuse, “republican” turned out to be increasingly emptied of an accurate meaning
and Jeﬀersonians began labeling themselves as democrats to distinguish themselves
from the Federalists. At that point the ideological battle was between the republican
faction and the democratic faction. This shows that “democratic” was still a label
for the movements associated to ordinary people’s interests—in contrast to those of
the gentry—, rather than a label for the American political system as a whole.
11 M. H. Hansen, “The Tradition of the Athenian Democracy A. D. 1750-1990,” Greece & Rome
39 (1992): 14-30, p. 19.
12 Hansen, “The Tradition of the Athenian Democracy A. D. 1750-1990,” p. 18.
13 Richard, The Founders and the Classics, p. 124.
14 Quoted in Dupuis-Déri, The Political Power of Words, p. 227.
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But the Jeﬀersonians used also another and more subtle strategy. They began
referring not only to themselves as democrats, but also to the American political
system as a whole as a democracy. So, when a group of Federalists founded The
Republican or Anti-Democrat in Baltimore in 1801, the editors of the Philadelphia
Aurora—the most widely read Jeﬀersonian organ in the nation—immediately replied.
Now, instead of defending Jeﬀersonians from the usual charges of being democrats,
they argued that it was the very American political system, and not only the Jeﬀer-
sonians, which was a democracy:
Republic does not so precisely deﬁne the nature of our government, as
democracy ... Democracy therefore especially designates our government than
republic—as it literally declares ... that all power is from, and all sovereignty
centers in, the people, the democracy.15
Three issues stand out here. First, by doing this, the Aurora editors were turning a
dispute over the features of a political faction—the Jeﬀersonians—into a dispute over
the features of the American political system as a whole This clever move left the
Jeﬀersonians—who were the democrats—in the advantageous position of speaking
not on behalf of a faction among others, but on the very behalf of America as a whole.
As Dupuis-Déri points out, “Here the political-linguistic strategy of the Aurora was
not only to stand as ’Democrats,’ but even to label the regime of the United States
with the name ’Democracy.” ’16
The Jeﬀersonians were eventually very successful in moving the issue in this di-
rection, as the subsequent replies of The Republican or Anti-Democrat show. “Those
who attempt to convince the people of the United States,” read a later issue, “that
they already live under a democracy, that curse of republics, that volcano of licen-
tiousness, that gulph of liberty, that proliﬁc mother of faction, cruelty, injustice,
sedition ... and tyranny ... do nothing but harm ... The Constitution of the United
States is far removed from a democracy ... It is a republic.”
Second, the use of the term in the editorial of the Aurora departed radically from
ordinary references to the American constitutional system in the 1780s. To be sure,
many had accepted that some parts of the system were democratic or at least more
democratic than others—notably, the House of Representatives in contrast to the
Senate or the presidential oﬃce. But virtually no one had dared to label the whole
system as a democratic system before. Now, the whole system was to be labeled as
democratic by the Aurora editors. And that this move was eventually successful is
showed by the fact that many used the term in this sense in the years to follow. As
Elias Smith would state in 1809,
The government adopted here is a DEMOCRACY.17
Third, by identifying democracy with popular sovereignty the editors of Aurora were
also departing from the distinction between the former and the latter widely assumed
15 Aurora, September 18, 1802.
16 Quoted in Dupuis-Déri, The Political Power of Words, p. 227.
17 Quoted in Dupuis-Deri, The Political Power of Words, p. 241.
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in the 1770s and 1780s, as it will become clear later (infra, §2.3.1). As Dupuis-Déri
has points out, in the late eighteenth century “ ‘democracy’ and ‘popular sovereignty’
were by no means thought of as coextensive.”18 Even further, as Shankman puts
it, “in fact, the declaration of popular sovereignty had done much to undermine
arguments for direct majority governance.”19
The clever move of the Aurora succeeded in identifying the American system
with a democracy and democracy, in turn, with the Jeﬀersonians themselves. This
improved both the previously derogatory use of “democracy” and the position of
the Jeﬀersonians in the political debate. But not everyone among the Jeﬀersonians
was convinced by the idea of democracy the editors of the Aurora were putting
forward. Jeﬀersonians had remained united while they shared a credible common
enemy. But, as soon as they defeated the Federalists and Jeﬀerson got to oﬃce in
1801, a harsh internal debate triggered among them. Among other many issues,
over the desirability of democracy and its implications not only regarding the de-
vices for political decision-making and the enfranchisement of the citizenry, but also
regarding highly controversial issues, such as property, employment contracts, and
the organization of the economy. As Andrew Shankman has shown, this debate was
especially vivid (and enlightening for present purposes) between the more radical
Jeﬀersonians of Pennsylvania and the more moderate ones. The former were to be
known as the Duane-Leib faction (after William Duane and Michael Leib, their two
most outstanding leaders), the Aurora-men, the Jacobins, or the Malcontents. The
latter, on the other hand, were known as the Rising Sun Party (after the tavern
where they ﬁrst met in 1802), the Third Party, the Tertium Quids, or simply the
Quids.20
The idea of democracy put forward by the Malcontents (as I will refer to them
from now on) was hardly at odds with the one used by the Federalists to discredit
their Antifederalist foes ﬁfteen years before. As for the system of checks and balances,
they leaded the attack on the senate, on the governor’s patronage and veto power
and, most notably, on the judiciary, demanding the impeachment of several judges
in Pennsylvania—some of them being successful—and putting forward a system of
arbitration as a substitute of courts.21 Put brieﬂy, their argument against an inde-
pendent judiciary was that such an institution was unnecessary in a democracy—and
even in contradiction with it. Judicial independence, Aurora argued, made perfect
sense in Britain, in order to protect judges from the arbitrary interference of an
obviously illegitimate power—the crown. However, in a democracy, judges could not
be “independent of the control of free people” and, interestingly for present purposes,
18 Francis Dupuis-Déri, “The Political Power of Words: The Birth of Pro-democratic Discourse
in the Nineteenth Century in the United States and France,” Political Studies 52 (2004): 118-134,
p. 121.
19 A. Shankman, “Malcontents and Tertium Quids: The Battle to Deﬁne Democracy in Jeﬀer-
sonian Philadelphia,” The Journal of the Early Republic 19 (1999): 43-71.
20 See Shankman, “Malcontents and Tertium Quids: The Battle to Deﬁne Democracy in Jef-
fersonian Philadelphia;” and Shankman, Crucible of American Democracy.
21 Between 1803 and 1806 the state legislatures passed some forms of arbitration legislation,
though all of them were vetoed by the Jeﬀersonian governor Thomas McKean afterward. See
Shankman, “Malcontents and Tertium Quids,” p. 56.
2.2. Brief history of the concept 81
much less so regarding the review of the constitutionality of the statutes passed by
the legislature, which was seen as a blatantly undemocratic measure.22 In addition
to this, the judges had been able to invoke English-inspired common law to shape
the economic and social landscape and, more precisely, had interpreted it—including
the common law of real estate—in ways protective of capitalist development.23
The Malcontents were not against commerce—and actually promoted it. But
they believed that, unless properly constrained by the democratic legislatures, com-
merce would serve the interests of the few, enlarging their fortunes, reinforcing their
position in the political decision-making process and eventually downsizing democ-
racy.24 For them, democracy had a two-way relationship with the economy. On
the one hand, it required economic equality to function properly and, on the other,
it served as a means to keep economic inequalities under control. They were not
concerned with economic inequality per se, but rather with the pernicious eﬀects of
economic inequality in creating political inequality and, in turn, with the eﬀect of
political inequality in enlarging economic inequality. In short, they did not demand
economic equality by itself, but as a precondition of democracy. By subordinat-
ing private property to democracy—instead of the other way around—, democratic
decision-making guaranteed a great degree of economic equality—what they used
to refer to as the “happy mediocrity of condition.” And preserving and promoting
this happy mediocrity of condition was, in turn, “our greatest security and our best
preservative against the gradual approaches of arbitrary power.”25 If large economic
inequalities arose, a lack of democracy would be the cause; and more democracy,
thus, the solution.
The demands of the Aurora to undo the separation of powers, in addition to
Michael Leib’s eﬀorts to present these demands as representative of the Pennsyl-
vania Jeﬀersonians in the House of Representatives—of which he was a member—,
made dissenting Jeﬀersonian speak out and organize themselves against the Malcon-
tents. By doing this, the Quids—as they would be known by their foes—not only
tried to inﬂuence the policies of Jeﬀerson’s party qua Jeﬀersonians but also intended
to inﬂuence what democracy meant and implied qua democrats. They knew that
appeals to democracy increasingly served to mobilize the electorate. So, instead of
giving up the democratic label with which the Federalists had tried to discredit them,
they claimed that they were—and not the Malcontents, who had monopolized the
term hitherto—the true democrats. Accordingly, they denounced how the Malcon-
tents had misunderstood and misused democracy in their newly edited Freeman’s
Journal.26 If Malcontents’ “intemperate conduct [were] countenanced by the Repub-
22 Aurora, March 7, 1803, p. 31. Quoted in Shankman, “Malcontents and Tertium Quids.” p.
53.
23 Mainly, by promoting developmental use and free exchange of property, in contrast to the
jurisprudence of the ﬁrst half or the eighteenth century, which had constrained the alienation and
transfer of real property. See Shankman, “Malcontents and Tertium Quids,” pp. 51 ss.
24 On the relationship between democracy and economic inequality see infra §2.3.3.
25 Aurora, May 27, 1805. Quoted in Shankman, Crucible of American Democracy, p. 260.
26 The original name of the newspaper was the Philadelphia Evening Post, but they quickly
changed it due to its shared name with the Hamiltonian New York Evening Post.
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licans as orthodox democracy,” the Quids argued, American politics would remain
indeﬁnitely turbulent.27
The idea of democracy put forward by the Quids was in clear contrast to the idea
of democracy the Malcontents had successfully put forward hitherto. The Quids
emphasized the division of powers and individual and property rights in the place of
majority rule. True, they were not the ﬁrst ones who defended the former against
the latter. However, they were very innovative in that they did so in the name of
democracy itself. According to them, the Malcontents had obliterated “the just and
wise lines of distinction which have been marked out for diﬀerent branches of our
government.”28 And, by doing so, they had distorted the true meaning of democracy.
Not so much because a properly functioning democracy had to be constrained (by
property rights and a system of checks and balances), but rather because such con-
straints were part of the very conditions of a proper democracy. So, if the Malcontents
attacked the judiciary as being potentially at odds with democratic decision-making,
the Quids replied by emphasizing the importance of removing some issues from the
control of the legislatures for the proper functioning of democracy. They maintained
thus that
the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited con-
stitution, against legislative encroachments. The exercise of power ... implies
nothing more than that the people are superior to the legislature, and that
the judiciary, as a coordinate branch of government ... is bound to regard
the will of the people, as expressed in the constitution, in preference of the
legislative body.29
In turn, by 1805 the Malcontents had begun to call into question the very nature
of constitutions, arguing that they were aristocratic and undemocratic documents,
resulting “from a disposition to controul future time.”30 A position that was used by
the Quids—who reacted by creating the Society of Constitutional Republicans—to
point out the radicalism of the Malcontents’ deﬁnition of democracy, which would
put “life, liberty, and property in danger of being cast aﬂoat on the boisterous sea
of anarchy.”31 And rather successfully argued that democracy had to respect, as a
matter of deﬁnition, property rights, the normative precedence of the Constitution,
and a clear division of powers—interestingly for present purposes, including the inde-
pendence of the judiciary and judicial review by the Supreme Court. The contrary,
they argued, was not democracy but “Jacobinism” and “turbulence”—which were the
epithets that had been traditionally used to discredit democracy. Revolutionarily
enough, the Quids were now using these epithets not to label what democracy was
but to label what democracy was not—and ought not to be.
27 Quoted in Shankman, Crucible of American Democracy, p. 102.
28 Evening Post, February 21, 1804. Quoted in Shankman, “Malcontents and Tertium Quids,”
p. 60.
29 Shankman, Crucible of American Democracy. p. 133.
30 Aurora, March 21, 1805. Quoted in Shankman, “Malcontents and Tertium Quids,” p. 62.
31 Freeman’s Journal, August 31, 1805. Quoted in Shankman, “Malcontents and Tertium
Quids,” p. 64.
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2.2.3. Jacksonian democracy
The eventual dissolution of the Federalist party in 1815 brought a period of
relative ideological calm regarding the use and meaning of “democracy.” A period
that would not end until the emergence of the second party system in the late 1820s,
when Andrew Jackson very successfully used democracy as a battle-cry.
After having been defeated by John Quincy Adams in the presidential contest
of 1824, Jackson decided to run again in 1828. But now he distinguished himself
from other candidates by labeling himself as a democrat rather than as a republi-
can—which was the label used by all the remaining candidates and the one Jackson
himself had used hitherto. Certainly, Jackson’s use of “democracy” to label himself
was not merely strategic. However, his success in the running for presidential oﬃce in
1828 had indirect consequences for the dramatic extension of the term “democracy”
in the American political jargon and also for its very meaning. A number of events
behind this extension stand out.
First of all, it is worth pointing out that during the 1820s “democracy” had
lost almost all its previous derogatory sense—even though it had still not gained
the undisputed acceptance it would enjoy later and that some could still claim, as
the Richmond Whig did in 1834, that under Jackson’s presidency “The Republic has
degenerated into a democracy.”32 In general, few believed democracy to be unfeasible
or unstable, nor incompatible with individual rights, as it had been usually claimed
for more than two thousand years. In clear contrast to the previous generation of
the Founders, the political elites during the Jacksonian era had received little if any
education in classical political theory and were free from its anti-democratic inﬂuence.
As Mogens Hansen points out, “the leading Jacksonian democrats were middle-class
business men with little education in general and none in classics.”33 Furthermore,
Many Jacksonians were even hostile to the classics and classical education, which
had served hitherto as a proxy for distinguishing the gentleman from the common
man, and was at odds with the new egalitarian-minded and often anti-intellectual
Jacksonian era. It was usual, for example, to count Jackson’s lack of classical educa-
tion among his virtues.34 Hence, their conception of democracy did not come from
the classics, but rather from their own political experience—most notably, from
Jeﬀersonian politics under which virtually everyone took shelter at that time.
The emergence of the second party system would not only spread this positive
sense of democracy, but would also legitimize the existence of opposed parties with
diﬀerent agendas as a common democratic practice. During the ﬁrst party system
both the Federalists and the Republicans had continued to present themselves as
representatives of the shared interests of the nation as a whole. Thus, it was rather
usual for them to denounce each other for having betrayed the republican principles
on which virtually everyone relied at the time. By contrast, due to the harsh compe-
tition during the second party system Americans slowly came to accept the existence
32 Quoted in Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, p. 425.
33 Hansen, “The Tradition of the Athenian Democracy A. D. 1750-1990,” p. 26.
34 See Edwin A. Miles, “The Young American Nation and the Classical World,” Journal of the
History of Ideas 35, no. 2 (April - June, 1974), 259-274, pp. 264-265.
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of diﬀerent candidates with diﬀerent agendas as a legitimate fact of American politics.
The fact of disagreement and political competition replaced the organic tenet that
had been so powerful during the ﬁrst party system. In short, democracy not only
gained wide support but was also associated with the institutional system of polit-
ical competition between increasingly professionalized and large-scale campaigning
parties. In an almost unprecedent commentary, Van Buren—the brains behind the
Jacksonians and successor of Jackson as president—cherished party competition and
deﬁned it as “a complete antidote for sectional prejudices by producing counteracting
feelings.”35
In this context of increasing competition Jackson not only labelled himself as a
democrat, but actually labeled the party itself as the “Democratic Party” and even-
tually just as “the Democracy.”36 As a matter of strategy, this served to distinguish
himself from other candidates—namely, John Quincy Adams ﬁrst and Henry Clay
later—and to show a higher responsiveness to the ordinary people than the other
candidates. Certainly, the strategy was in line with the social and political changes
of the period and Jackson’s own political agenda. Not only did many states called
for constitutional conventions and extended the franchise, but also the participation
rate increased dramatically. For example, turnout in presidential elections, had been
only 27 percent in 1824. By contrast, it soared to 57 percent in 1828 and to 80
percent in 1834.37 Even though an ample majority of the population would remain
disenfranchised—at least, until the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870,
the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965—, it was widely believed that America was indisputably
democratic.38 Right before passing away in 1826, Jeﬀerson had already stated the
“[w]e of the United States ... are constitutionally and conscientiously democrats.”39
And the Atlantic Monthly would write in 1872 that “the democratic principle ...
reached its culmination about 1850.”40
Thus, it is hardly surprising thus Jackson’s political agenda could gain the support
he received. Explicitly supported by Jeﬀerson himself before his death, Jackson—a
former general in the war of 1812—promoted short terms and rotation in oﬃce,
supported (moderate) suﬀrage extensions, fought the Bank of America by vetoing
its rechartering in 1834 and, more generally, represented the access of the ordinary
and humble man to the higher levels of the decision-making process. “The reign of
35 Van Buren to Thomas Ritchie, 1827. Quoted in A. James Reichley, The Life of Parties. A
History of American Political Parties (Maryland, Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 1992), p. 73.
36 “One of the ... parties has undergone various changes of name,” wrote the New York Evening
Post rather apologetically in an editorial in 1834, “the other has continued steadfast alike to its
appellation and to its principles is now, as it was at ﬁrst, the Democracy.” Quoted in Laniel, Le
mot "democracy" aux Etats-Unis de 1780 a 1856, p. 226.
37 See Reichley, The Life of the Parties, p. 84.
38 In his account of the American democracy, Tocqueville famously acknowledged this inconsis-
tency—advancing, for example, that the exclusion of the black population would be one of the most
problematic issues in the future—, but resolved it stating that “once a people begins to interfere
with the voting qualiﬁcation, one can be sure that sooner or later it will abolish it altogether.” De
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 52.
39 Quoted in Dupuis-Déri, The Political Power of Words, p. 227.
40 Keyssar, The Right to Vote, p. 63.
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KING MOB seemed triumphant,” famously stated Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Story regarding Jackson’s multitudinous arrival to the White House in 1829.41 How-
ever, just as he promoted measures as the ones mentioned above, Jackson and the
Jacksonians also strengthened central government, went back to colonial practices
such as patronage and made extensive use of the executive veto. And, interestingly
for present purposes, they did so in the name of democracy.42 As Wood puts it,
Jacksonianism did not create democracy in America. But it legitimated
it; it restrained and controlled it and reconciled Americans to it. It did so by
infusing into American democracy more elements of monarchy than even the
Federalists had dared to try. The Jacksonians did this, however, in the midst
of the most enthusiastic democratic rhetoric that any modern country had
ever experienced. Consequently, the centralizing and consolidating aspects of
the Jacksoninan revolution have been obscured and generally lost to us.43
Only slowly did National Republicans began to react to the hegemony of the Jack-
sonians. It was after Jackson’s war on the Bank of America in 1834 when they
reorganized themselves in a new party that brought together former National Re-
publicans, conservative Democrats and a number of disperse state parties. They
named themselves as the Whig Party, a label that had been previously adopted by
Southern planters—who advocated the rights of the states and thus hesitated to call
themselves National Republicans—and was commonly associated to both the revolu-
tionary uprising against the British crown—in contrast to the Tories, the supporters
of the Crown during the rebellion and later revolution—and the British Whigs of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The British Whigs and the American Whig
Party were far from having coincident ideological positions though. For example, the
former had traditionally supported the House of the Commons against the House of
the Lords„ while the latter defended a strong senate as “pre-eminently a conservative
branch of the federal government.”44 Thus, a Democrat could observe, not without
sarcasm, that through “metempsychosis ... ancient TORIES now call themselves
WHIGS.”45
As their next step, the Whigs began mimicking Jacksonian campaign techniques
and also calling themselves “democrats,” as Van Buren had perceptively predicted in
1834, when he ironically wrote that “I almost begin to pity the poor Whigs. Their
next cognomen will be Democrats.”46 The Whigs had adequately recognized that the
Democrats had “in their own name, a tower of strength.”47 And they believed that it
would be diﬃcult to defeat them while they monopolized its use. As senator William
41 Quoted in Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, p. 312.
42 See Marvin Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion. Politics & Belief (Stanford, Stanfor Uni-
versity Press, 1957), pp. 250-252.
43 Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, p. 302.
44 Quoted in Reichley, The Life of Parties, p. 79.
45 Quoted in Reichley, The Life of Parties, p. 79.
46 Quoted in Morantz, “Democracy” and “Republic” in American Ideology, p. 243. A joke not
without irony, since in 1840 Van Buren would be defeated in his running for a second oﬃce term,
by one of those “poor Whigs” now turned democrats—namely, William Henry Harrison.
47 Quoted in Morantz, “Democracy” and “Republic” in American Ideology, p. 237.
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H. Seward wrote in a letter to a friend, “It is utterly impossible, I am convinced, to
defeat Van Buren. The people are for him. Not so much for him as for the principle
they suppose he represents. That principle is Democracy.”48
Even though some Whigs still hesitated to embrace the democratic rhetoric,49
some of them like Seward and Thurlow Weed began publicly labeling themselves as
“democrats.” Even if the policies they put forward were dubiously democratic in
the classic sense, the Whigs had little more alternative if they wanted to present
themselves as a credible and strong electoral alternative to the Jacksonians. So they
denounced the despotic tendencies of Van Buren’s executive, organized “democratic
clubs,” introduced their candidate—William Henry Harrison—as the “poor man can-
didate” and the “people’s candidate,” and claimed insistently that they were the “true
democrats, the real friends of the people.”50 As the Boston Quarterly Review reported
in 1838,
It is well known that for the last two years the Whigs have, to some extent,
claimed to be democrats; and it is equally well known, because they themselves
have acknowledged it, that they claim to be democrats only because they
regard the people as so attached to the name, that they will not vote for a
party which does not bear it.51
Given the increasing popularity of “democracy,” the best option for the Whigs would
have been that the Jacksonians hesitated to adopt the term to label themselves.
As it is shown in the matrix below, that would have kept the Whigs in a similar
position to that of the Jacksonians, since the latter would not have beneﬁted from
using the now very appealing label—which ﬁtted well their political agenda—and
the former would not have been damaged by not using it—since the label did not ﬁt
their political agenda so well.
Jacksonians not “democrats” Jacksonians “democrats”
Whigs not “democrats” 0, 0 0, 1
Whigs “democrats” — 1, 0
Table 1. Whigs and Jacksonians on self-labelling as “democrats”
However, once the Jacksonians had seen the beneﬁts in exploiting the term and
had begun doing so, the initial tie situation was broken. Then, the Whigs could
not fall behind and had the incentive to start using it as well. No doubt this was
a hazardous strategy for them, since they would have to bear for a while the costs
of the dissonance between their public image and their actual policies. But they
had nothing to lose and, if successful, they would have achieved two very important
48 Quoted in Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, p. 482.
49 For example, as late as 1837, the American Quarterly Review was still criticizing Jeﬀerson
for turning America “from a republic into a democracy.” Quoted in Morantz, “Democracy” and
“Republic” in American Ideology, p. 235.
50 See Morantz, “Democracy” and “Republic” in American Ideology, p. 256-159.
51 Quarterly Review, September, 1838. Quoted in Morantz, “Democracy” and “Republic” in
American Ideology, p. 246.
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goals and would be better oﬀ as a result. First, they would have reduced the elec-
toral distance between them and the Jacksonians. Second, they would have changed
the meaning of the term, and would have managed to deactivate one of the main
ideological weapons of the Jacksonians.
No sooner said and done. Not only did the Whigs conscientiously adopt the
democratic rhetoric. They actually labeled themselves as “the true democrats.” For
example, in an speech delivered in Nashville in 1840 Henry Clay could claim that
I am a Democrat—was born a Democrat, have lived and shall die a Demo-
crat, in the true and genuine sense of the term.52
2.3. Early and later concepts compared
Democracy is not only an essentially contested concept—and so it was in the
late-eighteenth century America, when diverse political factions put forward their
own understanding of democracy and attempted to make it succeed over other un-
derstandings.53 It is also a fuzzy one. What does it refer to—a political system, as it
was for colonial political theorists; a condition of society, as it was for Tocqueville?
Which institutional arrangements does it include—unicameral and unchecked legis-
latures, as the Duane-Leib faction claimed, a mixed system of check and balances, as
the Quids defended? Which preconditions does it demand—economic independence,
equality of outcomes, equality of rights?
It is thus very complicated to deﬁne sharply and once and for all neither the
concept of democracy nor the concepts of democracy as used in the period studied
so far. Nevertheless, however contested and fuzzy, there are some features of the
concept that can be easier to identify in the early period but not in the later one,
and the other way around. Five of them stand out—representation and popular
sovereignty, feasibility, property, stability and division of powers. Let us compara-
tively reconstruct them following Madison’s famous argument in The Federalist no.
10.
2.3.1. Representation and popular sovereignty
It was a common belief in late eighteenth-century America that democracy in-
volved direct participation and that it was not easily compatible with representative
government.54 Government “of all over all,” had James Otis deﬁned it in 1766, in a
formulation almost identical to Aristotle’s deﬁnition of democracy as a government
were “the one party rule and the other parties are ruled in turn”55 So, when some
52 Quoted in Morantz, “Democracy” and “Republic” in American Ideology, pp. 259 and 244.
53 As Galie warned, the problem with this kind of concepts is not so much that they are
essentially contested, but rather that we can sometimes forget that they are. Walter Bryce Gallie,
“Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956), 167-198.
54 However, suﬀrage by lottery, which Montesquieu had written to be “natural to democracy,
as that by choice is to aristocracy,” was not seriously considered at that time. Charles Louis de
Secondat Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, p. 11. On the history of suﬀrage by lot and its absence
in eighteenth-century debates in America, see Manin, The Principles of Representative Government.
55 Quoted in Lokken, “The Concept of Democracy in Colonial Political Thought,” p. 577; and
Aristotle, Politics, 1271b7.
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royal oﬃcers feared the rising power of colonial assemblies, they related them to the
Puritan Revolution of 1641. However, as Lokken points out, few of them accused the
assemblies of being democracies or promoting democratic policies, for they did not
assemble the whole people. The minister of the First Church in Boston, John Cotton,
replying any suspicion that the colonist in Massachusetts Bay could be implementing
a democracy, wrote in a letter that “though it be status popularis, where people choose
their owne governors; yet the government is not a democracy, if it be administered,
not by people, but by governors, whether one (for then it is a monarchy, though
elective) or by many, for then (as you know) it is aristocracy.”56 Madison echoed
this conception of direct participation as a necessary condition for democracy when
he stated that
[By] a pure democracy ... I mean, a society consisting of a small number of
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person.57
Many claimed thus that representation was an entirely new principle, somehow un-
known by the classics, and that it was incompatible with democracy ex hypothesi.
Madison was more careful, though, and acknowledged that “the principle of represen-
tation was neither unknown to the ancients, nor wholly overlooked in their political
constitutions,”58 since in “pure democracies of Greece” many of the executives func-
tions had been performed by oﬃcials elected by the people and representing them.
Hence, the diﬀerence between a democracy and a representative system of the kind
the Federalists put forward—a republic, as Madison called it—was not so much “the
total exclusion of the representatives of the people from the administration of the
former,” but rather “the total exclusion of the people, in their collective capacity,
from any share in the latter ”59 As Bernard Manin has put it, “for Madison, repre-
sentative government was not one kind of democracy; it was an essentially diﬀerent
and furthermore preferable form of government.”60
The sharp separation between representatives and their constituencies was not the
only feature of the republican government put forward by the Federalists, though.
This form of government also implied that property qualiﬁcations—as deﬁned in
the state constitutions, though not in the Federal Constitution—ought to prevent
a majority of Americans—notably, women, blacks, natives and wage workers—from
enjoying political rights.
Now, the obvious question is: how could the Federalists reconcile these apparently
anti-popular implications of their position with the rhetoric of popular sovereignty
they had persistently appealed to as the main rationale against the British crown
ﬁrst and for the ratiﬁcation of the Federal Constitution next?61 The answer is that
56 Lokken, “The Concept of Democracy in Colonial Political Thought,” pp. 577 and 571.
57 Madison, “The Federalist no. 10,” in The Federalist, p. 46. See similar deﬁnitions in “The
Federalist no. 14” and “The Federalist no. 48,” in ibíd.
58 Madison, “The Federalist no. 63,” in The Federalist, p. 329.
59 Madison, “The Federalist no. 63,” in The Federalist, p. 329, italics in the original.
60 Manin, The Principles of Representative Government , p. 2.
61 In the latter case, the delegates conscientiously violated the instructions of the Continental
Congress in writing a new constitution instead of ammending the Articles of the Confederation.
But they justiﬁed their actions on the sovereignty of the people to alter or abolish the Articles.
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they could do so because popular sovereignty did not imply neither actual inclusion
nor actual participation of the citizenry at large.
Even though blacks, women, native Americans, and wage workers were denied
political rights, they were all said to be virtually represented by those on whom they
depended—and who did have political rights. The same applied to the ruling elite
of representatives. However separated and independent from ordinary citizens—and
to some extent unaccountable to them—, the former were conceived as virtually
representing the interests of ordinary people through their taking part in the shared
set of interests of the whole community. As Wood points out, “what justiﬁed elite
rule ... was the sense that all parts of the society were of a piece, that al ranks and
degrees were organically connected through a great chain in such a way that those
on the top were necessarily involved in the welfare of those below them.”62
In sum, the legitimacy of government rested in popular sovereignty but not in
democratic decision-making, which was not coextensive with popular sovereignty.
The argument for this is as follows. Indeed, democracy implied popular sovereignty:
(D1) D → PS
However, democracy also implied actual representation—not only in the sense of the
formal inclusion of everyone but also through the presence of a number of social
conditions and institutional devices aimed at making this participation actual and
meaningful. It thus excluded virtual representation by deﬁnition:
(D2) (D → AR) ∧ (D → ¬V R)
On the other hand, even though popular sovereignty was consistent with actual
representation, it did not require it and was also perfectly consistent with virtual
representation. As Lokken has pointed out, “in the political ethos of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth-century English world, representation did not involve direct
responsibility to the electorate. The political thought of the time included the idea
that the people are the source of all political power, but this idea did not extend to
the continued exercise of political power by the people after that power had been
contracted and delegated to the one or several persons chosen by the people to govern
them.”63 That is,
(D3) ¬ (PS → ¬V R) ∧ ¬ (PS → AR)
It followed thus that
(D4) ∴ ¬ (D ← PS)
James Wilson, for example, argued that “the very manner of introducing this constitution, by the
recognition of the authority of the people, is said to change the principle of the present Confederation
[but] The people therefore have a right ... to form either a general government or state governments
... This, I say, is the inherent and unalienable right of the people.” Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates
in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Philadelphia, J. B.
Lippincott, 1836), vol. 3, pp. 455-457.
62 See Wood, The Creation of the American republic, pp. 499.
63 Lokken, “The Concept of Democracy in Colonial Political Thought,” p. 570.
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In conclusion, as Dupuis-Déri points out, in the late eighteenth century “ ‘democracy’
and ‘popular sovereignty’ were by no means thought of as coextensive.”64 Even
further, as Shankman puts it, “in fact, the declaration of popular sovereignty had
done much to undermine arguments for direct majority governance.”65
Let us turn now to the later concepts of democracy and popular sovereignty and
the relationship between them, which would go through a remarkable shift during
the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century. By 1840 virtually everyone agreed that
democracy did not only imply popular sovereignty,
(D1) D → PS
But also the other way around. That is, few accepted that popular sovereignty did
not imply democracy. Now they were believed to be coextensive precisely because
the new deﬁnition of democracy was not at odds with virtual representation any
more. To be sure, democracy still required actual representation and this was in fact
enlarged—notably, through suﬀrage extensions occurred during the ﬁrst half of the
nineteenth century. But, contrary to what was believed earlier, it did not exclude
virtual representation in some branches of the political decision-making process. For
example, institutions such as the Supreme Court, which had been originally seen as
a check on the “excess of democracy,” gained now democratic respectability—even if
their members were not accountable because they were not elected and they enjoyed
life-long appointments. In sum,
(D2*) (D → AR) ∧ ¬ (D → ¬V R)
On the other hand, as for popular sovereignty, it was believed that sovereignty resided
in the people, but not only in the sense of citizens being virtually represented by
a number of more or less independent and unaccountable representatives—as was
the case in the earlier conception of popular sovereignty—but also in the sense of
necessarily letting the people actually take part in the decision-making process (say,
by extending suﬀrage, both active and passive). In sum,
(D3*) (PS → AR) ∧ ¬ (PS → ¬V R)
It followed thus that democracy and popular sovereignty turned out to be eventually
interchangeable.
(D4*) ∴ D ↔ PS
2.3.2. Feasibility
From the early idea that in a democracy the people necessarily met and exercised
the government in person it followed, as a matter of logic, that no democracy could be
64 F. Dupuis-Déri, “The Political Power of Words: The Birth of Pro-democratic Discourse in
the Nineteenth Century in the United States and France,” Political Studies 52 (2004): 118-134, p.
121.
65 Shankman, “Malcontents and Tertium Quids: The Battle to Deﬁne Democracy in Jeﬀerso-
nian Philadelphia.”
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realized in large communities. In large communities it was very complicated—if pos-
sible at all—to have all the people meet together in the same place. Even Rousseau
had seen this limitation and had concluded that “if we take the term in the strict
sense, there never has been a real democracy, and there never will be”66 Thus for
Madison
A democracy, consequently, must be conﬁned to a small spot.67
This implication ruled out the feasibility of a democratic government in a terri-
tory as large as eighteenth-century America. An implication that disappeared once
democracy left room for representation and turned out to be seen as viable for a
large territory, such as America. The Federal government was then taken as a fait
accompli. Accordingly, constitutional institutions—such as the Senate, the presi-
dential oﬃce or the Supreme Court—and devices—such as large electoral districts
and small legislative assemblies—that had been considered opposed to democratic
decision-making hitherto (see supra, §1.2.2.2) turned out to be seen, precisely, as the
solution for the feasibility of a democratic political system in a territory as large and
complex as nineteenth-century America.
2.3.3. Individual and property rights
Small-scale and democratic communities had also been traditionally seen to in-
volve a negative externality other than its infeasibility—namely, to make the so-called
tyranny of the majority more likely.68 As Madison put it, “The smaller the society,
the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer
the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of
the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority,
and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they
concert and execute their plans of oppression.” On the other hand, democracies were
taken to be feasible only in small territories. That is, precisely in communities were
those conditions applied. This was the reason why, according to Madison,
Democracies ... have ever been found incompatible with personal security,
or the rights of property.69
The trade-oﬀ between democracy and personal liberty had been a permanent charge
against democracy since antiquity. To be sure, Madison’s argument on the inverse
relationship between the size of a community and the likelihood of majority tyranny
was novel, and somehow at odds—as he was well aware of—with the classical assump-
tion on the unsuitability of large territories for republican governments, as typically
66 J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social, in Oeuvres complètes, vol. 3, B. Gagnebin and M. Ray-
mond, eds. (Paris: Gallimard, 1961). Quoted from J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in The
Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G.D. H. Cole (London and Toronto, J.M. Dent and Sons,
1923), p. 32. See also Shanaysha M. Furlow Sauls, The Concept of Instability and the Theory of
Democracy in the Federalist (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 2008).
67 Madison, “The Federalist, no. 14,” in The Federalist, p. 63.
68 The expression comes from J. S. Mill, “On Liberty,” in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill,
vol. 18, J. Robson, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
69 Madison, “The Federalist no. 10,” in The Federalist, p. 46.
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expressed by Montesquieu. However, the incompatibility between democracy and in-
dividual rights—and most notably, with property rights—had been an ever-present
tenet since the classics. It is worth recalling that Aristotle had deﬁned democracy as
the rule of the poor rather than as the rule of the many.70 It was obvious for him, as it
would be for the subsequent tradition of nondemocratic republicans, that democracy
jeopardized wealthy citizens’ property and individual liberty more in general. The
logic was apparently obvious: democracy would empower the poor and these, being
a majority of the population, would use their political power to advance their own
interests and trump the rights of the minority—notably, their property rights. To
be sure, there was a great deal of rhetoric involved in this charge both when used
by Aristotle and when used by the Federalists. Private property had hardly been
endangered neither during the post-Ephialtic Athenian democracy nor during the
American critical period—which threats, as Wood has recalled, were partly exagger-
ated to justify many of the constitutional reforms later introduced in the Philadelphia
Convention. Nevertheless, however historically inaccurate or empirically unsound,
the popularity of the tenet about how democracy would inevitably lead the poor
to expropriate the rich is hardly questionable. George Mason and Elbridge Gerry,
two prominent Antifederalists, had warned in 1787 about “the danger of the leveling
spirit” ﬂowing from “the excesses of democracy.”71
In addition to this, the relationship between democracy and property had also
worked the other way around. As we have already seen in detail (supra, §1.3.4),
it was believed that both a minimum property and a maximum property clauses
were implied by the concept of democracy. The former, in order to ensure that
everyone enjoyed the material independence required to take part in public aﬀairs.
The second, in order to prevent the wealthy from controlling the process of political
decision-making and making it serve their particular ends. As Andrew Shankman
concludes in his analysis of the Pennsylvania Jeﬀersonians, “Perfect democracy re-
quired perfect equality, not just before the law but also in wealth, in property.”72
Now, the shift in the concept of democracy during the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth
century would aﬀect both ways of the relationship. Consider ﬁrstly the trade-oﬀ
between democracy and property rights. To be sure, many during the nineteenth
century would still believe that democracy had a tendency to equalize property,
as Adam Przeworski has shown.73 However, the new deﬁnitions of democracy put
forward by the Quids in Pennsylvania or the Whig Party at the Federal level included
the protection of property rights as a very condition of democracy and thus resolved
the trade-oﬀ by subsuming one of the elements to the other. This shift had been
possible, in turn, because in almost all the states poor white men had secured the vote
and, nevertheless, property had not been threatened. In addition, judges had become
the arbitrators between public power and private rights of property. Accordingly, law
70 Aristotle, Politics, C. D. C. Reeve, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1948), Book 3, ch. 8.
71 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 484.
72 Shankman, Crucible of American Democracy, p. 4.
73 A. Przeworksi, “Democracy, Equality, adn Redistribution,” in Political Judgement: Essays
in Honour of John Dunn, R. Bourke and R. Geuss, eds. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2009), 281-313.
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became more and more of a specialized and autonomous science removed from politics
and carried out by only an educated few who needed to go through the specialized
professional schools.74
Consider next the maximum and minimum property clauses, which were also
dramatically aﬀected. As for the former clause, the inclusion of the inviolability of
property rights as a condition of democracy made democratic decision-making to
be to a great extent at odds with the maximum property clause. Once property
rights were entrenched as a very condition of democracy, it was very reasonable to
expect that the performance of unequally propertied and skilled individuals would
result in the enlargement of economic inequalities. However, this side-eﬀect would be
compensated, as the Quids had argued in Pennsylvania, by a widespread prosperity
and social mobility.
As for the minimum property clause, the two shifts in the deﬁnition and function
of material independence described above (supra, §1.3.3) diminished the importance
of material independence in the long run. On the one hand, even if many would
continue to accept material independence as a necessary condition for full citizen-
ship, the gradual redeﬁnition of the former as self-ownership would eventually make
everyone to be considered independent and thus worth granting full citizenship. On
the other hand, the powerful ideal of equality of rights endorsed in the Declara-
tion of Independence would serve as a rationale for demanding the extension of full
citizenship to all in spite of them being materially independent or not. These two
trends would dramatically transform the conception of the employment relationship,
which had been traditionally seen as a form of “limited slavery,” as Aristotle put it
and would be increasingly seen as as a free and voluntary exchange among juridical
equals.75 In turn, these two trends will be key to Part III of the dissertation, for they
help to explain why the workplace tends nowadays to be seen as a sphere in which
power relations are absent and that is, accordingly, beyond the scope of politics,
including democratic politics.
2.3.4. Stability
The incompatibility between democracy and individual rights, and the predictable
conﬂicts between majorities, on the one hand, and holders of property rights, on the
other, made Madison conclude that
[Democracies] have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention [and]
have, in general, been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their
deaths.76
Even though the Athenian democracy, the ever-present reference for the alleged
instability of democracy, had lasted more than a century and a half, this had been the
traditional view among nondemocratic republicans—namely, that democracy was a
very unstable form of government. For instance, in the Federalist no. 9 Hamilton had
74 See Wood, The Radicalism of the American revolution, p. 323.
75 Aristotle, Politics, C. D. C. Reeve, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1948), 1260a-b.
76 Madison, “The Federalist no. 10,” in The Federalist, p. 46.
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famously stated about Greece that “It is impossible to read the history of the petty
republics of Greece and Italy, without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the
distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession
of revolutions, by which they were kept perpetually vibrating between the extremes
of tyranny and anarchy.”77
However, as it was the case with feasibility, the suspicion about the stability of
democracy was dramatically reduced once the American political system was rela-
beled as democratic and its stability was thus taken for granted. (This assumption
would be seriously called into question, though, with the breaking out of the Civil
War.) Of course, if the stability of the American democracy rested on controlling
the causes of the potential clashes between factions—and, most notably, between
“those who hold, and those who are without property,” which according to Madison
had been “the most common and durable source of factions”78—the question was now
through which precise devices could those clashes be avoided. If we take into account
that a persistent charge against democracy had come from its being an “unchecked”
form of government, the inclusion of the division of powers—and, more precisely, of
the system of checks and balances—as part of the very deﬁnition of democracy would
provide a solution for this problem.
2.3.5. Division of powers
The revolutionary gentry had not referred to democracy in its own right but al-
ways used it comparatively, as one of the three basic forms of government: monarchy,
oligarchy and democracy—i.e. rule by the one, by the few, or by the many. This
distinction was as old as Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius.79 In addition, these three
regimes were often considered as the three parts of a mixed government (or politeia).
The idea of a mixed government inﬂuenced probably more than any other classic
idea the political thinking of the Federalists. They saw the British constitution just
as Polybius had seen the Roman Republic—as the most perfect instance of a mixed
government. The uprising against the British was justiﬁed thus not as an uprising
against the British Constitution but rather as an uprising against the degeneration of
its mixture. Even though the form of government remained the same, King George
III had corrupted both the House of Lords and the House of Commons and thus
destroyed the balance between them. So the Philadelphia Convention was called
in the name of the mixed government as deﬁned by the classics and occasionally
implemented in several historical periods. As John Corbin wrote, “The theory of our
Constitution derives from Aristotle, and was put into successful practice in Ancient
Rome, in eighteenth-century England, and in our early state constitutions, before it
was given perhaps its most perfect embodiment by the Convention of 1787.”80
77 Hamilton, “The Federalist no. 9,” in The Federalist, p. 37
78 Madison, “The Federalist no. 10,” in The Federalist, p. 44.
79 See Plato, Laws, 756e-757a and Politicus, 291d-e, 303c; Aristotle, Politics, 3.7; and Polybius,
Histories, 6.5-18.
80 Quoted in Gummere, “The Classical Ancestry of the United States Constitution,” p. 6.
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Accordingly, when in the 1770s and 1780s “democracy” reappeared as part of
the political jargon, it began to refer to particular devices or parts of the ongoing
constitutions—notably, to the legislative assemblies—rather than to the constitutions
as a whole. The other branches of the constitutions and many of their devices
were seen, actually, as checks on the democratic branch. And this branch, in turn,
was believed to have the tendency to trump individual rights and destabilize the
other branches—as the Federalists believed it had actually happened to some state
constitutions during the 1780s. That was how James McHenry of Maryland saw the
relationship between democracy and constitutions when he denounced that, “Our
chief danger arises from the democratic parts of our constitutions [i.e., the legislative
branch]. It is a maxim which I hold incontrovertible, that the powers of government
exercised by the people swallows up the other branches. None of the constitutions
have provided suﬃcient checks against the democracy.”81
By contrast, during the ﬁrst part of the nineteenth century, “democracy” ceased
to be limited to the legislature and began to refer also to other branches of the system
of checks and balances, including the Senate, the Presidential oﬃce, and, eventually,
the system as a whole. As we have already seen (supra, §2.2.2), the so-called Quids
of Philadelphia were very innovative when they denounced the Malcontents’ more
classic conception of democracy. In their view, this conception obliterated “the just
and wise lines of distinction which have been marked out for diﬀerent branches of our
government.”82 According to the Quids, a proper deﬁnition of democracy had to in-
clude the very idea of checks and balances. Otherwise, it would be hardly compatible
with property rights and thus unstable. In order for a stable and rights-consistent
deﬁnition of democracy to succeed, other branches of the government that had been
previously considered as non democratic had to be drastically redeﬁned.
The case of the Supreme Court is especially outstanding for present purposes. As
we have seen, judicial review of legislation by the Supreme Court had been seen as an
undemocratic mechanism and as a very check on democracy, by the Antifederalists
ﬁrst and radical Jeﬀersonains next. The former had denounced the institution of
judicial review because “the judicial under this system have a power which is above
the legislative”83 Similarly, the latter had considered that, in a democracy, judges
could not be “independent of the control of free people” and, accordingly, that the
review of the constitutionality of the statutes passed by the legislature was a blatantly
undemocratic measure.84 By contrast, by mid-nineteenth century, judicial review
had turned out to be considered not only as a democratic institution, but in fact as
a necessary condition of a good-working and balanced democracy.
As we have seen, this shift applie dto many other institutions and devices not be
taken to be democratic traditionally. Hence, the senate, the presidential oﬃce and
81 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1, pp. 26-27.
82 Evening Post, February 21, 1804. Quoted in Shankman, “Malcontents and Tertium Quids,”
p. 60.
83 Brutus, “The Anti-Federalists no. 15,” in The Essential Federalist and anti-Federalist Papers,
D. Wootton, ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2003), p. 92.
84 Aurora, March 7, 1803, p. 31. Quoted in Shankman, “Malcontents and Tertium Quids.” p.
53.
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judicial review by the Supreme Court, as well as the American institutional system
as a whole, would turn out to be considered as fully democratic. As Duﬀ Green
would report in the Telegraph in 1828,
If required to deﬁne their government, the people of this Union would say
that all their institutions were purely democratic.85
85 Quoted in Morantz, “Democracy” and “Republic” in American Ideology, p. 164.
Concluding remarks to Part I
The inﬂuence of the American constitutional system can be hardly overestimated.
Over the last two centuries not few of its core institutional features have been widely
replicated by a large number of democracies around the globe. Notably, judicial
review of legislation, which originated in the Early Republic, has had an astonishing
worldwide expansion afterward—to the point that nowadays three-quarters of the
world’s states have some form of judicial review.86 It is thus surprising that a po-
litical system that has served as a democratic model and has been replicated by so
many democracies was nevertheless taken to be non-democratic by its founders. And
not less striking is that, only a few decades after the ratiﬁcation of the Federal Con-
stitution of 1787, virtually everyone—the heirs of the Federalists included—turned
out to refer to very much the same system as a fully democratic one.
The goal of Part I of the dissertation has been to explain this shift in the Early
American Republic with the hope that it would shed light on the more general para-
dox presented in the Introduction—namely, that the worldwide expansion of democ-
racy has gone hand-by-hand with a dramatic downsizing of its scope (expressed in the
ever-growing presence of non-majoritarian institutions such as constitutional courts
and central banks). Hence, chapter 1 has shown that, despite its rather derogatory
sense in the 1780s, the term “democracy”—along with some of the institutional
devices traditionally attached to it—gained increasing support as soon as ordinary
people became increasingly aware of the plurality of interests and values across the
American society, organized themselves to advance such interests and the theory of
virtual representation—including the conception of the society as an organic entity
with a common set of interests—used by the Federalists in the 1780s gradually lost its
credibility and political eﬃcacy. Once we realize of the commonly derogatory sense
of the term “democracy” in the 1780s, it should not come with surprise that the
Federalists hesitated to use the term to label the political system they were putting
forward. Likewise, we should not be surprised by the fact that virtually everyone
referred to very much the same system as a democracy ﬁfty years later, when the
term gained a widespread positive sense and was used as a battle-cry by Andrew
Jackson ﬁrst and the Whig Party next.
Chapter 2, in turn, has shown that, besides its increasing acceptance, the term
“democracy” also went through a notable semantic shift in the aftermath of the
ratiﬁcation of the Federal Constitution. Although some features of the concept of
86 See Horowitz, “Constitutional Courts: A Primer for Decision Makers,” p. 125.
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democracy remained the same, some others shifted. Likewise, some of the institu-
tional devices that had been traditionally taken to be at odds with democracy for
their being constraints on democratic decision-making turned out to be seen not
only as consistent with democracy but actually as necessary for a democratic sys-
tem proper. This helps explain why the Federalists believed that the representative
government they were putting forward was not only diﬀerent from democracy but
in fact a very check against it. As Bernard Manin puts it, “for Madison, representa-
tive government was not one kind of democracy; it was an essentially diﬀerent and
furthermore preferable form of government.”87 And it also helps explain why, only
some decades later, virtually everyone referred to very much the same system as an
openly democratic one. In a nutshell, what the Federalists meant by “democracy” in
the 1780s is not exactly what the term turned out to mean half a century later.
It is reasonable to ask whether the shift in the acceptance of democratic institu-
tions and in the concept of democracy goes beyond the period and country studied.
To be sure, this is a question that exceeds by far the limited scope of the dissertation.
However, a number of authors have shown that a similar shift took place in other
countries, such as France or Poland, by the same time.88 Likewise, and going back
to the American case, there is ample evidence that the shift continued well after
the Jacksonian period. Not only regarding the acceptance of democracy and the
extension of universal suﬀrage, but also regarding the shift in the very concept of
democracy. For example, as late as 1928 a US Army training manual could still
deﬁne “democracy” as follows:
"Democracy, n.:- A government of the masses. - Authority derived through
mass meeting or any other form of direct expression. - Results in mobocracy.
- Attitude toward property is communistic ... negating property rights. -
Attitude toward law is that the will of the majority shall regulate, whether
it is based upon deliberation or governed by passion, prejudice,and impulse,
without restraint or regard to consequences. - Result is demagogism, license,
agitation, discontent, [chaos]."89
87 Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, p. 2.
88 See among others J. A. Christophersen, The Meaning of "Democracy:” As Used in European
Ideologies from the French to the Russian Revolution (Oslo: Universitetsforlagets Trykningssentral,
1968); Dupuis-Deri, The Political Power of Words; Palmer, “Notes on the Use of the Word ’Democ-
racy’ 1789-1799;” and P. Rosanvallon, "The History of the Word ’Democracy’ in France," Journal
of Democracy 6 (1995): 140-154.
89 U. S. War Department, “U. S. Army Training Manual No. 2000-25,” Washington, D.C.,
November 30, 1928.
Part II
Constitutionalism

Chapter 3
Analytical and normative background
Part I of the dissertation has shown, among other things, how some of the de-
vices that were originally designed to be checks on democracy turned out to be
considered not only consistent with democracy but often also necessary for a po-
litical system to be considered democratic proper. Part II focuses on two of these
devices—constitutional rigidity and judicial review—and on the very notion of consti-
tutionalism. It is divided into four chapters. Chapter 3 provides the deﬁnition, both
historical and comparative, of constitutionalism used throughout Part II, and ana-
lyzes the two main institutional devices of constitutionalism—constitutional rigidity
and judicial review.
The remainder of Part II analyzes in detail the most salient normative theories
of constitutional democracy, along with the problems they present.1 According to
these theories, constitutionalism need not be at odds with democracy, either because
constitutional constraints are necessary for the democratic procedures to bring just
outcomes about (chapter 4), or because they are the upshot of democratically made
precommitments (chapter 5), or yet because they set up the procedural rules and
preconditions required for the proper functioning of the democratic system (chapter
6). For example, as Eisgruber has recently put it regarding judicial review of legisla-
tion, “the institution of judicial review is a sensible way to promote non-majoritarian
representative democracy; not surprisingly, it is becoming increasingly popular in
democratic political systems throughout the world.”2 However, as I will try to show,
all these theories are ﬂawed from a democratic standpoint.
3.1. Introduction
Constitutionalism is often used as an umbrella-like term for very diﬀerent phe-
nomena. Hence, it is not unusual to refer to Britain (which lacks a written constitu-
tion), Australia (which lacks a bill of rights), the Netherlands (which lacks a system
of judicial review) or New Zealand (which lacks a rigid constitution) as constitu-
1 As Sunstein has put it, “on [the reasons for entrenching institutional arrangements and
substantive rights] constitutional theory remains in a surprisingly primitive state.” C. Sunstein,
Designing Democracy. What Constitutions Do (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 97.
2 C. L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2001), p. 210.
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tional states.3 However, in this chapter constitutionalism will be deﬁned, in a more
restricted way, as follows:
Constitutionalism.—The limitation of the powers of the legislative body en-
trenched in a rigid document and enacted through judicial review.4
Before turning to the three sorts of normative theories that will be studied below,
this chapter provides the analytical framework to be used throughout Part II. Section
3.2 brieﬂy presents the history of constitutionalism, its main deﬁnitional features and
the main sorts of constraints usually attached to it. Section 3.3 analyzes the role of
constitutional conventions vis-à-vis formal constitutional provisions. The two main
institutional devices of constitutionalism are analyzed in some detail in remainder
of the chapter—namely, constitutional rigidity in section 3.4 and judicial review in
section 3.5.
3.2. History and deﬁnition
A. Brief history. The global expansion of constitutionalism during the last two
centuries, and notably since World War II, can be hardly overestimated.5 In 1802
no constitutional system proper—i.e., including a written constitution with an en-
trenched bill of rights and judicial review—existed in the world. Nowadays, by
contrast, at least 190 countries have written constitutions, with some exceptions,
such as Bhutan, New Zealand, UK and Israel, which lack fully codiﬁed, entrenched
constitutions. Even further, among these exceptions, Israel has a powerful Supreme
Court that protects rights as part of the higher law and the UK and New Zealand
have recently adopted charters of rights, even though without judicial review proper.
Regarding entrenched bills of rights, at least 183 countries have adopted charters
of rights during the last decades, often including not only political and civil rights
but also social rights. And, as for judicial review, 101 out of the 106 constitutions
written between 1985 and 2008 include it.6
3 See J. C. Bayón, “Democracia y derechos. Problemas de fundamentación del constitucional-
ismo,” Constitucionalismo y derechos fundamentales, J. Betegón, Francisco Laporta, J. R. de
Páramo, Luís Prieto, eds. (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2004), p.
67.
4 Even though constraints on the executive body are also included in the concept of constitu-
tionalism, in this dissertation I will focus only on the limits on legislative action.
5 On the recent world-wide expansion of constitutionalism, see among others R. Hirschl, To-
wards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); M. Shapiro and A. Stone Sweet, “The New Constitutional
Politics of Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 26 (1994): pp. 397-420; C. Neal Tate and Torb-
jörn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (NYU Press, 1997); C. R. Epp, The Rights
Revolution. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998); N. Tate and T. Wallinder, eds. The
Global Expansion of judicial Power (New York: New York University Press, 1995). J. Ferejohn,
“Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law,” Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems 65 (2003):
41-68; Sieder et al., The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America (London: Palgrave, 2005). For
a reliable source of comparative data on constitutionalism, see www.concourts.net.
6 The data come from A. Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Rights, and Judicial Power,” in
Comparative Politics, D. Caramani, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). The shift has
gone hand-by-hand with the democratization processes in the last decades of the twentieth century.
Hence, if at least 68 percent of countries were authoritarian in 1975, by the end of 1995 only about
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Of course, modern constitutionalism is older than 1803 (when Marbury v. Madi-
son, the ﬁrst instance of judicial review, was rendered) and its origins can be traced
back to the late Middle Ages and early modern times, when constitutions emerged
as devices to constrain the power of absolute monarchies, such as those of the royal
houses of Tudor, Orange, Habsburg, or Hohenzollern. The unconstrained power of
the absolutist king was crystal-clearly expressed by Lous XV:
In my person alone resides the sovereign power, and it is from me alone
that the courts hold their existence and authority ... For it is to me exclusively
that the legislative power belongs, without dependence and without partition.
To me alone belongs the legislative power without dependence and without
division.7
True, as Lutz has pointed out, seventeenth and eighteenth-century constitutions
tended not to include a bill of rights establishing the limits of the power of the
branches of government.8 Rather, they tended to include only a set of institutional
rules deﬁning their functioning. This is why the American constitution did not
include a bill of rights in the ﬁrst place and why England was often believed not
to have a constitution proper—since, in spite of having a long tradition of bill of
rights, including the Magna Carta of 1215 or the Petition of Rights of 1628, no set
of rules specifying the division of powers was ever written down. Hence, the French
Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizens was rather innovative
when it included a bill of rights as a necessary—though not suﬃcient—condition of
constitutionalism. Its art. 16 read as follows:
A society where rights are not secured or the separation of powers estab-
lished has no constitution at all.9
Now, as constitutional monarchies gradually gave way to constitutional democra-
cies—even if often with a king rather than with an elected and revocable president
as the head of the state—, constitutionalism was redeﬁned as the limitation of the
power of the parliament rather than of the absolute monarch. When this happened,
constitutionalism was ﬁrstly taken to be at odds with democracy due to its con-
straining nature. As we have seen in the Part I of the dissertation, constitutionalism
was considered not only to be at odds with democracy but actually to be a check
on democratic decision-making. Only later did constitutionalism turn out to be
considered democratic, to the point that nowadays is usual to consider it as a nec-
essary condition for a political system being fully democratic. It is not the case
that the constraining nature of constitutions over ordinary legislative politics has
turned out to be overlooked so as to stress their enabling nature. Rather, it is
26 percent were authoritarian. See D. Potter, “Explaining Democratization,” in Democratization,
ed. D. Potter, D. Goldblatt, M. Kiloh and P. Lewis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), p. 1.
7 Quoted in D. Held, Models of Democracy, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p. 56.
8 See D. S. Lutz, “Introductory Essay,” in Colonial Origins of the American Constitution: A
Documentary History (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1998).
9 S. E. Finer. V. Bogdanor and B. Rudden, Comparing Constitutions (Oxford: Clarendon,
1995). p. 210.
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widely accepted that constitutions are constraining of the legislative process indeed,
but that such constraints are necessary for the democratic system to work properly.
Ronald Dworkin is an illustrative example of the mainstream usage. Hence, he
deﬁnes constitutionalism as “a system that establishes legal rights that the dominant
legislature does not have the power to override or compromise,” pointing out that
“constitutionalism so understood is an increasingly popular political phenomenon.”10
B. Comparative deﬁnition. Constitutionalism so deﬁned—what is sometimes termed
as “new constitutionalism” or as “strong constitutionalism”—contrasts with both ab-
solutist constitutions and the Westminster model of parliamentary sovereignty, but
also with the new commonwealth model of constitutionalism.11 Consider these dif-
ferences in turn. First, constitutionalism so deﬁned is at odds with the so-called
absolutist constitutions, which reﬂect and entrench the absolute power of one-person
or one-party rule rather than constraining it.12 The locus classicus is the French
Charter of 1814, though a number of current constitutions (e.g. those of Sri Lanka,
Togo, or Niger) could also be included under this umbrella.
Second, constitutionalism as deﬁned here is also absent from the Westminster
model of democracy, which concentrates all the power on the parliament. Three fea-
tures stand out in the Westminster model. First, the constitution (if there is a writ-
ten constitution at all) is not entrenched. That is, the constitutional provisions are
amendable through the ordinary legislative procedure. Second, any act—including
judicial acts—that contradict a statute turns out to be invalid. And third, no sub-
stantive constraints—i.e. rights—are constitutionally entrenched. However, it is to
be noted that Britain, New Zealand, Canada and Israel—once the epitomes of the
Westminster model of parliamentary sovereignty, along with the Third and Fourth
French Republics—have recently embarked upon profound constitutional reforms so
as to leave room for principles of constitutionalism proper in their political systems.
Third, constitutionalism as deﬁned here also departs from the so-called new com-
monwealth models of constitutionalism that combine rigidity and judicial review
with ensuring that the legislatures retain the last word on constitutional matters
and can override courts decisions on the constitutionality of statutes.13 According to
Gardbaum, the model—which is also referred to as “weak-form judicial review,” the
10 Ronald Dworkin, “Constitutionalism and democracy,” European Journal of Philosophy 3
(1995): p. 2. According to Dworkin, nowadays every member of the European Community as
well as other “mature democracies” embrace the view that parliamentary sovereignty ought to be
constrained through constitutionalization and judicial review. Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of Rights
for Britain (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), pp. 13-14.
11 The term “new constitutionalism” can be found in R. Hirschl, “The New Constitutionalism
and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide,” Fordham Law Review 75 (2006): 721-754. The
term “strong constitutionalism” can be found in Bayón, “Democracia y derechos,” p. 401; and in J.
Waldron “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” Yale Law Journal 115 (2006): 1346-1406,
pp. 1354-1357.
12 The term “absolutist constitution” comes from Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Rights, and
Judicial Power.”
13 See Stephen Gardbaum, “The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism”, American
Journal of Comparative Law 49 (2001): 707-760. See also Stepehn Gardbaum, “Reassesing the New
Commonwalth Model of Constitutionalism,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 8 (2010):
167-206.
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“parliamentary bill of rights model,” or the “dialogue model” of constitutionalism—,14
is deﬁned by three main features. The former two distinguish it from the Westmin-
ster model—namely, it includes a legalized bill of rights and some form of judicial
power to enact such rights by assessing legislation as well. The latter feature, by
contrast, distinguishes it from constitutionalism as deﬁned in this chapter—namely,
notwithstanding the role attributed to courts, the legislative branch retains the ﬁnal
word to decide by ordinary majority vote on the potential trade-oﬀs between statues
and such rights. According to Gardbaum, the Canadian Charter of Rights, the
New Zealand Bill of Rights and the UK Human Rights Act all represent this new
“commonwealth model of constitutionalism” which “decouples judicial review from
judicial supremacy by empowering legislatures to have the ﬁnal word.”15
C. Constitutional constraints. Consider now the sorts of constitutional constraints
and the institutional devices used to enact them. Greatly simplifying, constitutions
include two main sorts of constraining provisions of democratic decision-making.
First, substantive provisions, which typically adopt the form of a bill of rights en-
trenched in the dogmatic part of the text. And, second, procedural provisions in the
form of a set of rules constitutive of the decision-making institutions and included
in the organic part of the constitution. These provisions can have a constraining
eﬀect only if they are included in a constitution with legal normative precedence
over ordinary legislation—that is, a constitution not only with logical precedence
over ordinary legislation, which is the case when a norm is previous to another one
in the sense of providing the conditions under which the latter can be produced, but
also with normative precedence when trade-oﬀs between the former and the latter
arise and a decision has to be made.16
Accordingly, some institutional constraints are to be enacted so as to ensure that
this precedence is observed—typically, constitutional rigidity and judicial review of
the constitutionality of executive and legislative actions. When taking this form, the
checks and balances included in the constitution act as “restrictions embedded in
restrictions” proper.17 In the remainder of the section, constitutional conventions,
constitutional rigidity and judicial review are analyzed in turn.
3.3. Constitutional conventions
Before turning to the more formal institutional devices of constitutionalism, let
us brieﬂy mention the diﬀerence between written constitutions and constitutional
14 See Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights. Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights
in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008) and
Janet Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?,” Modern Law Review 69
(2006): 7-28.
15 Gardbaum, “The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism,” p. 708.
16 According to Bayón, normative precedence of norm A over norm B implies both “active
force” (norm A can modify norm B) and “passive force” (norm A cannot be modiﬁed by norm B).
See Bayón, “Democracia y derechos,” Appendix.
17 J. Elster, Ulysses Unbound (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 115.
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conventions and the role of the latter in constitutionalism.18 Constitutions can be
written or unwritten. The political systems of those countries that lack written
constitutions—notably, Britain, New Zealand or Israel—are only regulated by un-
written constitutional conventions. Now, even if uncodiﬁed, such conventions can
be as precise in their meaning as the written ones and do impose costs on political
agents that may violate them, thus successfully constraining the decisions of the
legislature and the executive.19
However, constitutional conventions are also present in countries that do have
codiﬁed constitutions—which include most Western countries—, as a supplement to
the written provisions. Consider, for example, the two-term limit on the tenure of
the American presidency, which is not included in the Constitution but is strictly
observed, at least, since Roosevelt violated it by occupying the presidential oﬃce four
consecutive times.20 It seems reasonable, thus, not to make a clear-cut distinction
between codiﬁed constitutions and constitutional conventions and to focus better on
the sort of constraints they impose on political decisions.
That said, even though some attention will be paid to constitutional conventions
(and, notably, to informal constitutional rigidity in section 5.4.4), throughout the
chapter I will refer mainly to written and formal constitutions. For two reasons.
First, because the causal mechanisms behind constitutional conventions are more
complex and remain poorly understood, as Elster points out.21 Second, because
written provisions are normatively more relevant. Violations of conventions may
bear political sanctions, such as electoral defeat or social revolt, whereas violations
of written provisions may also trigger legal sanctions in addition to political ones. It
might be replied that the distinction applies only as a general rule, for conventions are
sometimes enforced by courts. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled in
1981 that there was a constitutional convention requiring the government to seek the
approval of the provinces before amending the constitution while at the same time
ruling that the government was not legally required to do so.22 In turn, written con-
stitutions are sometimes ﬂexible, as we shall see below (section 3.4). However, these
18 The term “constitutional convention” comes from Dicey, who deﬁnes them as “understand-
ings, habits or practices which, though they may regulate the conduct of the several members of
the sovereign power, of the Ministry, or of other oﬃcials, are not in reality laws at all since they are
not enforced by the courts.” A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution,
E. C. S. Wade, ed. (London: MacMillan Press, 1945), pp. 23-24.
19 Lijphart argues that formal provisions are more constraining then conventions because the
latter tend to be “merely a more or less amorphous collection of basic laws and customs without even
a clear agreement on what exactly is and what is not part of the unwritten constitution.” Arendt
Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 218. However, this need not be the case. Take,
for example, the case of the rules of etiquette, which are often implict though very precise in their
prescriptions.
20 Diverse explanations are provided for the anomalies of Britain, New Zealand and Israel. For
example, that Israel has never been able to reach an agreement on a common set of constitutional
principles (mainly, as for the place of religion in the legal system), whilst Britain and New Zealand
have not need to reach a formal agreement due to the existence of a strong implicit agreement
on such principles. See Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, p. 217. Note, however, that both New
Zealand and Britain have incorporated charters of rights to their legal system in the last decades,
thus coming closer to the more formal model of a written constitution.
21 Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process,” p. 365.
22 Elster, Ulysses Unbound, p. 97.
3.4. Constitutional rigidity 107
are marginal cases. As Lijphart points out, the judicial enactment of “entrenched
clauses” and “basic laws” in New Zealand and Israel are exceptional since they can
be easily removed or superseded. And the same happens with ﬂexible constitutions,
which turn out to be very rarely used.
3.4. Constitutional rigidity
Constitutions regulate fundamental matters of political life as well as themselves.
Hence, apart from ﬁrst-order provisions—which include the substantive and pro-
cedural provisions analyzed in section 3.2—, they also include second-order provi-
sions regulating the ammendment (and the suspension, in case of emergency) of the
ﬁrst-order provisions. Thus, they present diﬀerent degrees of rigidity depending on
the complexity and stringency of the procedures by which their ﬁrst-order provisions
can be amendment.
Figure 3. Cross-national pattern for amendment rate and diﬃculty, indicating
amendment strategy.23
Constitutional rigidity serves as a necessary condition for the normative supremacy
of the constitution—i.e. for its normative precedence over ordinary legislation. And
23 D. S. Lutz, Principles of Constitutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), p. 173.
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normative supremacy, in turn, serves as a necessary condition for constitutionalism.24
If the legislative body has the ability to amend the constitution by means identical
to the ordinary legislative procedure (i.e., if the constitution is ﬂexible) it is unclear
how can that assembly be constrained by the constitution in any meaningful sense.
Elster provides a number of instances of this. For example, during the Hungarian
constitution-making process of 1989-1990, it often happened that, when the parlia-
ment noticed that a constitutional provision was at odds with legislation, it opted to
amend the constitution rather than the statute. Also, when the constitutional court
of India has overturned a piece of legislation as unconstitutional, the parliament has
frequently replied by amending the constitution. And so on. In short, the greater
the stringency of the amendment procedure, the higher the costs of amending the
constitution, and the less likely that it be amended, as Figure 3 above shows. As
Buchanan has put it,
Constitutional rules have the eﬀect of increasing the costs of taking certain
actions. It is more costly to take action in violation of a rule than it is to take
the same action in the absence of the rule. If this much be acknowledged, then
rules must matter if the basic law of economics is accepted. An increase in
the cost of any choice alternative will reduce the resort to that alternative.25
Rigidity can be deﬁned, thus, as follows:
Constitutional rigidity.—The greater stringency of the constitutional amend-
ment procedure in contrast to the ordinary legislative procedure, being this
stringency a necessary condition for the normative supremacy of the consti-
tution and, thus, for constitutionalism.
A number of institutional forms of constitutional rigidity (generally appearing in a
combined form) stand out. Without pretense of completeness, consider the follow-
ing ones:26 Parliamentary super-majorities; procedural delays; states ratiﬁcation (in
federal systems); ratiﬁcation by referendum; and absolute entrenchment. Of course,
absolute entrenchment or intangibility is a rather radical form of rigidity. However,
it is not an unusual one. For example, article 79(3) of the German constitution of
1948 includes such a clause as for basic rights. Similarly, the Bulgarian constitution
provides absolute immunity for fundamental rights, just as the German constitution
does regarding its federalism or the Romanian one regarding its republicanism. How-
ever, it is unclear whether such provisions can be absolutely entrenched in practice.
At least, for two reasons.
24 However, it does not serve as a suﬃcient condition, as Bayón shows. See his “Democracia y
derechos,” Appendix.
25 J. Buchanan, “Why constitutions matter,” in Why constitutions matter, N. Berggren, N.
Karlson, and J. Nergelius, eds. (Stockholm: City University Press, 2000), p. 14.
26 See Astrid Lorenz, “How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity. Four Concepts and Two Alter-
natives,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 17 (2005), pp. 339-361; Donald S. Lutz, “Toward a Theory
of Constitutional Ammendment,” American Political Science Review 88 (1994), pp. 355-370; V.
Ferreres, “Una defensa de la rigidez constitucional,” ed. F. Laporta, Constitución: Problemas
ﬁlosóﬁcos (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2000).
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First, if the article setting up the amendment procedures of the constitution (in-
cluding the speciﬁcation of which articles are intangible) is the highest-order article
in the legal system, it is unclear whether that provision applies to itself or not—i.e.
the much discussed “Ross’ paradox.”27 For example, the article 290 of the Portuguese
constitution of 1976 absolutely entrenched some principles, such as the collectiviza-
tion of the means of production in its article 83. However, the article 290 itself was
not entrenched absolutely and could be amended according to the procedure included
in the constitution. So, in 1982 the article 83 was indirectly amended by means of
eliminating the article 290 that prevented the article 83 from being amended.28
Second, both constitutional and extra-constitutional actions against articles al-
legedly entrenched once and for all are always possible. Even if the society attempts
sometimes to move some issues out of its political control by entrenching them,
there is no “outside of the society,” as Elster puts it.29 That is, all institutional
rules, including the absolutely entrenched ones, turn out to be institutionally or
otherwise revisable, even if often at high cost. For example, this can be done by
not observing them or their amendment procedures. As an instance of the former,
consider the annual budget deﬁcit ceiling of 3 percent of the GDP included in the
European Stability and Growth Pact (as part of the Maastricht convergence criteria).
The measure was adopted in 1997 by the seventeen state members of the European
Union that take part in the Eurozone and unobserved without batting an eyelash
by virtually all of them afterward. As an instance of the latter, consider the writing
of a completely new constitution by the delegates of the Philadelphia Convention
in 1787, who utterly ignored their mandate to limit themselves to drawing up and
proposing amendments to the Articles of Confederation.
This second argument raises the classic philosophical issue of whether the very
notion of a self-binding sovereign makes sense at all for “he that can bind can release,”
as Hobbes famously claimed. According to Hobbes, along with Bodin and Austin,
if all law—including constitutional law—is the command of a sovereign agent, the
idea that this agent could bind herself is incoherent except in a ﬁgurative sense. In
Hobbes’ own words,
The sovereign of the Commonwealth, be it an assembly or one man, is not
subject to the civil laws. For having power to make and repeal laws, he may,
when he pleaseth, free himself from that subjection by repealing those laws
that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was free before.
For he is free that can be free when he will: nor is it possible for any person
to be bound to himself, because he that can bind can release; and therefore
he that is bound to himself only is not bound.30
27 Alf Ross, “On Self-reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law,” Mind 78 (1969): 1-24.
28 See I. Sánchez-Cuenca, Más democracia, menos liberalismo (Madrid: Katz, 2010), p. 134.
29 Elster, Ulysses Unbound, p. 94.
30 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Richard Tuck, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988 [1651]), p. 184. See also John L. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), lecture VI.
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However, three problems arise with this view. First, it is not completely true that “he
that can bind, can release,” for that would be true only if the sovereign could undo
previous commitments without costs. However, in politics there is an asymmetry
between the cost of breaking a previous commitment and the cost of not making it
in the ﬁrst place. As Elster puts it, in politics a broken promise is worst than not
having made it at all.31 Second, there is a diﬀerence between sovereignty and its
exercise. In a democracy, sovereignty rests on the people and the branches of the
state, at least in theory, only exercise it. The constitution constraints the branches
of the state, not the people itself.32 Third, unlike the limited sovereign, the absolute
sovereign has problems to credibly commit itself. The asymmetry between the former
and the latter regarding credible signaling shows that constitutional constraints are
not merely ceremonial and that they can have a constraining eﬀect indeed. As Elster
points out, this diﬀerence was clear in China in the 1980s, after Deng Xiaoping
liberalized the economy and private property was allowed in order to improve the
economic growth.33 Since the economic agents could not know if those circumstances
would last and if they would be able to keep their proﬁts, their time horizon was
shortened and they often preferred to use their proﬁts for consumption rather than
reinvesting them. Even if the Chinese leaders may have wanted to commit themselves
to a hands-oﬀ policy, they could not do so credibly for they had all the power and
thus the ever-present possibility to undo their reforms.
Of course, an obstinate Hobbesian could always reply that these cases only present
a sovereign who either lacks complete sovereignty or is not really constrained after
all. In the ﬁrst and third cases, because an agent who is accountable for its broken
promises or who depends on third parties’ investments is not an absolute sovereign
proper. In the second case, because the constitution does not constrain the sovereign
(the people) but its agent (the state). In short, Hobbes and Austin might have been
right after all in claiming that a real sovereign cannot bind herself, as it is the case
under dictatorships.34 However, real-world democratic politics consists of multiple
agents whose sovereignty is limited and overlapping. These include not only the
people and their institutional agent (the state) but also international institutions,
transnational corporations, unions and more diﬀuse actors such as ﬁnancial markets.
Further, the people themselves stand divided by widespread and persistent disagree-
ments and conﬂicts of interests. Under these non-ideal circumstances, constitutional
constraints do pose costs and constraints on ordinary decisions made by the people
and the state. In short, it is naive to believe that constitutions are all-powerful
31 J. Elster, “Deliberation and Constitution Making,” in Deliberative Democracy, J. Elster, ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 98.
32 See Wil Waluchow, “Constitutionalism,” The Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/constitutionalism/>.
33 See Elster, Ulysses Unbound, pp. 148-149.
34 Franz Neumann, for example, deﬁned dictatorship as “the rule of a person or a group of per-
sons who arrogate to themselves and monopolize power in the state, exercising it without restraint.”
F. Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory
(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957), p. 233, my italics.
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institutional devices—just as it is to believe that they do not impose costs at all.
Things are way more complex and context-dependent than that.
3.5. Judicial review
As we have seen, constitutional rigidity is a necessary condition of the normative
precedence of the constitution and of its constraining nature, though not a suﬃcient
one. Rigidity alone can hardly constrain the legislative and executive branches if
nothing forces such branches to observe the constitutional provisions. As R. H. S.
Crossman, the member of the British Labour cabinet responsible for the controver-
sial 1968 immigration law denying entry into Britain to about a hundred thousand
British subjects living in Kenya, would declare later on, this law “would have been
declared unconstitutional in any country with a written constitution and a Supreme
Court.”35 This reasoning has lead some to claim that judicial review turns out to be
a necessary condition of the normative precedence of the constitution. As we shall
see immediately below, this is too fast a conclusion, for means other than judicial
adjudication (such as popular mobilization, external pressure by international agents
or expected electoral costs) can make such branches observe the constitution. How-
ever, their contingent relationship notwithstanding, during the last decades judicial
review has turned into the most widespread institutional device for the enactment of
the normative precedence of the constitution. Once an American anomaly (initiated
after the Marbury v. Madison Supreme Court decision of 1803), nowadays it has
become the norm rather than an exception—to the point that 101 out of the 106
constitutions written between 1985 and 2008 include it.36 This phenomenon is part
of what has been termed as the “judicialization of politics,” which Ran Hirschl deﬁnes
as “the ever-accelerating reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core
moral predicaments, public policy questions, and political controversies.”37
Three issues regarding judicial review are addressed in this subsection—the diﬀer-
ence between weak and strong judicial review, the diﬀerence between the American
and the European forms of judicial review and the actual inﬂuence of judicial review
over political decisions.
A. Weak and strong judicial review. As we have seen in section 3.2, weak and strong
forms of judicial review can be distinguished. According to the weak form typical of
the new commonwealth model of constitutionalism, courts assess the constitutional-
ity of legislation, but they lack the ﬁnal word vis-à-vis the legislatures and, therefore,
35 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, p. 223, my italics.
36 See among others Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Rights, and Judicial Power.” For the
history of judicial review, see Larry Kramer, The People Themselves (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004); Roberto Gargarella, La justicia frente al gobierno. Sobre el carácter contramayoritario
del poder judicial (Barcelona: Ariel, 1996); Mary Sarah Bilder, “Idea or Practice: A Brief Histo-
riography of Judicial Review,” Journal of Policy History 20 (2008): 6-26; Ran Hirschl, Towards
Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2004).
37 R. Hirschl, “The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide”
Fordham Law Review 75 (2006): 721-754, p. 721.
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the ability to turn down or modify statutes. In some versions of the weak form, courts
can enforce their decisions, but the legislature may override the decision, restating the
original statutes by some additional means. This is the case of Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, according to which courts can decline to enact statutes if they
violate any of the provisions included in the Charter whilst the legislature retain the
power to insulate legislation from judicial scrutiny (even though it has to be noted
that such power is rarely used). In another and weaker versions, courts enjoy the
ability to declare the unconstitutionality of a given statute, but lack the ability to
enforce such declaration so as to turn statutes down. This is the case of the UK
under the Human Rights Act, according to which the courts can issue “declarations
of incompatibility” that can trigger a fast-track legislative procedure carried out by a
minister in order to remedy the incompatibility. However, unless a minister initiates
the fast-track procedure, such declarations do not “aﬀect the validity, continuing
operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given; and ... is
not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made.”38
Now, throughout this chapter judicial review will refer only to its stronger form,
which can be deﬁned as follows:
Judicial review.—The authority of courts to assess the constitutionality of
legislative actions, including the ability to decline to apply statutes, to mod-
ify the eﬀect of their application so as to make them compatible with the
constitution and, in the limit, to strike them down altogether.
B. American and European judicial review.39 Even though both the American and
the European models of judicial review are part of the “post-war paradigm” of consti-
tutionalism, in which courts have the last word over the constitutionality of statutes,
salient diﬀerences between them stand out.40 The American model was very relevant
in starting the practice of judicial review and promoting it world-wide (for example,
by pressing post-WWII Germany and Italy to adopt written constitutions with a
charter of rights and judicial review). Hence, the American model is found in Africa,
Asia and the Caribeean, specially in countries that were part of the British Com-
monwealth or were under American occupation or inﬂuence, such as Japan and parts
of Central and South America. However, in recent times the European model has
been much more inﬂuential than the American one, which is believed to introduce
confusion in the separation of powers. With the decolonization process new consti-
tutionalism expanded, though in its European version rather than in the American
one.
Consider brieﬂy the history of the European model. By the time of Marbury
v. Madison, the French legislature had banned judicial review of legislation and
38 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4(2), (6). Quoted in Waldron, “The Core of the Case
Against Judicial Review,” p. 1355.
39 A. Ruiz Miguel, “Modelo americano y modelo europeo de justicia constitucional,” Doxa 23
(2000): pp. 145-160; A. S. Sweet, “Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review—And Why It
May Not Matter,” Michigan Law Review 101 (2003): pp. 2744-2780.
40 L. Eisenstat Weinrib, “The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism,” The Migration
of Constitutional Ideas, Sujit Choudhry, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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had set up the Napoleonic code system according to which courts must not take
part in the making of legislation. The French system expanded through Europe
during the nineteenth century. As time went by, speciﬁc organs were created to
protect rights from administrative or legislative abuses, but such power was never
conferred to courts. Finally, in 1970 a bill of rights was included in the French
Constitution and a Constitutional Council was created in the Fifth Republic. The
Council, however, exercises only pre-enforced and abstract review of statutes. Once
a statute has come into force, no review is allowed. The French system is important
for two reasons. First, because it spread across Europe ﬁrst and Africa and Latin
America later, mainly through Portuguese and Spanish colonialism. Second, because
it served as the stepping stone for the current European model. Hans Kelsen, the
father of the European-style constitutional court, drafted the constitution of the
Austrian First Republic and included a constitutional court of this sort among its
most outstanding institutional features. During the inter-war period, constitutional
review was stablished in Czechoslovakia (1920), Liechtenstein (1925), Greece (1927),
Spain (1931) and Ireland (1937), even though only the latter survived the WWII.
After the war, most European countries adopted the Kelsenian model in subsequent
waves.
In the American model, judicial review is decentralized, so any court has the abil-
ity to declare the unconstitutionality of statutes, with the Supreme Court serving as
the last court of appeal for ordinary law as well as for constitutional law and thus
addressing cases of constitutional law less often. By contrast, in the European model
constitutional review of legislation is carried out by a specialized constitutional court,
which is thus much more active than the American Supreme Court regarding consti-
tutional decisions. As Dahl has pointed out recently, contrary to what is sometimes
believed, it is the European and not the American model the one that has had more
world-wide inﬂuence, as Stone Sweet’s more comprehensive analysis proves (see table
1 below).41
Region American European Mixed Other None
Europe 5 31 3 (1) 1 2
Africa 12 29 1 6 3
Middle East 2 5 0 3 1
Asia and South Asia 18 13 2 11 0
North America 2 0 0 0 0
Central America 3 3 3 (1) 0 0
South America 3 4 5 (3) 0 0
Caribbean 8 0 0 1 0
Total 53 85 14 22 6
Table 2. Regional distribution of models of judicial review.42
41 Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution? (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 2001), ch. 3.
42 Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Rights, and Judicial Power,” p. 223.
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C. Eﬀectiveness. A lot has been said about the “counter-majoritarian diﬃculty”
that arises whenever a court—which members have not been elected and cannot be
voted out—strikes down a decision made by democratically elected members of the
parliament or the executive (see below, § 115). However, it has often been been
replied that judicial review could be the “least dangerous branch” after all,43 since
empirical evidence shows that, on average, constitutional courts tend not to make
decisions against public opinion. According to Dahl’s classical study, for example,
we should not worry too much about the counter-majoritarian diﬃculty for “policy
views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views
dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”44 Dahl’s study
has been conﬁrmed in subsequent studies. For example, Stimpson, Mackuen and
Erikson have shown that, in a scale of 1-100 of progressism-conservadurism, a shift
in the public opinion of 1 point translates into a shift in Supreme Court Justices’ view
of 0,3 points and of 0,9 in the House of Representatives or the Senate. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court is only slightly slower in getting in line with public opinion (on
average, 2,3 years) than the representative institutions (around 1 year).45 Diverse
explanations have been provided for this phenomenon. Consider three of them.
First, in Dahl’s classic account, the mechanism by which Supreme Court justices
tend to conform to the constitutional views of the majority is the appointment pro-
cess. Hence, as older justices die or retire (his analysis refers only to the American
Supreme Court, in which justices have life-long tenure), they are replaced by new
ones with shared views with the majority political coalition that appoints them.
Second, more recently, Epstein, Knight and Martin have argued, contra Dahl,
that justices tend not to oppose the view of the majority because of the institutional
constraints imposed on the court by the system of separation of powers.46 The
legislatures can always pass new legislation and institutional crisis can arise if the
court systematically strikes down statutes—as it happened in the US in 1937, when
Roosevelt threatened to “pack the [Supreme] Court.” For that reason, judges can
anticipate this possibility and incorporate the preferences of the members of the other
branches in their decisions, reducing the dissonance and improving the stability of
the institutional system overall.
Third, scholars who emphasize the inﬂuence of social movements over constitu-
tional law have provided yet another explanation for why judges adapt their views to
those of the citizenry—an explanation that is consistent, I believe, with both Dahl’s
and Epstein et al.’s. Hence, according to Robert Post and Reva Siegel, social move-
ments inﬂuence electoral politics, which in turn inﬂuences which judges get appointed
to the court. This is consistent with Dahl’s account. In addition, social movements
43 The expression comes from Hamilton, The Federalist, no. 78.
44 R. A. Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker,” Journal of Public Law 6 (1957), pp. 279-295.
45 J. A Stimson, M. B. Mackuen and R. S. Erikson, “Dynamic Representation,” American
Political Science Review 89 (1995): pp. 543-565. Cited in Sánchez-Cuenca, Más democracia,
menos liberalismo, p. 177.
46 See L. Epstein, J. Night and A. D. Martin, “The Supreme Court as a Strategic National
Policymaker,” Emory Law Journal 50 (2001): 583-612.
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also put direct pressure on the court when properly organized and supported, making
thus diﬃcult for judges not to take into account their views. This latter explanation
is consistent with Epstein et al.’s strategic account of judges’ behavior, and helps
explain why they often strike down legislation that is not supported by the large
public but not the other way around.
Conclusion: Despite the heated disputes they often provoke, constitutional courts
are not all-powerful. Now, they are not mere paper tigers either. At least, for
two reasons. First, in countries with a well established tradition of judicial review
constitutional decisions made by courts have a pervasive impact on society and, in
turn, on the decisions made by the legislature and the executive (i.e., the preferences
of the citizenry and of the representatives are to great extent endogenous to the legal
framework). Second, just as courts can anticipate and incorporate the preferences
of the public and of the members of other branches, the members of the legislative
and the executive branches can also anticipate the views of the constitutional court
and strategically take them into account in order to rule out the possibility of their
decisions being turned down. Therefore, their constraining nature—as well as the
counter-majoritarian diﬃculty—should be taken seriously indeed.
3.6. The counter-majoritarian diﬃculty
So far in this chapter we have brieﬂy covered the history and forms of consti-
tutionalism, along with its most characteristic institutional features—constitutional
rigidity and judicial review of legislation. On the one hand, rigidity makes the
constitutional amendment procedure more cumbersome than the ordinary legislative
procedure carried out by legislatures. On the other hand, judicial review provides
courts with the ﬁnal authority to assess the constitutionality of legislation, including
the ability to overturn statutes that have been previously passed by democratic legis-
latures. Hence, constitutionalism thus deﬁned raises serious problems of justiﬁcation
for everyone committed to democracy and majority rule. This is what Alexander
Bickel famously termed as “the counter-majoritarian diﬃculty.”47 Even though the
expression tends to be used to refer only to judicial review, it is obvious that the abil-
ity of legislatures to counteract decisions made by the courts through constitutional
amendment will depend on the rigidity of the constitution. Hence both constitutional
rigidity and judicial review can be depicted as counter-majoritarian devices.
Of course, the relationship between constitutionalism and democratic legisla-
tures is not an all-or-nothing matter. A rigid constitution poses constraints on the
47 A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch. The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 16-17. For the history of the “diﬃculty” from its origins in
the Early Republic until present times, see B. Friedman, “The History of the Countermajoritarian
Diﬃculty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy,” NYU Law Review 73 (1998): 333-433;
"The History of the Countermajoritarian Diﬃculty, Part Two: Reconstruction’s Political Court,"
Georgetown Law Journal 91 (2002): 1-65; "The History of the Countermajoritarian Diﬃculty, Part
Three: The Lesson of Lochner," NYU Law Review 73 (2001): 1383-1455; "The History of the Coun-
termajoritarian Diﬃculty, Part Four: Law’s Politics,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 148
(2000): 971-1064; "The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Diﬃculty, Part Five," 112 Yale Law Journal 153 (2002): 153-259.
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decisions made by the elected representatives. However, the degree to which the
counter-majoritarian diﬃculty is present depends on the stringency of the amend-
ment procedure. And, as we have seen, this stringency can go from mere procedural
delays to parliamentary majorities to the ratiﬁcation by non-elected bodies to ab-
solute entrenchment in its more radical form. In short, the greater the stringency
of the amendment procedure, the greater the contribution of constitutional rigidity
as a counter-majoritarian device. As for strong judicial review, its contribution as
a counter-majoritarian device depends on a number of factors.48 First, the larger
the number of abstract and vague articles included in the constitution, the greater
the need for constitutional interpretation and thus the discretion and power of con-
stitutional judges. Second, the democratic pedigree of constitutional judges will
depend on the how they are appointed, thus being higher if they are appointed by
the parliament and for a limited term than if they receive life-long appointments.
In short, constitutional rigidity and judicial review turn out to be more or less
counter-majoritarian depending on these factors. However, to the extent that they
are counter-majoritarian, they pose a serious problem of justiﬁcation from a demo-
cratic point of view. For anyone committed to democracy and majority rule as
the central sources of political legitimacy, constitutional rigidity and judicial review
are disturbing institutional devices that need to be justiﬁed. Consider the case of
the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (an autonomous community in Spain), which
provides Catalonia’s basic law. Even though the Statute was passed by the Catalan
parliament and by both chambers of the Spanish parliament, and eventually ratiﬁed
in referendum by a large majority of Catalans (73,9 percent of the votes) in 2006, the
Spanish Constitutional Court ruled in 2010 that fourteen of its articles were unconsti-
tutional and were thus turned down. Each time this occurs, the counter-majoritarian
diﬃculty, and the need for sound reasons to address it, become more pressing.
The remainder of Part II analyzes the main attempts to provide precisely such
reasons. More precisely, it analyzes three types of theories that call into question the
counter-majoritarian diﬃculty and justify constitutional rigidity and judicial review
on democratic grounds—namely, pure instrumentalist theories, precommitment-based
theories, and proceduralist theories. According to these theories, constitutionalism
need not be at odds with democracy, either because constitutional constraints are
necessary for democratic procedures to bring about just outcomes, such as the pro-
tection of human rights or the improvement of the economic output (chapter 4),
or because they are the upshot of commitments that actual citizens have made
democratically (chapter 5), or yet because they set up the procedural rules and
preconditions required for the proper functioning of the democratic system (chapter
6). Nevertheless, as we shall see throughout these chapters, all of them turn out to
fall short of justifying constitutionalism on democratic grounds.
48 See Bayón, “Democracia y derechos: Problemas de fundamentación del constitucionalismo,”
pp. 72-74.
Chapter 4
Instrumentalist theories
4.1. Introduction
This chapter addresses pure instrumentalist theories of the legitimacy of demo-
cratic authority and their justiﬁcation of substantive constitutional constraints.1 Ac-
cording to these theories, democratic institutions and decision-making are legitimate
if and only if they bring about a set of substantive and procedure-independent goals,
such as the protection of fundamental rights, the improvement of the economic out-
put, or the stability of the political system. Thus, a trade-oﬀ between constitution-
alism and democratic legitimacy need not arise, for the legitimacy of democratic
institutions rests exclusively on their ability to achieve some substantive goals that
are entrenched in the constitutional text and thus advanced by constitutional means.
If the only point of democratic institutions is to produce certain outcomes and it is
proven that constitutional constraints on democratic decisions are necessary for such
outcomes to be brought about, the apparent contradiction between the former and
the latter immediately dissolves and the latter becomes necessary for the proper
functioning of democracy.
The chapter proceeds as follows. It opens by setting up the structure of in-
strumentalism (§ 4.2) and turns to two prominent instrumentalist accounts of the
legitimacy of constitutionalism—namely, that it helps democratic decision-making
protect fundamental rights (§ 4.2.1) and that it improves the economic performance
of the system overall (§ 4.2.2). Three criticisms are raised next (§ 4.3).
4.2. The structure of instrumentalism
Democratic institutions can be normatively assessed with regard to their proce-
dures, to their outcomes or to a combination of both. According to (pure) demo-
cratic proceduralism, democratic decisions are legitimate because they are made by
1 See, among others, R. Arneson, “Democratic rights at national and workplace levels,’’ The
Idea of Democracy, D. Copp, J. Hampton and J. E. Roemer, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1993), p. 119; “Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy,”
Journal of Political Philosophy 11, no. 1 (2003), pp. 122–132; “Democracy Is Not Intrinsically
Just,” Democracy and Justice, K. Dowding, R. E. Goodin and C. Pateman, eds. (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004), 40-58; R. Dworkin, “What Is Equality? Part IV: Political Equality,”
University of San Francisco Law Review 22 (1989): 1-30; F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty
(London: Routledge, [1960] 1976); P. van Parijs, “Justice and Democracy: Are They Incompatible,”
Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (1996): 101-117;
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fair procedures.2 According to (pure) democratic instrumentalism, by contrast, they
are legitimate because they bring about better outcomes than any feasible alterna-
tive. Both democratic proceduralism and democratic instrumentalism combine two
tenets, one about what counts as legitimate authority and another one about why
democratic institutions and decisions meet that criterion. In the case of democratic
instrumentalism, they are the following two:3
Political instrumentalism.—Political institutions have legitimate authority iﬀ
they produce outcomes C better than any feasible political alternative, being
C a set of substantive goals independent from and prior to the procedures
used to bring them about.
and
Democratic instrumentalism.—Under the present circumstances, constitutional
democracies produce outcomes C better than any feasible political alternative.
A number of accounts have been provided for what counts as good outcomes—i.e.
what speciﬁc C is to be brought about in order for political decisions to be legiti-
mate. Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 will tackle two of the most prominent ones—namely,
the protection of fundamental rights and the improvement of the economic output.
Consider brieﬂy two additional accounts. First, Amartya Sen has famously claimed
that no democratic country with a free press has ever suﬀered from substantive
famine.4 Similarly, David Estlund has recently argued that democratic legitimacy is
the upshot of the ability of democratic institutions to prevent “primary bads” (i.e.
“war, famine, economic collapse, political collapse, epidemic, and genocide”) better
than any other political regime. Even though he does not provide his own empirical
evidence, he points at studies showing that democratic countries have a lower ten-
dency of going to war or that they do better in preventing famines or dealing with
2 See Robert Dahl, “Procedural Democracy,” in Philosophy, Politics and Society, Peter Laslett
and James Fishkin, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979); Waldron, Law and Disagreement ; Richard
Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism. A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
3 See R. Arneson, “The Supposed Right to a Democratic Say,” Contemporary Debates in Po-
litical Philosophy, T. Christiano and J. Christman, eds. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 197.
The most well-known instrumental account of the justiﬁcation of authority is Raz’s so-called service
conception of authority, according to which legitimate authority, while it does not require necessarily
the explicit consent of the governed, has to exist for their shake, in their beneﬁt. According to his
“normal justiﬁcation thesis,” “The normal way to establish that a person has authority over another
person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply
to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged
authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the
reasons which apply to him directly”. See S. Wall, “Democracy, Authority and Publicity,” Journal
of Political Philosophy 14 (2006): 85-100. Now, according to Viehoﬀ it is a mistake to think, as both
critics such as Waldron and Christiano and supporters such as Wall do, that the Razian account
of authority leaves no room for justiﬁcations of authority grounded on the value of procedures. As
the above-mentioned critics point out, since the NJT is concerned only with “the content of the
directives themselves” rather than with “how directives are reached,” it has to be supplemented by
a procedural account of legitimate authority. See D. Viehoﬀ, “Debate: Procedure and Outcome in
the Justiﬁcation of Authority,” Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (2011): 248-259, section II.
4 See A. Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999).
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natural catastrophes.5 Indeed, the relationship between democratic political systems
and the likelihood of famines taking place, torture levels, disappearances and mass
killings has been widely demonstrated to be negative and linear and generally be-
lieved to result from the fact that in democracies political leaders who use violence
against their citizens can be removed from oﬃce.6
Second, Adam Przeworski has argued that democracy makes possible alternation
in oﬃce without bloodshed, since elections, when free and competitive, provide the
losing parties with the strong incentive to wait until the next elections rather than
turning to military coup or calling for revolution.7 In a similar vein, though aimed
at explaining the raise of democracy, Acemoglu and Robinson have claimed that
democracy improves the stability of the political system and that it reduces the
likelihood of social revolutions by providing a way for the economic elites to commit
credibly to the redistribution of wealth to the poor, thus reducing the likelihood of
social revolutions aimed at redistributing wealth by means of violent expropriation.8
Thus far we have seen why political instrumentalists may have good reasons to
embrace democracy. Consider now why they may also have good reasons to embrace
constitutionalism. First of all. it is important to note that, since instrumentalist
theories deﬁne outcomes as prior to and independent from the procedures that are
expected to bring them about, the relationship between the former and the latter
is taken to be totally contingent. Further, democratic procedures can also produce
pathologies and undesirable side-eﬀects when inadequately constrained or uncon-
strained at all. Consider two instances of such pathologies. First, a parliamentary
majority might well use its political power to trump the civil rights of a minority, or
to expropriate private property and discourage foreign investment, or yet to exclude
an opposing party from the political process jeopardizing the stability of the political
system overall. This is the famous threat of a “tyranny of the majority,” as labeled
by J. S. Mill.9
Second, social choice theorists have argued that democratic voting can result
in intransitive and incoherent outcomes due to Condorcet’s paradox, thus enabling
actors to control the agenda setting so as to advance their own interests.10 Consider
5 D. Estlund, Democratic Authority. A Philosophical framework (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2008). For a critique of the weakness of the empirical evidence provided by Estlund,
see E. Anderson, “An Epistemic Defense of Democracy: David Estlund’s Democratic Authority,”
Episteme. A Journal of Social Epistemology 5 (2008): 129-139.
6 See C. Davenport and D. A. Armstrong II, “Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights:
A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996,” American Journal of Political Science 48 (2004): 538-554.
For a recent instrumentalist argument for a human right to democracy based on this evidence, see
T. Christiano, “An Instrumental Argument for a Human Right to Democracy,” Philosophy & Public
Aﬀairs 39 (2011): 142-176.
7 A. Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense,” in Democracy’s Value. I.
Shapiro, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
8 D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cam-
bridge: cambridge University Press, 2005). I go back to their argument in section 5.4.4.
9 See J. S. Mill, “On Liberty,” in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 18, J. Robson, ed.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
10 The locus classicus is W. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the
Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982). For a
criticism based on a comprehensive study of the empirical likelihood of this problem, see G. Mackie,
Democracy Defended (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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it brieﬂy. Assume that there are three candidates—A, B, and C—and that there
are three voters with the preferences shown in table 2 (the candidates are ordered in
decreasing order of preference). Further assume that the elected candidate is to be
chosen from the aggregation of all voters’ votes, with all the votes having the same
weight, and using a majority rule. As it turns out, the use of majority rule produces
an intransitive and cyclical outcome, for there is a majority of two voters that prefer
candidate A over candidate B, a majority of two voters that prefer candidate B over
candidate C and a majority of two voters that prefer candidate C over candidate A.
Voter Preference 1 Preference 2 Preference 3
Voter 1 A B C
Voter 2 B C A
Voter 3 C A B
Table 3. Condorcet’s paradox: voters’ preferences
Constitutional constraints are thus called upon to prevent these pathologies from
happening and to ensure that the democratic process produces the expected out-
comes. As for the ﬁrst problem, as Holmes has argued, the constitutionalization of
civil rights creates “gag rules” that take away issues of vote-swapping and horse-trading,
preventing them from being trumped by temporary majorities and ensuring the sta-
bility of the system overall. As for the second problem, it has been shown that
the requirement of majorities larger than 64 percent—the sort of supermajoritarian
requirement for a constitutional amendment—rules out the possibility of the Con-
dorcetian paradox taking place.11
In short, the instrumentalist case for constitutional constraints on democracy can
be divided into four steps. First, the legitimacy of political institutions depends only
on the outcomes they bring about. Second, democratic institutions have legitimate
authority over citizens due to their ability to bring about such outcomes better
than any feasible political alternative. Third, democratic institutions can also pro-
duce pathological outcomes and undesirable side-eﬀects when unconstrained. Fourth,
constitutional constraints are required in order to minimize those pathologies from
happening and to improve the likelihood of the expected outcomes being brought
about. Consider now two outstanding accounts that have been provided for what
counts as good outcomes
4.2.1. Outcomes 1: fundamental rights
A very inﬂuential justiﬁcation of constitutional democracy is that democratic
decision-making ought to be constrained so as to protect citizens’ fundamental rights
from the tyranny of parliamentary majorities. Even though the abuse of the expres-
sion has almost deprived it of its meaning, reasonable worries persist. This is so,
not only because majorities can often be ill-intentioned toward minorities. But also
due to the logrolling and horse-trading typical of parliamentary politics, on the one
11 See A. Caplin and B. Nalebuﬀ, “On 64%-Majority Rule,” Econometrica 56 (1988): 787-814.
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hand, and the possibility of majorities just erring, on the other. Hence the alleged
necessity to insulate rights from daily politics and ephemeral majorities. The ﬁrst
worry is expressed by Raz: “Legislatures because of their preoccupation with current
problems, and their felt need to secure re-election by a public all too susceptible to
the inﬂuences of the short term, are only too liable to violent swings and panic
measures.”12 The second worry, by Dworkin: “Any competent interpretation of the
Constitution as a whole must therefore recognize ... that some constitutional rights
are designed exactly to prevent majorities from following their own conviction about
what justice requires.”13 In short, one of the main reasons for posing constitutional
constraints on ordinary political decisions is that such constraints provide a better
protection for individual rights from temporary and fallible majorities.14
Richard Arneson has provided a very inﬂuential pure instrumentalist justiﬁcation
of constitutional democracy based on the protection of fundamental rights. Ac-
cording to him, fundamental-rights instrumentalism provides “the most natural and
compelling justiﬁcation of political regimes of substantive constitutional democracy
under modern conditions.”15 His argument, in a nutshell, is that democracy is a
mere means for the securing of fundamental rights, which justiﬁes the inclusion of
the latter in a rigid constitution enforced by non-elected judges holding ﬁnal powers
of review. Now, for his argument to succeed he needs to make three steps—one
conceptual, another one normative and yet another one empirical. First, he has to
show the conceptual distinction between procedural rights and fundamental rights.
Second, he has to show their normative distinction—i.e., the mere instrumental value
of the former and the intrinsic value of the latter.16 And third, he has to show that
constitutional democracy follows as the best institutional response to the second
step. Let us set aside the latter one (which has been already addressed, even if only
brieﬂy, in 4.2) and consider the former two in turn.
A. The conceptual distinction. Unlike civil or economic rights, political rights are
Hohfeldian power-rights. They provide their holders with the power to change the
12 J. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 260.
13 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Ma: Belknap Press, 1986), p. 376.
14 This view is often—even though not always—grounded on a mainly negative conception of
fundamental rights, termed as “trumps” (Dworkin), as “side-constraints” (Nozick), as the “sphere
of the undecidable” (Ferrajoli), or as “forbiden territory” (Garzón Valdés). According to Dennis
Mueller’s, for example, “A right is an unconditional freedom of an individual to undertake a partic-
ular action or to refrain from such an action without interference or coercion from other individuals
or institutions.” See D. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), p. 212.
15 R. Arneson, “Democratic rights at national and workplace levels,’’ p. 119. See also his
“Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy;” “Democracy Is Not In-
trinsically Just;” and “The Supposed Right to a Democratic Say,” Contemporary Debates in Political
Philosophy, Thomas Christiano and John Christman, eds. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp.
197-212.
16 It might be argued that someone who embraces an instrumentalism of rights across the board,
and thus rejects the very idea of fundamental rights also embraces an instrumentalism of democratic
rights. True. However, here I focus on a narrower position, as Arneson does as well—namely, the
one which assumes that if there are fundamental rights, democratic rights are not among them. See
Arneson, “The Supposed Right to a Democratic Say.”
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very framework of rights they and their fellow citizens have.17 As Arneson puts it,
“The exercise of the vote is an exercise of power by the voter over the lives of other
citizens.”18 The former are ﬁrst-order rights, whereas the latter are second-order
rights, for they refer to the former and can serve, provided that enough citizens ex-
ercise them in a certain, coordinated way, as eﬀective means, for example, to create
same-sex marriage rights, to eliminate retirement rights or to modify the structure of
property rights. In order to clarify the distinction, consider two possible objections.
First, it might be objected that ﬁrst-order rights also give power to their holders.
For example, a powerful foreign investor can be in a position to threaten the gov-
ernment with withdrawing her investment if workers’ rights are not curbed. Even
if she does not hold formal political rights, she might well be said to have powerful
political rights over workers’ rights. However, this example does not dissolve the dis-
tinction for she might be said to have de facto (and very powerful indeed) political
rights that put her in a position to successfully change the framework of workers’
ﬁrst-order rights.
Second, it might also be objected that ﬁrst-order rights give power to their holders
not because they indirectly provide them with de facto political rights, but because
they impose correlative duties on other people, thus aﬀecting the rights of the latter.
For example, if I have a right to free speech, then you have a correlative duty not to
interfere with my publishing of an op-ed piece in the newspaper. Likewise, if I have a
right to be assisted in case of a car accident, then you have a correlative duty to stop
driving and assist me. As Griﬃn has put it in his critique of Arneson, it actually
happens that “rights of virtually any sort ... allow one to exercise some degree of
power over others without ﬁrst getting their consent.”19 However, this kind of power
is very diﬀerent from the sort of power provided by political rights, which provide
their holders with the power to decide over which rights other people have, creating,
modifying and eliminating full sets of other citizens’ rights. For example, oﬃcials
have this sort of power over their citizens, bosses over their workers and parents over
their children not because they have rights that the latter have to honor (which they
do), but rather because they are in a position to modify the very structure of the
rights the latter have and to enforce them through the issue of binding commands.
As Arneson puts it, “a right that constraints other people from engaging in a certain
type of conduct toward the right-holder diﬀers from a right to set rules that might
specify what others shall do across a broad range of important types of conduct.”20
Now, assume that a distinction between ﬁrst-order and second-order rights holds.
Which rights among the former count as fundamental? Arneson’s response to this
question is ambiguous. In an early paper he included a set of Rawlsian-style rights
among the fundamental ones, including the right to material resources, while in a
later paper he leaves open the question of “what is the moral standard for assessing
17 W. N. Hohﬂed, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919).
18 Arneson, “Democratic rights at national and workplace levels,’’ p. 120.
19 C. G. Griﬃn, “Debate: Democracy as a Non-Instrumentally Just Procedure,” Journal of
Political Philosophy 11, no 1 (2003): 111-121, p. 112.
20 Arneson, “Democracy Is Not Intrinsically Just,” p. 47.
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results that determines which ones are best.”21 Neither response goes without prob-
lems, as it will become clear in section 4.3.2. However, let us assume for now that
an adequate account of which rights count as fundamental can be provided.
B. The normative distinction. The fact that democratic rights serve as an instrument
to create, change and even suppress ﬁrst-order rights does not necessarily imply that
they have mere instrumental value subordinated to the advancement of the latter.
For that matter, a taxi driver might well serve me as an instrument to get home,
but he obviously does not have mere instrumental value to me.22 Likewise, political
rights do have instrumental value, for someone who lacks franchise cannot advance
her ﬁrst-order rights properly. However, it might be argued that, when someone is
disenfranchised, her condition as an equal member of the political community—and
not only her political purchasing power, to put it in rather Schumpeterian terms—is
also taken away from her to great extent. Democracy would thus qualify as a worth-
while moral goal in itself (say, due to the equality or the autonomy that it would
acknowledge to each citizen).
Now, according to Arneson, intrinsic accounts of democratic rights are ﬂawed, for
political rights and democracy more generally lack intrinsic value and are justiﬁed
only insofar as they help secure citizens’ fundamental rights.23 This is so for two rea-
sons—namely, because procedural rights are by deﬁnition merely instrumental and
because they provide power over other people’s fundamental rights and thus are to be
assessed regarding whether they help advance or not such rights. Arneson provides
two analogies to justify these two reasons. Firstly, he compares democratic proce-
dures to searching for a genuine treasure, in which we asses our devices (e.g., maps)
in purely instrumental terms.24 Maps are indeed useful and probably necessary for
any attempt to gain the treasure, but it would be certainly awkward to say that
their use has intrinsic value of any sort. Mutatis mutandis, democratic procedures,
including democratic rights, turn out to be useful and probably necessary for any
attempt to secure and advance fundamental rights, but it would be equally awkward
to say that they have more than instrumental value.
The second analogy compares democratic rights to parental rights, which also
provide parents with great power over their children. Indeed, parents enjoy ample
discretionary authority in the upbringing of their children—they can decide which
21 Arneson, “Democratic Rights at National and Workplace Levels,” p. 119. “Democracy Is
Not Intrinsically Just,” p. 41 n. 3.
22 This example resembles Kant’s categorical imperative in its second formulation, which reads
as follows: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person
of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an end.” However,
it need not be justiﬁed on Kantian grounds. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of
Morals, James W. Ellington, trans. (Hackett, [1785] 1993), p. 30.
23 Arneson goes beyond more moderate consequentialist theories—which might allow trade-oﬀs
between intrinsic and procedural fairness, even if only to end up by defending that the latter trumps
the former—by embracing a “best results” theory, according to which intrinsic fairness judgements
should not be given any consideration in decision making and policy making at all. The label comes
from C. Beitz, Political Equality. An Essay in Democratic Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1989), p. 20. See Arneson, “Democratic rights at national and workplace levels,’’
p. 145 n. 15.
24 Arneson, “Democracy Is Not Intrinsically Just,” pp. 43-44.
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school to take them to, which religion to raise them in or which other kids can they
hang out with. Now, according to Arneson, such discretionary rights are given to
parents just because doing so proves to be a good way of ensuring each child’s right to
a decent upbringing. As soon as parents undisputedly fail to ensure the fundamental
rights of their children (say, because of malnutrition or sexual abuses), they also lose
their legitimate discretionary power over them. Mutatis mutandis, political rights
are given to citizens just because doing so proves to be a good way of ensuring that
each citizens’ fundamental rights are protected. Hence, as soon as citizens fail to
bring about this goal (say, because they use a parliamentary majority to suppress
their right not to be tortured or the right from deprivation), they also lose their
legitimate authority to exercise their political rights.25
4.2.2. Outcomes 2: economic performance
Consider now a second instrumentalist approach to constitutional democracy,
according to which constitutional constraints make democratic decision-making bring
about greater stability, accountability and credibility and thus improve the economic
performance of the system overall. As Berggren and Kurrild-Klitgaard point out in a
survey of the recent literature on constitutional political economy, “This perspective
entails a largely instrumental view of how a democracy should be designed. [It]
implies that the choice of democratic building blocs, within a framework of ’minimal’
basic principles of democracy, is a rather open question being dependent on to what
extent the alternative arrangements contribute to this satisfaction of the citizens’
preferences.”26
To be sure, as Elster points out, the causal relationship between constitutional-
ism and economic performance goes in both directions. Constitutional constraints
may improve economic performance and the enactment and eﬀective enforcement
of such constraints, in turn, may be feasible only under a speciﬁc level of economic
development.27 However, this section only focuses on the ﬁrst direction of the rela-
tionship—namely, the impact of constitutional constraints on economic performance
and their justiﬁcation on that ground.28
25 Griﬃn and others have objected that Arneson does not capture adequately the relationship of
paternity for he does not take into account the desire of parents to parent their children. According
to Arneson, this reading rests on a misunderstanding, for his account leaves room for taking into
account the deep and strong desires of parents to raise their own children as fundamental rights.
As long as “natural parents’ natural inclination to be connected as primary guardians of their
own children [proves to be] an important aspect of the aims and aspirations, satisfaction of which
enters into their right to wellbeing, then that goes in the hopper of the fundamental moral rights.”
Arneson, “Debate: Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy,” p. 128.
26 N. Berggren and P. Kurrild-Klitgaard, “Economic Eﬀects of Political Institutions, Whith
Special Reference to Constitutions” in Why constitutions Matter, N. Berggren, N. Karlson, and J.
Nergelius, eds. (Stockholm: City University Press, 2000).
27 According to Przeworski et al., for example, no democracy failed above a per capita GDP
of $6055 (measured in 1985 purchasing power parity dollars), which was Argentina’s level in 1975.
See A. Przeworski, J. A. Cheibub, M. E. Alvarez and F. Limongi, Democracy and Development:
Political Institutions and Material Well-being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), p. 106.
28 See J. Elster, “The Impact of Constitutions on Economic Performance,” Proceedings of the
World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1994 (1995): 209-226, p. 209. The ﬁeld
of constitutional political economy goes back to J. Buchanan and G. Tullock’s The Calculus of
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Before proceeding, three caveats are in order. First, the notion of economic
performance is not an undisputed one. While some deﬁne it as the maximization
of some aggregate utility or wealth, others such as Elster include economic secu-
rity—deﬁned along prioritarian lines as the ensuring of the highest level of well-being
for the worst-oﬀ—as one of its variables. Second, the causal relationship between
constitutional constraints and the improvement of economic eﬃciency and security
is too technical a question for my level of expertise. However, I think that it is worth
sketching the main causal mechanisms through which, as it is often claimed, consti-
tutionalism might bring about such outcomes. Third, contrary to what is sometimes
assumed in constitutional political economy, the main focus of the section is not the
economic impact of rights or democracy, for both rights and democratic institutions
can be enacted by means other than speciﬁcally constitutional means—i.e., without
being included in a rigid constitutional text and enforced through judicial review.
Instead, the section is mainly focused on the economic eﬀects of rigidity and judicial
review—i.e., constitutionalism proper.29 That said, let us mention three ways in
which constitutionalism might help improve economic performance:
A. Time consistency. Unless constrained to do otherwise, legislatures and adminis-
tration can suﬀer from time inconsistency in two diﬀerent ways. First, by investing
in short-term projects with smaller yields rather than in projects with larger yields
in the long run. The main reason for this is that the short-termism of electoral
politics. For example, in order to satisfy present voters, politicians in oﬃce might be
tempted to invest in housing by providing buyers with tax beneﬁts so as to reduce the
unemployment rate among construction workers rather than investing in education
and infrastructures so as to change the economic structure of the country, even if
in the long run this decision can create economic bubbles and worse economic out-
comes overall. David Stockman, budget director during the Reagan administration,
expressed this view with unusual sincerity. Stockman refused to address Social Secu-
rity severe long-term problems in 1981 because, as he claimed, he had little interest
Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962) and has developed in journals such as
Constitutional Political Economy, founded by Buchanan in 1990. The locus classicus showing the
relationship between constitutionalism and economic performance in seventeenth-century England
is D. C. North and B. R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” Journal of Economic History 49 (1989):
803-832.
29 True, the causal relationship between constitutionalism and economic performance can be
analyzed in terms of the economic impact of rights, federalism, the length of legislative terms, the
electoral system and other institutional devices, regardless of whether these devices are included in
a rigid constitution and enforced through judicial review or, by contrast, just in hands of the legisla-
ture, as it is the case in the Westminster model. Further, ordinary laws do limit the behavior of the
persons who operate under them, but unless constrained they do not credibly limit the behavior of
the legislator for she can change them at will—i.e., through a simple parliamentary majority, which
is precisely what constitutionalism attemps to prevent. Actually, what diﬀerences constitutional
laws from ordinary ones is that the former do constrain the behavior of the legislatures, for they
are enforced by an independent body and changeable only through a procedure more stringent
than the ordinary legislative procedure. For a survey of the former task, see P. Kurrild-Klitgaard
and N. Berggren, "Economic Consequences of Constitutions: A Theory and Survey," Journal des
Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 14 (2004): article 1. For the need to distinguish between rules
and commitments to rules, see Sánchez-Cuenca, Más democracia, menos liberalismo, p. 137-140.
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in wasting “a lot of political capital on some other guy’s problem in [the year] 2010.”30
Hence, the constitutionalization of certain burdens and duties can enlarge the time
horizon of the government, thus avoiding short-termism and ensuring the provision
of certain goods along time.
Second, constitutional commitments can prevent the government from deviating
from their plans, thus helping them to avoid the so-called hyperbolic discounting.
Time discounting is the tendency of people to give greater value to rewards (and
greater disvalue to punishments) as they come closer in time. At the personal level,
such a discounting is closely related to the phenomenon of the weakness of the will,
and it was captured in St. Agustine’s prayer: “Give me chastity and continence, only
not yet.”31 It can have the consequence of making people deviate from an unpleasant
commitment right before it happens. An example at the institutional level might be
the commitment of the UK Labour Party to put on the agenda the electoral reform, a
commitment that had been in their electoral manifesto for a long time but was never
carried out whenever they got to oﬃce. Another institutional example might be the
tendency of the head of government to break her previous commitments not to run
for oﬃce for a second term when the ﬁrst term is about to expire and no mandatory
rotation is included in the constitution. In short, constitutional commitments might
force governments to carry out their commitments by preventing them from deviating
from their previous plans.
B. Stability. Regardless of the speciﬁc content of the constitution, constitutional
rigidity improves the stability of the institutional system overall by providing a set
of higher-order laws that are very diﬃcult to change and impose strong constraints,
in turn, on the changeability of ordinary laws through judicial review. This improved
stability has a number of economic eﬀects.
First, constitutional rigidity and judicial review reduce the likelihood of fast and
continuous law-making due to short-termism. In turn, by improving institutional
stability and predictability constitutionalism can expand the time horizon of the
economic agents, providing them with the incentive to make long-term investments
and contracts and thus improving the economic output. As Deng Xiaoping once
said, “Without a stable environment, nothing can be achieved.”32
Second, even though no constitutional article has ever prevented a coup d’état
taking place, as Guillermo O’Donnell once commented, constitutional entrenchment
and judicial review can reduce the likelihood of a cabinet taking advantage of its
position to suspend democratic and civil rights, say, by ruling out opposing parties
and media. By doing so, constitutionalism provides economic agents with the cer-
tainty that democratic institutions will last long (or at least longer than under a less
constrained institutional framework). On the other hand, there is some evidence that
30 Quoted in P. Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,”
American Political Science Review 94 (2000): 251-267, p. 261.
31 Quoted in Elster, “The Impact of Constitutions on Economic Performance.”
32 D. Xiaoping, quoted in C. Wing-hung Lo, China’s Legal Awakening (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong University Press, 1995), p. 298.
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democracies perform economically better than autocracies. The main reason for this
is that authoritarian rulers are neither controlled by opposing parties nor can they
lose elections and have to step down. Accordingly, they have no proper incentive
to maximize the total economic output. Superior economic outputs are thus to be
expected under stable and durable democratic institutions.33
Third, constitutionalism can reduce the large amount of resources devoted at
manipulating law-making and lobbying MPs when no constitutional constraints ex-
ist. When certain issues are insulated from day-to-day politics by making them
diﬃcult to change, time and money that would be otherwise devoted to trying to
inﬂuence the reform can be spent diﬀerently. As Posner comments, “If the vote of
a simple majority could change the basic form of government or expropriate the
wealth of a minority, enormous resources might be devoted to seeking and resisting
such legislation.”34
C. Credible signaling. Even if truly committed, an unconstrained government might
lack mechanisms to make its commitments seem credible to other economic agents—e.g.,
investors or workers. Hence, rigid and externally monitored and enforced constitu-
tional constraints can help signal the willingness to uphold certain rules and therefore
improve the credibility of the commitments made.35 As Mancur Olson has argued,
an autocrat cannot credibly commit himself: “If he runs the society, there is no one
who can force him to keep his commitments.”36
As explained above, this was the case of China during the 1980s, when the econ-
omy was liberalized and private property allowed. Under such novel circumstances,
the economic agents could not know if the commitment of Deng Xiaoping and the
Politburo of the Communist Party was actual or pretended, if the system would last
and, eventually, if they would be able to retain their returns. As a consequence of
this, they often chose to use their proﬁts for housing or luxury consumption rather
than reinvesting them. The Chinese leaders were truly committed to the reforms
and the stability of the new system, as it turned. However, they could not signal
credibly their commitment because they retained all the power. Had they self-bound
through the constitutionalization of their commitments, they would have made it
easier for them to signal them, thus improving the incentives of the economic agents
to reinvest their proﬁts.37
33 A. Przeworski and F. Limongi, “Political Regimes and Economic Growth,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives 7 (1993): 51-69.
34 Quoted in Elster, “The Impact of Constitutions on Economic Performance.”
35 Schwartzberg explains how the Athenians used entrenchment of some provisions to make
their commitments more credible. M. Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. 2.
There seems to be a negative empirical relationship between the length of a constitution and
economic wealth. A study of 38 countries in the late 1980s shows that the longer the constitution
(measured by the number of articles as a proxy), the lower of GDP per capita. See A. A. Montenegro,
“Constitutional Design and Economic Performance,” Constitutional Political Economy 6 (1995):
161-169.
36 M. Olson “Autocracy, Democracy and Prosperity,” in Strategy and Choice, R. J. Zeckhauser,
ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p. 153.
37 See Elster, Ulysses Unbound, pp. 148-149.
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4.3. Criticisms
Three diﬀerent criticisms are raised in what follows, all of them aimed at calling
into question the democratic legitimacy of instrumentalist accounts of constitution-
alism. Section 4.3.1 argues that these accounts are unable to address Wollheim’s
paradox, and turn out to be an incomplete normative account of political author-
ity as a result. Section 4.3.2 shows that instrumentalist accounts turn out to be
self-defeating because they do not address adequately the fact of disagreement that,
as we have seen in Part I, turns out to be a necessary condition of democratic legit-
imacy. Finally, section 4.3.3 shows that pure instrumentalism turns out to be too
radical an account of political legitimacy when we consider it from the point of view
of actual citizens, who tend to take into account not only the outcomes of political
decisions but also the fairness of the procedures employed to bring such outcomes
about.
Before proceeding, the following caveat is in order though. Even though the
instrumentalist justiﬁcations of constitutionalism can be attacked on instrumentalist
grounds, this is not the path followed here. Put diﬀerently, it may be accepted that
the legitimacy of political institutions depends exclusively on the outcomes they bring
about, yet criticize the ability of constitutional rigidity and constitutional courts with
ﬁnal powers of review of legislation—vis-à-vis alternative institutional forms, such
as Westminster-style parliamentary sovereignty or the so-called new Commonwealth
models of constitutionalism—to better protect fundamental rights, or to produce
better economic outcomes, or yet to generate more stability. To be sure, there are
good grounds on which this sort of criticisms can be raised.38 However, this issue
is mainly empirical and cannot be settled by mere philosophical analysis—let alone
the methodological problems of analyzing the causal relationship between variables
as complex as these, and the very problematic counterfactual comparisons that such
analysis involve. This is the reason why the remainder of the chapter is limited to
the analysis of instrumentalist theories of constitutionalism from the point of view of
their democratic legitimacy. In short, I will leave aside the second tenet of democratic
instrumentalism (supra, § 117), and focus on the ﬁrst one, i.e.
Political instrumentalism.—Political institutions have legitimate authority iﬀ
they produce outcomes C better than any feasible political alternative, being
C a set of substantive goals independent from and prior to the procedures
used to bring them about.
4.3.1. Wollheim’s paradox
The ﬁrst problem with instrumentalist theories of democratic authority—at least,
with pure instrumentalist ones, which do not attribute any normative weight to pro-
cedures at all—is that they are unable to address Wollheim’s paradox.39 Let us
38 For a discussion and summary, see Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial review,”
pp. 1376-1386.
39 R. Wollehim, “A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy,” in Philosophy, Politics and Society,
Peter Laslett and Runciman, eds. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 71-87.
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consider the paradox ﬁrst (epigraphs A-D) and turn to the problems of instrumen-
talism to address it satisfactorily next (epigraph E).
A. The paradox. Consider ﬁrst Wollheim’s paradox. Take a citizen X who whole-heartedly
believes that
(A1) Policy A ought to be enacted.
However, since X is a democrat, she also believes that
(A2) The policy chosen by the majority ought to be enacted.
Now, assume that on this occasion
(A3) The policy chosen by the majority is policy B (which is incompatible
with A).
Therefore, from (A2) and (A3) it follows that our citizen also believes—at ﬁrst sight
inconsistently with (A1)—that
(A4) Policy B ought to be enacted.
A number of ways out of the paradox of X believing both in (A1) and (A4) have been
provided ever since Wollheim’s paper ﬁrstly appeared in 1962. They can be divided
into three main types—namely, those which attempt to collapse (A1) into (A4),40
those which attempt to collapse (A4) into (A1)41 and those which attempt to show
that (A1) and (A4) need not be at odds.42 In this chapter I try to show why the
two ﬁrst strategies fail and I try to provide an alternative solution to the paradox.
According to this solution (A1) and (A4) can be consistently held because they are
derived from two diﬀerent types of principles—a ﬁrst-order principle of substantive
correctness and a second-order principle of procedural legitimacy. These principles
provide an answer to two diﬀerent normative questions—namely, to “what ought to
be done” and to “what ought to be done provided that we disagree on what ought
to be done and that, nevertheless, we have to take a common course of action.” In
short, X can observe policy B, which authority is granted as procedurally legitimate
and respectfully obeyed, while at the same time being committed to policy A as the
policy she takes as substantively correct through, say, her attending demonstrations,
petitioning, or voting for A in referenda.
Next, it will be shown that, once we accept the two-level solution, pure demo-
cratic instrumentalism turns out to be an incomplete normative account of political
authority. According to pure instrumentalism, political institutions have legitimate
40 Among these, see T. Honderich “A Diﬃculty With Democracy,” Philosophy & Public Aﬀairs
3 (1973-4): 221-26.
41 Among these, see B. Barry, Political Argument (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965);
D. Weiss, “Wollheim’s Paradox: Survey and Solution,” Political Theory 1 (1973): 154-70; and R.
Pennock, “Democracy Is Not Paradoxical: Comment,” Political Theory 2 (1974): 88-93.
42 Among these, see Wollheim, “A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy;” R. Harrison, “No
Paradox in Democracy,” Political Studies 18 (1970): 514-17; V. Haksar, “The Alleged Paradox of
Democracy,” Analysis 37 (1976): 10-14; and J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement.
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authority if and only if they bring about outcomes better than any feasible politi-
cal alternative. It thus collapses procedural legitimacy into substantive correctness
and, accordingly, (A4) to (A1). However, pure instrumentalism cannot dismiss X’s
commitment to (A4) quite so easily, for (A4) obtains from X’s acknowledgment
of the fact of disagreement. And the fact of disagreement, in turn, is not to be
taken as a contingent political incident, but as a necessary condition for political
decision-making procedures being called for, for if all citizens agreed on what ought
to be done no decision-making procedure would be required at all. As Przeworski
has put it, democracy presupposes that “Interests or values are in conﬂict. If they
were not, if interests were harmonious or values were unanimously shared, anyone’s
decisions would be accepted by all, so that anyone could be a benevolent dictator.”43
The section proceeds as follows. Epigraphs B and C discuss previous sttempts to
solve Wollheim’s paradox. Epigraph D presents the two-level solution. Epigraph E
shows why pure instrumentalism is unable to address the paradox.
B. The Rousseaunian solution. A ﬁrst possible way out of the paradox consists
in claiming, ﬁrst, that there is a contradiction between X being committed both
to (A1) and (A4) and, second, that X can nevertheless change her mind once she
realizes that B is the preferred solution by the majority, thus turning to believe that
B rather than A ought to be enacted. In this case, it would be proven that the voter
was not truly committed to believing that A ought to be enacted no matter what,
for when she ﬁrstly expressed her preference this would have been hypothetical and
dependent on what other people believed. In short, she would have rather believed
that
(A1*) A ought to be enacted provided that a majority is of the same opinion.
Three sorts of problems (conceptual, empirical, and normative ones) arise with this
possible solution—call it the Rousseauian solution.
Consider the conceptual diﬃculties ﬁrst. Assume that voters do address Woll-
heim’s paradox by committing themselves to the view that A ought to be enacted
provided that a majority is of the same opinion. (In politics this can be often the
case due to, say, strategic voting or bandwagon eﬀects.) If that is the case, then
X’s preferred policy will eventually collapse into whatever she believes that it could
cast the support of a majority of voters, be it B or A. The reason for this is that,
if B is eventually chosen, X will admit, given that she is committed to (A2), that
she was wrong in her calculus, thus changing her mind and turning to believe that
B rather than A ought be enacted. And if, on the contrary, A is eventually chosen,
X will keep believing that A rather than B ought to be enacted, but only because a
majority has chosen A over B rather than because she whole-heartedly believes that
A ought to be enacted, for if that was the case she would not have changed her mind
in the former possibility.
43 Adam Przeworski, “Self-Enforcing Democracy,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Economy,
Donald Wittman and Barry Weingast, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 312.
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Of course, there is nothing inconsistent or irrational in someone behaving as X
does. Now, the problem comes when we generalize this voting behavior and apply it
to everyone else. Assume that
(B1) Every voter believes that A ought to be enacted provided that a majority
is of the same opinion.
Then it follows that
(B2) Every voter will cast their vote according to what they anticipate that a
majority will vote for rather than to what they believe whole-heartedly.
But then it also happens that
(B3) Since every vote is a function of everyone else’s votes, the policy that the
majority of voters vote for turns out to be indeterminate.
As an analogy, consider the case of someone—call her Mary—who distrusts her own
ability to wisely order in a restaurant and has decided to order whatever the majority
of her friends orders or, in order to keep the analogy accurate, whatever she believes
a majority of them would or will order. Nothing irrational or inconsistent thus
far. However, her behavior makes sense only insofar as her friends do trust their
own criteria. If all of them were as hesitant as Mary none of them would be in a
position to delegate their decision for, being the decision of the majority a function of
individual decisions that are, in turn, a function of the decision of the majority, the
former would turn out to be indeterminate. Turning back to politics, as Graham puts
it, “Since no one expresses a categorical opinion that B ... ought to be enacted, an
aggregation of the votes will yield only the conclusion that the majority has chosen
B -if-a-majority-chooses-it.”44
Admittedly, the conceptual problem does not pose a problem to the solution
insofar as enough citizens refrain from delegating their decision. This seems to be
the usual case in democratic societies indeed. But when that happens, an empirical
problem arises—namely, that the solution does not account precisely for such voters,
i.e. for those voters who whole-heartedly believe that A ought to be enacted. This
often happens both before and after the voting takes place. Thus, in democratic
politics it is not infrequent for a voter to vote for A knowing how the voting will go
and often, as Wollheim already anticipated, knowing quite well indeed that her vote
will go against the majority will.45 Now, why would someone who is truly committed
to (A2) vote for a policy that she knows in advance that won’t gain the support of
the majority?46 Further, many of these voters still disagree with policy B after it has
been backed by a majority of votes, often speaking out against it, yet without calling
into question the legitimacy of its adoption procedure. As Waldron has pointed out,
an adequate account of the law’s authority—including Wollheim’s paradox—must
44 K. Graham, “Democracy, Paradox, and the Real World,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 76 (1976): 227-245, p. 229.
45 Wollheim, “A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy,” p. 80.
46 See Harrison, “No Paradox in Democracy,” p. 515.
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accommodate the fact that the law “makes its demand ex hypothesi on someone who
thinks he has good ground for believing that the legislature is mistaken.”47
The third problem does not aﬀect the voters who believe that A ought to be
enacted even after realizing that B is the preferred option by the majority, but
rather the voters who do conform their policy preferences to those of the majority.
The problem is normative—namely, it is unclear why such votes should have any
normative appeal or authority whatsoever.48 After all, democracy is, among other
things, a procedure employed to reﬂect citizens’ preferences about policies that will
aﬀect their lives, which will be funded with their taxes and which will be coercively
enforced against them. Going back to the analogy, consider that Mary and her friends
wanted to order a dish to share. Should Mary’s vote have the same weight in the
ﬁnal decision as the votes casted by her less hesitant friends?
In short, the three issues raised here pose a dilemma to the Rousseauian solu-
tion. The more citizens behave as Rousseauians, thus adapting their beliefs to the
beliefs of the majority of their fellow citizens, the more indeterminate the upshot of
the democratic procedure is and the less normative force it has. And, conversely,
the more determinate and normatively forceful the decision is, the less relevant the
Rousseauian solution turns out to be.
C. The Hobbesian solution. Another possible way out of the paradox would be to
collapse (A4) into (A1), i.e. to claim that X’s commitment to democracy is not
strong enough to trump her belief in policy A and that her commitment to B is
merely prudential. In that case, X would observe policy B (in case it was eventually
enacted) in a rather Hobbesian fashion, i.e. not because she considered it to be
just or legitimate but just because she would be worst-oﬀ otherwise. The most
obvious reason for someone behaving this way is her understandable fear to be legally
punished by the state or to suﬀer the social pressure if she behaved otherwise. But
there are additional and perhaps more subtle reasons, such as rule-consequentialist
ones. According to Weiss, for example, X can simultaneously believe that “A ought
to be enacted” and that “I ought to do B ... because it is the law, and general
law-keeping has desirable consequences.”
Two problems with this solution—call it the Hobbesian solution—arise though.
First, it implies that the only reason for X not enacting A is that she lacks the social
and political resources required to do so. Hence, if X happened to enjoy the social
and political power to enact A, she would enact it without batting an eyelash. Barry
expressed this view with his usual clarity:
If you adhere to any ideal or principle which does not include in it a
reference to the opinion of others then it is logically possible that you might
be the only person holding it. There could be a situation, therefore, in which
you say ’So and so should be done’ and everyone except you says ’So and so
47 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, p. 101.
48 See Wollheim, “A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy,” p. 81; Graham, “Democracy,
Paradox, and the Real World,” p. 229.
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should not be done.’ You are in eﬀect setting yourself up as a dictator. Of
course, you probably won’t have the power to get what you want done against
everyone’s opposition, nevertheless you are saying that if you had the power
you would.49
Now, it is at least doubtful whether X’s wholehearted commitment to (A1) has to
imply that X would enact A against her fellow citizens in case she enjoyed the power
required to do so. This is a controversial issue for, even though it is sometimes
the case that a person has such power without necessarily using it to enact A, a
proponent of this solution can always reply that X is not truly committed to (A1),
or that she does not really have power enough to enact A, or yet that she wrongly
perceives that she does not have such power. However, it is plausible to think that
X might be truly committed to (A1), have the (actual and perceived) power to enact
A and yet hesitate to do so because she also believes that A ought not to be enacted
by any possible means but only by legitimate ones. As Haksar has put it, “A person
can be a genuine democrat, in the sense that he is morally committed to democracy,
and yet not agree that the majority is right about what ought to be done. He can
be a genuine democrat because he genuinely (and not just tactically or prudentially)
accepts and believes that the majority has the (moral) right to authorize or refuse
to authorize the use of certain means and certain compulsory measures.”50
Second, assume that the Hobbesian solution is right and that the only reason
that prevents X from enacting A, being X truly committed to (A1), is that she
lacks the (actual or perceived) power to do so. Thus, if she had such power she
would doubtlessly use it. The problem with this solution is twofold. First, it is
highly questionable whether someone who is willing to enact her preferred policies
regardless of whether her fellow citizens have consented to them or not could qualify
as a democrat at all. After all, being a democrat implies, almost as a matter of
deﬁnition, being morally committed to the decisions brought about by democratic
means (accordingly, many Hobbesians openly assume that they are democrats only
contingently.) Second, letting aside the deﬁnitional issue, rather than resolving the
paradox, the Hobbesian solution only evades it, for the paradox consists in saying
that two inconsistent pieces of legislation both ought to be enacted. As Barry points
out, Hobbesian attempts to address the paradox, such as Weiss’s, do not have any
obvious bearing on Wollheim’s paradox, which is supposed to involve a democrat in
saying at the same time that A ought to be enacted and B ought to be enacted,
where A and B are incompatible.51
D. The two-level solution. A number of attempts to address X’s commitments to
both (A1) and (A4) without neither precluding the former to the latter nor vice
versa have been provided. The solution proposed here—call it the two-level solu-
tion—draws upon the contributions of Wollheim, Harrison, Haksar and Waldron,
49 Barry, Political Argument, p. 59.
50 Haksar, “The Alleged Paradox of Democracy,” p. 12.
51 Barry, “Wollheim’s Paradox: Comment,” p. 318.
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taking them further when necessary. It attempts to show two things. First, that
(A1) and (A4) can be consistently held when they are derived from diﬀerent types of
principles—a ﬁrst-order principle and a second-order principle, respectively. Second,
that these principles provide an answer to two diﬀerent normative questions—namely,
to “what ought to be done” and to “what ought to be done provided that we disagree
on what ought to be done and that, nevertheless, we have to take a common course
of action,” respectively.
Consider ﬁrst Harrison’s contribution, which attempts to show that, rather than
a paradox of democracy, the paradox is just a particular case of the potential con-
tradiction between general moral principles, just as principles like keeping promises
and saving life can turn out to be incompatible under certain circumstances (e.g.,
when I have promised that I would go pick up a friend from the airport and on my
way I ﬁnd someone whose life is endangered and needs my help). Further, according
to Harrison, this proves that there is no paradox as such.
In both cases two moral principles, not in themselves incompatible, become
so in particular circumstances. If this were suﬃcient to create a paradox in
democracy, it would be suﬃcient to create a paradox in promising. However,
since it does not create a paradox in promising, it should not be taken to
create one in democracy either.52
Harrison is correct in presenting the alleged paradox as a particular case of a more
broad conﬂict between general principles. However, he does not capture the diﬀer-
ence between his own case and Wollheim’s, since the commitments in conﬂict in his
case and in Wollheim’s are of a very diﬀerent sort. In the former case, both com-
mitments are to substantive moral principles, such as keeping promises and saving
life. In the latter case, by contrast, the belief that “A ought to be enacted” expresses
a substantive principle whereas the belief that “B ought to be enacted,” though
also substantive, is derived from a procedural or second-order principle according to
which the policy chosen by the majority ought to be enacted—i.e., premise (A2).
In a nutshell, the principles from which (A1) and (A4) are derived pertain to two
diﬀerent normative levels—a substantive level and a procedural one. (A1) follows
from general commitment to what X takes as the correct policy to be enacted, being
such commitment non-conditional on third parties’ commitments. By contrast, (A4)
follows from a general commitment to what X takes as the legitimate source of
authority, which can be diverse and not necessarily democratic, for example:
(A2) The policy chosen by the majority ought to be enacted.
(A2*) The policy chosen by the Pope ought to be enacted.
(A2**) The policy chosen by lottery ought to be enacted.
(A2***) The policy chosen by Glenn Beck ought to be enacted.
Another form to put the disanalogy—and to clarify the nature of these two-level
principles—is to ask to which questions do Harrison’s and Wollheim’s commitments
52 Harrison, “No Paradox in Democracy,” p. 516.
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provide an answer. In the former case, the two principles provide an answer to the
question of what ought to be done. In the latter case, by contrast, “A ought to be
enacted” provides an answer to the question of what ought to be done, while “B ought
to be enacted” provides an answer to the question of what ought to be done provided
that we disagree about what ought to be done and that, nevertheless, we have to
make a collective decision on that issue. In short, while the former commitment
provides an answer to the question of substantive correctness or justice, the latter
commitment provides an answer to the question of legitimate authority in the face of
existing disagreements that, for better or worse, pervade political decision-making.
As Waldron has put it,
A person who believes that A is the right decision but B the decision
that should be implemented, is oﬀering answers to two diﬀerent, though com-
plementary questions. That B should be implemented is his answer to the
question, ’What are we to do, given that we disagree about whether A or B is
just?’ That A is the right decision is his own contribution to the disagreement
that called forth that question.53
The two-level solution is consistent with the one originally sketched by Wollheim.
According to Wollheim, (A1) and (A4) need not be at odds when they result from
diﬀerent types of principles, thus adopting diﬀerent meanings. Consider Wollheim’s
example: “Jews ought to be given privileged treatment.” Even though this judgment
seems to have a single meaning, it adopts very diﬀerent meanings depending on
whether it follows, say, from a principle regarding the compensation for the perse-
cuted or from an attitude of Jewish chauvinism. Mutatis mutandis, (A1) and (A4)
need not be at odds when they follow, respectively, from what Wollheim labels as
direct and oblique principles. Direct principles refer to the morality of actions, poli-
cies, etc. by means of some general moral expression (e.g. murder or envy), whilst
the oblique principles refer to the morality of actions, policies, etc. by means of an
artiﬁcial property bestowed upon them as the result of the action of some individual
or institution. According to Wollheim,
Two judgments of the form ’A ought to be the case’ and ’B ought to be
the case’ are not incompatible even though A and B cannot be simultaneously
realized if one of these judgements is asserted as a direct principle whereas
the other is asserted as a derivation from an oblique principle.54
However, as it has been often pointed out, Wollheim does not elaborate on the alleged
diﬀerent properties of the direct and oblique principles and leaves the issue open.55
What the two-level solution adds to Wollheim’s is that it deﬁnes such properties, in
the speciﬁc case of the paradox, in terms of substantive correctness regarding the
direct principle from which (A1) obtains and of procedural legitimacy regarding the
53 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, pp. 247-248.
54 Wollheim, “A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy,” p. 85.
55 See, for example, Weiss, “Wollheim’s Paradox: Survey and Solution,” and Graham, “Democ-
racy, Paradox, and the Real World.”
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oblique principle from which (A4) obtains, being procedural legitimacy a normative
issue that only triggers in the context of pervasive political disagreement among
citizens about what ought to be done when a common course of action has to be
taken.
Now, it might be asked whether there are any practical diﬀerences whatsoever
between the two-level solution and the one provided by Harrison.56 Consider two
possible replies. First, it can be replied that the two-level solution does resolve the
paradox not only in theory but also in practical terms, for it presents X as observing
policy A, which authority is granted as procedurally legitimate (i.e., for its being
the upshot of a democratic procedure) and thus respectfully obeyed, and, at the
same time, as being whole-heartedly committed to policy B through her attending
demonstrations, petitioning or voting for B in referenda.
Second, it might be further objected that the ﬁrst reply is question-begging for it
pretends to resolve the paradox by displaying the commitments to (A1) and (A4) at
two diﬀerent moments t1 and t2 rather than both at any given tn. In the latter case,
as Harrison has pointed out, “’A ought to be enacted’ and ’B ought to be enacted’
[would be] surely incompatible whatever the origins of the pair.”57 This could be
the case when X tries to make up her mind about whether to obey or challenge
(say, through civil disobedience) policy A. Admittedly, under these circumstances (in
which X’s commitments to substantive and procedural principles come into conﬂict
and a practical decision has to be made), X could only handle the case in the same
way as she handles a conﬂict between two substantive principles or between two
procedural principles to which she is morally committed. That is, she could only let
one of the commitments trump the other one—often tragically indeed. The costs of
not observing the law considered, it would be likely to expect X to bite the bullet and
let her procedural commitment override the substantive one. However, in some cases
she could let her substantive commitment trump the democratic one, thus deciding
to disobey the law.
But, then, what would be the practical diﬀerence between the two-level solu-
tion and the one provided by Harrison? Admittedly, probably none. Under these
circumstances, the two-level solution would not provide X with practical guidance
regarding how to overcome the dilemma without having to give up one of its horns.
However, even though the solution would not make a practical diﬀerence, it would
make a conceptual one, something that Harrison’s unfortunately does not, for he
just presents it as a contradiction between principles that operate at the same level.
A twofold distinction would be in order, thus, so as to keep the two-level solution
meaningful—namely, a conceptual distinction between substantive and procedural
or second-order principles, on the one hand, and between the conceptual distinction
and its practical implications, on the other. Of course, then it would be possible to
further object that, in the absence of a practical way out to X’s dilemma when having
to decide between her commitments to (A1) and (A4) at any given tn, the alleged
56 Something along these lines can be found in Barry, “Wollheim’s Paradox: Comment.”
57 Harrison, “No Paradox in Democracy,” p. 515.
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solution would not have really provided a full solution to the paradox—if a solution
at all. After all, Barry could have been right when he claimed that paradoxes—and,
notably, Wollheim’s paradox—cannot be solved but only evaded.58 If that was the
case, the two-level solution would have at least provided a better understanding of
the paradox.
E. Pure instrumentalism. Let us turn back to pure democratic instrumentalism,
which, as we have seen in section 4.2, consists in the following two tenets.
Political instrumentalism.—Political institutions have legitimate authority iﬀ
they produce outcomes C better than any feasible political alternative, being
C a set of substantive goals independent from and prior to the procedures
used to bring them about,
and
Democratic instrumentalism.—Under present circumstances, constitutional
democracies produce outcomes C better than any feasible political alternative.
Now, assume that the two-level solution is right and that Wollheim’s paradox can be
solved (or better explained if you wish) by making a distinction between (the belief
in) substantively correct and procedurally legitimate policies. Then pure instrumen-
talism turns out to be unable to address the paradox because it reduces legitimate
authority to the achievement of a set of procedure-independent goals C—no matter
whether by democratic means or not, for democracy is valued only contingently
according to its ability to bring about precisely such outcomes. In short, it collapses
procedural legitimacy into substantive correctness. Consider it from the third-person
standpoint. Assume that
(C1) X embraces pure instrumentalism, that is, she values democratic proce-
dures only insofar as they produce a set of outcomes better than any
feasible political alternative
And further assume that
(C2) X is truly committed to (A1), that is, she is completely convinced that
A is the best outcome that a decision-making procedure can bring about
all things considered.
It thus follows that
(C3) X has no reason whatsoever to be committed to (A4).
In short, X falls under the Hobbesian solution due to her embracing pure instrumen-
talism. There is no need to repeat the reasons why that solution is ﬂawed, reasons
that also apply to the current case. However, consider three possible objections and
58 “Indeed, one might make the observation that if an apparent contradiction can be shown
not to be a contradiction at all it is not a paradox in the ﬁrst place. A paradox is by deﬁnition
something to be evaded.” Barry, “Wollheim’s Paradox: Comment,” p. 318.
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how they can be replied by pointing out at the fact of disagreement not only as a
more or less pervasive and resilient political feature but as a necessary condition for
political decision-making procedures being called for.
Firstly, it can be objected that proponents of democratic instrumentalism are
not only instrumentalists—since they evaluate political institutions only according
to the outcomes they bring about—, but also democrats—since they consider that,
under present circumstances, democratic institutions tend to satisfy this normative
criterion better than any other feasible alternative. True, this is the reason why
a proponent of pure instrumentalism could relax her absolute commitment to (A1)
and submit to the majority will, thus turning to believe that B ought to be enacted.
A plausible reason for doing so is that X might admit her own moral fallibilism.
As Arneson has claimed, “The instrumentalist as I conceive her is a realist about
morality but can and should be a fallibilist about our present moral knowledge.
There is moral truth, but our current epistemic access to it is uncertain, shaky.”59
However, this case does not apply when X is completely convinced that A is the best
possible outcome. In those cases, (C4) applies, that is, there are no reasons for X
not to give up her democratic commitments and to impose the enactment of A if
she happens to have the power to do it.60 Now, this is an implication that need not
trouble pure instrumentalists at all, for they only embrace democracy conditionally
and, therefore, they are happy to give it up under certain circumstances, such as
the ones stipulated here. In other words, Wollheim’s paradox might be troubling for
those who are whole-heartedly committed to (A2), but not for those who see their
commitment to (A2) as merely contingent and are certain of (A1).
However, the paradox cannot be dismissed quite so easily, for pure instrumental-
ism is dependent on the possibility of outcomes C being speciﬁed and it is a feature
of political communities that their members disagree willy-nilly on which outcomes
ought to be pursued and which policies are to be enacted in order to achieve them,
as the proponents of actual representation denounced (see § 1.3.2). As we shall see
below in section 4.3.2, pervasive political disagreements need not be unreasonable
or ill-intentioned. On the contrary, they are often the natural consequence of the
slippery and contestable nature of political issues, of citizens’ imperfect ability to get
to know how to address such issues with certainty and of the opposing but legitimate
interests that pervade day-to-day political deliberation and bargaining.61 Premise
(A2) cannot be so easily dismissed precisely because it provides an answer to such
disagreements in the form of a collective decision-making procedure, thus expressing
citizens’ acknowledgment of the existence and pervasiveness of such disagreements.
59 Arneson, “Democracy Is Not Intrinsically Just,” p. 43.
60 “If you happen to have the power to implement [the] correct assessment, you should do
so, despite the fact that your assessment will not attract the unanimous assent of those aﬀected.”
Arneson, “Democracy Is Not Intrinsically Just,” p. 54.
61 Of course, political disagreements are often unreasonable and ill-intentioned—say, I may
want you to be kicked oﬀ my country by the government because America is for Americans and you
are a damn immigrant, while you may want me to be expropriated by the government because I own
a ﬁrm and surplus extraction equals exploitation. However, democracy is made for unreasonable
citizens as much as for reasonable ones. Further, that citizens make unreasonable claims does not
mean that they do not take some procedures to be more legitimate than others.
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Secondly, it can be further objected that the fact of disagreement need not per-
vade all political decisions, for it is possible to specify a number of political goals
that are beyond (or at least less aﬀected by) the fact of disagreement and which can
serve as a rather easily computable set of proxies for the evaluation of the output
of political institutions. Further, these goals need not be vague and general, as
part of a sort of incompletely theorized agreement.62 Indeed, they are often quite
precise. Consider, among probably many others, the rates of child mortality, life
expectancy, literacy, security of personal property, unemployment, gender equality,
inﬂation, corruption, violent deaths, imprisoned journalists or economic growth.
However, as we shall see in detail below (§ 4.3.2), even if a consensus existed
or could be reached on these and other political goals, disagreements are way more
far-reaching and pervasive, thus persisting at three diﬀerent levels at least. First,
when having to balance the weight of basic goals and rights so as to solve likely
trade-oﬀs among them. Second, when having to decide the means by which those
principles and rights are to be enacted. And, third, when having to enforce them to
particular cases and unforeseen contingencies.63 Disagreements on outcomes C per-
vade these three levels, and citizens’ commitment to (A2) is precisely the way they
acknowledge their pervasiveness and the need for collective decision-making proce-
dures so as to address them. By dismissing X’s commitment to (A2), pure instru-
mentalism overlooks a central feature of politics—i.e., the fact of disagreement—and
turns, therefore, into an incomplete normative account of political authority.64
Thirdly, it might be true that citizens disagree on these issues and that many
of them are whole-heartedly committed to (A2) and therefore to (A4) as a conse-
quence of their acknowledgment of the fact of disagreement. However, it can be
further replied that democratic instrumentalism is not a psychological account of
citizens’ current political behavior. Neither it is an empirical account of political
authority. Rather, it is a normative theory of political authority and it is therefore
independent both from the third-person standpoint and from the actual functioning
of current political communities. After all, the charm of political candidates or the
62 See C. Sunstein, “Incompletely Theorized Agreements,” Harvard Law Review 108 (1995):
1733-1772. Even though this sort of agreements are not analyzed here, it has to be noted that they
are not without problems. First, constitutional provisions that are very abstract increase the power
of constitutional courts, for they provide them with more margin for constitutional interpretation.
This is what Gargarella has termed as the “interpretive gap” and this is the reason why Kelsen
always defended very detailed constitutions, in order to reduce as much as possible the discretion
of the constitutional court. For example, is not the same to provide constitutional judges with the
ability to strike down statutes that may may imply “cruel and unusual punishment,” as the US
Constitution does, than to provide them with the power to turn down statutes enacting capital
punishment. See J. J., Moreso, Constitución: Modelo para armar (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009),
p. 143.
Second, it is very questionable whether we can say that these agreements are actual agreements
for, as Rescher has put it, “’agreement’ only exists where a question on the agenda of relevant
questions is answered by both of us in the same way.” N. Rescher, Pluralism. Against the Demand
for Consensus (Oxofrd: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 44-45.
63 See Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, ch. 1.
64 Indeed, empirical evidence shows that citizens normatively assess political institutions not
only according to their ability to produce their preferred outcomes but also according to the pro-
cedures used to bring shuch outcomes about. See section 4.3.3 for a cover of the social psychology
literature on the topic.
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tunes of their campaigns may well aﬀect citizens’ political behavior, as Schumpeter
cynically suggested. But it does not follow that such factors ought to be included in
a normative theory of the legitimacy of political decisions.
However, the fact of disagreement is not a mere psychological feature that can be
left aside when building up a normative theory of political authority. Neither it is
a contingent—though persistent and widespread—feature of political communities.
Rather, it is a necessary condition of politics proper, for if no disagreement existed no
political decision-making procedure—democratic or otherwise—would be required at
all (this is why pure instrumentalist turns out to be self-defeating, as we shall see
below in section 4.3.2, epigraph E). As Bobbio puts it, “What is democracy other
than a set of rules (the so-called rules of the game) for the solution of conﬂicts
without bloodshed?”65 The relevance of Wollheim’s paradox for the debate between
procedural and instrumental normative theories of democratic authority is that it
makes crystal-clear the fact of disagreement that is the very bread and butter of
politics. By dismissing X’s commitment to (A2), pure democratic instrumentalism
overlooks the fact of disagreement, fails to address Wollheim’s paradox adequately
and turns out to be an incomplete normative account of democratic authority.
4.3.2. Political disagreement
This section elaborates on the criticism presented at the end of the previous
section—namely, that pure instrumentalist theories of democratic legitimacy turn
out to be self-defeating because they dismiss the existing disagreements on which
outcomes are to be achieved through democratic procedures. It is divided into ﬁve
epigraphs. The ﬁrst four ones deﬁne the circumstances or politics, along with the
scope, causes and implications of the fact of disagreement. The last epigraph explains
why pure instrumentalism turns out to be self-defeating under the circumstances of
politics.
A. The circumstances of politics. As we have seen above, according to pure demo-
cratic instrumentalism, democratic institutions and procedures have legitimate au-
thority if and only if they bring about a set of substantive goals independent from and
prior to the procedures used to produce them. Now, the problem with this account
of legitimacy is that it dismisses the so-called circumstances of politics which, just as
Rawlsian circumstances of justice, are two.66 First, the need for a binding collective
agreement on a uniﬁed course of action due to the fact that all aﬀected parties
would be better-oﬀ than if no agreement was reached. And, second, the existence of
a persistent disagreement on which precise course of action ought to be taken (i.e.
the fact of disagreement).
To be sure, for a large number of matters disagreement need not be an issue, for
unilateral decision is possible and no uniﬁed collective course of action is required.
In these cases, each of us can do her own thing without having to reach an agreement
65 N. Bobbio, The Future of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 193.
66 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, pp. 101-106; Andrew Weale, Democracy (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1999), pp. 8-13; and Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, pp. 20-26.
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with other people on what ought to be collectively done. And the other way around,
for a large number of matters coordinated action is to be reached, but disagreement
need not arise. Now, we say that an issue is political when both conditions apply,
that is, when a uniﬁed collective course of action is required so as to improve the
situation of the parties and, at the same time, no agreement is likely to be reached
on which precise course of action ought to be taken.
Obviously, the fact of disagreement need not imply political paralysis, as political
decisions taken everyday proves. But far from being the upshot of a wide consensus
on what ought to be done, political decisions are taken, and have always been taken,
under lively and often harsh disagreements among aﬀected parties. Under a well
functioning democratic system such decisions are the upshot of the majority will
expressed in the form of a parliamentary majority while, under a nondemocratic
political system they are the upshot of the minority will. In neither case do they
result from a consensus reached among the parties, as liberals do sometimes assume,
but from a disagreement among them that is likely to persist after the decision has
been taken. As Waldron puts it,
The prohibition of child labour, the reform of the criminal process, the
limitation of working hours, the dismantling of segregation, the institution
of health and safety regulations in factories, the liberation of women—each
of these achievements was secured in what I have called the circumstances
of politics, rather than in anything remotely resembling the justice-consensus
that Rawlsians regard as essential to a well-ordered society.67
B. The causes of disagreement. Consider now the causes behind the fact of disagree-
ment as for two diﬀerent dimensions of political decision-making, namely, citizen’s
imperfect ability to get to know which political course of action will produce better
outcomes, the slippery and contestable nature of political decisions themselves and
the interests that unavoidably pervade political decision-making.
The ﬁrst cause is citizens’ imperfect ability to get to know what ought to be done
when political decisions are to be made. This need not imply that good political
decisions (or at least better ones) do not exist or that reliable knowledge about them
ought to be ruled out, but only that stable agreement about them is unlikely to
emerge. Citizens’ knowledge about political issues is way more slippery and imperfect
than scientiﬁc knowledge, for it is pervaded by what Rawls labeled as the burdens
of judgment, namely, “the many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious)
exercise of our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political
life.”68
Rawls famously distinguished between comprehensive (philosophical, moral and
religious) doctrines on which consensus is unlikely to be reached, on the one hand,
and principles of justice on which consensus can be expected to emerge, on the other
hand, thus limiting the eﬀects of the burdens of judgment to the former. However,
there is no reason why the burdens of judgment should not pervade principles of
67 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, p. 106.
68 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 56.
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justice as they pervade moral, philosophical and religious doctrines. As Bellamy has
argued, their existence raise doubts not only about a consensus on the good but also
on the right. He takes the debate over whether free speech ought to be restricted in
the case of pornography as an instance of this. It is worth quoting his analysis in
extenso:
First, it is notoriously diﬃcult to assess the evidence concerning the harm
pornography may cause in inciting violence against women or lowering the
esteem in which they are held and hold themselves. Second, even were there
agreement on some of these facts, not everyone would weigh them in the same
way because of the other four factors. Third, the concept of ‘speech’ has
proved infamously slippery and vague, producing long discussions over the
degree to which a performance or ﬁgurative art count as ‘speech’ and so on.
This vagueness is not just superﬁcial nit-picking about the ordinary usage of
words, but can extend to the core normative assumptions involved in certain
key terms – for example, over whether ‘speech’ suggests some form of reasoned
argumentation and what that entails. Disputes at this level can render terms
‘essentially contestable’, with a number of rival conceptions of a concept in
play, each of which will highlight a diﬀerent (if often overlapping) sphere of
applicability for any right. Fourth, diﬀerent life experiences are no doubt an
important factor in explaining why most women – even those who do not
agree with a ban – feel more strongly about, or have greater understanding of
the feelings raised by, this issue than most men. Fifth, this is a matter where
focusing on diﬀerent types of moral claim can produce diﬀerent assessments
and make an ‘overall’, ‘on balance’ judgment hard to make. An assessment
that looks at the consequences for social attitudes towards women is likely
to be more sympathetic to restrictions than one focused narrowly on the
deontological claims of particular parties. After all, speech is restricted in the
case of tobacco advertising in part because widespread smoking is regarded
as socially as well as personally harmful. Glamorising smoking is also seen as
encouraging young people to take it up. Sexually explicit advertising on TV
is limited for partly similar reasons related to public morality and its eﬀects
on children. Finally, the issue potentially raises a clash of rights of either
a logical or contingent character. In such cases, we are forced to compare
incommensurable goods and whichever decision we take entails some loss. We
may decide, say, that the risk to a woman’s right not to be discriminated
against is less than the problems and possible consequences of restricting
freedom of speech. But the comparison of the values involved is always go-
ing to be contentious because there is no metric for saying the one is more
important than the other. After all, some would counter even a small risk of
gender discrimination is worse than a greater than necessary curtailment of
free speech.69
69 Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, pp. 22-23.
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It is to be noted that democratic instrumentalists do not dismiss the importance of
moral fallibilism about political issues. According to Arneson, “The instrumentalist
as I conceive her is a realist about morality but can and should be a fallibilist about
our present moral knowledge. There is moral truth, but our current epistemic access
to it is uncertain, shaky.”70 Furthermore, Arneson makes clear that moral fallibilism
need not trump democratic instrumentalism at all. True, it might be the case that
our knowledge about which political goals are to be pursued is incomplete, thus
making unlikely for an epistemic consensus to emerge. However, unless we deny
the very idea of political correctness, this fallibilism need not trump the idea that
political institutions should be designed so as to maximize the achievement of such
goals. As Arneson puts it, the position of the instrumentalist resembles that of a
treasure-seeker. “We are searching for genuine treasure, and our practices should be
assessed instrumentally, by the degree to which they enable us to gain treasure. Our
current maps guiding us to treasure are ﬂawed, and our current ideas about what
‘treasure’ is are somewhat crude, and we have reason to believe there are better maps
to be located and better conceptions of ‘treasure’ to be elaborated.”71
However, Arneson’s analogy fails to acknowledge the second cause behind the
fact of disagreement—namely, the slippery and contestable nature of political deci-
sions. It is not only the case that our political knowledge about what ought to be
done is fuzzy, but also that political issues themselves are vague and contestable.
The analogy between seeking a treasure and political decision-making does not hold
because the former is mainly a technical matter of developing and applying a set of
skills in order to reach a goal settled in advance (even if we accept that our idea
of what “treasure” is might be somewhat crude), while politics is not only about
making technical decisions about which are the best means to achieve certain goal
settled at the outset, but also about the very goals that are to be achieved. And,
even though good (or at least better) political goals existed and citizens’ approach to
political issues could be undistorted by the burdens of judgment, the issue of which
goals ought to be pursued is slippery and contestable by deﬁnition, notably, when we
get down from general and abstract principles to actual policies and unforeseeable
contingencies (as it will be analyzed in some detail in the next epigraph on the scope
of the fact of disagreement).
Finally, in addition to the slippery and contestable nature of the political issues
and citizens’ imperfect ability to get to know how to address them with certainty,
particular interests are to be taken into account as well when addressing the existence
and pervasiveness of the fact of disagreement. Hence, opposing interests in the polit-
ical arena, and not only the vagueness of political issues and the falibilism in getting
to know them, make stable and uncontested consensus among citizens unlikely to
emerge. It is certainly the case that political interests can turn disagreeing parties
into unreasonable. But this need not be always the case. Consider, for example,
70 Arneson, “Democracy Is Not Intrinsically Just,” p. 43. This raises the question of whether
the diﬀerence between them and pure proceduralists, such as Waldron and Bellamy, could be only
theoretical.
71 Arneson, “Democracy Is Not Intrinsically Just,” pp. 43-44.
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the case of multinational countries such as Belgium, Canada or Spain in which it is
usual to see MPs of the nationalist parties openly refer to the interests of their con-
stituencies, which do often represent a large portion of the population. True, when
the parties at stake move toward radicalism and their interests become harsh and
purely selﬁsh, political paralysis can follow, as Belgians know well. However, under
normal conditions we tend to assume that these MPs are just advancing policies that
combine—in a diﬃcultly distinguishable way, not least because of the unavoidable
opacity of their intentions—the interests of their constituencies with what they take
as the general interest, defending them with what they take to be good reasons and
being open to negotiation and deliberation in the parliament and elsewhere. The
policies that they put forward might be completely mistaken, but we would be way
to fast to condemn them as necessarily unreasonable for that reason.
C. The scope of disagreement. It might be argued that the fact of disagreement
does not (or at least need not) pervade all political decisions. This view is behind
the persistent claim of many citizens who blame their representatives for not being
able to overcome the horse-trading and buck-passing typical of day-to-day politics
and to reach a much-needed consensus on fundamental political issues, such as civil
liberties, education, health care reform or national defense. Since, on the other
hand, virtually everyone seems to agree on a set of basic rights and political goals,
a minimal agreement appears to be possible at some level of generality. As Rawls
claimed, agreement on constitutional essentials is not only possible to emerge but
should actually be entrenched so as to insulate it from the short-term dynamics of
electoral politics.
Bellamy has criticized this view by pointing out that it is very questionable
whether libertarians, conservatives, social democrats and communists, among other
ideologically segmented citizens, would reach an agreement (in Rawlsian terms, an
overlapping consensus) even at the very level of principles and rights.72 However, I
believe that it is possible to list a number of political goals which are beyond the
fact of disagreement and which serve as a rather easily computable set of indicators
for the evaluation of the output of political institutions, including democratic ones.
As Rousseau put it, “some points on which all interests agree.”73 Consider, among
probably some other indicators, child mortality, life expectancy, illiteracy, security of
personal property, unemployment, gender equality, inﬂation, corruption or the rates
of violent deaths, imprisoned journalists or economic growth. Of course, I do not
mean to say that these indicators are completely beyond disagreement or that they
remain actually uncontested, but only that they are comparatively less pervaded by
disagreement and actually less contested than other indicators, as the ever-present
attempt to achieve them by governments of the most diﬀerent ideological sort proves.
Now, even if a consensus could be reached on these and other political goals
(which seems to actually happen, at least if we put them in comparative terms),
72 Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, pp. 23-24.
73 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 66.
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disagreements are more far-reaching, persisting at three diﬀerent levels at least. First,
when having to balance the weight of basic goals and rights so as to solve likely
trade-oﬀs among them, second, when having to decide the means by which those
principles and rights are to be enacted and, third, when having to enforce them to
particular cases and unforeseen contingencies. Brieﬂy consider them in turn.
First, moral principles and rights often give lead to incompatibilities and trade-oﬀs,
such as the one between the right to privacy and the right to security when being
searched before taking a plane. Further, the way such trade-oﬀs are to be addressed
depends not only on the weight attached to each right but also on the way rights
are conceived. When having to settle what counts as a right violation, for example,
it is not the same to see rights as pre-political and absolute side constraints, as
libertarians tend to do, or as mere social conventions, as utilitarians often do. As
Waldron puts it, not only do people diﬀer “about what rights we have, they diﬀer also
on what is being said when we are told that someone has a right to something.”74
Second, even though there seems to be a wide consensus on the set of political
goals listed above, it is much less clear by which means are such goals to be achieved.
We know some rather uncontested facts provided by social scientists indeed—for
example, that expansive monetary policies raise inﬂation, that investment in early
education is more eﬃcient than investment in higher education, or that private pro-
vision of health care brings about a worse overall health outputs at higher cost than
the public one. However, these and many other policies remain highly controversial
not only for the reasons included among the causes of the fact of disagreement but
also because of the fact that their achievement aﬀects other goals, raising new and
often tougher trade-oﬀs. For example, libertarians and socialdemocrats will in all
likelihood disagree on the appeal of a constrained monetary policy that may reduce
inﬂation at the expense of raising the unemployment rate or on the desirability of
investing in early education at the cost of enlarging the state intervention, let alone
on the advisability of a public health care scheme. As Richard Nixon put it in his
debate with Kennedy on TV,
I know what it means to be poor. I know what it means to see people
who are unemployed. I know Senator Kennedy feels as deeply about these
problems as I do, but our disagreement is not about the goals for America
but only about the means to reach those goals.75
Third, the interpretation of basic principles and rights turns out to be vague and
incomplete when going down to particular cases and unforeseeable contingencies. As
Sunstein has put it, even if we agree that freedom of speech is to be constitutionalized,
it is by no means clear whether it is abridged by laws regulating disclosures by
government employees, restrictions on pornography or laws prohibiting disclosure of
confessions during a criminal trial. True, the need for interpretation varies according
to the degree of detail and exhaustiveness of the constitutional text. However, since
74 J. Waldron, “Rights in Conﬂict,” Ethics 99 (1989): 503-519, p. 503.
75 See http://watergate.info/nixon/60-09-26_ﬁrst-election-debate.shtml (Accessed on Novem-
ber 15 2011)
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no constitution can cover all cases—it would have to be as Borges’ map, which was
as detailed as the territory that was supposed to map and, for that matter, as large
as the territory itself—, interpretation is needed and discretion unavoidable. This is
not a problem only due to the lack of exhaustivity and the need for the legal texts to
be handable, but also due to the temporal impossibility to advance the unforeseen
contingencies that might appear in the future. Further, even if such contingencies
could be established ex ante, it is also desirable for our principles and rights to be
ﬂexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances.
In short, the fact of disagreement does not only pervade political issues at the
level of fundamental principles and rights. It also pervades their application when
having to balance the trade-oﬀs that are likely to emerge among them and to address
particular cases and unforeseeable contingencies.
D. A second-best rationale? It might be argued that the fact of disagreement only
provides a second-best case against pure instrumentalism. Hence, according to this
argument even though the rationale for political rights consists in their ability to
bring about better outcomes, current contestability of political issues and citizens’
imperfect moral and political knowledge would trump the pure instrumentalist case.
However, this involves a misunderstanding about the very idea of a second best,
which implies that a ﬁrst best is possible but that, due to a constrained variable,
under present circumstances due to a constrained variable.76 In this case, consensus
on the precise outcomes against which political procedures are to be evaluated is the
variable that turns out to be constrained due to the fact of disagreement.
However, the fact of disagreement is not a mere psychological feature that can be
left aside when building up a normative theory of political authority. Neither it is
a contingent—though persistent and widespread—feature of political communities.
Rather, it is a necessary condition of politics proper, for if no disagreement existed no
political decision-making procedure—democratic or otherwise—would be required at
all. As Przeworski has pointed out, democracy presupposes that “Interests or values
are in conﬂict. If they were not, if interests were harmonious or values were unani-
mously shared, anyone’s decisions would be accepted by all, so that anyone could be
a benevolent dictator.”77 In short, rather than taking disagreement as a temporary
and contingent—even if persistent—constraint of our thinking about politics, it has
to be taken as a starting point.
E. Why pure instrumentalism is self-defeating. By dismissing this necessary feature
of politics—namely, the fact of disagreement—democratic instrumentalism turns into
76 Under such circumstances, trying to achieve the ﬁrst-best option can bring about worse
outcomes than turning to the second-best option. Santiago Carrillo expressed this view clearly
when he claimed that “one must have the courage to explain to the working class that is better to
give the surplus to this sector of the bourgeoisie, rather than creating a situation that carries the
risk of turning against us.” S. Carrillo, Demain l’Espagne (París: Seuil, 1974), p. 187.
77 A. Przeworski, “Self-Enforcing Democracy,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, D.
Wittman and B. Weingast, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
4.3. Criticisms 147
self-defeating, as Waldron has claimed. Here is why. According to pure democratic
instrumentalism:
(D1) Political decision-making procedures are legitimate if and only if they
bring about procedure-independent outcomes C better than any feasible
political alternative.
From what it follows ex hypothesi that
(D2) C can be speciﬁed.
However, it also happens that disagreements on which outcomes are to be reached
are a necessary condition for procedures of collective decision-making being called
for. Think about it a contrario. Assume that all citizens agreed on what ought to
be done across the board. If that was the case, no decision-making procedure would
be required, except for purely coordination matters.78 Put simply,
(D3) Political decision-making procedures are required only if disagreements
on which outcomes are to be reached exist.
Now, if (D2) and (D3) apply, then it follows that
(D4) No political decision-making procedure is required at all.
As Waldron has put it, “any theory that makes authority depend on the goodness of
political outcomes is self-defeating, for it is precisely because people disagree about
the goodness of outcomes that they need to set up and recognize an authority.”79
Of course, the fact of disagreement can also pervade political decision-making proce-
dures, thus preventing a consensus on the procedures to be used to handle substantive
disagreements from emerging.80 However, the possibility of a regress of procedures
should not worry us here. For present purposes is suﬃcient to show that the fact
of disagreement is a necessary feature of politics proper and a necessary condition
for political decision-making procedures—whether democratic or not—being called
for, thus preventing such procedures from being assessed according to their ability
to achieve a clear-cut set of non-relational outcomes C. As David Enoch has pointed
out, we will have to deal about disagreements about outcomes—not less than about
procedures indeed—“by doing politics: Non-ideal, messy, roughly democratic, not
remotely egalitarian, somewhat reason-supported, somewhat forcerelated, every-day
politics.”81
78 Kelsen referred to “the ideal of solidarity of interests of all members of the collectivity” as
a “metapolitical illusion,” expressing the idea that disagreement and conﬂict are necessary features
of politics. H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (Mohr: Tübingen 1920). H. Kelsen,
La Démocratie. Sa Nature-Sa Valeur (Paris: Economica, 1988 [1929]), pp. 32-33.
79 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, p. 253.
80 The point is made, among others, by T. Christiano, “Waldron on Law and Disagreement,”
Law & Philosophy 19 (2000): 513-543.
81 D. Enoch, “Taking Disagreement Seriously: On Jeremy Waldron’s Law and Disagreement,”
Israel Law Review 39 (2006): 22-35.
148 Chapter 4. Instrumentalist theories
4.3.3. Procedural minds
As we have seen above, legitimacy is a central normative feature of political
institutions. A feature that, according to political instrumentalism, depends exclu-
sively on the outcomes that political institutions produce, regardless of the fairness
of the procedures used to bring about such outcomes. To be sure, outcomes count.
Hence, we observe and support political decisions because, apart from being afraid
of being punished if we did otherwise, we do believe them to be adequate means
for the provision of security, welfare and freedom in the form of goods and services.
Likewise, we sometimes disobey such decisions, rebelling and speaking out against
the government, when we perceive them to fail in the provisions of such goods and
services (certainly along other factors, such as our belief that we are not alone in our
claims or that they can be eﬀective in changing the status quo). As an instance of
how widespread the outcome-oriented view of legitimacy is, consider the correlation
between the public support for European integration and economic growth, as shown
in the following graph.
Figure 4. Public support for European integration and economic growth.82
However, pure instrumentalism turns out to be too radical an account of political
legitimacy when we consider it from the point of view of actual citizens, for they
generally take into account not only the outcomes of political decisions but also the
fairness of the procedures employed to bring them about. Despite the exclusive focus
on outcomes of instrumentalism, empirical evidence shows that procedural fairness
counts as well and that, actually, procedure evaluations often exceed outcome evalu-
ations in both citizens’ conception of democracy, their trust in political institutions
and their personal well-being.83 The social psychology literature on the topic is
82 S. Hix and B. Hoyland, The Political System of the European Union (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011).
83 See, respectively, R. J. Dalton, D. C. Shin and W. Jou, “Understanding Democracy: Data
from Unlikely Places,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 4 (2007): 142-156; C. Carman, “The Process
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extensive but appears to converge on the centrality of procedural fairness for the
perceived legitimacy of the decisions made.84 In a review of the research on the topic,
Tom Tyler concludes that “studies of the legitimacy of authority suggest that people
decide how legitimate authorities are, and how much to defer to those authorities
and to their decisions, primarily by assessing the fairness of their decision-making
procedures.”85 Recent research conﬁrms the claim. For example, a recent study of
the Scottish Parliament petitioning system from 1999 to 2006 ﬁnds “clear support
to the hypothesis that it is individual-level assessments of procedural fairness that
have the greatest inﬂuence on trust in the political system. When individuals saw
the petitioning process as being fairer, they expressed greater trust in Scottish and
UK political systems ... Likewise, outcome evaluations [i.e., whether the petitioners
agreed with the statement Ì consider my petition to be a success’] fail to achieve
statistical signiﬁcance in either of the two equations predicting system trust.”86
Consider now two possible replies. It might be argued that procedural legitimacy
is more extended in consolidated democracies rather than in new ones (if regarded
at all), where citizens are more likely to value democracy because of its actual or
expected outcomes. Indeed, it is frequently argued that support for democracy in
developing countries merely signals a desire for a higher standard of living. Thus, as
Przeworski has reported, in post-Pinochet Chile, 59 percent of respondents expected
that democracy would attenuate social inequalities, and in post-communist Eastern
Europe the percentage of citizens linking democracy and social equality ranged from
61 percent in Czechoslovakia to 88 percent in Bulgaria.87 If that were the case,
the ﬁndings presented above would have to be qualiﬁed, for it could happen for
citizens in consolidated democracies to regard procedures as valuable in themselves
only as a reiﬁcation of what previously was taken as a mere means to achieve cer-
tain non-relational goals. However, in a review of the major cross-national surveys
asking common people about their understanding of democracy (including 49 coun-
tries), Russell Dalton et al. have found that, even if outcome-related conceptions
are slightly more extended in non-democratic countries and new democracies (spe-
cially immediately after transitions to democracy) than in established democracies,
procedural considerations are still salient. As they conclude, “Relatively few people
deﬁne democracy in terms of social beneﬁts ... These results undercut claims that
supporters of democracy really mean they want higher living standards and similar
beneﬁts”.88
is the Reality: Perceptions of Procedural Fairness and Participatory Democracy,” Political Studies
58 (2010): 731-751; and A. Stutzer and B. S. Frey, “Political Participation and Procedural Utility:
An Empirical Study,” European Journal of Political Research 45 (2006): 391-418.
84 The locus classicus is W. Laurens Walker and J. Thibaut, Procedural Justice: A Psychological
Analysis (Hilsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1975). For a more recent review of the literature,
see T. R. Tyler, “Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure,” International Journal of Psychology 35
(2000): 117-125.
85 Tyler, “Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure,” p. 120.
86 Carman, “The Process is the Reality,” p. 743, italics in the original.
87 A. Przewroski, “Democracy, Equality, and Redistribution,” in Political Judgement. Essays
in Honour of John Dunn, R. Bourke and R. Geuss, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010).
88 Dalton, Shin and Jou, “Understanding Democracy: Data from Unlikely Places,” p. 147.
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Second, it may also be replied that political legitimacy need not depend on how
citizens perceive it, for what they take to be legitimate might be relevant for a
descriptive account of legitimacy but not for a normative one. If that were the case,
legitimacy could still be deﬁned in purely instrumental terms, regardless of the fact
that citizens systematically take into account procedures when assessing the legiti-
macy of political decisions. Accordingly, the instrumentalist case for constitutional
constraints would remain justiﬁed. After all, past moral acceptance of slavery did not
make it any more correct, nor does current moral acceptance of eating non-human
animals turn it into any more correct either. However, there is a diﬀerence between
the justiﬁcation of slavery or the consumption of non-human animals and the jus-
tiﬁcation of the legitimacy of democratic institutions and decisions, for democratic
institutions and decisions are intended to be justiﬁed for the citizenry (while slavery
and the consumption of non-human animals have been rarely intended to be justiﬁed
for slaves and non-human animals). Hence, instrumentalist theories justify consti-
tutionalism on the better outcomes they bring about for the citizenry but, on the
other hand, they purport to justify it on grounds that are totally disconnected from
them. As Robert Sudgen points out, “Arneson speaks of justifying constitutional
constraints on democratic decision making. But to whom are these constraints being
justiﬁed?”89
89 R. Sudgen, “Justiﬁed to Whom?,’’ The Idea of Democracy, D. Copp, J. Hampton and J. E.
Roemer, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 152.
Chapter 5
Precommitment-based theories
5.1. Introduction
Precommitment-based justiﬁcations of substantive and procedural constitutional
constraints are addressed in this chapter.1 These theories do not justify such limits as
protecting and advancing a set of non-relational goals—as instrumentalist theories
do (see chapter 4 above)—, or as the procedural conditions and preconditions for
the very functioning of the democractic institutions—as procedural theories do (see
chapter 6 below)—, but as the upshot of citizens’ democratic decisions themselves.
Further, they do not deﬁne such constrains as the upshot of idealized democratic
procedures either—as contractualist theories do—, but of actual ones.2
Assume that citizens are the only source of sovereignty and the ones who ought
to decide which rights (either substantive or procedural) they have, how should these
rights be balanced when trade-oﬀs arise and by which means are they to be enacted,
as Waldron has claimed.3 Then we should be happy, from a democratic point of
view, when they decide to commit themselves to a set of constitutional principles
and provide courts with the ability to review future legislative decisions that may
jeopardize such principles. Hence, from a precommitment-based standpoint, consti-
tutional constraints need not be at odds with democracy for they can be the upshot
of an actual collective decision democratically made by the people themselves. As
Hayek put it, “Only a demagogue can represent as ’antidemocratic’ the limitations
which long-term decisions and the general principles held by the people impose upon
the power of temporary majorities.”4
The chapter is divided into three sections. First, the structure of democratic
precommitments is outlined. Second, Ackerman’s account of dualist democracy is
1 Relevant contributions include J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984); S. Holmes, “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy,” in Constitu-
tionalism and Democracy, J. Elster and R. Slagstad, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988); S. Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review,” Law & Phi-
losophy 9 (1990): 327-370; R. Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (London: Chatto & Windus,
1990), pp. 36-37; B. Ackerman, We the People. Foundations (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University
Press, 1991); J. Elster, Ulysses Unbound (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and J.
Kis, “Constitutional Precommitment Revisited,” Journal of Social Philosophy 40 (2009): 570-594.
2 See typically J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Ma.: Cambridge University Press,
1971) or Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1996).
3 See J. Waldron, “Participation: The Right of Rights,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
98 (1998): 307-337 and, with modiﬁcations, in Law and Disagreement, ch. 11.
4 F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, pp. 106-107. Quoted in Ely, Democracy and Distrust,
p. 63.
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presented as the most elaborated and inﬂuential instance of a precommitment-based
approach. Finally, ﬁve diﬃculties of this approach are analyzed in turn.
5.2. The structure of democratic precommitment
A precommitment is a device through which an individual or collective agent
binds her/itself in order to follow (or to increase the likelihood of following) certain
course of action in the future. The agent can do so by manipulating the structure
of future options open to her, either by increasing the costs of choosing alternative
options to the preferred one or, in the limit, by ruling out the very possibility of taking
such alternative options, the classic example being that of Ulysses tying himself so
as to be unable to swing toward the sirens later on.5
In order to clarify this device regarding constitutionalism, let us analyze, ﬁrst, the
distinction between personal commitments and institutional commitments, second,
the way in which constitutional constraints might be viewed as democratic commit-
ments of the second sort and, third, the reasons why citizens would decide to commit
themselves to a set of constraining rules that constrain their future decisions.
5.2.1. Commitments
Commitments can be institutional or personal depending on whether the agent
commits herself to following certain rules or just certain course of action, respec-
tively.6 As instances of personal commitment consider, besides Ulysses’ case, José
María Aznar’s public statement that he would not run for a third term or Hernán
Cortés’ burning up his ships as soon as he arrived to America. In the former case,
Aznar did not exclude the possibility of running for a third term but only increased
the cost of running for a third term, making more likely for him to do otherwise. In
the latter, by contrast, Cortés ruled out the very possibility of his crew going back
to Spain. However, both actions are instances of personal rather than institutional
commitments for neither Aznar nor Cortes committed themselves to rules.
Institutional commitments, by contrast, are those in which the agents commit
themselves to a set of rules that constrain their future decisions.7 As a historical
instance of a plausible institutional commitment, consider North and Weingast’s ac-
count of the Glorious Revolution. According to them, the key-factor of early modern
England’s economic success rests on the constitutional reforms enacted during the
Glorious Revolution. True, these reforms where forced, often violently, on the Crown
rather than self-adopted. But, from the point of view of England as a whole, they
5 See Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens; and Ulysses Unbound.
6 Elster also distinguishes between two types of commitments—intentional and func-
tional—depending on whether they are intended or untinded yet act as if they were so. See Elster,
Ulysses Unbound.
7 Another diﬀerence between personal and institutional commitments is that the former can
be irreversible (as in Hernán Cortes’ case, in which there is no turning back), whereas the latter
cannot for, as Elster points out, there is not an outside of the society—i.e., rules, including absolutely
entrenched rules, are always changeable. See Sánchez-Cuenca, Más democracia, menos liberalismo,
p. 147.
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can be seen as commitments that successfully constrained the future power of both
the Crown and the parliament. Actually, attempts to constrain the absolute power
of the Crown were as old as the Magna Carta of 1215. However, those attempts
had been largely unsuccessful. By contrast, after 1688, and with the regicide of 1649
contributing to the credibility of the threats posed by the opposition, the Crown was
forced to observe its commitments and thus lose many of its legislative and judicial
prerogatives, along with its ability to alter rules—notably, regarding taxation and
budgeting—without the consent of the parliament. As North and Weingast famously
put it,
What established the government’s commitment to honoring its agreements—notably
the promise not to appropriate wealth or repudiate debt—was that the wealth
holders gained a say in each of these decisions through their representatives in
Parliament. This meant that only if such changes were in their own interests
would they be made. Increasing the number of veto players implied that a
larger set of constituencies could protect themselves against political assault,
thus markedly reducing the circumstances under which opportunistic behavior
by the government could take place.8
5.2.2. Constitutions
Constitutions can be deﬁned as democratic institutional precommitments if and
only if two conditions are met. First, they can be deﬁned as institutional commit-
ments as long as they take the form of a set of rules that constrain the structure of
future options open to parliaments, that is, as long as they are enforceable against
ordinary legislation through their being rigid and enacted by third parties such as
constitutional courts. Constitutions can do this by making it harder for some options
to be chosen (through the requirement of procedures more stringent than ordinary
ones) or by removing them altogether (through absolute entrenchment).
Second, constitutions can be deﬁned as democratic commitments if and only if
the following two conditions are met:
Demos condition.—A constitution can be deﬁned as a democratic commitment
only if it is adopted by those citizens against whom the constitution is to be
enforced later on and only by them (i.e., without the participation of external
agents against whom the constitution is not to be enforced).
and
Procedure condition.—A constitution can be deﬁned as a democratic com-
mitment only if it is adopted through the use of equal voting and (perhaps
qualiﬁed) majority rule.9
8 North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment,” p. 831.
9 Social choice theorists have shown that majority rule is the only rule that satisﬁes basic
conditions of fairness, equality and rationality. See A. Sen, Collective Choice and Social welfare (San
Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970), 71-74; K. O. May, “A Set of Independent Necessary and Suﬃcient
Conditions for Simple Majority Decision,” Econometrica 20 (1952): 680-684.
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Once these two conditions are met, constitutions can be counted as democratic insti-
tutional commitments made by the citizenry; and judicial review, as the obvious in-
stitutional device through which such commitments are enacted against the logrolling
and horse-trading of temporary parliamentary majorities. As Freeman puts it,
So conceived, judicial review is a kind of rational and shared precommit-
ment among free and equal sovereign citizens at the level of constitutional
choice. By the exercise of their rights of equal participation they agree to a
safeguard that prevents them, in the future exercise of their equal political
rights, from later changing their minds and deviating from their agreement
and commitment to a just constitution ... By granting to a non-legislative
body that is not electorally accountable the power to review democratically
enacted legislation, citizens provide themselves with a means for protecting
their sovereignty and independence from the unreasonable exercise of their
political rights in legislative processes.10
5.2.3. Reasons
Why would a people decide voluntarily to bind themselves, thus constraining
their future ability to do as they please? Before turning to plausible reasons, an
important caveat is in order. Even if all the below-presented reasons for constitu-
tional precommitment were ﬂawed, a majority of citizens could still believe them to
be right and therefore give support to self-binding themselves on such grounds. It
is important to note that, from the point of view of what counts as a democratic
precommitment, that would be a form of precommitment for they would be binding
themselves, and it would be a democratic one for it would be backed by a majority.
In short, even though there are good reasons for why the people would be interested
in committing themselves to a rigid constitution, what has to be analyzed from the
point of view of precommitment-based theories is not such reasons, but rather the
structure of the commitment itself and its democratic pedigree. That said, consider
now six plausible instances of such reasons.11
First, citizens could decide to withdraw some issues from ordinary politics be-
cause of a belief that such issues are extrapolitical and should not be aﬀected by
what temporary and ever-changing majorities might think about them. Fundamen-
tal rights such as bodily integrity, protection against torture or freedom of conscience
are plausible candidates.
Second, though related to the ﬁrst reason, citizens may decide to constitutionally
entrench a set of procedural or substantive provisions in the belief that doing so
might improve the quality of the upshot of the decision-making process, as we have
seen in chapter 4. At the individual level, this happens when people constrain their
future behavior in order to overcome their own tendency to make unwise decisions
10 Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review,” p. 353.
11 On these and additional reasons for constitutional precommitment, see C. Sunstein, Design-
ing Democracy. What Constitutions Do (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 96-101;
and Holmes, “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy.”
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due to temporary passions, biases or interests—e.g., Ulysses tying himself in order
to avoid being tempted to swing toward the sirens. Likewise, at the collective level,
citizens could decide to tie themselves through a constitution to overcome their own
tendency to make unwise decisions due to short-termism, weakness of the will or
hyperbolic discounting. By doing so they can prevent primary bads from happening,
ensure the rules of the democratic game as to make possible the alternation in oﬃce
without bloodshed or reduce the likelihood of electoral cycles happening (at least, as
for fundamental issues).
Third, citizens may decide to entrench a set of procedural provisions in a consti-
tutional text not because of the outcomes they might help bring about but rather
because they believe them to be necessary for the very functioning of democratic
institutions, as we shall see in chapter 6. Plausible candidates include the right to
vote or freedom of speech, though they might included a longer list of rights, so as to
prevent minority or marginal groups from being excluded from the political process.
For example, the South African Constitution ensures minimum economic conditions
on the belief that ordinary politics cannot be trusted to protect those who live on
the margins and are likely to suﬀer social exclusion with the risk of not being able
to take part in politics in a meaningful way.
Fourth, the following reason could be added to the third one. Under conﬂicts of
interests between citizens and representatives and imperfect information and limited
civic engagement on the side of the former during ordinary politics, citizens may want
to entrench the most fundamental issues (or for issues that might be easily manipula-
ble and open to opportunistic behavior) in a rigid constitution during extraordinary
moments of constitutional transition, when citizens are specially engaged in politics
and deliberation is widespread and robust. This is one of the main arguments put
forward by Ackerman in We the People, as we shall see immediately below.
Fifth, in societies that are deeply divided on some particular issues, it may be
perfectly reasonable for citizens to decide to take such issues oﬀ the political agenda
so as to ensure civil peace and the stability of the democratic system proper. For
example, in religiously divided society the constitution can have the function of
banning the legislatures from legislating on religious matters, thus taking oﬀ the
day-to-day political agenda a potentially explosive question like this, improving the
stability of the system overall and allowing the society to reach agreements on less
polarized issues.
Sixth, a constitution can improve coordination and bargaining among diverse and
often struggling parties by including provisions that are aimed at solving collective
action problems, which can take the form of prisoners’ dilemmas, hold-up problems,
unbearable transaction costs or the inability to make credible commitments. Con-
sider only a prisoner’s dilemma sort of problem. According to Sunstein, “The leading
example is the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which requires each state to enforce
judgments rendered in other states. Without this provision, every state might have
a strong incentive to refuse to enforce the judgments of other states; if Massachusetts
chooses not to honor the judgment of a New York court against a Massachusetts cit-
156 Chapter 5. Precommitment-based theories
izen, then Massachusetts receives a short-term gain because the resources its citizen
needs to satisfy any judgment remain within the borders of Massachusetts. But all
states would be better oﬀ if the law bound each of them to respect the judgments of
others. The Full Faith and Credit Clause ensures precisely this outcome, eﬀectively
solving the problem.”12
5.3. Ackerman’s dualist democracy
Ackerman has put forward a very inﬂuential precommitment-based account of
constitutional democracy, which is now considered in some detail.13 In his account,
a constitutional democracy—or, as he puts it, a “dualist democracy”—leaves room
both for moments of constitutional politics, when citizens deeply engage in politics
and commit to a set of constitutional provisions after considered reﬂection, and for
ordinary politics, when engagement is lower but temporary majorities are unable to
jeopardize citizens’ considered judgments because they have previously entrenched
them in a rigid constitution against such possibility.
A. Dualism. Dualist democracy is a third way between “monistic democracy” and
“rights foundationalism.” In a monistic democracy the democratic process has nor-
mative precedence over any sort of constitutional check, including those checks that
are necessary for democracy to operate. According to Ackerman, supporters of this
system take the Westiminster parliamentarianism as a reference and include, among
others, Woodrow Wilson, Charles Beard and Oliver W. Holmes. Rights foundation-
alism, in turn, equals rights instrumentalism as deﬁned in section 4. It depicts rights
as conceptually diﬀerent from and normatively prior to the democratic process and
is typically represented by the German constitutional system, in which fundamental
rights are entrenched once and for all (to the extent that they are only amendable
through the replacement of the entire constitutional text). It includes, among its
supporters, legal scholars such as Ronald Dworkin, Richard Epstein and Owen Fiss.
Dualist democracy contrasts with these two ends as follows.14 It contrasts with
rights foundationalism because it does note deﬁne rights as pre-political and non-relational
goals to which the institutional framework has to adapt. Rather, it deﬁnes them in
a strictly relational way—namely, as the upshot of citizens’ considered democratic
deliberation and consensus. Thus, in a dualist democracy rights are not deﬁned
12 Sunstein, Desingning Democracy, pp. 99-100.
13 Ackerman, We the People: Foundations; and We the People: Transformations (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).
14 Ackerman’s aim in We the People is not only descriptive but also normative. It is descriptive
because he believes that the model of dualist democracy better describes the American constitu-
tional system (in contrast to the above-mentioned British and German systems, which would be
better characterized by monism and rights foundationalism, respectively). Hence, unlike British
parliamentarianism (Ackerma’s book is previous to the enactment of the Human Rights Rights
Act), the American system does have a written constitution with normative priority over the ordi-
nary legislative process but, unlike the German Basic Law, the constitution can be amended when
the people consider it to be necessary, which has happened, according to Ackerman, in three key
moments, namely, the Founding , the Reconstruction and the New Deal. But Ackerman’s aim is also
normative for he puts forward an idea of constitutional democracy that he believes to be superior
to both monistic democracy and rights foundationalism.
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as previous to the democratic process, but as the outcome of that process.15 On
the other hand, it contrasts with monistic democracy because it does not deﬁne
rights as the upshot of whatever democratic process, regardless of citizens’ degree of
engagement, deliberation and support. By contrast, it deﬁnes them as the upshot of
a mobilized deliberation in which citizens deeply engage in politics, discuss to each
other at length and reach wide consensus on fundamental issues, including rights.
A dualist democracy includes a two-track lawmaking system. First, a constitu-
tional lawmaking track, in which citizens commit, after considered reﬂection, to a set
of fundamental laws—including fundamental rights—by entrenching them in a rigid
constitutional text. And, second, an ordinary lawmaking track, in which elected
representatives draft and enact ordinary laws with little participation on the side of
citizens. Constitutional lawmaking is the upshot not only of a deeper engagement and
more considered reﬂection on the side of citizens, but also of a wider consensus and
commitment among them. By contrast, during normal politics plurality of competing
parties is the norm, with no faction being powerful enough to advance its agenda
against that consensus. That is the reason why constitutional laws entrenched during
constitutional moments, either aimed at amending the previous constitutional order
or to create it for the ﬁrst time, have normative precedence over ordinary laws. They
prevent fundamental issues—including fundamental rights—from being jeopardized
by temporary parliamentary majorities that are poorly monitored by citizens during
ordinary times.
Accordingly, constitutionalism is not justiﬁed as an external constrain on demo-
cratic decision-making, but rather as the democratic upshot of citizens’ decisions
under certain conditions of engagement and reﬂection that are absent during ordinary
politics. It overcomes the apparent trade-oﬀ between democracy and constitutional
rights assumed by both monists and rights foundationalists by showing that both
elements can be accommodated in a consistent framework. Within this framework
constitutional rights are deﬁned as the upshot of a democratic decision made by
the people in constitutional moments, and the normative priority of the constitution
over ordinary legislation is deﬁned as the priority of the considered judgment of the
people (democratically expressed in the constitutional moment) over the ordinary
legislative process. According to Ackerman, this framework dissolves the classical
quarrel between monists and rights foundationalists:
It allows an important place for the foundationalist’s view of ’rights as
trumps’ without violating the monist’s deeper commitment to the priority of
democracy. To grasp the logic of accommodation, suppose that a rights-oriented
movement took the higher lawmaking track and successfully mobilized the
People to endorse one or another Bill or Rights. Given this achievement,
the dualist can readily endorse the judicial invalidation of later statutes that
undermine these rights, even when they concern matters, like the protection of
15 “My understanding of the Constitution does not begin with inalienable rights; it starts with
the eﬀort by the American people to govern themselves. Fundamental rights have constitutional
status only if they have their source in a deliberate and mobilized aﬃrmation of principle by the
American people.” B. Ackerman, “Rooted Cosmopolitanism,” Ethics 104 (1994): 516-535, p. 517.
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personal freedom or privacy, that have nothing much to do with the integrity
of the electoral process so central to monistic democrats.16
B. Private citizenship. According to Ackerman, the main rationale for a dualist
democracy is that it better suits “private citizenship,” which Ackerman deﬁnes as a
third way between “public citizenship” and “perfect privatism.” The former accords
to the idea of citizenship in the tradition of civic humanism as updated by Hannah
Arendt and more recently by some communitarians. According to this idea, the
public sphere is where freedom is realized, going thus ﬁrst for citizens than the
private one. In Arendt’s words, the political sphere “is the realm where freedom is a
worldly reality”.17 Now, even if true that millions of citizens in democracies read the
papers, talk politics to their friends, relatives and fellow workers and volunteer in
unions, NGOs and political parties, it is equally true that many citizens are closer to
the latter ﬁgure—that of the perfect privatist, for whom the private sphere goes ﬁrst
in her life to the point that she refuses to take part in politics altogether. Of course,
the perfect privatist need not be self-interested. His understanding of what ought
to be done may be richer, including the pursuit of spiritual and associational ideals
along with more purely selﬁsh interests. What characterizes him is that, whatever
the content of her private goals, they always trump her public ones.
Private citizenship lies between these two ends and is, according to Ackerman,
the general disposition among citizens during normal politics. Hence, as a general
rule, citizens in modern democracies are far from being the zoon politikon typical of
the public citizen, since they greatly value their private lives. But they are neither
perfect privatists in the sense of not caring about politics at all. Private citizens
balance these two ends by way of standing up against the government and/or the
constitutional order when a pressing issue requires them to do so, while giving greater
importance to their private life during more normal times at the same time. Accord-
ing to Ackerman, modern democracies have to accomodate this fact by “learning to
economize on public-regarding virtue.”18 Dualist democracy is precisely the institu-
tional solution to that goal.
C. Economy of virtue. The point of a dualist democracy is not only that it ac-
comodates private citizens’ apathy during normal times and their engagement in
constitutional moments. Neither it is only that it honors citizens’ considered con-
stitutional commitments during more ordinary political times. Its point is also and
foremost that it minimizes the potential negative eﬀects of private citizenship during
normal politics. Here is way. In the absence of constitutional constraints, temporary
parliamentary majorities and powerful political lobbies would be in a position to take
advantage of citizens’ apathy so as to advance their own interests and trump citizens’
fundamental rights. Consider three instances of such abuses. First, unless constitu-
tionally constrained, “taxes may be designed so that the social groups supporting the
16 Ackerman, We the People, pp. 12-13.
17 Hannah Arendt, “What Is Freedom?,” in Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin
Books, 1993), p. 154.
18 Ackerman, We the People, p. 239.
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Opposition are forced to pay the bulk of the revenue; beneﬁts may be distributed so
that the Government supporters appropriate the lion’s share.”19 Second, a powerful
political platform can take advantage of private citizens’ apathy by enacting policies
that a more participatory citizenry would not tolerate. Third, material asymmetries
can dramatically distort the political process due to the fact that some citizens have
larger economic and informational resources and more time available to take part
in politics, as the data in table 3 below suggest. Unless adequate constraints are
constitutionally entrenched, political apathy and ignorance of ordinary citizens can
put democracy into risk as much as the mobilized support of a malevolent majority.
In short, a dualist democracy “seeks to protect [citizens’ fundamental rights] against
erosion during more normal times, when the People are less involved in aﬀairs of
state.”20
Type of activity Income group < $15,000 Income group ≥ $75,000
Voting 52% 86%
Campaign work 4% 17%
Campaign contributions 6% 56%
Contact 25% 50%
Protest 3% 7%
Community activity 13% 38%
Board membership 1% 6%
Political aﬃliation 29% 73%
Table 4. Percentage of Americans active in politics: High and low income groups.21
D. Constitutional amendability. Now, even though constitutionalism may prevent
private citizens’ commitments from being abused by opportunistic politicians and
powerful elites and inﬂuenced by material inequalities, such commitments cannot be
said to be democratic unless citizens can successfully turn their considered demands
into constitutional amendments or into a completely new constitution. According
to Ackerman, the transition from ordinary to constitutional politics can be divided
into four main steps—namely, signaling, proposal, mobilized deliberation and codi-
ﬁcation. Let us see them brieﬂy in turn.
During the signaling stage the movement earns the authority to place the issue on
the constitutional agenda, above day-to-day competition among ideological factions.
The issue is successfully signaled when it gains the suﬃcient depth (it involves a high
degree of information exchange and deliberation among the citizenry), its breadth (it
generates a large support) and its decisiveness (it defeats the competing alternatives).
As Ackerman describes it,
There will be times in the future, as in the past, when one or another
group of private citizens wil begin to strike a responsive chord amongst a
19 Ackerman, We the People, p. 256.
20 Ackerman, We the People, p. 19.
21 The data come from S. Verba, K. L. Schlozman and H. E. Brady, Voice and Equality. Civic
Voluntarianism in American Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 190.
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larger group of fellow Americans; the weak, fragmentary, disconnected politi-
cal talk around dinner table and workplace will begin to focus on a particular
movement’s constitutional agenda, and will give shape to the debate in more
public forums; increasingly, the transformative initiative will dominate the
country’s political life; elections will be fought on the movement’s agenda, in
the process transforming the public’s understanding of the nature of the is-
sues, as well as the character of possible solutions; then, after long struggles in
many diﬀerent public places, a movement may at last gain the constitutional
authority to speak, once again, for We the People.22
Regarding how to identify when a demand has reached suﬃcient depth, breadth and
decisiveness, voting fails to be a useful tool, for it does not distinguish proposal that
are deep, wide and decisive from proposals that are not. By contrast, constitutional
rigidity provides for such a device, for it rules out proposal that are not deep, wide and
decisive enough by making higher lawmaking much harder than normal lawmaking.
In a second stage, more or less ambiguous claims give way to increasingly concrete
proposals, formulated in a language that the majority of the population can support.
Of course, the institutional means used to translate a more or less chaotic bunch
of claims into an accurate and concrete set of proposals varies across countries with
diverse political traditions. Hence, if hierarchically organized and all-powerful parties
have been the rule in Europe, America has always had less powerful and disciplinary
parties (even though this might have changed from mid-twentieth century onward).
A third stage of mobilized popular deliberation follows, which lapse varies but
goes from proposal to ratiﬁcation. At this stage, citizens’ engagement is deep and
deliberation robust and often witty indeed. As Ackerman puts it, “Not that this
period of mobilized deliberation is anything like a philosophy seminar. It is much
more democratic; much more energetic; much more multivocal. There will be a
great deal of passion and personality, action as well as argument, drama as well as
debate—the stakes are much too high to imagine otherwise.”23
A fourth stage of formal codiﬁcation follows when the previous stage does not
fail due to the successful opposition of supporters of the traditional constitutional
framework and the proposal eventually gains the support of a widespread majority.
Codiﬁcation can take the form of a formal constitutional amendment procedure,
such as the one speciﬁed in the art. 5 of the US Constitution. But it can also take
a more informal path, as it happened under Roosevelt, when he claimed a mandate
from the people and the Congress enacted transformative statutes that, even though
they ﬁrstly challenged previous constitutional principles, were eventually taken as
equivalent to a formal amendment.24
22 Ackerman, We the People, pp. 263-264.
23 Ackerman, We the People, p. 287.
24 Of course, the Supreme Court of the so-called Lochner era overturned the statutes, to which
the President and the Congress replied by issuing a second wave of statutes and threating to pack
the Court, as part of a turbulent and mobilized public deliberation. Finally, the Court accepted the
new statutes thorugh a number of opinions—beginning with “the switch in time that saved nine”
of Justice Roberts in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital 1936 decision—that created a new doctrine
compatible with the New Deal.
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E. Judicial review. Thus far the stages of a constitutional moment. Consider now the
Supreme Court from Ackerman’s standpoint, which can be seen under a completely
new light. Namely, not as questioning democracy or “the People,” but rather as
questioning the popular mandate of a few hundred politicians in Washington, D. C.
(or in Berlin or Cape Town, it may be added).
While these folks have all won election, they have normally done so on the
basis of soft ballot s by a majority of private citizens who themselves recog-
nize that they have not given the key issues the kind of sober consideration
they deserve. President and Congress normally do not have the considered
support of the American people in assaulting the principles established by
past successes in cosntitutional politics. If the Court is right in ﬁnding that
these politician/statesmen have moved beyond their mandate, it is further-
ing Democracy, not frustrating it, in revealing our representatives as mere
“stand-ins” for the People, whose word is not to be confused with the collective
judgment of the People themsleves.25
Note that Ackerman does not claim that the Supreme Court represents the people
better than the Congress. On the contrary, “During normal politics nobody repre-
sents the People in an unproblematic way—not the Court nor the President nor the
Congress nor the Gallup polls.”26 The issue is not as easy as choosing the insti-
tutional arrangements that better represent citizens’ interests, for citizens’ interests
during normal politics and during constitutional moments are not the same. “In the
very process of mobilized debate and decision, many minds would change, many new
directions would be explored before a new constitutional solution was reached.”27
The aim of a dualist democracy is to make sure that the people can turn their more
considered judgments into constitutional provisions during constitutional moments
and that such judgments are not trumped by temporary parliamentary majorities
during more normal times. Hence, “during more normal times, isn’t it better for the
Court to represent the absent People by forcing our elected political/statesmen to
measure their statutory conclusions against the principles reached by those who have
most successfully represented the People in the past?”28
5.4. Criticisms
A number of criticisims are raised in what follows. Before proceeding, a caveat
is in order though. When the precommitment-based justiﬁcation is used by pure
instrumentalists, their case turns out to be inconsistent, for instrumentalists should
be indiﬀerent to how non-relational rights are constitutionalized as long as they are.
If the achievement of outcomes C is the only (and suﬃcient) criteria for the legitimacy
25 Ackerman, We the People, p. 262.
26 Ackerman, We the People, p. 263.
27 Ackerman, We the People, p. 263.
28 Ackerman, We the People, p. 264.
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of political institutions, it turns out to be irrelevant whether those institutions have
the support of a majority of citizens or not, as long as they are eﬃcient in advancing
C.
5.4.1. Categorial confusion
As we have seen, according to precommitment-based theories, constitutional con-
straints on democracy need not be undemocratic insofar as they are the upshot of
a democratic decision made by the people, say, in a constitutional moment. Hence,
Dworkin once argued that this alone is enough to dispose the democratic objection
against constitutionalism. Since polls revealed that more than 71 percent of people
believed that the British democracy would be improved by the incorporation of a Bill
of Rights to the British legal system, that alone would turn such an incorporation
into democratic.29 Similarly, a recent opinion poll carried out in Spain has shown
that the people trust the Spanish Constitutional Court much more than political
parties and politicians who, interestingly enough, were the less trusted institutions
by far.30
Now, Waldron has argued that this argument rests on a categorial confusion. Po-
litical arrangements—including constitutional constraints—do not become any more
democratic just because they have been chosen by democratic means, for a majority
of citizens could pass blatantly undemocratic constitutional provisions democrati-
cally without such provisions turning into democratic for that reason.31 What makes
political arrangements be democratic is not the means by which they are adopted,
but rather their intrinsic institutional features, such as whether they are inclusive of
all citizens, whether they provide them with meaningful rights to take part in the
decisions, whether majority rule is used as the decision-making procedure, and so
on.32 Since Dworkin has modiﬁed his early view on the issue and has granted that
constitutional arrangements do not become any more democratic just because they
have been adopted by democratic means, Waldron’s reductio is generally taken to
have settled the debate. However, I think that Waldron’s is too fast an argument,
at least if we consider the meaning of “democratic” in daily usage when ascribed to
a charter of substantive—rather than procedural—rights.
Waldron may be right in pointing out that what makes a decision-making pro-
cedure democratic is not the means by which that procedure was arrived at, for
the people may well adopt an autocratic procedure by democratic means without
that procedure turning into democratic for that reason. Thus he is right in claiming
that what makes a decision-making procedure be democratic depends on its intrinsic
features. However, Waldron commits a non sequitur when he extends this argument
29 See Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain, pp. 36-37.
30 See http://blogs.elpais.com/metroscopia/2011/09/menos-respeto-a-los-que-mandan.html
(Accessed January 4, 2012)
31 The typical example of undemocratic laws passed by democratic means is the fall of the
Weimar Republic in the hands of the Nazis. This particular case is critically discussed below in
section 6.2.
32 This point is made by Waldron, Law and Disagreement, pp. 255-257; and Bayón, “Democ-
racia y derechos.”
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to substantive constitutional provisions, such as those that tend to be included in a
charter of rights, as well. In contrast to procedural provisions, what makes substan-
tive provisions—such as the prohibition of torture, the respect for one’s private and
family life, or reproductive rights—be democratic has little to do with their intrinsic
features or, to put it more precisely, has less to do with their intrinsic features than
it does in the case of procedural provisions. Rather, we tend to say that substan-
tive provisions—at least those that are completely disconnected from the concept of
democracy—are democratic because they have been adopted by democratic means
and enjoy the support of a majority of the citizenry.
To be sure, “democracy” is an essentially contested concept and the ascription
of “democratic” to substantive provisions is contestable and vague. Indeed, we often
claim that substantive provisions are democratic because they apply to all citizens
or because they have inclusive eﬀects (similarly as we often say that Inditex or
H&M have “democratized” fashion because they have made it available to ordinary
people). However, these are derivative uses of the term, which clearly refers to the
intrinsic features of procedural provisions but much less so to the intrinsic features
of substantive provisions. As an instance of this, consider the following statement:
(E1) The Belgian electoral law is very democratic,
in which “democratic” clearly refers to the intrinsic features of the electoral law (e.g.
its proportionality, the compulsory character of its voting, its use of open lists, etc.)
rather than to the means by which the law was adopted. And compare it to the
following one:
(E2) The Belgian stem cell policy is very democratic,
which makes little sense unless “democratic” refers to the means by which the policy
was adopted—rather than to the intrinsic features of the policy. Hence, in the former
case the subject of which “democratic” is predicated (the Belgian electoral law) is
a procedural issue and, accordingly, “democratic” refers to its intrinsic features. By
contrast, in the latter case the subject is a substantive issue that is disconnected from
the concept of democracy (the Belgian stem cell policy) and, accordingly, “demo-
cratic” does not refer to its intrinsic features but to the means by which the issue
was arrived at or adopted.
In short, Waldron’s reductio may apply to procedural provisions, such as the
electoral law, by showing that such provisions do not turn into any more democratic
just because they have been chosen by democratic means. But, since substantive
provisions are democratic precisely by virtue of the means by which they are adopted,
Waldron’s reductio does not apply to substantive provisions, such as those that are
usually included in a charter of rights. Notably, it does not apply to most of the
provisions included in the European Convention on Human Rights that became part
of the British domestic law through the Human Rights Act of 1998. And since,
incidentally, Dworkin’s case was limited to the adoption of provisions that were
mostly substantive, Waldron’s reductio does not apply to his argument.
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Let us turn back to Ackerman now. Ackerman does not evade the mistake pointed
out by Waldron, for his argument does not apply only to substantive issues. In fact,
his dualist democracy may well end up turning into all but democratic. In order to
see why, take the signaling stage of a constitutional moment. According to Ackerman,
there are three criteria that are to be met for a political signaling to be considered
constitutional proper—its depth (it has to involve a high degree of information ex-
change and deliberation among citizens), its breadth (it has to generate a strong
support) and its decisiveness (it has to defeat the competing alternatives). Now,
consider voting rights.33 Unlike the so-called rights foundamentalists, Ackerman
believes that these rights are to be taken as the upshot of the democratic process,
rather than as being prior to it. That is what makes his account be democratic.
Now assume that a proposal for a constitutional amendment canceling these rights
is put forward and, after wide and open deliberation, it gains the depth, breadth
and decisiveness (along with the normative criteria of the subsequent stages, which
I am not taking into account for the sake of simplicity) to be turned into higher
law. In contrast to the German constitutional system, in which fundamental rights
including voting rights are entrenched against constitutional amendment, in a dualist
democracy this possibility remains open to be taken by legal means. Commenting
on whether judges should be able to turn down amendments that have successfully
gone through all the stages of a constitutional moment but are obviously repellent,
Ackerman claims that “I do not believe that judges would be justiﬁed in asserting a
general authority to protect the fundamental principles of dualist democracy against
repudiation by the People.”34
However, as Herzog points out, this reponse raises a dilemma for Ackerman:
“We want to know if ’the People’ can do anything they like and nonetheless remain
’the People’ or if some of their actions threaten or undercut their own status.”35 If
the former, Ackerman’s account of dualist democracy turns out to be potentially
self-defeating, for it can end up being all but democratic. If the latter, his dualism
turns into a form of rights foundationalism and, accordingly, it looses its democratic
pedigree according to Ackerman’s own standards. Conclusion: what makes voting
rights (either constitutionalized or not) be a constitutive condition of democracy
does not depend on what the people decide, but on how the concept of democracy
is deﬁned. A democratic system that passes a law cancelling such rights would turn
into undemocratic, regardless of whether the law has gained the support of the people
or not.
5.4.2. Constitutional disagreements
The precommitment-based account of constitutionalism has two alleged virtues.
First, it presents collective commitments to constitutional rules as analogous to indi-
vidual commitments to personal rules (as when we save a percentage of our monthly
33 This case is adapted from D. Herzog, “Democratic Credentials,” Ethics 104 (1994): 467-479,
pp. 468-472.
34 Ackerman, We the People, p. 16n.
35 Herzog, “Democratic Credentials,” p. 469.
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income or we decide to smoke only after lunch). This is a very powerful analogy, for
self-constraining decisions tend to be seen not only as autonomous decisions but ac-
tually as more autonomous than unconstrained ones. As Harry Frankfurt famously
claimed, freedom of the will precisely consists in being able to have second-order
desires that constrain our ﬁrst-order desires and judgments.36 Mutatis mutandis,
citizens’ collective commitments to constitutional rules need not be undemocratic
when they are depicted as institutional precommitments, for they can be seen as
more autonomous than unconstrained actions by parliamentary majorities. Second,
this account does not present such constitutional commitments as the upshot of an
idealized or counterfactual collective decision, but of a collective decision taken by
actual citizens. Thus, Ackerman appears to leave aside the contractualist idealized
methodology and provide a rationale for constitutionalism that emerges from actual
politics in extraordinary moments, i.e. when actual citizens let aside their factional-
ism, deliberate at length and end up speaking with one uniﬁed voice on matters of
fundamental concern.
These two features are related to each other and, as we shall see immediately,
are equally mistaken. In a nutshell, ﬁrst, collective commitments are not personal
commitments writ large for, unlike individuals, modern societies contain millions of
people that are divided by political disagreements that prevent them from having or
reaching a shared set of common goals that they can constitutionally impose upon
themselves. As Hannah Arendt put it, there is politics because “not man, but men
inhabit the world.”37 And we all disagree with one another. Second, even though a
set of shared common goals could be established, that could only be done only under
some idealized assumptions, that is, at the expense of the realistic methodology that
provides for the democratic pedigree of constitutional commitments as the upshot of
actual citizens’ decisions.
Consider the ﬁrst problem in some detail. The analogy between personal and col-
lective commitments does not hold because it assumes that, under certain conditions
(namely, in constitutional moments), political societies can let aside their day-to-day
political diﬀerences, deliberate open-mindedly, achieve or ﬁnd out an homogeneous
will and speak with a unique voice. Hence, as Olsen has put it, “Constitutional rules
and change procedures achieve legitimacy from the consent of the governed. Agree-
ment and allegiance are based on argumentation, persuasion and compromises more
than on commands and coercion.”38 However, as we shall immediately below, unlike
individuals, political communities are pervaded by persistent and deep disagreements
that prevent them from having such an uniﬁed will.
Of course, the analogy between individuals and political communities would still
apply if individuals were assumed to have multiple personalities, for example, in the
36 H. G. Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy
68 (1971): 5-20. Frankfurt’s analysis is in line with Kant’s classical one in the Groundwork. See I.
Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Kants gesammelte Schriften, vol. 8, Königlichen
Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed. (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1902-).
37 H. Arendt, Men in Dark Times (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1968), p. viii.
38 J. P. Olsen, “Coping with Conﬂict at Constitutional Moments,” Industrial and Corporate
Change 12 (2003): 815-842, p. 816.
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non-pathological sense of thinking, feeling and acting diﬀerently in diﬀerent contexts,
as Jeﬀ Sebo has recently claimed.39 As Hume put it,
I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic
or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal
ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, which
propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts.40
Now, even if the analogy thus seen held, it would not be enough to make the precom-
mitment argument work. The reason why it would not is that the precommitment-based
case for constitutionalism does not depend on whether political communities are
analogous to individuals or not, but rather on whether they share homogeneous in-
terests under certain circumstances—namely, in constitutional moments. This is
the crucial point. If that condition fails, then the precommitment-based case for
constitutionalism fails as well, regardless of whether the analogy thus deﬁned holds
or not.41
To be sure, Ackerman acknowledges the fact of disagreement not only during
normal politics but also during the four stages of a constitutional moment. For
example, during the deliberation stage: “Not that this period of mobilized delibera-
tion is anything like a philosophy seminar. It is much more democratic; much more
energetic; much more multivocal. There will be great deal of passion and person-
ality, action as argument, drama as well as debate—the stakes are much too high
to imagine otherwise.”42 However, he believes that the success of a constitutional
moment depends precisely on the possibility of overcoming this situation of sharp
disagreement and confrontation so “the contending parties [are chanelled] into an
energetic exchange of public views, inviting them to address each other’s critiques as
they seek to mobilize deeper and broader support from the general public.”43 Thus,
what distinguishes normal from constitutional politics is that citizens’ political ig-
norance and apathy give way to a higher degree of information and mobilization
and, more importantly for present purposes, that political disagreements give way
to constitutional consensus (or at least to a higher one, for consensus is not an
all-or-nothing matter) on a set of fundamental principles that citizens support not
on prudential and strategic reasons but whole-heartedly after a long and admittedly
diﬃcult process of signaling, proposal, mobilized deliberation and codiﬁcation. In
short, for Ackerman’s argument to work, the following condition has to apply:
39 See J. Sebo, The Personal is Political (PhD dissertation, NYU, 2011).
40 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1978 [1739-1740]), Book 1, part IV, section VI, p. 261. The analogy is also made, regard-
ing precommitment-based accounts of constitutionalism, by José Juan Moreso. See J. J. Moreso,
Constitucion: Modelo para armar (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009), p. 138.
41 It may be argued that this condition also applies to individuals. Hence, if they turn out to
be constituted of multiple personalities, as Sebo claims, and this feture prevents them from having
a uniﬁed will when they make precommitments, then it may be also questionable that we can refer
to individual precommitments as actual precommitments.
42 Ackerman, We the People, p. 287.
43 Ackerman, We the People, p. 287, my italics.
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Consensus condition.—Wider consensus can be reached in constitutional mo-
ments than during normal politics.44
However, this condition need not apply for at least three reasons. First, if it were
true that consensus is wider in constitutional moments than during normal politics,
qualiﬁed majorities could be required for the ratiﬁcation of constitutional texts. As
Melisa Schwartzberg has pointed out, “if ratiﬁcation requires widespread support,
framers may be induced to ensure that their provisions have broader justiﬁability.”45
However, even though constitutions require qualiﬁed majorities for their amendment
(often along with additional requisites), they only require, with few exceptions,
simple majorities for their ratiﬁcation.46 Now, if the very point of constitutional
precommitments is to prevent ordinary parliamentary majorities from trumping the
considered judgments to which the people have previously committed during consti-
tutional moments, why should such commitments be adopted by simple (rather than
qualiﬁed) majority rule, which is the very same rule that parliaments use? A plau-
sible reason for this is that constitutional commitments, at least at the ratiﬁcation
stage, may not always enjoy a wider consensus than ordinary statutes during normal
times.
Second, constitutional moments tend to take place in very fragile periods of insti-
tutional crisis, transition from autocratic regimes and civil unrest or even civil wars.47
For example, the American Founding came right after the so-called critical period
of the American history; the Reconstruction, after the Civil War; the New Deal,
after the Great Depression.48 And these are not exceptions but the general rule. It
goes without saying that the imprisonment of thousands of petty debtors and revolts
across the country, a bloody civil war or the worst economic disaster in the history
of capitalism are not the best conditions for considered judgment and open-minded
deliberation. By contrast, normal politics better provides citizens with the calm and
stability necessary for the considered reﬂection and good-faith deliberation required
for a real consensus, rather than a mere bargaining, to emerge.49
Third, due to their constraining and rigid nature, the issues included in a consti-
tution tend to last long and have an immeasurable impact on the political landscape
and on citizens’ life. Of course, the parties involved in a constitutional moment
are aware of this. If we add the conditions of confrontation and unrest described
right above to the cocktail, it is reasonable to think that, rather than giving way
to wide consensus, constitutional moments will deepen disagreements and polarize
44 Since Ackerman adopts a deliberativist view of constitutional moments (in contrast to normal
politics), he is far from alone in embracing the consensus requirement. For example, in one of locus
classicus about deliberative democracy, Joshua Cohen claims that “deliberation aims to arrive
at a rationally motivated consensus.” J. Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in
Democracy and Diﬀerence. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, S. Benhabib, ed. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 23.
45 Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, p. 24.
46 See Elster, Ulyses Unbound, p. 101.
47 See Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 65; and
Elster, “Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process,” p. 394.
48 It has to be noted that Ackerman acknowledges this. See We the People, p. 306.
49 Paradoxically enough, when calm and undisturbed circumstances obtain citizens tend not
to back constitutional change.
168 Chapter 5. Precommitment-based theories
interests. Unlike ordinary statutes, which can be easily modiﬁed, the stringency of
constitutional rules turns incentives to prioritize private interests into too strong to
think otherwise. If the stakes during constitutional moments are “much too high,” as
Ackerman claims,50 we should expect to see a lot of manipulation, strong pressure
by powerful interest groups, violent backlash from radical groups, perhaps subtle
(or even open) threats of a putsch by the military, large amounts of money invested
by special interests, polarization and radicalization, and so on. Accordingly, during
constitutional moments citizens might well be more engaged and information be more
widely shared, as Ackerman claims. But it is unlikely for deliberation to be more
open-minded, for the ﬁrst-order and hardly amendable status of the constitutional
upshot provide citizens with the incentive to defend their interests as strongly as they
can, rather than leaving such interests aside, and deliberation can push them toward
extrems, rather than toward consensus.51 As Ginsburg has put it, “Groups can invest
more energy in playing for rules at the constitutional level precisely because of the
presumptively higher stakes in the selection of rules. This might lead to more rather
than less rent-seeking behavior at the constitutional level.”52
True, Ackerman acknowledges that mobilized deliberation always includes, in
his own words, opportunism and strategic behavior, along with grievance, outrage,
extremism and hate. But he concludes that, if predominant, these pathologies of
democratic deliberation can only bring about the failure of the constitutional mo-
ment. However, all these phenomena need not make the constitutional moment fail.
If the support for the proposed amendment is large enough, or is backed by groups
with enough power, the deliberation can end up in an equilibrium among the opposed
parties that might not endorse the outcome whole-heartedly but might have enough
incentives to support it.
Consider the Spanish transition to democracy as an instance of this sort of equilib-
rium.53 Even though it has been often pictured in terms of a great consensus on some
basic principles which all or a large majority of Spaniards agreed to, it can also be
pictured as a multilevel equilibrium among opposed parties in a very fragile and com-
plicated environment (among many other destabilizing factors, the military putsch
attempt known as “Operation Galaxia,” the tough economic crisis that provoked the
Moncloa Pacts or the intense political violence by ETA and GRAPO). Thus it can
be pictured as an equilibrium among democrats and representatives of the previous
regime; among Federalists and supporters of government centralization; among the
50 Ackerman, We the People, p. 287.
51 See C. Sunstein “The Law of Group Polarization,” Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2002):
175-195.
52 T. Ginsburg, “Public Choice and Constitutional Design,” in Research Handbook in Public
Choice and Public Law, D. Farber and A. J. O’Connell, ed. (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2010).
53 On the Spanish transition, see J. M. Maravall, The Transition to Democracy in Spain (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982); J. J. Linz, Obras escogidas. Vol. 4. Democracias: quiebras,
transiciones y retoss, T. J. Milley and J. R. Montero, eds. (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos
y Constitucionales, 2009) and Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1994); and G. O’Donnell, P. C. Schmitter, L. Whitehead, Transiciones desde un gobierno autori-
tario, vol. 4 (Buenos aires: Paidós, 1988).
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moderate right-wing Popular Alliance, the centrist Union of the Democratic Centre,
the Socialist Party, and the Communist Party; and so forth.
To be sure, a large majority of Spaniards—who were very mobilized indeed—agreed
that the regime was moribund, that a change toward some form of democracy was
inevitable and that it was preferable to make that change without bloodshed (or
with as little bloodshed as possible, for political violence accompanied the transition
across the board).54 But this does not imply that the eventual constitutional upshot
was grounded on a consensus rather than also, and probably predominantly, on a
fragile bargaining where all parties (though some more than others) had to make
concessions so as to make the transition possible. For example, the interests of the
de facto powers of the army and the Catholic Church were widely represented in the
text.55
In short, we can present the Constitution as the upshot of a precommitment made
by the Spanish society taken as a whole. But we cannot present such a commitment
as resulting from a wide consensus among the individual citizens rather than as a
fragile though successful equilibrium among bargaining parties that made concessions
but not necessarily changed their minds or constitued an uniﬁed will. The question,
then, is that it turns out to be unclear why should this solution have a special
normative weight (other than for prudential reasons) over ordinary legislative politics
and be entrenched in a rigid constitution against the will of future generations.
Time to sum up. The analogy between individual and collective commitments
does not hold regarding constitutional moments because, unlike individuals, collec-
tivities are pervaded by the fact of disagreement. This fact is likely to persist, ﬁrst,
because otherwise qualiﬁed majorities could be used for the ratiﬁcation of consti-
tutions, second, because the circumstances under which constitutions are adopted
or amended are not the better ones for citizens to leave such disagreements aside
and, third, because the stakes are too high due to the immeasurable impact and
hardly amendable nature of constitutions. Rather than giving way to wider consen-
sus in which the people speak with a uniﬁed voice, constitutional moments are better
depicted as bargaining processes and constitutions as equilibria. As Schwartzberg
concludes in her historical study of constitutional entrenchment and amendment,
“Constitution-making assemblies, far from resembling agents in an original position
or ideal deliberative forum, are ﬁrst and foremost legislatures, both for good and for
ill.”56
In turn, these doubts about the wider consensus of constitutional moments raise
doubts about the precision of Ackerman’s methodology, which aims to leave aside
the Rawlsian idealized methodology and provide a rationale for constitutionalism
that emerges from actual politics in extraordinary moments, that is, when profound
54 In fact, the Constitution gained an almost unanimous vote in the parliament (excluding
some votes against it from the members of the right-wing Popular Aliance and the abstention of
the Basque Nationalist Party) and 87,7 percent of the votes in a referendum.
55 The Constitution entrenched the freedom of the Catholic Church to create its own schools
and the right to receive subsidies from the state to make them work. As for the army, it was charged
with the duty to guard the sovereignty, independence and the territorial integrity of Spain.
56 Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, p. 24.
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crisis make the people let aside their factionalism, deliberate honestly and eventually
speak with one uniﬁed voice. However, as we have seen, constitutional moments are
far from Ackerman’s picture of them. Further, they are probably in a worse position
in terms of producing a consensus among citizens. By doing so, Ackerman treats
constitutional moments as somehow more ideal than normal politics.57 This raises
a dilemma for Ackerman—namely, either he maintains his non-idealized methodol-
ogy and drops the consensus condition or the other way around, he maintains the
consensus condition by dropping his non-idealized methodology.
5.4.3. Constitutions as other-binding devices
As we have seen immediately above, constitutions need not be the upshot of a
wide consensus after open-minded and informed deliberation by the people. Far from
Daniel Webster’s vision of “one country, one Constitution, one destiny,”58 constitu-
tions are often fragile equilibria among disagreeing parties that lack the power to
impose their particular will and thus have to bargain with each other under circum-
stances of crisis and unrest. As an instance of this, consider Acemoglu and Robinson’s
inﬂuential account of the historical expansion of democracy, according to which the
wealthy accepted to share political power with the poor—i.e., democracy—in order
to avoid revolution, since otherwise revolution was the only way the latter had to
achieve wealth redistribution in a nondemocratic regime.59 Historically, a twofold
worry pervaded the debates on the likely consequences of this move. First, contrary
to the interests of the wealthy, the poor could use their newly gained political power
to expropriate the wealthy once enfranchised.60 Second, contrary to the interests of
the poor, the wealthy could eventually refuse to redistribute once the revolutionary
threat is over. Solution to the ﬁrst problem: constitutionalize property rights, so the
poor cannot easily use their political rights to expropriate the rich. Solution to the
second problem: constitutionalize democracy—along with a number of redistributive
mechanisms (e.g., in the form of automatic stabilizers such as unemployment bene-
ﬁts)—so the poor have a political device to ensure that wealth is in fact redistributed.
Even if neither the the poor really wanted to expropriate the rich nor the rich refused
to redistribute their wealth, they might have not been able to credibly communicate
their commitments except through constitutional signaling.
57 See Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, pp. 129 ss.
58 D. Webster, Speech, March 15, 1837.
59 This is an oversimpliﬁed outline of their argument indeed. See Daron Acemoglu and James A.
Robinson, Economic Origins of Deictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006). For a rather comprehensive account of the reasons behind suﬀrage extensions, see
Adam Przeworski, “Conquered or Granted? A History of Suﬀrage Extensions,” British Journal of
Political Science 39, no. 2 (2009): 291-321.
60 As Thomas Macaulay put it in the 1842 speech on the Chartists, “The essence of the Charter
is universal suﬀrage ... If you grant that, the country is lost ... My ﬁrm conviction is that, in our
country, universal suﬀrage is incompatible, not only with this or that form of government, and with
everything for the sake of which government exists; that it is incompatible with property.” Quoted
in A. Przeworski, “Democracy, “quality, and Redistribution,” Political Judgement, R. Bourke and
R. Geuss, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 303.
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In short, as Elster has pointed out, constitutional provisions are best understood
as devices for binding others rather than for binding oneself.61 Now, this need
not trump the idea of constitutions as democratic institutional precommitments as
long as we assume that the collective body who makes the commitment is pervaded
by deep and persistent disagreements among its parts and that the rules to which
the commitment is made are the upshot of a bargaining process among such parts.
Further, it need not trump the idea of constitutions as democratic collective institu-
tional precommitments as long as the resulting equilibrium is adopted by a majority
of citizens; and, more precisely, as long as the demos condition and the procedure
condition deﬁned in section 5.2.2, according to which
Procedure condition.—A constitution can be deﬁned as a democratic com-
mitment only if it is adopted through the use of equal voting and (perhaps
qualiﬁed) majority rule.
However, failure to meet these conditions happen along synchronic and diachronic
lines, as we shall see. Let us analyze the synchronic dimension here and the diachronic
one in the next section. As for the former dimension, at least three sorts of failures
to meet the above-established conditions can occur.
A. Tyranny of the minority. The ﬁrst sort of failure consists in a minority of cit-
izens imposing their interests in the constitution against a majority of their fellow
citizens. There are at least four senses in which this can happen. Before turn-
ing to them, consider a rather trivial point though—namely, that constitutions and
constitutional amendments are generally drafted, and often ratiﬁed as well, by rep-
resentatives rather than by the people themselves.62 This undermines a distinction
made by Ackerman between constitutional lawmaking as made by the people and
ordinary lawmaking as made by their representatives. In Ackerman’s words, “Above
all else, a dualist Constitution seeks to distinguish between two diﬀerent decisions
that may be made in a democracy. The ﬁrst is a decisions by the American people;
the second, by their government.” 63 However, constitutions are not written down by
the people themselves. The people only ratify a text drafted by someone else—and
only sometimes. To be sure, there is a distinction between the constitutive and the
constituted powers. Unlike the latter power, which is exercised by the government
proper, the former power cannot be exercised by the government either because no
government has been properly constituted yet or because passing a constitutional
amendment exceeds its authority. However, the constitutive power is not exercised
by the people either—or not more than the constituted power, for in both cases it is
61 See Elster, Ulysses Unbound. Ely puts it similarly: “in fact there is no consensus to be
discovered (and to the extent that one may seem to exist, that is likely to reﬂect only the domination
of some groups by others).”
62 Of course, the point is not so trivial if representation is dismissed altogether, as some
neo-Rousseauian critics of representation do. See, for example, B. Barber, Strong Democracy.
Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1984). For a criticism of Barber and a defence of representation as a sine qua non condition of
democracy, see D. Plotke, “Representation Is Democracy,” Constellations 4 (1997): 19-34.
63 Ackerman, We the People, p. 6.
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exercised by someone on behalf of the people. In short, it is mistaken to oppose the
people exercising the constitutive power to the government exercising the constituted
power.
This admittedly trivial point assumes that constitutional law-making is made by
representatives on behalf of their constituencies. However, this need not be the case.
Actually, it is not the case, at least, under four not uncommon conditions. Consider
them in turn.
First, even though we usually think of a constitutional assembly representing
the diversity of social interests and deliberating about the principles that should be
turned into higher law, this sort of assemblies is the exception rather than the rule.
Thus, after analyzing ﬁfty-nine constitutional processes, Braulio Gómez found out
that only twenty-ﬁve percent of them were conducted in an assembly, the remaining
seventy-ﬁve percent corresponding either to negotiation tables between the outgoing
regime and forces of the new emerging regime or to boards of experts.64 And when
constitutional assemblies take place, they are often constituted by representatives
who have not been elected by a majority of citizens or lack an interest to put forward
democratic constitutional arrangements.65 In short, neither direct participation of
citizens, nor indirect participation of them is the norm.
Second, even when citizens are appropriately represented and the resulting text
is submitted to referendum, the “upstream constraints” that are imposed on the as-
sembly before it starts to deliberate may undermine its representativeness.66 These
constraints are of two types. First, the agent who convenes the constitutional con-
vention and, second, the mechanism used to select the delegates. None of them
has to be necessarily democratic. For example, in the United States in 1787, the
Philadelphia convention was called by the Continental Congress; in France in 1789,
it was called by the King; in Germany in 1949, it was called by the Western occupying
Allied Powers. To be sure, the resulting text can nevertheless be labeled democratic
when having to be ratiﬁed by the legislatures or in referendum. Even when they are
drafted by non-democratically called and appointed constitutional assemblies, and
despite the fact that citizens only take part in the ratiﬁcation (typically, through
referendum) at best, the ratiﬁcation process can force delegates to take into account
the preferences of the electorate. Indeed, if the delegates know that the document
they produce will have to be ratiﬁed by another body—namely, by citizens or their
representatives—their perception of the preferences of that body will constrain their
decision. However, this is not always the case and constitutions are often made un-
64 See B. Gómez, “El control político de los procesos constituyentes” (PhD dissertation, Com-
plutense University of Madrid, 2006). Quoted in Sánchez-Cuenca, Más democracia, menos liberal-
ismo, p. 142.
65 For example, regarding the American Founding, Ackerman claims that “We must learn to see
the Founders as they see themselves.” Ackerman, We the People, p. 165. However, most Americans
were marginalized from the Founding, which was aimed at only white males and was ratiﬁed by less
than two thousand people, as Ackerman keeps in mind (p. 307). Further, as we have seen in the
ﬁrst chapter, the Founders were far from being democrats; actually, they drafted the Constitution
with downsizing and checking democracy as one of their central aims.
66 See J. Elster, “Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process,” Duke Law Jour-
nal 45 (1995): 364-396, p. 373.
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der non-democratic constraints, without mobilized deliberation at all and not being
submitted to referendum for ratiﬁcation. As Ackerman himself acknowledges, the
four-step process of signaling, proposing, deliberating and codifying that leads to
a constitutional founding/amendment might end up in the congress or an assem-
bly proposing a constitution/constitutional amendment without anything remotely
similar to “the deep, broad and decisive support appropriate for a constitutional
signal.”67
Third, even when citizens are appropriately represented without signiﬁcant up-
stream constraints on the constitutional assembly and the ratiﬁcation of the ﬁnal
text is submitted to referendum, powerful elites can be expected to attempt to in-
ﬂuence—sometimes successfully indeed—both the drafting of the text and its rat-
iﬁcation. Consider a number of ways in which they can do so. First, by posing
(implicit or explicit) threats on representatives and/or citizens if they deviate from
their preferred outcome. Instances of such interferences are the “coups by memo-
randum” carried out by the Turkish military in 1971 and 1997, the coup attempt
during the French Algiers crisis of 1958 that placed De Gaulle in charge of the Re-
public and gave way to the Fifth Republic (and, interestingly for present purposes,
to the establishment of the Conseil Constitutionnel), or the coup threat posed by the
military in Madagascar in 2010 in face of a potential constitutional reform. Second,
powerful and organized interest groups (e.g. business organizations, religious groups,
unions) can inﬂuence the constitution making at the expense of unorganized groups
(e.g. the unemployed, homeless) either by directly lobbying the delegates of the
constitutional convention or by trying to manipulate public opinion or by trying the
inﬂuence delegates’ perception of citizens’ preferred constitutional choices.68
Fourth, even when citizens are appropriately represented without signiﬁcant con-
straints on the constitutional assembly and the will of the majority is adequately
translated into the constitutional text, a majoritarian party can impose constraints
upon the legislature and the executive on the believe that it will soon cease to be
majoritarian (say, due to demographic reasons or to a predicted ideological shift). A
good example is Giscard d’Estaing’s extension of the powers of the Conseil Constitu-
tionneil at the end of his second term in order to reduce the power of the Communist
Party in case it reached power in the next election.69 Likewise, a party (or a coali-
tion) with a parliamentary majority may design the constitutional framework so as to
increase its future power. For example, at the constitutional stage, large parties tend
to prefer majority voting in single-member districts rather than a more proportional
electoral system, which is preferred by small parties.70
B. Democratic indecisiveness. It can also happen just the contrary. A majority
67 Ackerman, We the People, p. 291.
68 On the latter two options, even though regarding the ordinary legislative process, see S.
Stokes, “Pathologies of Deliberation,” in Deliberative Democracy, J. Elster, ed. (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1998), pp. 128-132.
69 See Elster, Ulysses Unbound, p. 171.
70 For speciﬁc examples, see Elster, “Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-making Pro-
cess,” pp. 378-379.
174 Chapter 5. Precommitment-based theories
of citizens, even a qualiﬁed one, might want to amend the constitution yet not be
able to do so because the formal constitutional amendment is never carried out or
even blocked by the political elites. Taking into account the strong rigidity of many
constitutions and the very complicated process of amendment of many constitutions,
the latter possibility is more likely.
It might be replied that it is adequate for a constitution to be very rigid so as to
allow only the proposals for constitutional amendment that are supported without
any doubt by a vast majority of well-informed, highly-engaged and publicly-spirited
citizens. However, the reply is ﬂawed in two ways. First, such a device is not
symmetric between past and current considered judgments” of the citizenry. Rather,
it is biased toward the status quo, regardless of the preferences of the citizenry.71
Second, for the device to be justiﬁed, the constitution that the device is protecting
from being amended needs to be free from the sort of pathologies depicted in the
subsection immediately above. But that need not be the case, for such pathologies
(e.g., critical circumstances preceding the constitutional moment, greater stakes and
greater incentives to manipulate/advance factional interests, etc.) are as likely in
the original constituent moment as in the amendment process.
C. External pressures. Finally, it can also happen for a external agent to be able to
impose their interests in the constitution against those of the citizenry as a whole.
This was the case of the Japanese Constitution in the aftermath of the World War
II, drafted by Douglass MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
in Japan and the interim leader of the country from 1945 until 1948. But it is also
the case when a powerful external agent imposes certain constitutional amendments
on a country in exchange of something. Consider, for example, the “hidden letter”
sent by the European Central Bank to a number of EU member states asking them
to include a deﬁcit ceiling in their constitutions in exchange of buying their sovereign
debt bonds in the secondary market.
Among the latter countries, the Spanish case is specially outstanding for at least
four reasons. First, the alleged “hidden letter” made the two main parties—the
Socialist Party and the Popular Party—reach an agreement on the deﬁcit ceiling
amendment in just a few days and pass the amendment in just a few weeks, even
though the debate on amending the Constitution had been going on for years and had
been blocked by precisely such parties. Second, the proposed amendments that had
enjoyed citizens’ wide support for years were dismissed once again. Third, the debt
ceiling amendment was in neither of the two parties’ manifestos and, accordingly,
citizens had not voted for it. And fourth, the agreement was reached in August,
when most citizens were on holidays; the amendment was passed in a few weeks,
without suﬃcient time for citizens to get informed and deliberate about it; and the
71 In this sense, Ackerman acknowledges that Article 5 of the American Constitution is overly
stringent, preventing constitutional moments from generating succesful constitutional amendments.
Accordingly, he defends that it should be replaced by a “Popular Sovereignty Initiative.” Ackerman,
We the People: Transformations, p. 415.
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call for a referendum was despised, even though a ten percent of the members of
either chambers of the Parliament could have made it mandatory.
A ﬁnal caveat. Note that, even when externally imposed, constitutional con-
straints may well improve the performance of the country due to the reduction of
temporal inconsistency, the protection of fundamental rights or the stability of the
political system overall, as we have analyzed in chapter 4. All these points are obvi-
ously relevant from an instrumentalist point of view, and may justify such externally
imposed constraints. Further, as long as they help to reach the mentioned outcomes,
they may be said to be completely democratic as well from an instrumentalist point
of view, for instrumentalist theories deﬁne democracy only according to the outcomes
it brings about. However, from a precommitment-based standpoint, outcomes are
irrelevant. What counts is whether the constitutional constraints are the upshot of a
democratic commitment made by those citizens against whom such constraints are to
be enforced. Hence, from a precommitment-based point of view, externally-imposed
amendments unavoidably undermine the democratic status of the constitution.
5.4.4. Future generations and constitutional change
Consider now the democratic status of constitutional precommitments across gen-
erations. It is a point as old as Jeﬀerson and Paine that fully democratic consitutions
are not possible ex hypothesi, for constitutions are designed to be enforced against
future generations that did not have a say in the making and ratiﬁcation of the
constitution. “The earth belongs to the living, not to the dead,” wrote Jeﬀerson,
from which it followed that, “by the law of nature, one generation is to another
as one independent nation to another.”72 And according to Paine, “Every age and
generation must be free to act for itself, in all cases, as the ages and generations
which preceded it.”73
Of course, a founding generation can have long-term motivations and be con-
cerned about future generations, but just as dictators can be benevolent and be con-
cerned about their peoples, thus taking their preferences into account when making
political decisions. (Actually, less than benevolent dictators have to do so as well to
some extent, in order to ensure the stability of their regime and to minimize repression
costs.) By contrast, democratic decision-making refers, as a matter of deﬁnition, to a
sort of decision-making that makes compulsory, rather than only advisable, for those
in power to take into account the preferences of their constituencies and provides
citizens with the institutional technology necessary to ensure that their preferences
are taken into account. This idea of democracy is compatible with ex ante and with
ex post accountability, with direct and with indirect participation, with divided and
with undivided government, and so on. But it does rule out decision-making that
does not include formal institutional mechanisms to ensure that citizens have a say
and that those in oﬃce have to take into account their preferences.
72 Jeﬀerson, Political Writings, p. 599; and “Letter to James Madison, September 6, 1789,” p.
116.
73 T. Paine, “The Rights of Man,” ed. B. Kuklick, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), p. 63.
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Now, future generations cannot be said to be democratically represented by pre-
vious constitutional commitments because they are excluded from those mechanisms
almost by deﬁnition. Put it in the jargon of the all-aﬀected principle, unlike the
constituent generation, subsequent generations are aﬀected without having a say.
Put it in the Aristotelian jargon, unlike the constituent generation, which members
rule and are ruled in turn, subsequent generations are ruled without ruling at all.
However, consider two possible replies.74
A. Amendability. A ﬁrst possible reply is that the people can always amend the
constitution.75 As Justice John Marshall famously put it regarding the American
constitution, “The people made the Constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is
the creature of their own will, and lives only by their will.”76 If this were the case, a
core feature of democratic government would be satisﬁed—namely, the changeability
of the laws in the light of new circumstances, beliefs and needs.77 However, even
though the possibility of amending a constitution is certainly open to subsequent
generations (with the exception of absolutely entrenched provisions), two problems
arise with this reply.
First, there is an asymmetry between adopting and amending a constitution,
both formally and informally. Formally, because, as a general rule, constitutions
only require simple majorities for their ratiﬁcation yet qualiﬁed majorities for their
amendment, as we have seen above (§ 5.4.2). Informally, because there is an asym-
metry between doing and undoing a constitution, just as there is an asymmetry
between breaking a promise and not doing it in the ﬁrst place. Consider six mech-
anisms through which constitutions tend to be much more resilient to change than
what is speciﬁed in the formal amendment procedure.
1. Material incentives. A constitution that has been in force for years and perhaps
for decades creates an incentive structure that, even if ineﬃcient or unjust, makes
it harder for citizens to be willing to modify it. For example, a constitution or
a constitutional jurisprudence that promote ownership housing at the expense of
rental housing may well produce a poorer economic output—for example, due
to its tendency to create housing bubbles or to prevent labor mobility and thus
increase unemployment. Yet, an amendment toward a diﬀerent model would face
the likely opposition not only of current and would-be owners, but also of strong
lobbies such as construction companies, mortgage banks and labor unions who
may beneﬁt from the existing model.78
2. Learning eﬀects. The incentives created by the existing constitutional order need
74 The non-existence and non-identity problems are not addressed here. The locus classicus
for such problems is D. Parﬁt, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
75 This point is raised both by Ackerman, We the People; and Holmes, “Precommitment and
the Paradox of Democracy,” p. 256.
76 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheaton (19 US) 264, 389 (1821).
77 See J. Waluchow, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
78 For a similar example, see A. Stone Sweet, “Path Dependence, Precedent, and Judicial
Power,” in A. Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. 118.
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not be only material. They can be cognitive as well. Getting used to a new
constitutional order is costly and time-consuming and leads to higher returns
from continuing use. Therefore, the costs of amending that framework will also
increase as time goes by and citizens get used to it. Consider, for example, the
administrative structure of the state. Since it is very costly to get used to it and
to know how it works, citizens will have a strong incentive not to modify it due
to the high costs of getting used to the new structure.
3. Coordination eﬀects. These take place when the individual gains of performing
an activity increase as other individuals join the same activity. It is also related
to the ﬁrst mechanism, but it ampliﬁes its relevance as more people adapt their
behavior to the existing order, thus increasing their beneﬁts and reducing the
beneﬁts of those who hesitate to conform to it. Hence, the more people conform
to the existing constitutional order, the more costly amending that order turns
out to be and, in turn, the more people tends to conform to the existing order.
As for this conformation, it can take place in the form of a genuine process of
preference adaptation or as a mere falsiﬁcation of preferences resulting from the
fear of social disapproval that expressing the view held in private would trigger.79
4. Status quo bias. Letting aside actual incentives to support the existing consti-
tutional order, a constitutional amendment can also face the status quo bias of
citizens that need not have an actual rational preference or incentive for the status
quo per se but, nevertheless, are averse to change due to loss aversion or aversion
to uncertain and unforeseen consequences of the proposed amendments. Tests of
status quo bias in both experimental and ﬁeld settings have demonstrated that
certain options tend to be preferred vis-à-vis alternative options only because the
former pertain to (or are labeled as pertaining to) the status quo.80 I am not
aware of evidence regarding constitutional change, but it is reasonable to expect
many citizens to consider that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush as for
constitutional issues as well.
5. Expressive function of law. Citizens’ preferences are endogenous to the legal
system. Law does not only reﬂect citizens’ will as channeled through the leg-
islative process (assuming that this is roughly the case in a proper democratic
system). As the literature on the “expressive function of law” has shown, law has
a preference-shaping eﬀect as well.81 By making an statement about what ought
to be done, law may inﬂuence dramatically citizens’ understanding of what ought
to be done. Thus, there is evidence available that unenforced laws are observed
79 On preference adaptation, see J. Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Ratio-
nality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); on preference falsiﬁcation, see T. Kuran
Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsiﬁcation (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1995).
80 For a survey of the evidence, see D. Kahneman, J. L. Knetsch and R. H. Thaler, “Anomalies:
The Endowment Eﬀect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5
(1991): 193-206.
81 See, among many others, C. Sunstein, “On the Expressive Function of Law,’’ University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 144 (1987): 2021–53; K. Dau-Schmidt, “An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy,’’ Duke Law Journal 1 (1990): 1–38; E. B. Rasmusen
and R. McAdams, “Norms in Law and Economics,” in Handbook of Law and Economics, vol. 2, A.
Mitchell Polinsky and S. Shavell, eds. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007).
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just by the fact of having been passed as part of the law. The preference-shaping
eﬀect of law can take place at two diﬀerent levels. First, at an epistemic level,
notably, when the law makes a prescription about a complex issue on which
citizens have very imperfect information. Consider, for example, the eﬀect that
German government’s decision to ban nuclear energy under its territory may
have on citizens’ evaluation of the risks involved in this sort of energy. And,
second, at a moral level, when the law modiﬁes not only citizens’ causal beliefs,
but also their values. Patricia Funk has analyzed the recent legal abolition of
compulsory voting in Switzerland. Even though the ﬁnes for not voting had only
been symbolic, the legal abolition of the voting duty signiﬁcantly decreased av-
erage turnout.82 Mutatis mutandis, it is reasonable to expect constitutional law
to have the same eﬀect on citizens evaluations—both epistemic and moral—of
government’s authority and fundamental rights (if not greater, due to the rele-
vance that citizens usually attribute to the constitution). Put diﬀerently, it is
reasonable to expect a preference-shaping eﬀect from constitutions as well. In
turn, this eﬀect can produce a constitutional circularity that can consolidate the
status quo, thus making it even harder for an amendment to eventually take
place.83
6. Power asymmetries. As Pierson has pointed out, power asymmetries can produce
positive feedback over time.84 Hence, increasing returns processes can turn a
situation of relatively balanced conﬂict in which one group has to impose its
preferences on another openly, into a situation in which power relations become
so unbalanced that anticipated reactions and ideological manipulation make open
political conﬂict irrelevant. Consider a majority electoral system that distributes
campaign resources according to the number of seats of each party. As a party
obtains more seats in the parliament, it will also enjoy more campaign resources
and will be able to increase the number of seats in the next election and, in turn,
obtain even more resources, thus consolidating its ideological position in the eyes
of the citizenry, becoming a natural beneﬁciary of strategic voting and being in
a better position to exploit the electoral system. In short, positive feedback over
time increases power asymmetries, enlarging the power of the parties that beneﬁt
from the current constitutional order and providing them with an incentive to
support the status quo.
Most of this phenomena fall under the umbrella of what has been termed as path
dependence, which according to Margaret Levi means that “once a country or a region
has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other
choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct
an easy reversal of the initial choice.”85 And regarding law-making, Stone Sweet
has described it as follows: “At a beginning point, a range of choices, formats, or
82 See P. Funk, “Is There An Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting
Laws with Symbolic Fines,” American Law and Economics Review 9 (2007): 135-159, p. 136.
83 See M. Abramowicz, “Constitutional Circularity,” UCLA Law Review 49 (2001-2002): 1-91.
84 P. Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American
Political Science Review 94 (2000): 251-267, p. 259.
85 M. Levi, “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical
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templates for a particular form of behavior are available; at one or several ’critical
junctures’ one of these choices gains an advantage, however slight, and this advantage
is continuously reinforced through positive feedback. Ultimately, the choice becomes
dominant, or ’locked-in’, as a relatively taken-for-granted state of aﬀairs.”86
The relevance of this phenomena for the debate on the intertemporal democratic
pedigree of constitutions should not be diminished. Put simply, here is why. For a
constitution to be fully democratic across generations it ought to present a symmetry
between the founding and subsequent generations, so the existing provisions could
be amended by the latter provided that the amendment enjoyed the support of a
majority of citizens. However, this symmetry does not exist.
Consider now the second problem with the reply. The problem with arguing
that constitutions are democratic accross generations because they can always be
amendmened is that rigidity (at least, in its formal form) is a constitutive feature of
constitutionalism proper, for the very point of constitutionalism is to limit the powers
of the legislative and administrative bodies by entrenching a set of constraints in a
rigid document, as it has been deﬁned at the outset of Part II of the dissertation
(§§ 3.2 and 3.4). A constitution that does not constrain future decisions (that is, a
completely ﬂexible constitution) falls outside the scope of constitutionalism. Hence,
there is a contradiction between supporting constitutionalism, on the one hand, and
appealing to the ﬂexibility and amendability of constitutions as a response to the
counter-majoritarian diﬃculty, on the other, for the very idea of constitutionalism
includes the rigidity of the constitution as a constitutive feature.
B. Future beneﬁts and future duties. A second, more subtle, reply is the one provided
by Stephen Holmes, who relies on an argument already put forward by Pufendorf in
the seventeenth century to justify why the heirs of the crown were bound by the duties
and commitments in which their ancestors had incurred.87 More precisely, Pufendorf
analyzed whether a recently crowned king had the duty to pay the debts in which his
predecessor had incurred, provided that sovereign debt was a crucial resource to fund
the public expenditure and that few monarchs could go without using it. Pufendorf
argued that, as a general rule, a commitment made by an individual or a generation
cannot bind subsequent individuals or generations. However, this rule had a crucial
exception, namely, “the act of a generation can only bind another one when a man
[for example, a creditor] has acquired a right from him.”88 More precisely, if someone
inherits the property of someone else (for example, the throne), he also inherits the
duties associated to that property (for example, the debts). Mutatis mutandis, if a
subsequent generation enjoys the beneﬁts of a precedent generation, it also assumes
its duties as well. Consider, for example, that the founding generation includes a
Analysis,” ed. M. I. Lichbach and A. Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and
Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 28.
86 Stone Sweet, “Path Dependence, Precedent, and Judicial Power,” p. 115.
87 Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, Book 8, ch. 10. Quoted in Holmes, “Precommitment
and the Paradox of Democracy,” p. 234.
88 Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, Book 4, ch. 2. Quoted in Holmes, “Precommitment
and the Paradox of Democracy,” p. 234.
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budget deﬁcit ceiling in the constitution so as to solve the problem of temporal ﬁscal
inconsistency between governments, that is, to prevent governments (including the
present government) from generating negative budget diﬁcits that current citizens
enjoy but future citizens will have to pay.89 Further assume that, by doing so, the
founding generation is assuming certain burdens from which the subsequent genera-
tions will beneﬁt. Would it be reasonable for these subsequent generations to beneﬁt
from such burdens without assuming their costs as well (for example, by saying that
the decisions of the founding generation do not bind them, for they did not have a
say in such decisions)?
Hence, Holmes appears to solve the intergenerational problem of constitutional
constraints by presenting such constraints as inherited duties correlative to inher-
ited beneﬁts. In short, if subsequent generations beneﬁt from the constitutional
constraints adopted by the founding generation, then it makes complete sense to
claim that they are also bound by them. Now, even if Holmes might be right as a
matter of justice and constitutional constraints between generations might be just,
the argument misses the point of whether they are democratic from a precommitment
point of view, which is the issue in which we are interested in this section (rather
than in whether they are just or not). From a precommitment point of view, a con-
stitution counts as a democratic precommitment only if it is adopted (not implicitly,
but through an actual institutional device such as voting) by the very same people
against whom the constitution is to be enacted afterward. And the fact is that the
asymmetry between generations persists, for the founding generation takes part in
the adoption of the constitution, while the subsequent generations do not, regardless
of whether they are beneﬁted from its existence or not. More precisely, the founding
generation takes part in the adoption of the constitution through a simple majority
procedure, while the subsequent generations can take part in its amendment through
a more cumbersome rule, such as a qualiﬁed majority rule. Even more precisely, the
founding generation takes part in a decision that breaks with the previous legal or-
der (say, a dictatorship) by using a simple majority procedure, while the subsequent
generation can amend the existing legal order only through a more cumbersome rule,
such as a qualiﬁed majority rule.
In short, the persistent problem is why a rigid constitution adopted by the founding
generation should count as democratic when enforced against future generations
(sometimes very distant in time indeed) when the latter did not have a say in its
adoption nor can they amend it as easily as the founding generation adopted it.
The problem is similar to the one described in subsection 5.4.3—namely, a minority
imposing their will over a majority, only that across generations. Here the minority
is the founding generation and the majority all future generations against whom the
will of the former is constitutionally enacted. Robert Dahl has summarized both
89 Recall David Stockman’s declaration, who refused to address Social Scurity severe long-term
problems in 1981, when he was budget director of the Reagan administration, because he had little
interest in wasting “a lot of political capital on some other guy’s problem in [the year] 2010.” Quoted
in Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” p. 261.
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the synchronic and the diachronic problems regarding the American Constitution as
follows:
Why should we feel bound today by a document produced more than two
centuries ago by a group of ﬁfty-ﬁve mortal men, actually signed by only
thirty-nine, a fair number of whom were slaveholders, and adopted in only
thirteen states by the votes of fewer than two thousand men, all of whom are
long since dead and mainly forgotten?90
5.4.5. Private citizenship and participation
An alleged virtue of a constitutional democracy is that its two-track lawmaking
system provides both for citizens’ mobilized deliberation during constitutional mo-
ments and for a lower civic engagement during ordinary legislative politics, when cit-
izens devote most of their time to their families, friends, jobs and hobbies while their
fundamental rights are constitutionally protected against opportunistic behavior by
temporary majorities and powerful lobbies. In a nutshell, constitutional democracy
conforms well to private citizenship.
However, to see constitutional democracy as the upshot of, and the solution for,
private citizenship, rather than the other way around, implies too static a concep-
tion of citizenship. Not in the sense of taking political passivity and apathy as an
exogenous disposition under any circumstances, for private citizens can stand up and
speak out against the constitutional order during constitutional moments—just as
they can turn to less engaged tasks during more ordinary times. But rather in the
sense of taking citizens’ political passivity and apathy during normal politics as the
norm and as something to which the institutional framework has to adapt, rather
than as something to great extent endogenous to the constitutional system.
Assuming that it is possible to overcome the problems raised in this section
and that constitutionalism rather than feasible alternatives (such as Westminster
parliamentarianism or the new commonwealth system) better protect citizens’ fun-
damental rights, constitutional entrenchment and judicial review have the side-eﬀect
of making political change on fundamental issues very hard. As we have discussed
in subsection 5.4.3 (epigraph B), a majority of citizens, even a qualiﬁed one, might
want to amend the constitution yet not be able to do so due to the stringency
of the constitutional amendment procedure. Of course, the capacity of citizens to
raise their demands and modify the constitution varies from constitutional system
to constitutional system. But, apart from the rigidity of the constitution raises the
likelihood of phenomena of preference adaptation and status quo bias taking place.
On the one hand, citizens might adapt their preferences to the existing constitutional
order when they perceive that the possibility of advancing their current preferences
through constitutional change is low and/or very costly. On the other hand, citizens
can suﬀer from a status quo bias once the existing constitutional system has been
consolidated due to the diﬃculty of changing it.
90 R. Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution? (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2003), p. 2.
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Accordingly, citizens can end up taking the constitutional system for granted
and naturalizing it, rather than taking it as something that has been created and
can be amended at will. In turn, this can spread the perception among them that
their demands, even when widely discussed and supported, cannot be adequately
channeled by the political system, thus providing them with the incentive to abandon
useless political activism and turn to their private lives, where they perceive their
actions as having a deeper and more visible eﬀect. In short, the apathy and passivity
typical of ordinary politics is better understood as the upshot of the constitutional
system and the stringency of its amendment procedures, rather than the other way
around. In turn, two undesirable eﬀects follow from this apathy and passivity.
First, continued apathy and passivity due to the unchangeability of the consti-
tutional system can spread frustration among citizens, who can perceive that the
most salient issues aﬀecting them are always out of their control and are decided
by an elite of judges that are often as ideologically divided and politicized as they
are. In turn, frustration can jeopardize the legitimacy of the political system in the
long run. Legitimacy is a limited capital and a system can obviously run out of it,
with dangerous consequences for its stability.Ackerman seems to be aware of this
problem for he urges, in the last chapter of We the People, that a constitutional
moment, including a new Bill of Rights, is needed in American politics in order to
make citizens perceive that the Constitution is amendable and thus the upshot of
a democratic precommitment. Otherwise, he warns, “the constitutional narrative I
have told will lose credibility for the next generation.”91
Second, even if we accept that private citizenship is not a ﬁxed feature of normal
politics but partially a function of normal politics under stringent constitutional
constraints, private citizenship can still be taken as something to be promoted and
constitutional democracy as the best institutional technology to do so. This is Acker-
man’s point, for he claims that a constitutional democracy is preferable to monistic
democracy because it leaves room and better protects private citizenship, which
under modern circumstances is preferable to public citizenship. However, for democ-
racy to work properly, larger participation than the typical of the private citizen is
required during ordinary legislative politics. Unless adequately monitorized by an
informed and active citizenry, politicians in oﬃce will lack an adequate incentive to
take into account ordinary citizens’ interests and the political process will be likely
controlled by special interests. As Rawls thoughtfully explained,
Unless there is widespread participation in democratic politics by a vigor-
ous and informed citizen body ... even the best-designed political institutions
will eventually fall into the hands of those who hunger for power and military
glory or pursue narrow class and economic interests ... If we are to remain
free and equal, we cannot aﬀord a general retreat into private life.92
91 Ackerman, We the People, p. 296.
92 J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2001), p. 141.
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Ackerman is fully aware of this possibility for he devotes a large amount of time
to refute the idea that a good-working democracy can go without civic virtue at
all. According to him, “while a modern democracy must learn to economize on
public-regarding virtue, there can be no hope of doing without it entirely—even in
normal politics.”93 Now, even if he does not specify the degree of public involvement
needed for the democratic system to work properly (something that, nevertheless,
could hardly be done in general terms, being so context-dependent an issue), he
appears to believe that a low degree of such an involvement would suﬃce under
proper institutional conditions. To be sure, the causal relationship between partici-
pation and accountability and responsiveness is an empirical and highly controversial
matter. But it is not unreasonable to believe, ﬁrst, that a well informed and active
citizenship is necessary for the political system to work adequately during normal
times and, second, that the stringency of the amendment procedure and the large
judicial power of constitutionalism promotes citizens’ apathy and passivity.
Ackerman could reply that the informed and active citizenry required for a healthy
democratic system could give way to what he labels as “coercive democracy”—that is,
the imposition of “public citizenship” as compulsory for citizens that might not value
political participation at all. However, this need not be the case for two reasons.
First, because private citizenship could give way to a more engaged citizenship in
case the constitutional constrains were relaxed, being such constraints one of the
causes of citizens’ apathy and frustration. And, second, because alternatives to
the civic humanistic model of public citizenship are available. Hence, according to
classical republicanism, participation is not even remotely valued per se, but rather
as a condition to prevent the corruption of the political elite. As Skinner recalls
regarding classic republicanism, “the writers I am considering never suggest that
there are certain speciﬁc goals we need to realise in order to count as being fully
or truly in possession of our liberty.” “[They] merely argue that participation (at
least by way of representation) constitutes a necessary precondition of maintaining
individual liberty.”94
Of course, the causal relationship between participation and the quality of the
political performance is a mainly empirical and highly controversial issue. However,
assume for the sake of the argument that informed and active participation—or
at least a more informed and more active participation than the one assumed by
Ackerman—was required for normal politics to function adequately. In that case,
what would be the point in keeping the dualist distinction between normal and
constitutional politics? As we have seen, Ackerman’s dualism is dependent on the
existence of private citizens that only stand up and engage in politics during unsual
constitutional moments, when they entrench their considered demands against the
horse-trading of ordinary politics, when they can go back to their private aﬀairs and
let their elected representatives do their job. But once we have accepted that private
citizenship is not enough for the political process to remain accountable and that
93 Ackerman, We the People, p. 239.
94 Q. Skinner, “The Paradoxes of Political Liberty,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values,
VII (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 1986), 233; and Liberty Before Liberalism, 74-75.
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an alternative model to the Arendtian public citizenship is available, the rationale
for constitutional entrenchment against ordinary politics decision-making seems less
robust.
Chapter 6
Proceduralist theories
6.1. Introduction
Theories of procedural constitutional constraints are addressed in this chapter.1
According to these theories, democratic institutions cannot be said to be really demo-
cratic unless a set of constitutive conditions (e.g., “general elections, freedom of the
press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of speech,” as Rosa Luxemburg put it criti-
cizing the suspension of civil liberties by the Russian Bolsheviks) and preconditions
(e.g., “decent wages and universal reading,” as John S. Mill put it) are met.2 Further,
it is also argued that, unless entrenched in a rigid constitution and enacted by a con-
stitutional court, such conditions and preconditions can be jeopardized by temporary
parliamentary majorities, which can decide, for example, to disenfranchise a group
of citizens, to ban a political party, or yet to suspend certain democratic rights alto-
gether. In a nutshell, unless constitutionally constrained, ephemeral parliamentary
majorities can downsize or even destroy democracy by democratic means.
It is noteworthy that, unlike instrumentalist accounts of democratic legitimacy,
procedural theories do not justify constitutional constraints independently from the
democratic process, for democratic institutions can bring about blatantly unjust
outcomes without such outcomes turning into democratic for that reason. Neither
do they justify them as the upshot of democratic commitments made by the cit-
izenry—as it is the case with precommitment-based accounts—, for citizens can
commit themselves to blatantly undemocratic rules without such rules turning into
democratic for that reason. On the contrary, procedural theories justify consti-
tutional procedural constraints as the constitutive conditions and preconditions of
the the democratic process proper, as the constitutional safeguards of its adequate
functioning.
The chapter is divided into four sections. First, the much cited instance of a demo-
cratic system destroyed by democratic means—namely, the fall of the Weimar Repub-
lic in the hands of the Nazis—is brieﬂy analyzed (§ 6.2). Second, preconditions-based
1 The locus classicus is J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust. A Theory of Judicial Review
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980). See also Holmes, “Precommitment and the
Paradox of Democracy;” C. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conﬂict (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1996); and Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1989).
2 Luxemburg is quoted in C. E. Schorske, German Social Democracy, 1905-1917: The Devel-
opment of the Great Schism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 324. Mill is
quoted in Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), p. xiii.
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theories of constitutionalism are brieﬂy analyzed, notably, the rather standard ac-
count of Holmes and Sunstein and the more peculiar one of Habermas (§ 6.3). Third,
Ely’s (and Holmes’, though more brieﬂy) “participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing”
approach to judicial review is analyzed as the most inﬂuential instance of a purely
procedural account of constitutionalism (§ 6.4). Finally, a number of criticisms are
raised (§ 6.5).
6.2. Excursus: was Hitler democratically elected?
The case for the constitutional entrenchment of democratic procedures and pre-
conditions is often made in purely theoretical or counterfactual terms. It may well
be the case for a parliamentary majority to decide to disenfranchise a minority or to
suspend some democratic rights altogether, as it is frequently argued. When made
in reference to actual political systems, however, the Weimar Republic and the way
the Nazis destroyed the democratic system from within is the ever-present reference.
Indeed, it is virtually impossible to raise this issue in the classroom without having a
student pointing out that Hitler was elected democratically and that, unless strong
limits on democratic procedures are constitutionally entrenched, a new Hitler could
get to oﬃce in the future and destroy the democratic system by democratic means
again. (Certainly, a version of Godwin’s law for the classroom would not be com-
pletely useless.) Joseph Goebbles himself seemed to have agreed with this observation
when he argued that “[i]t will always be one of the best jokes of democracy that it
gives its deadly enemies the means to destroy it.”3
In the aftermath of the World War II it became usual to believe that Goebbles had
been basically correct. As it was widely assumed by scholars, citizens and politicians
alike, the institutional system of the Weimar Republic had failed to provide enough
constitutional guarantees for the protection of the democratic institutions against the
Nazis. But post-war Germans knew better and the Basic Law of 1948 was in part
the upshot of this shared perception. To be sure, the perceived democratic fragility
of the Weimar constitution was by no means the only reason behind the absolute
entrenchment of some of the provisions of the German Basic Law, which not only
included entrenched procedural rights but also procedure-independent ones.4 But
the story of the democratic fragility of the Weimar Constitution would be much
cited in circumstances of actual or perceived hazard for the Federal Republic—such
as the banning of the Socialist Reich Party by the German Constitutional Court in
1952—, providing a powerful rationale for the constitutionalization of the procedural
conditions and preconditions of democracy.
Now, the received wisdom notwithstanding, the rise to power of the Nazis is
very far from being a clear-cut example of the destruction of a democratic system by
perfectly democratic means.5 To be sure, Hitler had a plurality of votes when he was
3 Quoted in A. S. Kirshner, “Proceduralism and Popular Threats to Democracy,” Journal of
Political Philosophy 18, no. 4 (2010): 405-424, p. 405.
4 See Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, pp. 153-192.
5 See R. J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: Penguin, 2005); H. A. Turner,
Hitler’s Thirty Days To Power: January 1933 (Basic Books, 1997).
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appointed chancellor by president Hindenburg on January 30, 1933 (the NSDAP had
gained 196 seats in the November election, vis-à-vis the 121 seats of the SPD and the
100 seats of the KPD). Further, the “Reichstag Fire Decree” that suspended many of
the fundamental rights after the Reichstag building was set on ﬁre on February 27,
1933 was issued by Hindenburg following the emergency powers included in the art.
48 of the Constitution. Even further, after the election of March 1933, the NSDAP
gained a 43,9 percent of the votes and, along with their Nationalist allies (the DNVP),
not a plurality but a majority of 51,8 percent. Yet even further, the Enabling Act
that provided Hitler with the power to enact laws without the participation of the
Reichstag was passed by the Reichstag on March 23 1933 and signed by Hindenburg.
However, the Nazis also took a large number of blatantly undemocratic measures
in their road to absolute power. Consider just three of the most outstanding ones.
First, most of the members of the KPD were unable to take part in the March
election, either because they had been arrested after the Reichstag was burnt down
(not less than four thousand members of the KPD were arrested during that night
of February) or because they had been “invited” not to run for oﬃce by the SA
under dead threat. Second, Hitler’s government had expropriated the KPD of their
properties before the election and their election propaganda, as well as that of the
SPD, had been banned. Third, The Enabling Act was passed by the Reichstag under
two illegal circumstances. On the one hand, the minimum quorum requirement
established by the constitution was modiﬁed without observing the constitutional
amendment procedure so as to prevent the SPD deputies from blocking the law.
On the other hand, members of the SA illegally entered the parliament during the
voting, and threatened indecisive deputies.
In short, it is at the very least controversial to use the Weimar Republic as
an instance of the alleged threat of a parliamentary majority destroying the demo-
cratic system by democratic means. However, it is always possible to point at addi-
tional—though admittedly controversial—instances of this threat, such as the large
number of left-wing parties, religious parties or Kurdish separatist parties that have
been systematically banned in Turkey, the American Communist Party, which was
outlawed by the Congress in the Communist Control Act of 1954 or the Basque
separatist party Batasuna, which was banned in 2003 by the Spanish Supreme Court
under the Law of Political Parties, which was amended by the parliament the year
before so as to outlaw political organizations, including parties, associated with ter-
rorism.6 Further, the possibility of undemocratic decisions being made by democratic
6 Article 9 of the Organic Law of Political Parties states that “a party will be declared ille-
gal when its grave and continuous” activity “makes democratic principles vulnerable.” Prohibited
activities include
“promoting, justifying or excusing assaults against the life or the integrity of persons ...
inciting, bringing about or legitimizing violence as a means for the achievement of political
objectives ... politically complementing and helping the action of terrorist organizations for
the achievement of their ends of subverting constitutional order or gravely altering public
peace ... giving express or tacit political support, legitimizing terrorist actions or excusing
and minimizing their signiﬁcance.”
It has to be pointed out that the three cases are very diﬀerent. As for the ﬁrst one, most of the
Turkish parties were banned by the Constitutional Court rather than by the National Assembly.
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means remains always open as a counterfactual. Either way, there are good grounds
to claim that, unless constitutionally entrenched, democratic conditions and precon-
ditions can be unattended or even openly violated by parliamentary majorities unless
they are constitutionally protected.
6.3. Preconditions-related constraints
A frequent criticism of pure procedural democracies—of which Westminster-style
democracies are the most outstanding example—is that they do not protect ade-
quately the preconditions that are to be met for the democratic process to work
properly. By refusing to constitutionalize them, these democracies run the risk of
letting such preconditions unattended at best and perhaps violated at worst. If a
democratic system is to work adequately—or so the argument goes—, such precon-
ditions have to be protected adequately and taken away from the logrolling and
horse-trading typical of ordinary politics, being their constitutionalization the best
way to do so. Before turning to pure proceduralist accounts, thus, it is worth consid-
ering brieﬂy two types of preconditions-based accounts of constitutional constraints.
First, a more or less standard account, as exempliﬁed by Holmes and Sunstein, and,
second, Habermas’ more peculiar account.
Before turning to these accounts, consider two outstanding types of democratic
preconditions. Firstly, there are those rights that, even if not strictly political, turn
out to be necessary for the proper functioning of the democratic system. Consider,
for example, civil rights such as free speech and religious freedom or economic rights
such as universal instruction and freedom from starvation. Is democracy possible
in countries in which citizens are prosecuted because of their religious beliefs, in
which illiteracy is the norm, or in which citizens starve not to die out of hunger?
In countries in which these conditions apply, it is diﬃcult not to see democracy
and its policies as mere window dressing. As Nino points out, “democracy requires
fulﬁllment of certain prerrequisites without which there is no reason to defer to the
results of democracy.”7
Secondly, there are structural (social and economic) conditions that, even if di-
rectly unrelated to the democratic process, can inﬂuence and distort the political
process. Consider, for example, economic and social inequalities that may be large
enough to distort the democratic decision-making through campaign ﬁnance, pork
barreling, or threats posed by powerful investors (e.g. countries such as China or
private hedge funds such as Paulson & Co or Morgan Chase) of massively selling
sovereign debt so as to obtain political beneﬁts. As Larry Bartels has concluded
from his recent study of the relationship between economic and political inequalities,
As for the second one, the act was largely ineﬀectual. In 1961 case case, Communist Party v.
Catherwood, the US Supreme Court ruled that the act did not prevent the party from taking part
in New York’s unemployment insurance system, and no administration has attempted to enforce it
ever since. As for the third one, the law was passed by the parliament, which asked the Supreme
Court (Spain’s highest court of appeal) to ban Batasuna under the amended law. Eventually, the
Supreme Court unanimously approved the request, which was ratiﬁed by the Constitutional Court
afterwards.
7 Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy, p. 138.
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“economic inequality clearly has pervasive, corrosive eﬀects on political represen-
tation and policy making ... In light of these eﬀects, the liberal hope for distinct
‘spheres of justice’ with ‘their boundaries intact’ seems naively fastidious and quite
probably ineﬀectual.”8
Unlike in Habermas’ account, as we shall see immediately below, these precon-
ditions are generally acknowledged to be substantive and conceptually independent
from—though related to—the democratic process. Among these are Stephen Holmes
and Cass Sunstein.9 Even though they support, as a general rule, constitutional
ﬂexibility and the collapse of the distinction between constitutional and ordinary
legislation, they also consider that the rights that serve as democratic preconditions
should not only be constitutionalized but actually entrenched against the possibil-
ity of being amended. As they put it, “a speciﬁed list of individual rights should be
made immune to revision. This list should include, ﬁrst and foremost, rights that are
indispensable to democratic legitimacy.”10 Among them it is what Brettscheneider
labels as “rights as procedural preconditions” to democracy, which may include the
constitutional rights to free speech or the right to freely travel.11
This position does not go without problems, as we shall see below in section
6.5. Among other things, because insofar as rights are deﬁned as substantive, the
problems with rights-instrumentalism analyzed in section 4.3 turn out to pervade
preconditions-based approaches as well. Habermas’ account diﬀers from more stan-
dard accounts that acknowledge that democratic preconditions are substantive pre-
cisely in that his account is deﬁned as purely procedural. This is so because no
pre-political or substantive rights can be worked out under what he calls the “con-
ditions of post-metaphysical thinking.”12 Under such conditions, basic rights can
neither be grounded on religious arguments, nor in metaphysical or traditional ones.
They can only be the upshot of the political process, which is the only source of
legitimacy and, in turn, serves as a means for the protection of such rights.13
In short, according to Habermas, far from an oxymoron, constitutional democ-
racy is the natural expression of public autonomy—as instantiated in democratic
decision-making—and private autonomy—as instantiated in constitutionalized basic
rights. Even though he is reluctant to absolute entrenchment,14 he does not consider
8 L. Bartels, Unequal Democracy. The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 285.
9 See S. Holmes and C. Sunstein, “The Politics of Revision,” in Responding to Imperfection,
Sanford Levinson, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
10 Holmes and Sunstein, “The Politics of Revision,” p. 279.
11 C. Brettschneider, Democratic Rights. The Substance of Self-government (Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 13.
12 See J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechtes und des
demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992).
13 Habermas’ set of basic rights is ﬁve-fold: ﬁrst, classic liberty rights; second, communitarian
rights; third, procedural rights; fourth, political rights; and ﬁfth, basic social rights and rights to
protection against technological risks as well as basic ecological rights.
14 In his words, “The character of constitutional foundings, which often seal the success of
political revolutions, deceptively suggests that norms out of time and resistant to historical change
are simply ‘stated.’ The technical priority of the constitution to ordinary laws belongs to the
systematic elucidation of the rule of law, but it only means that the content of constitutional norms
is relatively ﬁxed. As we shall see, every constitution is a living project that can endure only as an
ongoing interpretation continually carried forward at all levels of the production of law.” Habermas,
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constitutionalism, including judicial review, to be at odds with democracy. “A con-
stitutional court guided by a proceduralist understanding of the constitution does
not have to overdraw on its legitimation credit.”15 In turn, basic rights are also nec-
essary preconditions for the proper functioning of the political process, which would
otherwise be distorted. Hence, the need for both democracy and constitutional rights
rests on the interdependence of both elements. As Habermas puts it,
The demand to orient oneself to the common good, which is connected with
political autonomy, is also a rational expectation insofar as only the demo-
cratic process guarantees that private individuals will achieve and equal en-
joyment of their equal individual liberties. Conversely, only when the private
autonomy of individuals is secure are citizens in a position to make correct
use of their political autonomy. The interdependence of constitutionalism and
democracy comes to light in the complementary relationship between private
and civic autonomy: each side is fed by resources it has from the other.16
Now, it is at least doubtful whether Habermas’ account can live up to its purely
procedural promise without becoming substantive. At least, for three reasons. First,
Habermas presents his account as purely procedural because the political goals that
are to be achieved remain open for the citizenry to decide. However, since the
outcomes have to be rational to be legitimate—i.e., they have to be consistent, at
least, with the basic rights required for the procedure to be legitimate—, eventually
such goals are far from being really up for grabs. Second, Habermas’ set of rights is
so expansive that it includes some rights that could be rarely said to be democratic
preconditions. For example, it is diﬃcult to see how reproductive rights or ecological
rights (included in the ﬁrst and ﬁfth categories of his set of rights, respectively)
could be related to the proper functioning of the political process. Third, Habermas’
co-originality thesis implies that a decision suppressing some basic right ought to be
considered necessarily undemocratic, even if the decision has been made by undis-
putable democratic means and regardless of whether that right is actually necessary
for the proper functioning of the democratic process.17 However, this can lead to
highly counterintuitive conclusions. For example, it would be very counter-intuitive
to say that Swiss citizens’ decision to ban minarets in 2009—assuming that the deci-
sion did diminish the freedom of conscience of Swiss Muslims—made the referendum
that lead to that decision less democratic.
6.4. Pure procedural constraints
Consider now pure procedural theories of constititutional constraints. According
to these theories, while substantive issues should be left to legislatures, constitutional
Faktizität und Geltung. Quoted from J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1996), p. 129.
15 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 279.
16 J. Habermas, “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Princi-
ples?,” Political Theory 29 (2001): 766-781, p. 781.
17 See Bayón, “Democracia y derechos.”
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constitutional rigidity and judicial review are justiﬁed when they are exclusively
aimed at entrenching the constitutive conditions of democracy and protecting them
from potential threats in the form of, say, gerrymandering, the disenfranchisement of
insulate minorities or the prohibition of political parties.18 Of course, pure procedu-
ralist theories need not be at odds with precommitment-based accounts.19 However,
in this section they will be analyzed separately.
From a purely procedural point of view, even though removing substantive issues
(such as abortion, national defense or ﬁscal policy) from the legislatures and placing
them in the hands of constitutional courts is taken to be undemocratic, that need
not be the case when the entrenched issues are the procedural conditions necessary
for the very functioning and adequate working of the democratic institutions. As
Robert Dahl puts it, “a court whose authority to declare laws unconstitutional was
restricted to rights and interests integral to the democratic process would be fully
compatible with the democratic process.”20 Among the most commonly held proce-
dural conditions, the following ones stand out:21
— Equal participation of all citizens, including the right to vote, organize, assemble,
protest and lobby for their interests so as to inﬂuence the decision-making process.
— Regular, free and fair electoral competition between parties and open to all citi-
zens.
— Vertical accountability, which includes information and justiﬁcation of the polit-
ical actions of politicians and branches of government and the resulting punish-
ment or compensation by citizens.
— Horizontal accountability, which requires oﬃce-holders to be answerable to other
institutional actors, such as the parliamentary opposition, the parliamentary in-
vestigative committees, the bureaucracies or the ombudsman.22
18 Ackerman refers to this variant as “sophisticated monism,” trying thus to make it clear that,
despite its commitment to a set of procedural and sometimes substantive checks, its supporters see
constitutional checks as anti-democratic and justify them only when strictly necessary to ensure the
procedures to function properly, always subordinating them to the democratic process.” Ackerman,
We the People, p. 8. The view is also consistent with what Estlund labels as “intrinsic democratic
proceduralism,” according to which the value of political arrangements depends only on (a) their
being democratic and (b) their not unduly undermining or threatening the possibility of demo-
cratic procedure in the future. See D. Estlund, Democratic Authority. A Philosophical Framework
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 84.
19 This is actually the case of Ely, who argues that fundamental rights are a necessary condition
for the exercise of self-government.
20 Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, pp. 191 and 359, n. 9.
21 See L. Diamond and L. Morlino, “Introduction,” in Assessing the Quality of Democracy,
ed. L. Diamond and L. Morlino (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2005). See also
the indicators included in Freedom of the World Reports by Freedom House, the yearly Economist
Democracy Index or the United Nations Development Program Human Development Report 2002,
Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2002); and Polity IV reports, such as M, G. Marshall and B. R. Cole, Global Report 2009: Conﬂict,
Governance, and State Fragility (Vienna: Center for Systemic Peace, 2009).
22 The term comes from G. O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy?,” Journal of Democracy 5
(1994): 55-69.
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6.4.1. Holmes’ constitutional grammar
Before turning to Ely’s more elaborated account, consider brieﬂy Holmes’ ac-
count of constitutions as constitutive—rather than regulative—rules. As Holmes
famously argued, the above-mentioned procedural conditions need not be constrain-
ing of democratic decision-making because they contain constitutive rules, rather
than regulative ones.23 Put brieﬂy, while regulative rules regulate already existing
activities (e.g. “smoking is forbiden”), constitutive rules make an activity possible for
the ﬁrst time (e.g. “the bishop moves diagonally”). Hence, procedural rules are consti-
tutive because, rather than regulating already existing democratic decisions-making
procedures, they create and enable them, for they establish how, when, and by whom
are democratic decisions to be made. In short, while substantive constitutional rules
are regulative and may constrain the exercise of democratic power, procedural con-
stitutional rules are constitutive and do not constrain the exercise of such power—on
the contrary, they create and organize it. As Holmes puts it, “constitutional rules
are enabling, not disabling; and it is thus unsatisfactory to identify constitutionalism
exclusively with limitations of power.”24
As we shall see below in section 6.5 in more detail, Holmes’ account of proce-
dural constraints as constitutive rules does not solve the counter-majoritarian diﬃ-
culty. Put brieﬂy, even though he is obviously right in pointing out that democratic
decision-making is not possible without democratic rules that enable it, it does not
provide a reason for why the deﬁnition, interpretation, enactment and amendment of
such rules should be taken away from the hands of ordinary legislatures by entrench-
ing them in a rigid constitution and being interpreted and enacted by constitutional
judges. However, before turning to this and other problems, let us turn consider
John H. Ely’s inﬂuential account of judicial review of the procedural condition of
democracy.
6.4.2. Ely’s procedural constitutionalism
In Ely’s inﬂuential account of constitutional adjudication, judicial review is to
be limited to the establishment and maintenance of the procedural conditions re-
quired to ensure that the legislative process is fair and that all citizens can take
part in it on an equal footing. Hence, rather than aimed at ensuring that the demo-
cratic process brings about certain substantive outcomes—notably, the protection
of fundamental rights—, as in the accounts analyzed so far, courts are to adopt a
“participation-oriented, representation enforcing approach to judicial review,”25 thus
correcting potential distortions of the democratic process and ensuring that it re-
mains open to everyone, especially to those who might have a more disadvantaged
position in it. In this account, constitutionalism—and, more notably, judicial re-
view—need not be at odds with democracy as far as only procedural constraints are
included in the constitution and enforced by courts. In short,
23 See Holmes, “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy.” The distinction comes from
J. Searle, “How to Derive ’Ought’ from ’Is’,? Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 195-240.
24 Holmes, “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy,” p. 227.
25 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 87.
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contrary to the standard characterization of the Constitution as ’an en-
during but evolving statement of general values,’ ... in fact the selection and
accommodation of substantive values is left almost entirely to the political pro-
cess and instead the document is overwhelmingly concerned, on the one hand,
with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes (process writ
small), and on the other, with what might capaciously be designated process
writ large-with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions
of government.26
Let us see Ely’s distinction between “fundamental values” and “the process of rep-
resentation,” the reasons advanced for this process-enforcing approach to judicial
review and, in the next section, the problems arising from such an account.
Ely rejects what he labels as the “fundamental values” thesis—namely, the idea
that constitutionalism and judicial review are to be aimed at ensuring the protec-
tion of substantive rights. This rejection is both descriptive and normative. It
is descriptive for he believes that the American constitution is mainly procedural
and that no substantive constraints can be enforced on its grounds. But the argu-
ment is normative as well, aﬀecting both the rights-based instrumentalism and the
precommitment-based account of substantive constitutional constraints. The criti-
cisms, though very similar in both cases, operate in three diﬀerent levels—meta-ethical,
empirical and epistemological. Regarding rights-based instrumentalism, he believes
that it is ﬂawed because of its dependence on supposedly objective substantive rights.
“We shall sense in many cases that although the judge or commentator in question
may be talking in terms of some “objective,” nonpersonal method of identiﬁcation,
what he is really likely to be “discovering,” whether or not he is fully aware of it, are
his own values.”27 Regarding the precommitment-based justiﬁcation, he rules it out
because of its dependence on a supposed consensus among the citizenry. According to
Ely, this consensus does not exist in practice though: “in fact there is no consensus
to be discovered (and to the extent that one may seem to exist, that is likely to
reﬂect only the domination of some groups by others).”28 And, even if did exist,
it would be unlikely to discover it, at least, for judges when getting down to cases.
Ely mentions the opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall in Furman v. Georgia,
arguing that the death penalty was unconstitutional because it was at odds with
contemporary community values.29 According to Ely, it is unlikely for a consensus
on those “community values” to exist but, even if it existed, “between courts and
legislatures, it is clear that the latter are better situated to reﬂect consensus [even
if] legislatures are imperfectly democratic.”30
Note that Ely is here limiting himself to those decisions aimed at striking down
legislation, letting aside the common law context, where the court ﬁlls the gaps left
by the legislature and applies its legislation to speciﬁc cases. Ely’s target is thus
26 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 87.
27 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 44.
28 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 63.
29 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 65.
30 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 67.
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limited to the constitutional context, where the legislature has passed a law and
the court is in a position to overturn it on the basis that the legislature does not
reﬂect the consensus of the citizenry as reﬂected in the constitution. “A body that
is not elected or otherwise politically responsible in any signiﬁcant way is telling the
people’s elected representatives that they cannot govern as they’d like.”31 According
to Ely, judicial review turns out to be disturbing because the American constitutional
system was originally designed to be mainly democratic, and because the subsequent
two centuries have “strengthened the original commitment to control by a majority
of the governed.”32 To be sure, from a historical point of view, this is a rather
controversial claim. Not so much because the Constitution may embrace substantive
provisions on top of procedural ones, but rather because, as we have seen in chapter
1, the Founders did not intend the American constitution to be democratic at all.
However, it is not totally incorrect if democracy is used in its current meaning as Ely
appears to do. Also, for what it is worth here, the historical accurateness of the claim
is irrelevant if what is to be analyzed is the democratic pedigree of judicial review
from a point of view that assumes, as Ely does, that “whatever the explanation, and
granting the qualiﬁcations, rule in accord with the consent of a majority of those
governed is the core of the American governmental system.”33
Assume that Ely’s case against the judicial review of parliamentary actions in-
volving substantive rights is sound. Since judicial review is often attached to the
protection of substantive rights against potential violation by the legislatures, does
Ely’s position rule judicial review out altogether? Not that fast. According to Ely,
judicial review “may be desirable or it may not, depending on the principles on the
basis on which it is done.”34 And, while it is not so when the protection of substan-
tive principles is at stake, it turns out to be desirable concerning the very procedural
conditions of democratic decision-making. Hence, according to Ely, judicial review
is justiﬁed when it is limited to prevent those in power from using their position to
block the channels of political change to those who remain outside (e.g., by limit-
ing free speech or political association of opposing citizens) and from marginalizing
discrete and insular minorities from taking part in the political process. Ely has in
mind Justice Stone’s suggestion in the famous United States v. Carolene Products
footnote four: “[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”35
Ely provides a three-fold case for the participation-enforcing conception of consti-
31 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, pp. 4-5.
32 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 7.
33 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 7.
34 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 5.
35 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n. 4 (1938). Of course, as
Tushnet and Waldron have pointed out, not every minority deserves this special treatment, for the
few supporters of going back to the gold standard may lose systematically in every election without
for that reason becoming a discrete and insular minority or turning to be marginalized. As Tushnet
points out, “ “Every law overrides the views of the minority that loses ... We have to distinguish
between mere losers and minorities that lose because they cannot protect themselves in politics.”
Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts, p. 359.
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tutionalism. Only the third one is worth considering for present purposes. However,
let us mention the former two. The ﬁrst one is that, as a matter of fact, the American
constitution is procedural in two senses: “on the one hand, with procedural fairness
in the resolution of individual disputes ... and on the other, with . . . ensuring
broad participation in the processes and distributions of government.”36 As for the
attempts to entrench substantive values in the text, “have been ill-fated, normally
resulting in repeal, either oﬃcially or by interpretative pretense.”37 Ely concludes
from this fact that preserving fundamental values is not an appropriate constitutional
task. However that is too hasty a conclusion, for constitutional systems other than
the American one—notably, the German Basic Law—give more weight to substan-
tive values, often entrenching them against the very possibility of being amended.
The second case is that the procedural approach, unlike the substantive one, is not
inconsistent with representative democracy, American or otherwise. But that reason
turns out to be circular, for the inconsistency between democracy and substantive
constitutional constraints is precisely what is to be proved.
The third case for why procedural fairness should be guaranteed through judicial
review rather than through the ordinary legislative process is not that judges have
more expertise in procedural matters for, according to Ely, others—notably full-time
participants and legislators (being many of them lawyers themselves—can also claim
expertise on how the political process allocates voice and power. The diﬀerence relies
on the institutional position of courts vis-à-vis legislatures and on the sort of incen-
tives that the former and the latter have to reinforce or diminish the fairness of the
political process.38 According to Ely, constitutional adjudication of the procedural
type is to be viewed as analogous to an “antritust” rather than an interventionist
orientation to economic aﬀairs. That is, rather than dictate substantive outcomes,
constitutional adjudicatio should be limited to prevent that the “political market”
malfunctions. In turn, malfunctioning happens when those in power use their pow-
erful position, ﬁrst, to block the channels of political change to those who remain
outside (e.g., by limiting free speech or political association of opposing citizens) or,
second, to prevent a minority from being taken into account in the decision making.
Bearing this in mind, the problem with elected representatives is that they are
judges in their own cause when having to ensure that the political market remains
fair and competitive. They have a clear incentive to use their position while they
remain in oﬃce to advance their own interests and to increase their political power
(for example, by making the electoral system more majoritarian, or by manipulating
the campaign ﬁnance system or through gerrymandering).39 By contrast, appointed
36 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 87.
37 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 88. For a criticism of this strictly procedural reading of
the constitution, see Lawrence H. Tribe, “The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories,” Yale Law Journal 89 (1980): 1063-1080. pp. 1065-1067.
38 Rawls also believed that this is how the issue of judicial review vis-à-vis parliamentary
supremacy ought to be addressed—namely, by considering the incentives of the agents according to
their institutional positions. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 198.
39 The point is also made by Elster: “A majority government will always be tempted to ma-
nipulate political rights to increase its chances of reelection. If it is free to change the timing of
the election, it may choose a moment when economic conjuctures are favorable. If electoral district
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judges are less prone to conﬂicts of interests of this sort because their permanence
in oﬃce does not depend on the political cycle (even more when they enjoy life-long
tenure). Moreover, unlike MPs, they do not control the political agenda. In a
nutshell, judges are neither more skilled nor more able to grasp the procedural prin-
ciples constitutive of the democratic process. However, they enjoy an institutional
position that make them less prone to self-serving bias and more independent in their
assessment of procedural principles.
6.5. Criticisms
Four problems with procedural theories are raised in what follows. Before pro-
ceeding, a caveat is in order though. Procedural theories cannot exhaust the set of
rights usually linked to constitutionalism, for there are a number of rights that are
usually included in a constitution yet are completely independent from the demo-
cratic process, such as reproductive rights. Of course, this cannot be a criticism of
procedural theories, for this is precisely what they argue for—that the constitution
should only include provisions related to the constitutive conditions and precondi-
tions of the democratic process. However, it is important to note that, precisely for
that reason, proceduralism only provides a rationale for a tiny version of constitu-
tionalism—a much more tiny version than the one we see at work in most of the
current legal systems around the world. Just to mention a notable example, proce-
duralism is unable to provide for what is usually taken to be the most important
aim of constitutional adjudication—namely, the protection of process-independent
yet fundamental rights from potential abuses by the legislatures and other branches
of the state.40
6.5.1. Paradox of preconditions
Consider ﬁrst the so-called “paradox of democratic preconditions” that follows
from preconditions-based accounts.41 Assume that these accounts are correct and
that democracy cannot work properly unless a number of substantive precondi-
tions—such as the above-listed ones (§ 6.3)—are ensured via constitutional entrench-
ment. As noted above, even if substantive, these preconditions need not be justiﬁed
as process-independent constraints. They can be justiﬁed because of their relation-
ship to democracy, that is, as necessary for its proper functioning. Now, if such pre-
boundaries have to redrawn because of population changes, the government may try to do so to
its advantage. If the majority is free to change the electoral system—for example, proportional
representation versus single-member districts—it may exploit this possibility for strategic purposes.
if voters have to be registered before they can vote, the government may have an incentive to make
registration more diﬃcult to disenfranchise de facto some of those who would have voted for the
opposition ...” J. Elster, “Majority Rule and Individual Rights,” S. Shute and S. Hurley eds., On
Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1993), p. 182.
40 This is why Waldron refers to these theories as “non-core” cases. See Waldron, “The Core of
the Case Against Judicial Rveiw,” pp. 1401-1406.
41 See C. Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997); J. Bohman, “Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy,” Journal
of Political Philosophy 6 (1998): 400-425, pp. 403-404; and J. L. Martí, La república deliberativa.
Una teoría de la democracia (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006), pp. 115-127.
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conditions are constitutionally entrenched, then they are taken away from the hands
of the legislatures, thus reducing the scope of what can be decided democratically.
In short, if democracy is to work properly, a number of substantive preconditions
are to be constitutionally enshrined, but then such preconditions are insulated from
democratic decision-making and democracy turns out to be downsized as a result. As
Nino puts it, “It seems that if we make provision of all these resources preconditions
for democracy ... there will be very few questions for democracy itself to answer.”42
Even further, it is reasonable to believe that the more ensured these preconditions
are, the better the democratic process will work and, in turn, the less issues will
be left for democracy to decide. Hence, as Bohman points out, “[D]emocracy could
become a very robust method for deciding very little. Or, it could also easily become
a very weak procedure for deciding too much.”43
Even though both Nino and Bohman refer to theories of deliberative democracy,
the same problem pervades preconditions-based theories of constitutionalism, which
also fall into the paradox of preconditions. Hence, even if these accounts put democ-
racy ﬁrst and deﬁne substantive constitutional constraints as subordinated to the
democratic process, in their attempt to ensure the proper functioning of democracy,
they end up insulating key political issues from what can be decided democratically,
thus severely limiting the scope of democracy. The more issues are constitutionally
entrenched, the better democracy functions, but the less issues are left for citizens
to decide. And, conversely, the more issues are left for citizens to decide, the less
issues are constitutionally entrenched, and the worse democracy functions.44 The
result is paradoxical because, in order to ensure the adequate working of democracy,
a fundamental principle of democracy is diminished—namely, that in a democracy,
as Nadia Urbinati puts it, “all issues [are] an object of public evaluation and all values
a matter of opinion and consent.”45
An alleged solution to the paradox consists in trying to reach a balance between
the requisites of democracy and its actual operation. Thus, according to Nino, “We
must not try to make the democratic procedure so perfect, by strengthening its
preconditions to the maximum, that its scope of operation shrinks so much that
it embraces almost nothing but coordination problems as the direction of traﬃc.”46
Rather, we should try to establish a baseline of preconditions and leave the remaining
issues—including additional preconditions—open for citizens to decide. “There is a
certain baseline below which the democratic process has lost all capacity to improve
itself. Above the baseline, democracy replenishes itself, working for the fulﬁllment
of its own preconditions.”47 To be sure, Nino’s solution can be useful, since at the
end of the day we may have to reach a balance between ensuring that some basic
democratic preconditions are met—so the democratic process does not turn into a
pantomime—and leaving enough issues open for decision—so democracy does not
42 Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy, p. 139.
43 Bohman, “The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy,” p. 404.
44 See Martí, La república deliberativa, p. 117.
45 N. Urbinati, “Unpolitical Democracy,” Political Theory 38 (2010): 65-92, p. 65.
46 Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy, p. 139.
47 Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy, p. 140.
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turn into mere window dressing by being emptied of content. This is what we do
at the individual level when we reach a balance between ensuring the preconditions
of our autonomy (e.g., by taking care of our health, so we can keep doing things
autonomously) and exercising our autonomy (e.g. by doing risky things that may
worsen our health).48
However, two problems arise with this balancing solution. First, as José Luís
Martí has pointed out, Nino’s solution does not solve the paradox. It only provides
a point of balance between the two extremes of democratic decision-making being
emptied of content, on the one hand, and giving up the preconditions that ensure
the fairness of the democratic process altogether, on the other.49
Second, Nino’s account assumes that a clear-cut set of democratic preconditions
can be settled beyond dispute. However, disagreement is as pervasive regarding
democratic preconditions as it is regarding non-relational goals, as we shall see im-
mediately below in section 6.5.2. Nino’s account is correct in presenting the para-
dox—unlike Harrison’s alleged solution to Wollheim’s paradox, for example—as a
trade-oﬀ between two issues of very diﬀerent sorts—procedural and substantive.
However, his account does not quite rightly show that the procedural issue only
triggers if disagreement on substantive issues exists, including disagreement on demo-
cratic preconditions such as civil rights and social and economic conditions. It seems
very reasonable to claim that, unless a number of conditions are met, political de-
cisions cannot be said to be truly democratic. However, as it will become clear in
the next section, citizens disagree on such preconditions, and even on whether pre-
conditions are required for the good working of democratic institutions at all. The
procedural issue triggers precisely because (even more, only if) such disagreements
exist—as a way to tackle them and reach a common course of action not only on the
process-independent goals that are to be advanced by democratic means, but also on
the preconditions that are to be met so as to improve the quality of the democratic
system. Thus seen, the paradox dissolves.
6.5.2. Disagreements, yet once again
It has been often argued that, even though disagreements are inherent to substan-
tive political issues, they need not pervade the decision-making procedures used to
deal with such disagreements. According to Anthony Giddens, Gaddaﬁ would have
commented in a personal interview that citizens in Western countries disagreed on
political issues as much Lybian citizens. To which Giddens would have replied that
Gaddaﬁ was right, except regarding democracy, on which virtually everyone agreed
as the best political system.50 In his review of Rawls’ Political Liberalism, Stuart
Hampsire also defended this view. “Whithin diﬀerent moralities, liberal and conser-
vative, the fairness of the actual outcome of a conﬂict will be evaluated diﬀerently,
even though both sides recognize the fairness of the adversarial process. Outcomes
48 See Martí, La república deliberativa, pp. 125-126.
49 See Martí, La república deliberativa, pp. 123 ﬀ.
50 Unfortunately, I have not been able to ﬁnd out the source.
6.5. Criticisms 199
are by their nature open to dispute, but processes need not be.”51 However, there
are good grounds to believe that this need not be the case both regarding demo-
cratic preconditions and procedures. Consider possible disagreements on democratic
preconditions ﬁrst and on procedures next.
A. Disagreements on preconditions. To be sure, it is not the same to discuss which
rights should be entrenched as a matter of justice, or which economic variables are to
be maximized, rather than asking which constitutional rights are needed for democ-
racy to work properly or below which threshold of GDP per capita and above which
rate of inequality is democracy endangered. However, if we assume contra Habermas
that, as we have seen above (§ 6.3), democratic preconditions are substantive, it is
diﬃcult to see why the problems with instrumentalism raised in section 4.3.2 should
not arise here as well. In the end, if citizens disagree on substantive issues—such
as reproductive rights, immigration policies or health care schemes—they are likely
to disagree as well on the preconditions needed for the good working of democ-
racy—such as whether public schooling should be provided, whether hate speech
should be guaranteed, whether borders should be closed so as to protect national
identity, or whether hedge funds should be banned or regulated so as to prevent
them from lobbying governments. Disagreements on procedures can take place at
diﬀerent levels. Consider some of them.
First of all, citizens may discuss whether democratic preconditions are needed
at all. For example, for many democrats, democracy consists on a set of minimal
rules—such as universal suﬀrage, fair elections and majority rule—that enable gov-
ernment formation and that are suﬃcient for a political system to qualify as demo-
cratic, while other citizens reasonably see this minimalist conception as aberrant and
the resulting political system as a democratic pantomime.52
Second, even if citizens agreed that some preconditions are needed for the proper
functioning of democracy, they would still disagree—sometimes reasonably, some-
times not so much—on which precise preconditions are implied by democracy. As
we have seen in chapter 1, William Findley believed that “Perfect democracy required
perfect equality, not just before the law but also in wealth, in property.”53 However,
many citizens would see this view as way too demanding, thus arguing for diﬀerent
of combinations of rights and social conditions.
Third, even if citizens agreed on the set of preconditions required by democ-
racy, this counterfactual only applies if they also share a common conception of
51 Hampsire also claims elsewhere that “Universal agreement can be expected, in the name of
rationality, only on the methods of fair argument which will arbitrate between the diﬀerent answers
to these questions [of substantive justice], when an answer is needed for public purposes and social
arrangements.” Both quotes come from J. Cohen, “Pluralism and Proceduralism,” Chicago-Kent
Law Review 69 (1993-1994): 589-618, p. 589 and 590.
52 Actually, it could turn out for the relationship between democratic procedures and demo-
cratic preconditions to be empirically unsound. hence empirical studies could eventually show
that participation was causally unaﬀected by the preconditions these theories have posited, as
Brettschneider has pointed. However, I am not sure whether that would make disagreement among
citizens disappear. See Brettschneider, Democratic Rights, p. 14.
53 Quoted in Shankman, Crucible of American Democracy, p. 4.
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democracy, for diverse conceptions of democracy—direct or representative, federal
or centralist, presidential or parliamentary, with a majoritarian electoral system or
with PR—entail diverse sets of preconditions. However, as we shall see in the next
epigraph, citizens are far from endorsing the same form of democracy. Accordingly,
they also endorse very diﬀerent views on democratic preconditions.
Fourth, even if citizens could overcome these disagreements and eventually reach
a consensus on the set of preconditions that are to be constitutionally entrenched in
order to ensure that democratic institutions work adequately, the above-mentioned
problems of scope are likely to arise regarding preconditions as much as regarding
process-independent goals. First, in the form of incompatibilities and trade-oﬀs not
only between preconditions (for example, between free speech and the right to secu-
rity), but also between preconditions and constitutive conditions of democracy (for
example, between the right to association and the strict regulation or even ban on
economic organizations such as the above-mentioned hedge-funds).54
B. Disagreements on procedures.55 Some critics of Ely’s account or procedural consti-
tutionalism, such as Gargarella and Nino, have focused on his pluralist conception of
democracy.56 Some others, such as Ackerman, have criticized Ely’s focus on discrete
and isolated minorities rather than on unorganized and difuse majorities that might
be more vulnerable.57 As Gaetano Mosca had put it in the 1930s,
The domination of an organized minority ... over the unorganized ma-
jority is inevitable. The power of any minority is irresistible as against each
single individual in the majority, who stands alone before the totality of the
organized minority. At the same time, the minority is organized for the very
reason that it is a minority.58
To be sure, these are sensible concerns. However, they all misﬁre, for Ely could
easily accommodate them just by saying that constitutional adjudication should be
limited to the protection of the constitutive features (though he would add precon-
ditions as well) of the democratic process, whatever those features turn out to be.
Now, these criticisms and Ely’s possible reply make a less easily-avoidable problem
of Ely’s account emerge—namely, that scholars as much as citizens have divergent
conceptions of democracy and, therefore, endorse divergent sorts of procedures as
democratic ones. Citizens not only disagree on procedure-dependent or -independent
substantive issues, they also disagree on procedural issues. That is, citizens disagree
on whether abortion should be banned or not, on whether the inheritance tax should
54 The reasons behind these disagreement need not be very diﬀerent from the ones mentioned
in section 4.3.2, epigraph B.
55 “Procedural and substantive values come ... as parts of a package; contrary to Hampshire’s
claim, moral pluralism does not drive a wedge between them.” Cohen, “Pluralism and Procedural-
ism,” p. 591.
56 See Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy ; Gargarella, La justicia frente al
gobierno; For a comparison, see S. Linares, La (i)legitimidad democrática del control judicial de las
leyes (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2008), pp. 129-135.
57 B. Ackerman, “Beyond Carolene Products,” Harvard Law Review 98 (1985): 713-746.
58 G. Mosca, The Ruling Elite, A. Livingston, ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 53.
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be abolished or not or on whether illegal immigrants should be regularized or pros-
ecuted. But, even when they acknowledge that they disagree on these issues, that
they have to reach a common course of action nevertheless and that they want this
course of acton to be reached by democratic means, they also disagree on which
decision-making procedures count as democratic and should therefore be used.59
Of course, these disagreements do not jeopardize the very idea of democracy.
They only show that democracy is an essentially contested concept that leaves room
for many possible institutional arrangements and decision-making procedures.60 Con-
sider only a few of them: bicameralism vs. unicameralism, presidentialism vs.
parliamentarianism, proportional representation vs. majoritarianism, participatory
budgets vs. cabinet budgetary discretion, subsidiarity vs. centralization, division
of powers vs. parliamentary sovereignty, and so on and so forth. Incidentally, these
disagreements debunk Holmes’ characterization of constitutional rules as constitutive
rather than regulative rules and, for that matter, his analogy between constitutional
rules and grammar rules. The analogy does not hold because, unlike the rules of
grammar, democratic procedures are not neutral.61 Diﬀerent procedures produce
diﬀerent allocations of power, thus beneﬁting some citizens at the expense of others.
In short, they are not a matter of mere coordination but a political and highly
controversial one. Hence, it is perfectly reasonable to see them as a subject of harsh
and lively disagreement and political debate for the reasons pointed out in section
4.3.2—brieﬂy restated, citizen’s imperfect ability to get to know which procedures
will produce a fairer allocation of power, the slippery and contestable nature of demo-
cratic procedures themselves and the interests that unavoidably pervade debates on
which procedures should be enforced and, thus, who will beneﬁt from them. In short,
the alleged neutrality and constitutive nature of democratic procedures cannot justify
their constitutional entrenchment, for they allocate power very diﬀerently depending
on the speciﬁc procedures that are enforced and, accordingly, they are neither neutral
nor merely constitutive.62
In short, as Waldron has put it, “Like all rights ... participation is also an appro-
priate target or subject matter for authority. In politics, the right to participate (its
nature and limits) is one of the things on which we disagree and about which we have
to decide. But, unlike other rights, the right to participate also presents itself as a
possible answer (or part of answer) to the question of authority.”63 This raises seri-
ous doubts on any attempt to entrench democratic procedures in a rigid constitution
and enforce them via judicial review. To be sure, there is a clear distinction between
procedural and substantive issues, as Ely protests against those who may reply that
59 See Herzog, “Democratic Credentials,” p. 468, n. 2; and Jane S. Schacter, “Ely and the Idea
of Democracy,” Stanford Law Review 57 (2004): 737-760.
60 For the idea of an “essentially contested concept” see W. B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested
Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956): 167-198.
61 It may be objected that the grammar rules are not neutral either, for they beneﬁts some
speakers over others. Thus seen, the analogy would hold, but Homes’ point when using the analogy,
which was show the constitutive and neutral character of constitutionally entrenched procedures
would not hold.
62 See Sánchez-Cuenca, Más democracia, menos liberalismo, pp. 136-140.
63 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, p. 249.
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participation is also a value and that, accordingly, judicial adjudication aimed at
protecting it is not very diﬀerent from judicial adjudication aimed at protecting any
other value.64 However, that participation is procedural rather than substantive does
not turn it into any less immune to disagreement. These disagreements provide, in
turn, a strong case for leaving its deﬁnition, instantiation and application on the
hands of the legislatures rather than insulated from them.65
C. Disagreements on values. To close this section, consider a criticism of procedure-based
constitutional constraints from the opposite end, namely, from among those who
claim that Ely’s account falls short of an adequate and complete concept of con-
stitutionalism for procedural constitutional provisions ought to be complemented by
substantive ones. According to these critics, it is not possible to trace a clear-cut dis-
tinction between procedural and substantive issues because procedural issues imply
a number of core substantive values that provide the rationale for why democratic
procedures are worth being protected and constitutionally entrenched.66 For exam-
ple, the values of mutual respect, equality or autonomy provide good normative
grounds for democratic procedures and their constitutional protection, as Corey
Brettschneider has claimed.67 Now, once we assume that democratic procedures
are grounded on some values that serve as a litmus test against which to evaluate
the fairness of the democratic procedures—or so the argument goes—, there is no
reason why we should not use such values to evaluate the fairness of the outcomes
and to justify the constitutionalization of some substantive constraints as well.68 For
example, if we consider unfair a democratic decision that disenfranchise a minority
of the population because it prevents some individuals from exercising their public
autonomy, why should we consider fair a decision that prevents them from exercising
their private autonomy (for example, a bill that prevents them from opting out of a
compulsory organ donation program)?69
This argument diﬀers from the one put forward by Richard Bellamy, who claims
64 “Participation itself can obviously be regarded as a value, but that doesn’t collapse the two
modes of review I am describing into one. As I am using the terms, value imposition refers to the
designation of certain goods (rights or whatever) as so important that they must be insulated from
whatever inhibition the political process might impose, whereas a participational orientation denotes
a form of review that concerns itself with how decisions aﬀecting value choices and distributing the
resultant costs and beneﬁts are made.” Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 75n.
65 This may obviously raise a regress on procedures, as it has been often argueed. See T.
Christiano, “Waldron on Law and Disagreement,” Law & Philosophy 19 (2000): 513-543; A. Rieger,
“Voting on Voting Systems, or the Limits of Democracy,” Analysis 71(2011): 641-642. For a re-
sponse, see Waldron, Law and Disagreement, pp. 302-306.
66 See Tribe, “The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,” Yale Law
Journal 89 (1980): 1063-1080; Bretschneider, Democratic Rights; Cohen, Pluralism and Procedu-
ralism;” C. Fabre, Social Rights Under the Constitution. Government and the Decent Life (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 277; A. Kavanagh, “Participation and Judicial Review: A Repy
to Jeremy Waldron,” Law & Philosophy 22 (2003): 451-486, pp. 468-469.
67 See Brettschneider, Democratic Rights.
68 For example, Tribe criticizes that “the constitutional theme of perfecting the process of
governmental decision is radically indepeterminate and fundamentally incomplete. The process
theme by itself determines almost nothing unless its presuppositions are speciﬁed, and its content
supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and values—the very sort of theory the process
perfecters are at such pains to avoid.” See Tribe, “The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories,” p. 1064.
69 To be sure, these sorts of principles might fall short of addressing all the outcomes of the
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that it is not possible to state what counts as a fair democratic process without staing
what counts as a fair outcome. According to Bellamy, “you cannot judge whether
the process is fair without a view of what counts as a fair outcome, and cannot
judge a fair outcome without referring to some account of fundamental values.”70
Rawls’ notion of “pure procedural justice” serves as a counterexample for Bellamy’s
argument though.71 The usual example is that of a lottery, in which there is no
criterion for what counts as a just outcome other than the procedure itself. But the
evidence provided above in section 4.3.3 show that citizens clearly distinguish be-
tween outcomes and procedures, and that they often judge that political procedures
are fair even if they consider that the outcome they bring about are not.
Turning back to the previous argument, the attempt to settle a set of val-
ues behind democratic procedures and to infer a set of constitutional rights from
them seems to be as subject to disagreements as the attempt to settle a set of
disagreement-free procedures, and probably much more. Consider universal suﬀrage,
which appears to be to great extent beyond controversy and disagreement (at least,
in well-established democracies). Now, controversy and disagreement ﬁercely arise
again when trying to settle the values behind it. Hence, while some would agree on
the values pointed out by Brettschneider, others would embrace universal suﬀrage
for completely diﬀerent reasons, such as its ability to bring about economic growth
or political stability or to reduce the likelihood of social revolutions breaking out.
As Jacques Maritain (1949, p. 9) liked to tell,
at one of the meetings of a UNESCO National Commission where human
rights were being discussed, someone expressed astonishment that certain
champions of violently opposed ideologies had agreed on a list of rights. “Yes”,
they said, “we agree about the rights but on condition that no one asks us
why”. That “why” is where the argument begins.
6.5.3. Constitutive rules and rigidity
Procedures-based theories provide a powerful case for constitutionalism—even if
only for a tiny version of it. The reason is that, rather than grounding constitutional
rigidity and judicial review on the protection of much disputed non-relational goals,
these theories justify them only in order to protect the constitutive conditions (and
perhaps preconditions) of democracy proper. Thus, as Holmes puts it, while consti-
tutional entrenchment of non-relational goals can be easily seen as a constraint on
democratic decision-making, constitutionally entrenched democratic procedures can
be less easily seen as constraints, for they ensure the constitutive rules of democ-
racy—i.e., conditions without which a political system cannot be democratic at all.
Just as it is not possible to play chess unless the rules of the game are settled in
advance, it is not possible to make democratic decisions unless the democratic rules
political decision-making, but would nevertheless be unreasonable to limit their scope to procedural
issues.
70 Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, p. 110. See also R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 57-69.
71 See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), section 14.
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and institutions are settled before. In short, constitutionalism so deﬁned, far from
being at odds with democracy, it enables it and is required by it.
Now, Holmes’ argument falls into a non sequitur. To be sure, Holmes is right
(1) in distinguishing constitutive rules from regulative rules, (2) in depicting demo-
cratic procedures as the former, (3) in distinguishing constitutive rules, including
democratic procedures, from the exercise of such rules in ordinary politics and (4)
in depicting the former as conceptually prior to the latter. However, he does not
explain why the former should be normatively prior to the latter in the sense of
being constitutionally protected from it. That is, he does not explain why the deﬁ-
nition, organization, enactment and amendment of democratic rules should be taken
away from the hand of citizens and their representatives. Holmes is right when he
claims that “Decisions are made on the basis of pre-decisions ... When entering the
voting-booth, for instance, voters decide who shall be president, but not how many
presidents there shall be.”72 Surely, it is logically inconsistent for citizens to make
decisions about D according to certain decision-making rules R and about those very
rules R at the same time. But the inconsistency disappears as soon as decisions about
D and decisions about R are made at diﬀerent times. And, once the inconsistency
disappears, Holmes’ argument fails to explain why, unlike decisions decisions about
D, decisions about R should be constitutionally entrenched and be left in the hands
of courts rather than parliaments.
If democratic rules were rules of pure coordination and were out of the discus-
sion, Holmes’ conclusion would probably follow. However, three problems block the
argument. First, far from being an all-or-nothing issue and requiring a clear-cut
set of decision-making rules, democracy is consistent with a wide range of rules and
institutions (even if obviously not with all; a country without elections or where
protest is prosecuted can hardly count as democratic). Second, democratic rules
are far from being merely of coordination for, as we have seen, diﬀerent procedures
produce diﬀerent allocations of power, thus beneﬁting some citizens and groups at the
expense of others. Third, the issue of which democratic rules are fair—and, therefore,
of which allocations of power are fairer—remains open to reasonable (and sometimes
not-so-reasonable) disagreement. Why should citizens and their representatives be
prevented from being able to settle such disagreements democratically and thus from
being able to decide by which precise rules do they want to govern themselves?
In short, it is obviously the case that democratic decision-making requires a set
of rules specifying who ought to make political decisions, how are decisions to be
made and what are those decisions to be made about. Holmes is right in claiming
that democratic rules are not constraining of democratic decision-making. But con-
stitutionally entrenched democratic rules are, for there is no reason why they ought
to be entrenched against deﬁnition, enactment and amendment through the ordinary
political process.
72 Holmes, “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy.”
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6.5.4. Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa
Assume that the doubts presented thus far are sound, that is, that citizens dis-
agree about democratic procedures and preconditions as much as they disagree about
non-relational issues and that legislatures stand in a better institutional position
vis-a-vis constitutional courts to address such disagreements. Now, even if legisla-
tures may address disagreements better than courts because of their representative
and openly confrontational and deliberative nature, they are also more prone to con-
ﬂicts of interests regarding procedural issues than courts because such issues aﬀect
them decisively. Thus, one of the main reasons for judicial review advanced by Ely is
precisely that courts are in a better institutional position vis-à-vis legislatures regard-
ing the impartial monitoring of the political process. Sure, it is perfectly reasonable
for citizens to disagree on the electoral reform, the setup of the congress or the powers
of the branches of government. Likewise, it is perfectly reasonable for them to think
that if an agreement existed on these issues, constitutional entrenchment and judicial
review would be good candidates to ensure them, but since disagreement persists
accross the board it is better to leave them in the hands of their representatives.
However, this is too naive an account of parliamentary representation, for it assumes
that citizens and their elected representatives have common interests and that no
information asymmetries exist among them. Now, once we relax this assumption
and assume that politicians may have particular interests and do have asymmetric
information, it follows that they may also have a strong interest to use their powerful
position to strengthen their position and enlarge their power. For example, a large
party will have a strong interest to reduce the number of seats in the parliament, to
make the electoral system less proportional and to improve presidential powers.
In short, according to Ely, judges and elected oﬃcials stand in a similar institu-
tional position, have similar incentives and are equally likely to be biased regarding
substantive issues. However, regarding the design of political procedures, judges are
less prone to have conﬂicts of interests and to suﬀer self-served biases than elected
oﬃcials. They are “comparative outsiders” because they have a weaker incentive to
design political procedures so as to increase their power and advance their political
interests than the latter.73 In a nutshell, elected oﬃcials are judges in their own
cause while courts are not (or are less so).
Now, as Bellamy and Shapiro have pointed out, how convincing is this argument
in the light of the US Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore in 2000?74 This
case is especially appropriate to analyze Ely’s argument for at least three reasons.
First, it was limited to a procedural controversy regarding the electoral process in the
presidential election and, more precisely, regarding the method for recounting ballots
in the state of Florida. Second, the election in both Florida and in the country was
too close and the parties too subject to conﬂicts of interests and self-serving bias
to reach a decision that could be seen as remotely fair (for example, many of the
73 Ely, Democracy and Distrust, p. 103.
74 See Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, p. 118-120; “Introdution,” in Constitutionalism and
Democracy, R. Bellamy, ed. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. xxix-xxx.
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oﬃcials involved were political appointees and the state governor was a brother and
a fellow member party of one of the candidates). Third, a tie-breaking third party
was available so as to avoid conﬂicts of interests and ensure that a fair decision was
reached—namely, the Supreme Court. However, as the public statement signed by
over ﬁve hundred American las professors denounced, it was quickly shown that,
rather than an impartial and uninvolved third party, the Supreme Court had acted
as a party to the more general political disagreement, for justices were as aﬀected
by the outcome of the election as as every other American citizen. As part of the
political system, Supreme Court justices are dramatically aﬀected by the way the
political system is organized and how power is allocated—let alone the fact that
they tend to disagree with each other as much as citizens do, as their use of majority
rule to reach decisions shows.75 As Bellamy puts it, “Because they are at the apex
of the system, they are judges over their own constitutional competence on the
matter too.”76 Things being so, then there is no reason to give them priority over
citizens that are equally aﬀected by the decision. As Waldron puts it, nemo iudex
can be replied with another Latin adagio, namely, quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus
approbetur.77
It may be replied that the US Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore does not
ﬁt Ely’s argument because it does not deal with “insular and discrete minorities.”
However, three sorts of additional cases can be mentioned. First, cases in which
constitutional courts have turned down campaign ﬁnance legislation aimed at curbing
the inﬂuence of powerful economic groups on political parties and, in turn, on the
political process. Second, cases in which constitutional courts have banned political
parties representing minorities, such as the Kurds in Turkey or separatist Basques in
Spain. And third, in the limit, cases in which constitutional courts have often backed
not only the banning of political parties but also of coups against the democratic
system. To be sure, constitutional courts have sometimes protected the democratic
system from procedural injustices. But for each constitutional decision aimed at
entrenching the democratic system, it is possible to point at a constitutional decision
backing and thus legitimizing military coups, as it often happened in Latin America
during the twentieth century.78
To be sure, these concerns do not settle the issue on whether courts or parlia-
ments are more suitable and have more adequate incentives to protect the proce-
dural conditions and preconditions of democracy. This issue is mainly empirical
and context-dependent. This is the reason why Waldron acknowledges that his case
against judicial review applies only under certain circumstances, e.g. countries with
good working democratic institutions.79 Now, this caveat also poses a burden on
75 On internal disputes within the Supreme Court, see E. Lazarus, Closed Chambers: The First
Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court (New York: Times Books, 1998).
76 Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, p. 119. For an analysis of the self-interested motiva-
tions of the US Supreme Court justices, see F. Schauer, “Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious
Determinants of Judicial Behavior,” University of Cincinnati Law Review 68 (2000): 615-636.
77 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, pp. 297-298.
78 See Linares, La (i)legitimidad democrática del control judicial de las leyes, p. 92.
79 See Waldron, “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review,” p. 1360, n. 1.
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supporters of constitutionalism and judicial review, for they also have to admit that
judicial review is to be rejected in those cases in which the constitution contains ob-
viously unjust provisions or the constitutional court is openly corrupt. Hence, when
discussed at a theoretical level, legislatures and courts are to be compared either at
their best light or at their worst one, so as to avoid fallacies of asymmetry.80 And,
when discussed at the level of implementation, contextual analysis seems the most
cautious option to follow.
80 See Stacey, “Democratic Jurisprudence and Judicial review”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
30 (2010): 749-773, pp. 768 ﬀ.

Concluding remarks to Part II
Over the last decades we have witnessed an astonishing expansion of constitu-
tionalism worldwide, to the point that 101 out of the 106 constitutions written be-
tween 1985 and 2002 include some form of judicial review. This expansion has gone
hand-in-hand with the conceptual shift in the concept of democracy presented in the
Introduction and analyzed in Part I of the dissertation as for the Early American
Republic. According to this shift, constitutional rigidity and judicial review are nowa-
days seen not only as consistent with democracy but also as fundamental parts of any
democratic system proper. For example, in the 2004 Report on Democracy in Latin
America Guillermo O’Donnell addresses the relationship between democracy and ju-
dicial review as a dilemma between the European model and the American model of
judicial review, asking which of them is more democratic rather than whether judicial
review is democratic at all or not.81 At a philosophical level, a number of theories
have been elaborated so as to justify the democratic pedigree of constitutionalism.
Part II of the dissertation has carefully analyzed the most prominent theories among
these and has found that they all face serious problems to justify constitutionalism
from a democratic standpoint.
Three prominent types of theories have been analyzed—pure instrumentalist the-
ories, precommitment-based theories, and proceduralist theories. According to pure
instrumentalist theories, constitutionalism need not be at odds with democracy be-
cause constitutional constraints are necessary for the democratic procedures to bring
just outcomes about (chapter 4). According to precommitment-based theories, con-
stitutional constraints need not be at odds with democracy because they are the
upshot of democratically made precommitments (chapter 5). Finally, according to
proceduralist theories, constitutional constraints need not be at odds with democracy
because they set up the procedural rules and preconditions required for the proper
functioning of the democratic system (chapter 6).
A number of problems of all these theories have been analyzed. However, a
common problem to all of them has been pointed out—namely, that they all fail to
address adequately the fact of disagreement that, as we have seen in Part I of the
dissertation, made democracy gain legitimacy and be increasingly demanded as the
nineteenth century progressed. This fact is not a contingent, though resilient and
widespread, feature of our political communities that we can leave aside when elab-
81 G. O’Donnell, “Notas sobre la democracia en América Latina,” Programa de Naciones Unidas
para el Desarrollo, ed. La democracia en América Latina. El debate conceptual sobre la democracia
(New York: PNUD, 2004).
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orating normative theories of political authority. Rather, it is a necessary condition
of politics proper, for if no disagreement existed no political authority—democratic
or otherwise—would be required in the ﬁrst place. Hence, any normative theory of
political authority that depends on elements that are beyond dispute (either actually
or counterfactually) turns out to be self-defeating.
Now, it may be asked what is the alternative to strong constitutionalism provided
that it is so problematic from a democratic standpoint and that we have a strong
commitment to democracy nevertheless. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation
to make a full case for an alternative to constitutionalism. To be sure, despite of the
diﬀerences between them, it is obviously the case that parliaments are better suited
vis-à-vis constitutional courts to address diversity and disagreement. The Spanish
Cortes Generales, the Russian Duma, the British House of Commons, the French
National Assembly, the Japanese Diet, the American House of Representatives, they
all include hundreds of representatives and are organized for ideological confronta-
tion. As Walter Bagehot described the House of Commons in 1867, “Here are 658
persons, collected from all parts of England [sic], diﬀerent in nature, diﬀerent in look
and language.”82
However, it is worth pointing out that the Westminster model of parliamentary
sovereignty is not the only available alternative to strong constitutionalism. There
are many intermediate models, including the new commonwealth forms of consti-
tutionalism described in section 3.2 above. Further, constitutionalism is not an
all-or-nothing matter. A constitutional system in which some constitutional pro-
visions are absolutely entrenched is completely diﬀerent from a system that only
requires submission to referendum for amendment. Likewise, a system of judicial
review in which courts have the last word on all constitutional matters and can
overturn any statute that may be rendered unconstitutional completely diﬀers from
a system in which courts, by contrast, can only issue declarations of incompatibility
and the parliament retains ﬁnal authority on constitutional matters.83
82 W. Bagehot, quoted in J. Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), p. 34.
83 For a gradualist approach to judicial review and an attempt to measure the degree of
the democratic objection as for diverse forms of judicial review, see Linares, La (i)legitimidad
democrática del control judicial de las leyes, ch. 6.
Part III
The workplace

Chapter 7
Analytical and normative background
Part III of the dissertation analyzes the possible extension of democratic decision-making
to the workplace, a sphere that in our liberal democracies is usually taken to be be-
yond the scope of democracy. It is divided into two chapters. Chapter 7 introduces
and deﬁnes the main forms of workplace democracy (WD), focusing on the German
co-determination system and cooperativism. Next, it reviews in some detail the core
arguments for and against WD regarding its feasibility and eﬃciency, and analyzes
the so-called “epistemic” and “propertarian” arguments against WD. Finally, Bowles
and Gintis’ theory of contested exchange—which they use to show that the workplace
is a political sphere in which power is exercised and that ought to be democratized
accordingly—is critically analyzed.
Chapter 8, in turn, puts forward a novel, republican case for WD that partly
draws upon the democratic branch of republicanism analyzed in Part I, section
1.3.4. First, two competing views are analyzed—ﬁrst, that the availability of an
exit option alone ensures workers’ freedom from arbitrary interference and, second,
that ensuring this sort of freedom requires workplace regulation but not WD. Next,
the republican case for WD is presented as straightforward as possible. Finally, it
is argued that WD requires, from a republican standpoint, not only workers’ control
but also workers’ ownership of the ﬁrm due to bargaining power asymmetries and
moral hazard problems arising from the formal separation of ownership and control
rights. It is thus shown that cooperativism is ceteris paribus preferable to other
forms of WD in which ownership and control rights are formally separated, such as
co-determination.
7.1. Introduction
The current economic crisis has triggered the interest in workplace democracy
once again, 2012 having been proclaimed International Year of Co-operatives by the
United Nations. Even though workplace democracy was a usual battle-cry among
workers and a central research topic in industrial relations, labor economics and
political theory in the 1970s and 1980s,1 since the early 1990s the topic has raised
less and less attention among scholars, politicians and workers alike. However, the
greater resilience of cooperatives to the current crisis—partly due to their greater
wage ﬂexibility and lesser need to make proﬁts for investors and bonuses for man-
1 See D. Christie, “Recent Calls for Economic Democracy,” Ethics 95 (1984): 112-128.
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agers—has strengthened their presence in the world economy and triggered once
again the interest in this and other forms of workplace democracy.2
Early experiments with workplace democracy (henceforth, WD) can be traced
back at least to the Industrial Revolution and have developed into many diﬀerent
forms, such as cooperatives, workers’ councils, the Israli kibbutzim, the German
co-determination system or the US Employee Stock Options Plans, and has also
served as an umbrella for dubiously democratic arrangements such as quality cir-
cles, just-in-time production, total quality management, ﬂexible practices and so
forth. However, even though its very concept is inevitably fuzzy and contested, in
its minimal account WD can be deﬁned as follows:3
Workplace democracy.—A form of managerial organization where, if not all,
a majority of workers, though not necessarily only them, have equal control
rights over the management of the ﬁrm.
A number of arguments have been traditionally advanced for and against WD. The
aim of this chapter is to introduce the main forms of WD and to analyze in some detail
the main arguments for and against it. Section 7.2 distinguishes between control
rights by capital or by labor and between public and private ownership of the ﬁrm.
Two main forms of WD can be found depending on whether democratic ﬁrms are
owned by external investors or by workers themselves—the German co-determination
system and cooperativism, which are respectively analyzed in sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2
respectively.
Section 7.3, in turn, reviews the main arguments for and against WD. Section
7.3.1 addresses its feasibility, considering that the proposal is not on the agenda,
that it does not seem to be supported by workers themselves, and that there may be
more pressing issues right now. Section7.3.2addresses a number of eﬃciency-based
arguments for WD (greater eﬀort and information-sharing, lower unemployment out-
put, and better vertical and horizontal monitoring), as well as against WD (greater
decision-making costs, diﬃculties to attract external capital and to diversify invest-
ment, and likelihood of free-riding due to common ownership in large democratic
ﬁrms). Sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.4 address in some detail the so-called “epistemic” and
“propertarian” arguments against WD, respectively. According to the former: Why
should workers be granted a say in their running when they often lack the expertise
required to make informed decisions about these topics? According to the latter:
Why should workers be granted control rights over the ﬁrm when they are not its
2 See J. Birchall and L Hammond Ketilson, Resilience of the Cooperative Business Model in
Times of Crisis (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2009); R. D. Lansbury, “Workplace
Democracy and the Global Financial Crisis,” Journal of Industrial Relations 51 (2009): 599-616.
3 For a sample of notably diﬀerent deﬁnitions see Christie, “Recent Calls for Economic Democ-
racy”; R. Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cal-
ifornia Press, 1985); S. Bowles and H. Gintis, “A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic
Enterprise,” Economics and Philosophy 9 (1993): 75-100; and N.-hê Hsieh, “Survey Article: Justice
in production,” Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2008): 72-100. For exhaustive overviews of dif-
ferent forms of WD, see H. Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press, 2000) and G. K. Dow, Governing the Firm. Workers’ Control in Theory and
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
7.2. Deﬁnition and models 215
owners? Finally, section 7.3.5 analyzes in much more detail Bowles and Gintis’ theory
of contested exchange, which they use to make a case for WD.
7.2. Deﬁnition and models
Democratic ﬁrms are often introduced as a third way between capitalist and so-
cialist ﬁrms, which are often distinguished along the dimension of ﬁrms’ ownership.
Thus, while ﬁrms are owned by private investors under capitalism, they are publicly
owned under communism. However, as Dow points out, economic systems also diﬀer
along another dimension namely, control over production activities.4 Here the dis-
tinction is not between public and private ownership of the ﬁrm, but rather between
ﬁrms controlled by capital suppliers and labor suppliers. Hence, while the ownership
of the ﬁrm refers to the ownership of non-human assets, such as ﬁnancial wealth or
physical assets, control rights refer to the authority to make managerial decisions,
which may be delegated to directors and managers who, nevertheles, are elected and
remain accountable to those holding ultimate authority in conventional (and large)
ﬁrms, shareholders; in democratic ﬁrms, workers.
Even though it is a matter of discussion whether control rights and ownership of
the ﬁrm can be sharply separated in practice, as we shall see in detail below in section
8.5, these are two very diﬀerent dimensions that, combined, provide the following
matrix.
Private ownership Public ownership
Control by capital Capitalist ﬁrm Socialist ﬁrm
Control by labor Private democratic ﬁrm Public democratic ﬁrm
Table 5. Ownership and control
As we can see, four alternatives follow from the combination of these two dimen-
sions. On the ﬁrst row we have capitalist and socialist ﬁrms, which diﬀer in whether
assets are privately or publicly owned but have in common control by capital either
private or public. By contrast, ﬁrms pertaining to the second row have in common
that they are controlled by workers, even if they can be privately or publicly owned.
An actual instance of the latter case could be found in Yugoslavia under Tito, where
the assets of ﬁrms were publicly owned by the state but workers within each ﬁrm
had substantial control over their use,5 while a theoretical instance of it has been
developed by David Schweickart idea of “economic democracy.”6
Here I will focus on the ﬁrst column of the second row namely, private demo-
cratic ﬁrms, which are also controlled by workers but are nevertheless privately
4 G. Dow, Governing the Firm, p. 3.
5 It has been widely discussed whether workers had actual autonomy or were rather controlled
by the Communist Party, not only because many board seats were appointed by the Party but also
because the Party had de facto control over managerial decisions. See J. E. Roerner, A Future for
Socialism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
6 See D. Schweickart, “Economic Democracy: A Worthy Socialism That Would Really Work,”
Science and Society 56 (1992): 9-38.
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owned. Depending on whether ownership and control rights are separated or not,
they can be classiﬁed in two main groups. On the one hand, democratic ﬁrms in
which capital is supplied by external investors but workers have control rights over the
ﬁrm’s decisions. On the other hand, democratic ﬁrms in which workers have control
rights but capital is also supplied by workers themselves, who ﬁnance collective asset
ownership through debt contracting or by drawing upon their own savings. Thus,
while ownership and control rights over the ﬁrm’s decisions are separated in the
former case, they are kept together in workers’ hands in the latter case. I will take
the German co-determination system and cooperativism as the most outstanding
instances of the former and the latter, respectively. Before considering these two
sorts of ﬁrms in detail, two caveats are in order though.
First, the separation of ownership and control rights to which I refer here is not
to be confused with the “separation of ownership and control” debate in managerial
theory.7 This debate refers to the separation between a principal (shareholders, who
own the ﬁrm) and its agent (directors and top managers, who exercise the control of
the ﬁrm) and the limited control shareholders often have over the board of directors
(and these, in turn, over top managers). To be sure, this problem also applies to
democratic ﬁrms. The only diﬀerence is that, while the agent remains the same,
workers rather than shareholders are now the principal. Hence, (at least in large
democratic ﬁrms) managers are hired and ﬁred by a board directors, but board
members are not elected and held accountable by shareholders (or at least not only
by them), but rather by the workers of the ﬁrm.
Second, it can be called into question whether control and ownership of the ﬁrm
can be separated in practice (see section 8.5 below). On the one hand, the conven-
tional concept of “ﬁrm ownership” includes not only the ownership of non-human
assets used by the ﬁrm and the claim on the net income, but also control over the
ﬁrm’s decisions and the right to sell the preceding rights to a third party. On the other
hand, even though they are often believed to be inextricably linked, control rights can
be and are often de iure separated from ownership. Consider three examples of this
separation. First, the Yugoslav system of economic democracy, in which workers were
granted control rights over ﬁrms that remained property of the state. Second, ﬁrms
with employee stock options plans in which workers often have residual claims and
contribute capital but lack control rights. And, third, the German co-determination
system, in which workers have control rights but assets are owned by shareholders,
who retain exclusive claims over net income.
7.2.1. Co-determination
The German co-determination system is the closest actual model to formal separa-
tion between ownership and control rights, for it gives workers control rights without
requiring them to make any equity investment in the ﬁrm. The co-determination
act, in force since 1976, makes compulsory for all limited liability ﬁrms with over
7 The locus classicus is A. Berle and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (New York: MacMillan, 1932)
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2,000 workers to have a two-tier board structure. On the one hand, the manage-
ment board directly runs the ﬁrm, making day-to-day decisions. On the other hand,
the supervisory board makes the more general decisions, such as the ratiﬁcation of
important investments or the approval of the annual budget. In the management
board only shareholders’ executives are represented, while in the supervisory board
both shareholders and workers are represented on a “near-parity” basis. The size of
the supervisory board varies proportionally to the number of workers in the ﬁrm,
but the number of representatives of shareholders and employees remains always
equal. (In turn, blue-collar and white-collar workers elect their delegates, which in
turn elect board members, separately and in proportion to their numbers.) Thus
co-determination can be deﬁned as follows:
Co-determination. A system in which ﬁrms are owned by shareholders but
control rights are shared among shareholder and employees.
Now, shareholders and workers are usually said to be represented only on a “near-parity”
basis because the chairman of the board has a tie-breaking vote and tends to be
elected from the group of shareholders. In theory, this person can be elected from
either the shareholder or the employee group. But in case of deadlock, which given
the composition of the board is likely, the chairman is elected by the shareholder
group. In short, it is very stylized to consider co-determination as separating own-
ership and control of the ﬁrm, for shareholders retain along with their property
rights ample control rights both by electing all the members of the management
board and half of the members of the supervisory board plus the chairman, who has a
tie-breaking vote. Further, it might be called into question whether codetermination
could be considered an instance of workplace democracy at all, for workers are not
the only agents with control rights and the principle of “one worker, one vote” is thus
violated. However, codetermination is still the most developed existing instance of a
system in which workers are provided with control rights over decisions made in the
ﬁrm without having ownership rights as well.8
7.2.2. Cooperativism
Consider now democratic ﬁrms in which workers both have control rights and own
the ﬁrm. Cooperatives are not the only case in which control rights and ownership
are kept together in workers’ hands. For example, the employee stock options plans
(ESOPs) developed in the United States also provide workers with property rights
that range from minority stock ownership as part of a beneﬁt plan with little or no
control rights at all to voting equity shares that provide workers with ample control
rights over decisions made by the board. ESOPs have rapidly expanded throughout
the United States during the last two decades due to the generous corporate tax
8 A theoretical model in which ownership and control rights are also separated with a more
equal distribution of conrol rights among shareholders and employees is the one developed by
Isabelle Ferreras, in which the management of the ﬁrm is divided into two houses, one with work-
ers’ representatives and another with shareholders’ representatives. See I. Ferreras, On Economic
Bicameralism (master diss., MIT, 2004).
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deductions, reaching an amount of 11,000 ﬁrms with ESOPs in 1999, including 12
among the 400 largest private ﬁrms.9 However, it is very questionable whether
ESOPs could be regarded as an instance of WD, for in most ﬁrms control over the
ﬁrm remains in shareholders’ hands.10 Further, the system is strong in the US but
not elsewhere.
In the remainder I will focus on another, more democratic and more widely
extended, form of WD in which control rights and ownership are held together in
workers’ hands namely, cooperatives, which can be deﬁned as follows.
Cooperative. A ﬁrm in which all workers and only workers have equal own-
ership and control rights over the ﬁrm.
Of course, only rarely we ﬁnd cooperatives so-deﬁned in real-world economies. As
Elster recalls, non-working owners, non-owning workers and unequal distribution of
shares are common.11 When these deviations become suﬃciently large, ﬁrms cannot
be considered cooperatives any longer. Consider these deviations in turn.
First, even though cooperatives are meant to be owned only by workers, this
is hardly the case. To be sure, cooperatives’ equity capital tends to come from its
members, either in the form of membership fees or in the form of reserves accumulated
out of retained earnings. But it often comes from private investors as well, who
accordingly enjoy control rights accordingly. In Spain, for example, non-members
contributions are allowed to up to 45 percent of the total equity capital.12 Second,
even when only workers own the ﬁrm, shares are often unequally distributed. Now,
even though in some forms of WD e.g. ESOPs unequal shares are translated into
unequal votes, in cooperatives the norm is to follow the principle of “one worker, one
vote,” regardless of the shares owned by each worker. Third, it is also quite often
the case that some workers, and sometimes a majority of them indeed, are salaried
employees rather than owners of the cooperative. For example, only one in three
workers of Mondragón cooperatives are full members, the remainder being hired and
paid a salary as workers in conventional ﬁrms do.13 Hiring salaried workers may suit
cooperatives better for market changeability and ﬂuctuances in product demand,
even though they often justify it due to the fact that the cooperative mentality is
not present everywhere or that it can take time for new workers to develop it. All
these deviations are quite common, a reason why it may be useful to provide a less
stringent deﬁnition:
Cooperative*. A ﬁrm in which a majority of workers have equal control
rights over the ﬁrms and a majority of shares are owned by them.
The origins of cooperativism can be traced back at least to the Industrial Revolution,
with outstanding examples such as Robert Owen’s cooperative experiments in New
9 Dow, Governing the Firm, pp. 78-79.
10 See Dow, Governing the Firm, p. 81; Hansman, The Ownership of Enterprise, p. 69.
11 See J. Elster, “From Here to There; or, If Cooperative Ownership is so Desirable, why are
there so Few Cooperatives?,” Social Philosophy and Policy 6 (1989): 93-111.
12 Cooperatives Act 26/1999 of July 16.
13 See www.mcc.es (Accessed October 28 2011)
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Lanark, which included discounted retail shops where proﬁts were transferred to
his employees, and the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, founded in 1844, in
which 28 weavers and other artisans set up the society to open their own store selling
food they could not otherwise aﬀord and that triggered the cooperative movement
throughout the UK. Even though its early advocates were aimed at transforming the
economic system, cooperativism has turned into a peripheral yet persistent form of
economic organization. Thus, according to the International Co-operative Alliance
(ICA), in 2004 100 million people worked in cooperative ﬁrms, and the top 300
cooperatives in the world had around the same output as the GDP of Canada.
Now, the notable persistence of cooperatives in the world economy does not imply
that their market presence is homogeneously distributed across all market sectors. In
fact, cooperative ﬁrms are very rare in sectors in which capital-intensive investment is
required and substantial diﬀerences among employees of the ﬁrm exist, such as man-
ufacturing. Notable exceptions are Fagor, Europe’s ﬁfth largest domestic appliances
manufacturer that pertains to Mondragón Cooperative Corporation, and the ply-
wood manufacturing cooperatives in the American Paciﬁc Northwest, which in 1984
accounted for more than 10 percent of all plywood produced in the US.14 By con-
trast, cooperatives have a rather strong presence in the service sector, including law,
accounting, investment banking, management consulting, advertising, architecture,
engineering, and medicine. Companies in this sector are more labor-intensive and
diﬀerences among their workers are less substantial. As Hansmann points out, even
though the debate on WD usually focuses on industrial ﬁrms and rarely refer to part-
nerships and professional ﬁrms, the latter are precisely the most widespread forms
of WD. A notable instance is that of transportation companies, which are among
the sort of ﬁrms more often organized as cooperatives. In Sweden, for example, all
taxicab services and 50 percent of truck transports are supplied by cooperatives. (A
presence that sharply contrasts with manufacturing, where cooperatives are virtually
non-existent.)15 As Dow’s review of the literature concludes, “workers’ cooperatives
tend to favor labor-intensive industries that lack signiﬁcant scale economies, require
few specialized physical assets, and have minimal barriers to entry.”16 This is bad
news for WD in developing countries, where the economy is heavily based on the
industrial sector. But it is good news for Western countries, whose economies are
heavily based on services. For example, according to the United States Department
of Commerce, just approximately 22 percent of the total GDP of $25.8 trillion was
based on industrial output in 2007.17
14 See, respectively, http://www.fagor.co.uk/about-fagor-i-77.html (accessed October 26 2011)
and Hansman, The Ownership of Enterprise, p. 66.
15 See Hansman, The Ownership of Enterprise, pp. 67-68.
16 Dow, Governing the Firm, p. 49.
17 See B. F. Snowden, The Feasibility of Workplace Democracy in Large, Publicly Traded Cor-
porations in the United States (PhD diss., Union Institute and University of Cincinnati, 2005), p.
11.
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7.3. Normative arguments
Why is workplace democracy a topic worth being researched? After all, demo-
cratic ﬁrms are relatively rare and marginal institutions in our economic landscapes
and there are many pressing issues worth being analyzed in political philosophy,
including war, poverty, energy policies, exploitation, human rights, criminal justice,
especiesism, social capital, inter-generational justice, wealth inequality, nationalism,
climate change, global ﬁnancial markets or religious fundamentalism. As Philippe
van Parijs often repeats, political philosophy is not (or ought not to be) “an idle
game played for the pleasure of making subtle distinctions and smart points, but a
crucial part of the urgent task of thinking up what needs to be done to make our
societies and our world less unjust than they are, or even simply to avert disaster.”18
There are at least four reasons why studying how the workplace is organized and
whether workers should be given a say over managerial decisions may be important.
First, because workers spend one third of their daytime in the workplace, probably
more than anywhere else. Second, because decisions made by shareholders, directors
and managers dramatically aﬀect workers’ lives, not only directly through day-to-day
commands or the setting up of the working conditions, but also indirectly, as a
side-eﬀect of strategic decisions such as production planning or relocation. Further,
what happens in the workplace does not only have an instrumental value to the
worker but also an intrinsic one, work being a central source of self-respect in modern
economies.19 As Rawls put it, “The lack of ... the opportunity for meaningful
work and occupation is destructive ... of citizens’ self-respect.”20 Third, as we shall
see below, workers’ participation can be way more eﬀective and meaningful in the
workplace than in other spheres, such as national or even local politics, being the
impact of each vote 1n (where n = the number of participants in the decision) and
being n much larger in the national and local political domains than in the workplace,
even in corporations as large as Mondragón, which has around 80,000 workers.21
Fourth, apart from workers’ everyday life, raising income inequalities within ﬁrms
and an increasing political inﬂuence of modern corporations, in what some have
termed as the “new Gilded Age,” puts corporations and their management at the
center of the public debate.22
18 P. van Parijs, “Contestatory Democracy versus Real Freedom,” Just Democracy. The
Rawls-Machiavelli Program (Colchester: ECPR, 2011), p. 24.
19 This is shown by the reluctance to stop working of those who nevertheless could aﬀord doing
it. The intrinsic value of work as a source of self-respect has been widely noticed at least since Max
Weber. Marx and Peeters have recently studied the eﬀects of the Belgian Win for Life—a lottery
game where winners are granted a periodically unconditional lifelong income of 1,000 euros—over
its winners. Although acknowledging the obvious limitations of a study of this kind, they found
out that no single winning person out of fourteen reduced the amount of working hours and most
of the winning households did the same. See Axel Marx and Hansen Peeters, “An Unconditional
Basic Income and Labor Supply: Results From a Pilot Study of Lottery Winners,” The Journal of
Socio-Economics, 37 (2008), 1636-1659, at p. 1648.
20 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. lix.
21 See http://www.mcc.es/language/en-US/ENG/Economic-Data/Most-relevant-data.aspx
(Accessed November 1, 2011)
22 For a recent analysis of these trends in the Americna context explicitly linking them to
democracy in the workplace, see P. Frymer, “Labor and American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics
8 (2010): 609-616.
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7.3.1. Feasibility
Even though WD was a usual battle-cry among workers and a pressing proposal
for many policy-makers in the 1970s and 1980s, today there are reasonable doubts
about its appropriateness and feasibility, at least, for three reasons. First of all, as
Axel Gosseries has pointed out, “The issue is not at all on the political agenda.”23
Second, regardless of whether it is on the ageda or not, the proposal does not seem
to be clearly and explicitly supported by workers, who might be more interested
in ensuring and improving their working conditions and often in just getting a
job rather than in acquiring control rights over their companies decisions. Further,
even when they enjoy good working conditions and stable jobs, risk-averse workers
may prefer not to invest their savings in their own ﬁrms, for if the ﬁrm goes bankrupt
they would lose not only their savings, but also their jobs.24 Third, global trends
toward working ﬂexibilization and precariousness, decreasing union aﬃliation and
increasing unemployment has weakened workers’ bargaining position during the last
decades and has made it more unlikely for a social dialogue on WD to ever take
place.25
To be sure, these are sensible concerns that cannot be easily dismissed from a
normative point of view, unless it is believed that feasibility does not pose any sort
of constraints on normative theorizing. I do not want to raise the very complicated
methodological controversy on ideal versus non-ideal theory in normative ethics and
political philosophy. However, I assume that feasibility and real-world applicability
do pose some constraints on normative philosophy. What can be good under certain
circumstances can turn into catastrophic when such circumstances change. In short,
if WD proved to be completely unfeasible, there would be little if any interest in
analyzing its desirability.
That said, it has to be recalled that, WD is not merely a theoretical and counter-
factual proposal, but an ongoing reality with two centuries of history behind it and
a persistent presence nowadays. Thus, in 2006 more than 100 million people worked
in cooperative enterprises, according to recent data compiled by the International
Cooperative Alliance. To be sure, WD is not in the political agenda at all, as
Gosseries points out. However, the proclamation of 2012 as the International Year of
Co-operatives by the United Nations may change this. Furthermore, there are good
reasons to call into question the objections raised above.
On the one hand, it is questionable whether workers really despise the democra-
23 A. Gosseries, “Taking Workplace Democracy Seriously.”
www.politika.lv/en/topics/civil_society/15968/ (Accessed October 26, 2011)
24 “[W]orking men prefer to work where they can obtain the best wages and the most comfort-
able place, while at the same time they also prefer to invest their capital where they think it will
bring the greatest interest or dividend, whether that place be the one in which they are employed
or elsewhere.” Letter from William Nuttall to Auberon Herbert, quoted in Elster, “From Here to
There,” p. 94.
25 Figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor
show that approximately 12.5 percent of jobs in the US are unionized, compared to a high of
approximately 34 percent durunder Franklin Roosevelt’s administration. Quoted in Snowden, The
Feasibility of Workplace Democracy in Large, Publicly Traded Corporations in the United States, p.
2.
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tization of the companies in which they work. Of course, the perception varies a lot
depending on the context. But in 1984, for example, 66 percent of workers supported
it and, as recently shown by Isabelle Ferreras, in Belgium there is a widespread de-
mand for increasing workplace participation among low-skilled employees, such as
those working at supermarket cashiers, a sectors in which trade unions already have
a strong presence. Further, preferences for WD may be endogenous. As Elster has
pointed out, isolated democratic ﬁrms in an otherwise capitalist economy may make
them appear as less attractive for the average worker than they would be in an
economy were these ﬁrms were the norm26.
On the other hand, economic crisis does not need to reduce the presence of
democratic ﬁrms. Rather the contrary. The presence of cooperatives tends to enlarge
during economic crisis, such as the current one.27 This is so at least for two reasons.
First, because, cooperatives are specially resilient to economic recessions, partly due
to their greater wage ﬂexibility and the lesser need to make proﬁts for investors and
bonuses for managers. Second, because failing conventional ﬁrms are often taken over
by employees, who buy them out in a desperate attempt to avoid getting unemployed.
For example, in 2009, the year following the beginning of the Great Recession, an
increase of 15 percent in the creation of cooperatives was registered in Catalonia, in
contrast to a reduction of 32 percent in the creation of conventional companies.28
Of course, the greater resilience of cooperatives to economic crisis is not new.29
Consider a number of examples. First, during the agrarian crisis of the 1870s co-
operative rural banks dramatically expanded in quasi-industrialized countries, along
with manufacturing, trading and processing agricultural cooperatives. Second, dur-
ing the Great Depression in the 1930s in the United States, cooperative farm supply
purchasing greatly expanded from $76 million in 1924 to $259 in 1934. And the
same goes for other businesses, such as petroleum cooperatives supplying farmers
and farmer cooperatives. As for the former, by 1935 there were around 2000 of
them supplying products worth $40 million and, as for the latter, by the same time
there were 10,500 of them with 3,66 million members. Third, during the economic
crisis that lead to mass unemployment in Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s,
many employees responded with a wave of takeovers in the form of employee-owned
cooperatives aimed at curbing the impact of massive job losses. Finally, similar
cases can be found in Finland during the early 1990s recession, when over 1200
labor cooperatives were created under the support of the Finnish Ministry of Labor.
In a nutshell, even though democratic ﬁrms do suﬀer during economic crisis, they
demonstrate to be more resilient to them. If the current crisis lasts long, it clearly
appears that we will see more rather than less democratic ﬁrms across the globe.
26 See Elster, “From Here to There,” p. 96.
27 See Birchall and Ketilson, Resilience of the Cooperative Business Model in Times of Crisis;
Lansbury, “Workplace Democracy and the Global Financial Crisis,” Journal of Industrial Relations.
28 The data come from the Catalan Federation of Labor Cooperatives. See
http://www.cooperativestreball.coop/v2/inici/comunicacio/mostra.php?id_pagina=9&idPare=
(accessed March 15 2010).
29 See Birchall and Ketilson, Resilience of the Cooperative Business Model in Times of Crisis.
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7.3.2. Eﬃciency
Let us now turn to another key normative aspect of WD its productive eﬃ-
ciency, understood in terms of level of inputs used per unit of output. Consider ﬁrst
the main comparative advantages of democratic ﬁrms and their main disadvantages
next. Of course, I do not pretend to cover all the potential and existing advantages
and disadvantages from the standpoint of eﬃciency, which would make the section
unnecessarily long, but only the main ones.
A. Eﬃciency. It has been argued that democratic companies present three major
eﬃciencies compared to non-democratic ones.
— Eﬀort and information-sharing. It has been often argued that workers in demo-
cratic ﬁrms tend to ﬁnd their jobs more satisfying and meaningful, for they have a
say in their companies’ decisions.30 Accordingly, it is very likely for productivity
to increase, since workers’ supply of eﬀort increases and turn-over, absenteeism
and strikes rates decrease. In addition, it is likely for product quality to improve,
since workers are more willing to share their expertise and private information
with managers and co-workers. And it is likely for job rotation to decrease, since
workers are less likely to quit their jobs. In addition, all these eﬀects are likely
to be greater in cooperatives, in which, in addition to control rights, workers also
participate in proﬁts and wage inequalities are lower.31
— Unemployment. It has also been shown that, in times of economic crisis, demo-
cratic ﬁrms ten to produce a lower unemployment rate than non-democratic
ones due to greater wage ﬂexibility (workers are more willing to moderate their
salaries) and relocation of workers across diﬀerent departments of the ﬁrm. Again,
this eﬀect is likely to be greater when workers are the owners of the ﬁrm.32
— Vertical and horizontal monitoring. Firms are structures of delegation between
principals and their agents. Put simply, in conventional ﬁrms shareholders dele-
gate to the board of directors, who in turn delegate to managers, who ﬁnally
delegate to workers at the shop-ﬂoor level. Under more than likely circum-
stances of heterogeneous interests and asymmetric information among principals
and agents, agency loss is served and agents have an incentive to shrink at best
and behave opportunistically against the shareholders’ interests of maximizing
proﬁts at worst. A number of means can be put in practice in order to address
agency loss, including continued supervision of performance or salaries adjusted
to productivity. However, all these means are costly and unavoidably imperfect,
let alone speciﬁc problems such as the reduction of product quality. WD ad-
dresses the problem of agency loss by providing workers and managers alike with
30 See R. Sennett and J. Cobb, The Hideen Injuries of Class (New York: Knopf, 1972), pp.
235-236.
31 See S. Bowles and H. Gintis, “A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enter-
prise,” Economics and Philosophy 9 (1993): 75-100; H. M. Levin, “Worker Democracy and Worker
Productivity,” Social Justice Research 19 (2006): 109-121.
32 R., Parks, D. Kruse and J. Sesil, “Does Employee ownership Enhance Firm Survival?,”
Employee Participation, ﬁrm Performance and Survival, V. Perotin and A. Robinson, eds. (Ams-
terdam: JAI Press, 2004).
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an incentive not only not to shrink but also to monitor each other. Even though
perverse incentives may arise as well due to the democratic organization of the
workplace, as we shall see below in section 8.5, workers in democratic ﬁrms have
an incentive to monitor both managers’ performance and how their co-workers
perform, with a reduction in the loss of agency and the costs of supervision and
discipline as a consequence of it.33
B. Ineﬃciency. Brieﬂy consider now some of the main productive ineﬃciencies that
have been pointed out. (Some frequent criticisms are not addressed though, such as
rigidities of democratic ﬁrms in hiring and ﬁring or their potential tendency toward
wage maximizations.)34
— Decision-making costs. Democracy takes time at least more than vertical and
hierarchical decision-making.35 This is as true in the political sphere as it is in
the workplace. These costs go in three steps. First, the costs involved in electing
representatives (MPs and the president, in politics; delegates and board members,
in ﬁrms) and in making them accountable and responsive to their constituencies,
including the need for some familiarity with what is going on in the ﬁrm on
the side of electors (citizens in the former case; workers in the latter). Second,
decisions are to be made collectively, which implies that coalitions will have to
be formed, bargaining processes will have to be carried out and decision-making
will be slow. Now, it might be argued that these are features shared both by
democratic and non-democratic ﬁrms, for in the latter there is also a chain of
delegation, there are costs associated to ensure accountability and responsiveness
and decisions are often made collectively (say, by the assembly of shareholders,
the board of directors, an so on). Yet there is a crucial diﬀerence. Namely, that
in conventional ﬁrms there is a single well-deﬁned objective to maximize the
net present value of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts , while in democratic ﬁrms there is a
greater plurality of objectives because there is a greater plurality of interests. As
Hansmann points out, this is not to say that there is no room for conﬂict among
shareholders in a conventional ﬁrm, for they can have diﬀerences in tax status,
risk preference, or liquidity. But these diﬀerences are modest compared to those
in a democratic ﬁrm.36
— External capital and risk aversion. It is a point often repeated that democratic
ﬁrms tend to have problems to attract foreign capital and tend to be more risk
averse.37 This is not a problem for codeterminated ﬁrms, in which capital is
supplied by shareholders. But it is a problem for cooperatives, in which capital
33 See Bowles and Gintis, “A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise.”
34 See, respectively, J. Meade, “The Theory of Labour-managed Firms and Proﬁt Sharing,”
Economic Journal 82 (1972): 402-428; and J. Vanek, The General Theory of Labour Managed
Market Economies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970).
35 See J. Dreze, “Some Theory of Labour Management and Participation,” Essays on Economic
Decisions under Uncertainty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 375 ﬀ. Cited in
Elster, “For Here to There,” p. 94.
36 See Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise, p. 62.
37 See M. C. Jensen, and W. H. Meckling, “Rights and Production Functions: An Application
to Labor-managed Firm and Codetermination,” Journal of Business 52 (1979): 469-506.
7.3. Normative arguments 225
is supplied by its members, either in the form of membership fees or in the form
of reserves accumulated out of retained earnings or yet by investing their pension
savings in the ﬁrm. This feature has two negative consequences. On the one
hand, it prevents workers from diversifying risk, for they reduce not only the
diversiﬁcation of their investment portfolio but also the diversiﬁcation between
their portfolio and their human capital. Put simply, it makes workers put all their
eggs in the same basket, for if the ﬁrm goes bankrupt they not only lose their
savings but also their jobs. Reasonably enough, this makes them more risk-averse
and trumps eﬃciency-enhancing decisions that would otherwise be made. On the
other hand, it makes them dependent on loans, which are diﬃcult to get when
they are aimed at purchasing ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets, i.e. assets that are not easily
fungible. This may explain why democratic ﬁrms are rare in capital-intensive
sectors, and notably in sectors in which investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets is re-
quired, but nevertheless have a strong presence in labor-intensive sector and in
sectors in which capital investment is required but the assets are easily fungible,
such as transportation or taxicab services.38
— Common ownership and free-riding. It is often argued that when workers use an
asset they do not own, they may have no incentives to use it properly and take
care of it, mainly when they are paid for the production output rather than for
the production process and the way they treat the means of production (more
on moral hazard problems arising from the separation of ownership and control
on section 8.5). This is why some workers, such as truck drivers or carpenters,
own their own tools, even if they work for a salary. And it is a reason sometimes
used to argue for cooperativism, in which workers collectively own the means of
production and thus have an incentive to take care of them. However, as Alchian
and Demsetz have argued, joint ownership in large ﬁrms can produce free-rider
problems. Assets that are owned by everyone may in practice be owned by no
one if the number of owners is large enough.39 Now, it may be argued that this
problem can be avoided in small cooperatives for, as Elinor Ostrom has famously
shown, small-scale communities often resolve this collective-action problem.40
However, this solution is very problematic from the point of view of eﬃciency, for
it rules out the exploitation of scale economies by means of enlarging the size of
the ﬁrm, which is crucial for improving its eﬃciency. In short, an eﬃciency-based
paradox follows from the joint ownership typical of cooperatives. The smaller the
number of members of the cooperative, the more eﬃcient is the use of the assets
but, in turn, the less eﬃcient is the exploitation of scale economies. And the
other way around: The larger the number of members, the more eﬃcient the
exploitation of scale economies is but the less eﬃcient the use of the assets turns
38 See Dow, Governing the Firm, pp. 47-50; and Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise, pp.
75-77.
39 A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,”
American Economic Review 62 (1972): 777–795. See also Dow, Governing the Firm, p. 167.
40 See E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(New York: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1990).
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out to be.
However, at this point it is preferable to be cautious. First, because the issue of
economic eﬃciency is too technical and complex for my level of expertise. Second,
because, as pointed out by Dow and Hodgson, we lack data enough to draw con-
clusive and robust conclusions.41 Third, as noted by Hansmann, because the strong
presence of democratic ﬁrms in certain economic sectors but not in other ones shows
the context-dependency of eﬃciency issues, to the point that, if we leave aside con-
siderations other than eﬃciency, we may well end up concluding that WD is a good
idea in some sectors (say, services) but not in other ones (say, industries requiring
large ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment).
C. Additional eﬀects. Apart from their strict economic output, it may be worth
mentioning three additional eﬀects that democratic ﬁrms may bring about. First,
their likely impact on job security and workers’ health in terms of reducing the
likelihood of occupational hazards taking place. Provided that workers are given
a say over the setting up of working conditions, it can be expected that they will
improve those conditions not only by ensuring that existing security standards are
respected but also by providing their own knowledge so as to amend and improve
such standards.42
Second, given the widespread and growing political apathy in Western democra-
cies, a number of authors, such as Pateman and Mason, have defended WD not be-
cause of its potential economic or health beneﬁts, but due to its potential side-eﬀects
over citizens’ engagement in the political sphere. According to the so-called “spillover
thesis,” participation in the workplace provides an eﬃcient and eﬀective means of
increasing participation in politics beyond the workplace.43 Given the amount of
time workers spend in the workplace, participation in the workplace could promote
the development of attitudes and psychological qualities necessary for a wide and
genuine participation in the political sphere. However, as recently noted by Neil
Carter, the existing evidence on the relationship between WD and political par-
ticipation is far from conclusive and often at odds with the spillover thesis.44 For
example, a study carried out by Greenberg et al. using a sample of 1,247 workers
of democratic and non democratic companies shows that the relationship is much
weaker than anticipated by Pateman and Mason.45
41 Dow, Governing the Firm, pp. 261-262; G. L. Hodgson, “Organizacional Form and Economic
Evolution: A Critique of the Williamsonian Hypothesis,” Democracy and Eﬃciency in the Economic
Enterprise, U. Pagano and R. Rowthorn, eds. (London: Routledge, 1996).
42 T. Theorell, “Democracy at Work and its Relationship to Health,” Emotional and Physiolog-
ical Processes and Positive Intervention Strategies, en P. L. Perrewé and D. C. Ganster (Amsterdam
and London: Elsevier, 2004).
43 See C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970) and R. Mason, Participatory and Workplace Democracy (Carbondale, IL: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1982).
44 See N. Carter, “Political Participation and the Workplace: The Spillover Thesis Revisited,”
The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 8 (2006): 410-426.
45 E. Greenberg, L. Grunberg and K. Daniel, “Industrial work and political participation: Be-
yond ’simple spillover’,” Political Research Quarterly 49 (1996): 287–304.
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Finally, given the global trend toward growing inequalities of size and weight
among ﬁrms and of income and wealth within ﬁrms, WD has been sometimes advo-
cated as a way of curbing such inequalities and of controlling, from within ﬁrms them-
selves, their inﬂuence over decisions made beyond the economic sphere notably,
those made by democratic governments. During the last decades we have witnessed
a rising income inequality in general and within ﬁrms in particular not observed since
the Roaring Twenties in what some have termed as the “new Gilded Age.”46 For
example, according to a recent report by the International Labor Organization, the
average wage diﬀerences of CEOs and average workers in the US grew from 370 to 1
in 2003 to 521 to 1 in 2007. For the same period, in the Netherlands the grew from
50 to 1 in 2003 to 100 to 1 in 2007.47 In addition, a similar trend has been observed
regarding the size and weight of global corporations. For example, by 1996 51 out
of the 100 largest world economies were already private companies, while only 49
were countries. For example, Wal Mart was larger than Poland, General Motors was
larger than Denmark and Toyota was larger than Norway.48
It is questionable why democracy within ﬁrms would reduce their political in-
ﬂuence or their rent-seeking behavior. There is no reason why workers ought to be
less interested in manipulating the political environment so as to receive transfer
payments or tariﬀ protections from the government. By contrast, wage inequalities
within ﬁrms is a diﬀerent issue that WD may help to address.49 Indeed, in his
study of American factories owned and/or operated by workers, Carnoy and Searer
concluded that “in each of the cases studied, if the companies owned by the workers’
wages did not completely uniform, at least matches were signiﬁcantly in comparison
with capitalist-owned enterprises and even the public bureaucracy.”50
7.3.3. Expertise
Firms are complex institutions that operate in constantly changing economic en-
vironments. Their management involves decisions about investment policies, produc-
tion engineering, contracting and compensation and on budgetary planning, among
many other technical and complicated issues. Why should workers be granted a
say in their running when they often lack the expertise required to make informed
decisions about these topics? As an executive said when asked about WD, “What?
And let the monkeys run the zoo!”51 Call this the epistemic argument against WD,
which can be summarized as follows:
46 L. M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Guilded Age (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
47 International Labour Organization, World of Work Report: Income Inequalities in the Age of
Financial Globalization (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 2008), pp. 18-20. For
an analysis of the eﬀects of economic inequalities over the political sphere (at least in the US), see L.
Bartels, Unequal Democracy. The Political economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2008).
48 See S. Anderson i J. Cavanagh, “Corporate Empires,” Multinational Monitor 17 (1996).
49 For arguments for WD based on wage equalitity, see e.g. R. Plant “Socialsim, Markets and
End States,” Market Socialism, J. Le Grand and S. Strin, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
50 M. Carnoy and D. Searer, Economic Democracy. The Challenge of the 1980s (New York:
Sharpe/Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 175
51 Christie, “Recent Calls for Economic Democracy,” p. 115)
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(A1) In order to function properly and be eﬃcient, complex institutions, in-
cluding ﬁrms, are to be run by those who have the expertise required to
do so.
(A2) Workers, at least a majority of them, lack this expertise.
(A3) Firms are not to be run by their workers.
Two replies can be raised against the epistemic argument. First, consistently ex-
tended, it allows for an analogous criticism in the political sphere.52 Since ordinary
citizens often lack the political knowledge required to take part in the government
of an institution as complex as the state, why should they be able to do so? If
WD is unjustiﬁed for epistemic reasons, then the government of those who know
best—epistocracy, in Estlund’s insightful terms—follows also in the political arena.53
Those who consider that this argument fails to undermine the principle of political
equality in the government of the state should also reject it (by modus tolens) in the
government of the ﬁrm. And, on the contrary, those who consider that the argument
succeeds they should consistently apply it to democracy across the board.54 Put
simply,
(A4) States are also complex institutions and not all citizens have the political
expertise required to control the state.
(A5) Not all citizens should control the state (from A1 and A4).
(A6) Since (A5) is nowadays unacceptable, (A1) should be rejected—i.e. ex-
pertise should not be a necessary condition for having control rights.
Second, even if we accepted premise (A1), it seems unlikely for shareholders to
actually have more expertise than workers. Moreover if we consider that, unlike
shareholders, workers spend a third of their daytime working in their respective
frms. To be sure, this is the reason why shareholders delegate control to a board
of directors, these in turn to top managers, and so forth. However, there is no
reason why WD ought to be incompatible with delegation of decision-making about
speciﬁc tasks to speciﬁc agents who can be democratically elected by workers and
revoked by them. As Elster puts it, “Competence and expertise can be hired.”55 In
fact, division of labor is the norm in democratic ﬁrms as much as in non-democratic
ones, for it is true that blue-collar workers, for example, may not have suﬃcient
knowledge of ﬁnance or management to run the ﬁrm. As Hansmann puts it, “An
individual employee need not herself have the expertise to make managerial decisions
in order to exercise her voice eﬀectively ... She need only be able to vote intelligently
in electing the ﬁrm’s directors”56
To be sure, the institutional forms and means through which democracy can
be realized within ﬁrms are as plural and open for debate as those in the political
52 I use here the so-called “parallel-case argument,” which will be discussed below.
53 D. Estlund, Democratic Authority. A Philosophical Framework (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2008).
54 A current example of this position is J. Brennan, “The Right to a Competent Electorate,”
The Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011): 700-724.
55 Elster, “From Here to There,” p. 95.
56 Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise, p. 115.
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sphere. But they need not exclude extensive use of division of labor and delegation
of speciﬁc tasks to speciﬁc agents. As Walzer points out, “in a developed economy,
as in a developed polity, diﬀerent decisions are made by diﬀerent groups of people
at diﬀerent levels of society. The division of power in both cases is only in part a
matter of principle; it is also a matter of circumstance and convenience.”57
These two replies cast doubts about premises (A1) and (A2)—the former by
trying to undermine the link between expertise and control and the latter by trying to
refute the lack of workers’ expertise and by trying to show how this lack of expertise,
even if true, could be consistently combined with WD through division of labor and
delegation of control over ﬁrm’s decisions. However, it may be replied that they
both neglect the relevance of agency problems in democratic ﬁrms and the epistemic
preconditions required for a meaningful exercise of the democratic rights, including
those of workers within a democratic ﬁrm. If we call into question the quality of
a democratic system with, say, widespread illiteracy among its citizens and we do
support public funding of education as consequence of it rather than assuming that
democracy is not suitable for such countries under such circumstances, we ought to
do the same regarding large epistemic asymmetries within democratic ﬁrms.
In this regard, Kasmir has documented the eﬀects of the lack of expertise and
spare time available over workers’ representatives in the Social Council of Fagor (the
instance through which shop-ﬂoor workers are represented to management at one
of the Mondragón Cooperative Corporation’s cooperatives) and over their ability to
properly evaluate the proposals raised by management and to amend them if re-
quired.58 She has also shown the general apathy and refusal to participate produced
by the absence of the epistemic conditions required for the meaningful exercise of
control rights on the side of workers. According to Kasmir “normatively the Social
Council extends considerably more rights to cooperative workers, while these rights
to participate and plan are protected managerial prerogative in private frms. In
practice, however ... structural factors (not having enough time, receiving too much
complex information, not being able to seek the help of outside professionals ...)
can limit its eﬀectiveness.”59 Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that a set of
epistemic preconditions are to be met in order to hold directors and managers ac-
countable and for control rights to be meaningfully exercised by workers. These may
include, among other measures, permanent professional training and time assigned in
workers’ schedule for the evaluation, amendment and elaboration of board proposals.
Just to be clear, this does not need to mean that division of labor and delegation
of complex tasks to speciﬁc agents should be excluded from democratic ﬁrms. Nei-
ther does it mean that eﬀective and meaningful exercise of control has an intrinsic
value further beyond ensuring that directors and managers are held accountable,
that agency loss is minimized, and that workers’ interests are taken into account in
managerial decisions. But, even if we assume that division of labor and delegation
57 M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic books, 1983), p. 302. See also Elster, “From
Here to There,” p. 95.
58 S. Kasmir, The Myth of Mondragon (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996).
59 Kasmir, The Myth of Mondragon, p. 143.
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of control are necessary and desirable in large and complex companies, a minimum
competence on workers’ side—mainly, on less qualiﬁed, and therefore more vulnera-
ble, workers’ side—is required if monitoring is to remain accurate and elected agents
are to be held accountable.
7.3.4. Ownership
Consider now WD from the point of view of the ownership of the ﬁrm. Why
should workers be granted control rights over the ﬁrm when they are not its owners?
Workers can always choose to work for democratic ﬁrms, take over their own ﬁrm
in case it goes bankrupt or buy a majority of its voting shares—through ESOP
or in the stock market—and thus gain control rights. As Nozick put it, “persons
may form their own democratically-run cooperative ﬁrms. It is open to any wealthy
radical or group of workers to buy an existing factory or establish a new one, and
to institute their favorite microindustrial scheme; for example, worker-controlled,
democratically-run ﬁrms.”60 But, while they do not do it, shareholders remain the
only legitimate owners of the ﬁrm and, accordingly, retain the rights derived from
that ownership—among others, the right to possess the ﬁrm and to exclude others
from using it, the right to decide how and by whom it may be used, the right to the
residual income from it and the right to sell, modify and destroy it.61 Call this the
propertarian argument, which runs as follows:
(B1) Only shareholders are the legitimate owners of the ﬁrm.
(B2) Ownership implies having control rights over the ﬁrm.
(B3) Only shareholders have the right to control the ﬁrm.
Accordingly, a compulsory WD would violate the right of shareholders to use and run
the ﬁrm they own as they wish (let aside, for the sake of the argument, prerogatives
voluntarily awarded by shareholders to workers).
As we shall see, proponents of WD do not stand empty-handed when facing the
propertarian argument. But before turning to possible replies to premises (B1) and
(B2), the following caveat is required. Even if we accepted that shareholders are the
only owners of the ﬁrm and that ownership does imply full control rights, it may
be replied that there is no reason why the implementation of WD ought to imply a
violation of such rights, for it need not be compulsory. To be sure, some have argued
for an inalienable right to WD.62 However, instead of through, say, expropriation
or prohibition of non-democratic ﬁrms, the implementation of WD could be done
gradually and voluntarily, by providing legal advice or through tax beneﬁts and direct
subsidies such as those that, for the record, numerous non-democratic ﬁrms receive.63
60 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basick Books, 1974), p. 250.
61 L. Becker, Property Rights. Philosophic Foundations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul),
pp. 18-20.
62 See Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy ; Walzer, Spheres of Justice; and D. Ellerman,
Property and Contract in Economics. The Case for Economic Democracy (Oxford: Blackwell,
1992).
63 Some have argued that this shows that democratic ﬁrms are not eﬃcient, for if they were
they would be created voluntarily, without requiring these advantages. See Jensen and Meckling,
7.3. Normative arguments 231
As Bowles and Gintis point out, “to argue against mandatory workplace democracy
is to critique a straw man and to elide the fundamental issue, which concerns whether
policies promoting workplace democracies are justifed in the interest of giving workers
the opportunity to participate in these forms of governance.”64 However, even if not
compulsory, a rationale is still required for the state promotion of democratic ﬁrms
at the expense of non-democratic ones. To be sure, there is a notable diﬀerence
between using the coercive force of the state to ban non-democratic ﬁrms and using
its public resources to discriminate them in favor of democratic ones. However, in
both cases public means are used to beneﬁt one managerial option at the expense of
the other one. In this sense, the propertarian argument still poses a serious threat
to the justiﬁcation of WD. Let us then turn to its premises.
Firstly consider premise (B2), according to which shareholders’ ownership of the
ﬁrm implies their having exclusive control rights over it. In order to call this idea into
question, it is possible to use again the analogy between WD and political democracy
used above to reduce ad absurdum the epistemic objection. If we accept that property
rights imply exclusive control rights, census suﬀrage appears to follow in the political
arena. Why should all citizens enjoy equal political rights when they contribute such
disparately—if at all—in the ﬁnancing of the state revenue through their taxes?
Since, as Dow points out, “nothing about the ownership of a physical asset logically
entails the owner to run the ﬁrm,” those who ﬁnd the objection unsound in the
political sphere have to explain why they ﬁnd it sound—in case they do—within
ﬁrms.65 And, on the contrary, those who ﬁnd the objection sound ought to admit
that its scope goes beyond the ﬁrm and aﬀects the government of the state as well.
In short,
(B4) Not all citizens own property (neither do they pay taxes).
(B5) Not all citizens should have control rights over the state decisions (from
B2 and B4).
(B6) Since (B5) is nowadays unacceptable, (B2) should be rejected—i.e. own-
ership should not be a necessary condition for having control rights.
Consider now premise (B1)—namely, that only shareholders are the legitimate own-
ers of the ﬁrm—and two possible replies. First, it may be argued that a ﬁrm is a
set of agents supplying inputs such as ﬁnancial wealth, physical assets, raw mate-
rials, labor and so on. And that, since one of such inputs—namely, labor—cannot
be legally owned, it is simply incorrect to say that ﬁrms are or can be owned by
their shareholders. For example, Wal-Mart includes the workers of Wal-Mart, but
Wal-Mart’s shareholders cannot legally own such workers without them technically
becoming slaves. As Dow puts it, “in a society where slavery and indentured servitude
“Rights and Production Functions.” For a reply regarding why this need not be the case due to
endogenous preference formation, adverse selection, discrimination and externalities, see Elster,
“From Here to There,” esp. section III.
64 S. Bowles and H. Gintis, “Is Workplace Democracy Redundant in a Liberal Economy?,”
Democracy and Eﬃciency in the Economic Enterprise, U. Pagano and R. Rowthorn, eds. (London:
Routledge, 1996), p. 66.
65 Dow, Governing the Firm, p. 34.
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are not legally enforceable, no one can own a frm because a ﬁrm is a set of human
agents.”66 However, it can be replied that talking about the “ownership of the ﬁrm”
is just a way of talking about the ownership of non-human assets, such as ﬁnancial
wealth or physical assets, and that workers are not owned but hired—just as some
non-human assets are rented rather then owned. Further, shareholders and their
agents (directors, managers) have limited authority over their employees. Unlike
non-human assets, workers enjoy a number of labor rights, such as safety conditions
and protection from discrimination. Furthermore, unlike under nineteenth-century
Master and Servants Acts, or in current black markets of forced labor, or yet under
circumstances of monopsony in the labor market, workers in free markets have the
ever-present right to quit whenever they please. Whether these rights are enough to
protect them from abuses is a completely diﬀerent issue that will be discussed below.
Consider now a second criticism of premise (B1), which will be analyzed in some
detail in the remainder of the section, along with some possible replies. According
to a commonly held idea, shareholders’ property rights over the ﬁrm are negative
rights—that is, they are rights from interference by third parties, including state
intervention and, notably, state intervention aimed at advancing democracy within
the ﬁrm. In the standard deﬁnition,
Negative and positive rights.—The holder of a negative right is said to be
entitled not to be interfered by third parties—including the state—, whereas
the holder of a positive right is said to be entitled to the provision of a good
or a service, again, from third parties—usually being the state.
This conception is sometimes referred to as the “full liberal ownership” conception.67
Under it, shareholders’ property rights over the ﬁrm (actually, property rights in
general) are said to be purely negative because they only require that third parties,
including the state, refrain from interfering (e.g. through taxation, regulation and
promotion of WD) in the owner’s possession, use, transfer, etc. of the assets of their
property.
Two reasons have been advanced against deﬁning property rights as negative
ones. The ﬁrst one is that, as a matter of fact, enforcing property rights has public
costs that are mainly funded out of taxing property (be it through real estate tax,
income tax or VAT, among other). Since these costs are large—often larger than
those posed by positive rights—and can only be funded out of taxing property, it is
inconsistent to deﬁne property rights (including shareholders’ property rights over
the ﬁrm) as restrictions against the very state intervention required to fund their
enforcement costs. For example, Holmes and Sunstein have shown that just in 1996
the protection of property rights posed a cost of approximately $6,622 million on the
US Federal budget. In order to put it in perspective, the education budget for the
66 Dow, Governing the Firm, p. 107.
67 The expression comes from A. M. Honoré’s classic paper, “Ownership,” Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence, A. G. Guest, ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961).
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same year was of approximately $2,132 million.68 As Elizabeth Warren has recently
put it,
There is nobody in this country who got rich on his own. Nobody. You
built a factory out there—good for you! But I want to be clear. You moved
your goods to market on the roads the rest of us paid for. You hired workers
the rest of us paid to educate. You were safe in your factory because of police
forces and ﬁre forces that the rest of us paid for. You didn’t have to worry
that marauding bands would come and seize everything at your factory, and
hire someone to protect against this, because of the work the rest of us did.
Now look, you built a factory and it turned into something terriﬁc, or a
great idea—God bless. Keep a big hunk of it. But part of the underlying
social contract is you take a hunk of that and pay forward for the next kid
who comes along.69
The second reason is related to the ﬁrst one—namely, that the very existence of
property rights, and not only their enforcement, depends on state interference.70 As
an instance of this, Murphy and Nagel take pre-tax income as an instance of this and
argue that it is not possible to take it as independent from government interference.
This is so because, despite the strong feeling that we are absolutely entitled to
our pre-tax income, its very existence depends on the previous existence of money,
banks, ﬁrms, stock exchanges, patents, and so forth. And these, in turn, depend
on the existence of a previous system of criminal, contract, corporate, property and
tort law. It is thus inconsistent to deﬁne pre-tax income independently from the
institutional framework of which is partially a function. And the same goes for
shareholders’ property rights over the ﬁrm. Since they are equally dependent on the
institutional and legal framework that enable them, it is inconsistent to deﬁne them
as negative rights. As Murphy and Nagel put it, “property [is] what it is created by
the tax system, rather than what is disturbed or encroached on by the tax system.
Property rights are the rights people have in the resources they are entitled to control
after taxes, not before.”71
Consider now three replies to these criticisms. First, it can be argued that Holmes
and Sunstein overestimate the public costs of property rights and underestimate
the (raising) role of private agencies—such as private prisons and private security
companies—in their enforcement.72 Unlike prisons and security companies, some
state services may not be privately provided ex hypothesi (e.g. adjudication, which
cannot be totally supplemented by private arbitration). However, previous, current
and counterfactual situations in which property rights arise and are enforced in the
68 See S. Holmes and C. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights. Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (New
York and London: Norton. 1999), pp. 233 ﬀ.
69 The statement got viral in the blogosphere. It can be found, among many other places,
at http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2011/10/warren.html (Accessed Oc-
tober 31 2011).
70 See Holmes and Sunstein, The Cost of Rights; and L. Murphy and T. Nagel, The Myth of
Ownership: Taxes and Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002).
71 Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership, p. 175.
72 See D. Schmidtz, “Property and Justice,” Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2010): 79-100.
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absence of a state are thinkable.73 Taking into account the unavoidable limits of
private supply of goods and services, property rights may be hardly depicted as
purely negative under present circumstances. However, the degree and forms of
state interference required for the existence and enforcement of property rights—and
thus the degree to which such rights can be said to be negative—vary dramatically
from context to context. For example, property rights over ﬁrms can be said way
more negative under the First Industrial Revolution, when the state interference was
virtually nonexistent, than under the Second one, when the state played a crucial
role in enabling monopolies at home and opening new markets abroad.
Second, it is possible to accept that both the existence and enforcement of prop-
erty rights pose costs on the public budget and yet deﬁne them as partially negative.
To be sure, the state apparatus required for the existence and enforcement of property
rights against third parties is costly. Since such costs are mainly funded out of taxing
property, it is inconsistent to deﬁne property rights as restrictions against the very
state intervention required to enable and enforce such rights. However, that does
not turn such rights into purely positive rights, at least, for two reasons. First, since
such costs are still aimed at enforcing a right from interference (both from private
individuals and from the state, including monitoring public oﬃcials so as to prevent
them from abusing their powers), they could still be considered as partially negative,
rather than as completely positive.74 Second, even though shareholders beneﬁt from
the institutional framework that enables and enacts their property rights, they are
not the only ones in taking advantage of that framework—notably, workers also ben-
eﬁt from its existence. They both beneﬁt from the existence of roads, schools and
police, and not only the former, as Elizabeth Warren’s statement seems to imply.
Likewise, they both pay for such services, either in the form of capital gains and
property taxes or in the form of income tax and VAT. Shareholders may be wrong
when they argue to have absolute property claims against state interference. But
Holmes and Sunstein and Murphy and Nagel are equally wrong when they argue
that they do not have any such claims at all.
Third, it is possible to assume that state interference is required for property
rights to exist yet reject that this interference has to be at odds with the negative
deﬁnition of property rights when it follows the beneﬁt principle. That is, when
such an interference is aimed at enabling and enforcing property rights—or, more
broadly, at allowing the market to operate—and is funded out of taxes levied upon the
taxpayers according to the beneﬁt they obtain from the existence of that institutional
framework. Hence, assume that the institutional framework that enables and enacts
property rights does pose serious burdens on the public budget and, accordingly,
on the taxpayer. And further assume that some of the elements of the framework
cannot be supplied privately, either because they cannot be privatized ex hypothesi
73 See F. Maultzsch, “Morals and Markets: The Signiﬁcance of Pre-Tax Ownership,” The
Modern Law Review 67 (2004): 508-523; and J. P. Sterba, “Review of The Myth of Property,”
Ethics 114 (2004): 628-631.
74 See A. Gewirth, “Are All Rights Positive?,” Philosophy & Public Aﬀairs 30 (2002): 321-333;
G. Brennan, “’The Myth of Ownership.’ A Review Essay,” Constitutional Political Economy 16
(2005): 207-219.
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(e.g. criminal justice) or because they are public goods that would otherwise be
underprovided by the market (e.g. national defense or clean air).75 Now, even though
it follows that state interference via tax imposition is required if a regime of private
property is to exist at all, this does not need to trump the idea of shareholders’
property rights as negative rights as long as that interference follows the beneﬁt
principle. Once shareholders have paid for what they get—namely, the legal and
institutional framework required for the existence and enforcement of their property
rights over the ﬁrm—there is no reason why they should not be left alone to do as
they please with their shares.
However, the problem with the beneﬁt principle is one of measurement. Since
not everyone beneﬁts equally from the provision of public goods, we need to ﬁgure
out whom, what and to what extent to tax. And the problem is that the market
price system does not work here, because regarding the provision of public goods the
state operates as a price-discriminating monopoly.
In short, the attack launched by Holmes and Sunstein and Murphy and Nagel on
property rights as negative rights proves to be way too radical, for there are good
grounds on which shareholders can claim to have negative rights over the shares they
own and from being interfered by the state in such rights. However, it opens the door
for a less absolute and negative conception of ownership in which state interference
is justiﬁed as a matter of logic rather than on perfectionist grounds.
7.3.5. Power and contested exchange
Part of the previous replies to the epistemic argument and the propertarian
argument—namely, the reductiones in (A4)-(A6) and (B4)-(B6)—are based on an
analogy between ﬁrms and the state that has been referred to as the “parallel-case
argument.”76 According to this argument, once democracy is accepted in the state,
then there is no reason why it should be rejected in the workplace, in which power
relations between employers and employees analogous to those between oﬃcials and
citizens take place. As Robert Dahl famously put it, “If democracy is justiﬁed in
governing the state, then it must also be justiﬁed in governing economic enterprises;
and to say that it is not justiﬁed in governing economic enterprises is to imply that
it is not justiﬁed in governing the state.”77
To be sure, it may be replied that the analogy does not hold because ﬁrms and
states are very diﬀerent. For example, while ﬁrms are for-proﬁt, clearly states are
not.78 However, here I wish to focus on another potential objection—namely, that
75 As it is well known, public goods are nonrival and non-excludable. Since their consumption
by one individual does not reduce availability of the good for consumption by others, and since no
one can be eﬀectively excluded from using the good, markets tend to be unable to provide these
goods optimally, if at all.
76 The label comes from J. Cohen, “The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy,” Social
Philosophy and Policy 6 (1989): 25-50. For diﬀerent versions of the argument, see Hsieh, “Justice
in Production,” pp. 86-91. For a careful criticism, see C. López-Guerra, “Against the Parallel Case
for Workplace Democracy,” Revue de Philosophie économique 8 (2008): 11-28.
77 R. A. Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985), P. 111, italics in the original.
78 See López-Guerra, “Against the Parallel Case for Workplace Democracy.”
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even if we accept that relations of power, such as those between the state and its cit-
izens, ought to be managed democratically, it happens that, unlike relations between
the state and its citizens, employment relations are not relations of power, for they
are contractual relations in which the parties have entered voluntarily. Compulsory
labor could have been the norm in nineteenth-century England, when Master and
Servant Acts were still in force and employees were criminally prosecuted for quitting
their jobs. And it is so, nowadays, in black markets of prostitution and forced labor,
which according to the International Labor Organization include at least 12.3 million
of forced workers.79 However, in free and competitive labor markets workers can exit
their jobs as freely as they enter them. Accordingly, any attempt to democratize em-
ployment relations would turn out to be redundant at best, for they are already free
and voluntary, and an illegitimate interference in a voluntary agreement at worst. As
Bowles and Gintis put it, “if the capitalist economy is a sphere of voluntary private
interactions, what is there to democratize?”80
In this section I will present Bowles and Gintis’ challenge to this view. As we shall
see, according to them, employment relations are power relations indeed, for they
imply a contested exchange between the employer and the employee. This, in turn,
would give way to their democratization.81 Put diﬀerently, the existence of power
relations within the ﬁrm would not only justify the use of the analogy between ﬁrms
and the state in (A4)-(A6) and (B4)-(B6), it would also provide a straightforward
argument for WD. As Bowles and Gintis put it, “Because the employment relation-
ship involves the exercise of power, its governance should on democratic grounds be
accountable to those most directly aﬀected.”82
The section analyzes the theory of contested exchange along with the problems
it presents. First, the liberal conception of employment as absent of power rela-
tions is brieﬂy presented. Second, Bowles and Gintis’ theory of contested exchage is
reconstructed in detail. Finally, a number of problems are raised.
7.3.5.1. The liberal conception of wage labor
Unlike in much of classical political and legal thought, which considered employ-
ment relations as a partial form of slavery in which the employee temporarily waived
her freedom by working for a salary, in neoclassical economics and liberal political
79 The ILO estimates that of these 12.3 million, 20% are coerced by the state (largely into
military service), 14% are forced sex workers, and the remaining 66% are coerced by private agents
in other industries, such as agriculture, mining, ranching, and domestic service, B. and Belser, P.
(eds.) (2009), Forced Labor: Coercion and Exploitation in the Private Economy, Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
80 S. Bowles and H. Gintis, “A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise,”
Economics & Philosophy (1993): 75-100, p. 97.
81 See S. Bowles, and H. Gintis, “Contested Exchange: Political Economy and Modern Eco-
nomic Theory,” American Economic Review 78 (1988): 145-150; “Contested Exchange: New Micro-
foundations of the Political Economy of Capitalism,” Politics and Society 18 (1990): 165-222; “Power
and Wealth in a competitive Capitalist Economy,” Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs 21 (1992): 324-53;
“A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise;” “The Revenge of Homo Economicus:
Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7
(1993): 83-102; “Is Workplace Democracy Redundant in a Liberal Economy?,” Democracy and
Eﬃciency in the Economic Enterprise, U. Pagano, et al., eds. (London: Routledge, 1996).
82 Bowles and Gintis, “A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise,” p. 75.
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philosophy employment relations tend to be seen as voluntary relations between free
individuals and competitive labor markets, in turn, as non-political. As we have
seen above (§1.3.3.1), Cicero had perfectly illustrated classical thought by deﬁning
the wages of “of all hired workmen whom we pay for mere manual labor, not for
artistic skill [as] a pledge of their slavery.”83 Taking into account that the classics
deﬁned freedom precisely in opposition to slavery, it is unsurprising that employment
relations were naturally considered to be power relations.
By contrast, in neoclassical economics and libertarian political philosophy power
is absent from employment relations, at least, under certain circumstances—namely,
as long as labor markets remain competitive and workers can freely enter and exit
their jobs. As Abba Lerner famously pointed out, in neoclassical economics “an
economic transaction is a solved political problem.”84 Since in free and competi-
tive markets transactions are made freely and voluntarily, the only existing power
is, in fact, purchasing power. Of course, it has been widely debated whether this
feature applies to ﬁrms as well for, unlike in market exchanges, in the employment
relationship employers continuously exercise their authority within ﬁrms in the form
of commands and supervision. According to the conception of the ﬁrm as a nexus
of contracts, it is mistaken to draw a clear line between ﬁrms and markets and
employment relations are just another kind of market contracting.85 Even though
employment relations may diﬀer from other market contracts in the continuity of
association among employers and employees, the relationship among them is far
from being a power relation. In Alchian and Demsetz’s formulation, for example, an
employer has no more authority over an employee than a customer over a grocer.
Of course, both the employer and the customer can punish their counterpart by no
longer dealing with her. But an employer ﬁring or threatening to ﬁre an employee is
not exercising her power any diﬀerently from a customer who stops or threatens to
stop buying from her grocer. In Alchian and Demsetz’s words,
It is common to see the ﬁrm characterized by the power to settle issues by
ﬁat, by authority, or by disciplinary action superior to that available in the
conventional market. This is delusion ... The ﬁrm ... has no power of ﬁat,
no authority, no disciplinary action any diﬀerent in the slightest degree from
ordinary market contracting between any two people ... Telling an employee
to type this letter rather than to ﬁle that document is like my telling a grocer
to sell me this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread.86
83 Cicero, De Oﬁciis, trans. W. Miller (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1913), I. XLII.
The word in the Latin original version is “servus” rather than “sclavus.” However, it has to be
noted that in the Roman Republic “servitude” was synonymous with “slavery.” This meaning would
remain stable until the High Middle Ages (c. 1000-1300), when the term would acquire its more
usual medieval meaning, i.e. as the status of those peasants who were bound to a manor and subject
to a levy of their labor, production and/or income by the lord of the manor.
84 A. Lerner, “The Economics and Politics of Consumer Sovereignty,” American Economic
Review Proceedings 62 (1972): 258-66, p. 259.
85 See A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Orga-
nization,” American Economic Review, 62 (1972), 777–795; and Jensen and Meckling, “Rights and
Production Functions.”
86 Alchian and Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” p. 777.
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The transition from the conception of employment as a form of slavery, in which the
worker temporarily gives away her freedom to the liberal conception of employment as
a voluntary transaction between free and self-standing individuals, had an important
role in the development of industrial capitalism, at least in two ways. On the one
hand, the conception of wage labor as free labor made it possible for American
abolitionists to distinguish between slavery and wage labor. This use contrasted to
that of the slaveholders in the South, who used the term “wage slavery” to discredit
the supposed freedom of industrial workers in the North and, therefore, to justify
slavery. Paradoxically enough, socialists were not the only ones to denounce wage
labor in factories as wage slavery. According to Carsel, “By 1860 [the term “wage
slavery”] had become a standard part of the proslavery rationale, and some publicists
... made it a central thesis in their arguments.”87
On the other hand, as we have seen above (§1.3.3.1), the extension of wage labor
to millions of workers during the Industrial Revolution turned out to be possible only
because the status of wage laborers was assimilated to that of capitalists. Namely,
as both being owners—the former of her labor force, the latter of her capital—and
thus as being able to freely exchange their properties in the market. As Antoni
Domenech has pointed out, this shift from partial slavery to freedom was possible
thanks to “the legal ﬁction according to which the male have-nothings were also
’free owners:’ Owners of their labor force, and with an equal legal capacity—with
an equal freedom—to make legal actions and business (civil contracts) from their
’property.” ’88
The ownership of the worker over her own person is a legal ﬁction—or a “political
ﬁction,” as Pateman has put it—because, even though there are parts that can be sep-
arated from the owner and exchanged in the market—e.g. esperm or some organs—,
other parts—e.g. abilities and talents—cannot be technically separated. They can
be exchanged only as if they were another productive asset.89 As Karl Polanyi put
it, “Labor [cannot] be detached from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized ... The
commodity description of labor ... is entirely ﬁctitious.”90
If workers are deﬁned as owners of themselves, it seems obvious that them being
hired needs not to reduce their freedom, as long that they do it voluntarily. Further,
if they are deﬁned as owners of themselves, why should they be prevented from
selling themselves as slaves, as long as they do it voluntarily? Taken to its logical
consequences, the liberal conception of wage labor as free labor calls into question
the inalienable rights against slavery. If workers can be hired, there is no reason
why they should not be bought, provided that they are sold voluntarily. Hence,
Nozick could famously argue on Anarchy, State and Utopia that “The comparable
87 W. Carsel, “The Slaveholders’ Indictment of Northern Wage Slavery,” Journal of Southern
History 6 (1940): 504-520, p. 504.
88 A. Domènech, El Eclipse de la fraternidad (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004), pp. 94-95.
89 See C. Pateman, “Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization and a Tale
of two Concepts,” Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2002): 20-53, pp. 26-27.
90 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our Time
(Boston: Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), p. 71
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question about an individual is whether a free system will allow him to sell himself
into slavery. I believe that it would.”91
In short, the liberal conception of employment contracts as free contracts in which
power is absent makes it possible to draw a clear line between states and ﬁrms. In the
former domain public oﬃcials do exercise coercion over citizens, while in the latter
the employer is unable to exercise coercion of any sort over the employee, for the
employee has voluntarily agreed to the terms of the employment contract and can
quit the job at will and unilaterally.92 Accordingly, the analogy between ﬁrms and
states does not hold and the replies to the epistemic and the propertarian arguments
fail.
7.3.5.2. Contested exchange
Against the liberal conception of employment relations, which are regarded as
non-political relations, Bowles and Gintis attempt to demonstrate “what is transpar-
ent to the unschooled—that the capitalist economy confers power upon those who
occupy leading positions in the business world—is denied by the sophisticated.”93
According to Bowles and Gintis, employment relations are relations of power be-
cause they involve a “contested exchange” between the employer and the employee,
which opens the door to their democratization. “Because the employment relation-
ship involves the exercise of power, its governance should on democratic grounds be
accountable to those most directly aﬀected.”94 This section reconstructs the theory
of contested exchange regarding wage labor,95 and a number of criticisms are raised in
the following one. Firstly consider the deﬁnition of “power” and “contested exchange”
employed by Bowles and Gintis.
Power relationship.—Agent A has power over agent B if, by imposing or
threatening to impose sanctions on B, A is capable of aﬀecting B’s actions in
ways that further A’s interests, while B lacks this capacity with respect to A.
According to this deﬁnition, the advantageous and asymmetric imposition of sanc-
tions—or of threats thereof—is a suﬃcient condition for the exercise of power. It is
not a necessary one though, for it does not exclude additional instances under which
A can be said to have power over B (say, under more stringent conceptions of power).
Hence, the deﬁnition of Bowles and Gintis is rather minimal and hardly disputable.
Even though there may be additional conditions under which power relations can
91 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 331.
92 Interestingly, in the early twentieth century, in the heyday of the monopoly capitalism that
characterized the second Industrial Revolution, Friedrich Nauman, founder of the German Liberal
Party, had distinguished liberalism from socialism, precisely because of their willingness to accept
or reject this distinction. Nauman said: "If regarding the state there are only diﬀerences of degree
between socialism and liberalism, their relationship are more complicated when taking into account
the major economic enterprises that have appeared in recent years. These are private organizations
(...) That is how liberalism considers them. But, on the other hand, they are also major capitalist
organizations such as the state (...) That is how they appear in the eyes of Socialists.” Quoted in
Domènech, El eclipse de la fraternidad, p. 171; my italics.
93 Bowles, and Gintis, “Contested Exchange,” p. 145.
94 Bowles and Gintis, “A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise,” p. 75.
95 Bowles and Gintis also apply the theory to ﬁnancial markets, which are of course beyond
the scope of this dissertation.
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indeed take place, it could hardly be denied that, when their conditions apply, power
is exercised. Consider the example of a dictatorship, in which the dictator has the
ability to aﬀect the actions of her citizens for her own interests, and citizens lack a
similar capacity in relation to the dictator.
On the other hand, an exchange is contested under the following conditions:
Contested exchange.—An exchange between A and B is contested when B
possesses an attribute that is valuable to A, is costly for B to provide, yet is
not adequately speciﬁed in an exogenously enforceable contract.
When the terms of a contractual relationship can be fully speciﬁed ex ante and are
costlessly enforceable by a third party—e.g. a court—the exchange can be said to be
uncontested. Thus many of the market exchanges are uncontested because the terms
of the contract are well speciﬁed at the outset of the exchange and these terms can
be enforced by a third party. However, there are also many cases in which the terms
of the relationship cannot be fully speciﬁed ex ante and/or cannot be exogenously
enforced. These exchanges are said to be contested.
These conditions obtain under a number of common circumstances. For example,
when the terms of the relationship cannot be fully speciﬁed in the contract—or
it would be too costly to do so—because unforeseeable contingencies are likely to
appear (say, change of the economic cycle); when there is no third party to which
the contracting parties can turn to (say, when A and B are two sovereign states);
or yet when there is a third party but the relevant evidence cannot be adequately
measured (say, eﬀort). In all such cases, the contested attribute that A wants to get
from B has to be obtained ex post, through the use of an endogenous enforcement
mechanism, such as monitoring, sanctioning or designing an incentive scheme aimed
at obtaining that desired attribute from B, given that it is costly for B to provide it.
Now, according to Bowles and Gintis, the employment relationship follows this
scheme. For the following reasons. The employment relationship begins when, in ex-
change for a salary, the worker agrees to submit to the authority of the employer. An
employee diﬀers from an independent contractor—e.g. a free-lance worker—because
the employee is subject to the authority of the manager of the ﬁrm, while an inde-
pendent contractor acts autonomously. However, the employer does not contract the
labor of the worker, but his ability to work, that is, her labor force. The employer
hires the worker’s ability to work, from which the employer has yet to obtain actual
work. The relationship between the employer and the employee can be characterized
then as an agency relationship.
Agency relationship.—There is a relationship of agency when a principal A
authorizes an agent B to act on her behalf but cannot costlessly control the
behavior of B and would like B to take some action that B would otherwise
not undertake.
In the employment relationship all these clauses apply. First, the employer hires
a worker to act on her behalf, say, to perform certain task in the ﬁrm. Second,
the employer tries to obtain the greatest quantity and quality of labor from the
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worker, while the worker ﬁnds this costly and has an incentive to shrink. That
is, the employer desires the employee “to take some action that B (the employee)
would otherwise not undertake.” Third, the employer “cannot costlessly control
the behavior of employee B.” That is, the employer cannot costlessly ensure that
the employee will perform the assigned task at the desired degree of eﬀort. In the
absence of a third party, the employer has to devise a set of mechanisms to ensure
that the worker performs the task and works at the desired level of eﬀort.
In order to do this, the employer can attempt to specify a set of quantitative
properties of the job in the labor contract, including speciﬁc tasks, salary, breaks,
etc. Generally, these properties can be exogenously enforced. Thus, a “no call, no
show” form of absence, for example, can lead to exogenously enforceable dismissal.
However, there are a number of qualitative properties—such as the employee’s eﬀort,
intensity and initiative—that are very diﬃcult to specify ex ante and that are equally
diﬃcult to enforce exogenously. As De Francisco has put it, “you cannot go to the
court and tell the judge that you have ﬁred the worker because she did not work
hard enough.”96 These properties are contested willy-nilly and turn the employment
relationship into a contested exchange. According to Bowles and Gintis,
An employer oﬀers a wage in exchange for which the employee oﬀers not
some fully speciﬁable pro quo, but rather at best an unenforceable promise to
perform at an adequate level of intensity, care, and initiative. The employer
must develop a monitoring system to determine whether this level has been
achieved in any particular case and must have means to discipline an employee
whose performance is deemed unsatisfactory.97
To the extent that the employment relationship contains contested properties that
can not be speciﬁed ex ante and/or enforced by means of exogenous mechanisms,
the capitalist has to devise endogenous enforcement mechanisms in order to extract
such properties. Which are these mechanisms? The mechanization, sequencing and
standardization typical of Taylorism, as well as piecework, productivity bonuses,
and internal promotion are attempts to address the problem of agency loss in the
employment relationship and ensure that employees work hard. In the case of Tay-
lorist practices and piecework, by reducing the weight of the contested elements
of the relationship via specifying and standardizing as much as possible the tasks
to be performed. In the case of productivity bonuses and internal promotions, by
providing incentives for workers to supply endogenously the contested elements of
the relationship.
Without denying the importance of these and other mechanisms, Bowles and
Gintis focus on the endogenous enforcement mechanism that they consider to be
central to the employment relationship—namely, contingent renewal or, in other
words, the threat of dismissal. According to them, the threat of dismissal is the main
96 A. de Francisco, Ciudadanía y democracia. Un enfoque republicano (Madrid: Los Libros de
la Catarata, 2007), p. 73.
97 Bowles and Gintis, “Contested Exchange: Political Economy and Modern Economic Theory,”
p. 146-147.
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disciplinary mechanism used by the employer to obtain the contested properties from
the employee. A mechanism that, on the other hand, the employee lacks. Is it thus
possible to conclude that the employment relationship is a relationship in which the
employer has power over the employee?
Not that fast. The threat of dismissal is only credible if the dismissal implies a cost
for the worker, that is, if the worker cannot easily ﬁnd a similar job in the market.
However, in competitive equilibrium labor supply equals demand and, when the
market clears, agents are indiﬀerent between their current transactions and pursuing
the next best alternative. In such circumstances the threat of dismissal is not credible
because the employee can ﬁnd a similar job elsewhere. In short, as Bowles and Gintis
put it, “to the extent that such sanctions are the basis of power, neither owners,
managers, nor creditors have power in Walrasian competitive equilibrium.”98
In imperfect labor markets the employee may lack a real exit option, for the
labor market does not clear. That is, there is a group of workers involuntarily
unemployed—an “industrial reserve army,” to use Marx’s famous expression—and
willing to take B’s job in case she is ﬁred, which turns the threat of dismissal into
credible. Put diﬀerently, the existence of involuntary unemployment turns the exit
option into costly, which in turn provides the employer with an advantageous position
over the employee. By contrast, under competitive equilibrium the labor market
clears and, accordingly, the employee does enjoy a costless exit option that balances
the asymmetric bargaining position between the employer and the employee. Under
such conditions, employer A cannot credibly threaten to ﬁre employee B, or at least
not more than B can threaten A with quitting and, accordingly, no power can be said
to be exercised according to Bowles and Gintis’ deﬁnition. In Samuelson’s famous
words, “in a perfectly competitive model, it really doesn’t matter who hires whom;
so let labor hire capital.”99 And, as expressed by Gauthier, “the perfect market, were
it realized, would constitute a morally free zone, a zone within which the constraints
of morality would have no place.”100 That is, a zone free of power relations, as he
makes it clear:
the presupposition of free activity ensures that no one is subject to any
form of compulsion ... Each chooses for herself what to produce, what to
exchange, and what to consume ... given the freedom of market interaction,
the introduction of moral constraints would be the introduction of the very
compulsion that we suppose morality is intended to counteract.101
Now, as shown by Shapiro and Stiglitz, when the employer can only imperfectly
control the actions of the employee, the labor market does not clear, for the ex-
istence of involuntary unemployment serves as a necessary disciplinary mechanism
98 Bowles and Gintis, “Power and Wealth in a competitive Capitalist Economy,” p. 326.
99 P. Samuelson, “Wages and Interests: A Modern Dissection of Marxian Economics.” American
Economic Review 47 (1957): 884-912, p. 894.
100 D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 121.
101 Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, p. 96. According to Daniel Hausman, if this argument
were correct, "morality [or, for what concerns us here, a possible democratization] would have
applicability to markets only in virtue of the imperfection of these markets.” D. M. Hausman, “Are
Markets Morally Free Zones?,” Philosophy & Public Aﬀairs 18 (1989): 317-333, p. 317.
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to ensure that employees work at the desired level of eﬀort.102 If the labor market
cleared, workers would lack adequate incentives not to shirk, for they would be able
to ﬁnd a similar job easily in case they were caught shirking. In short, involuntary
unemployment turns out to be eﬃcient, for it serves as a disciplinary mechanism for
those who do have a job, thus increasing their productivity. According to Shapiro
and Stiglitz:
Under the conventional competitive paradigm, in which all workers receive
the market wage and there is no unemployment, the worst that can happen
to a worker who shirks on the job is that he is ﬁred. Since he can immediately
be rehired, however, he pays no penalty for his misdemeanor. With imperfect
monitoring and full employment, therefore, workers will choose to shirk ...
With unemployment, even if all ﬁrms pay the same wages, a worker has an
incentive not to shirk. For, if he is ﬁred, an individual will not immediately
obtain another job. The equilibrium unemployment rate must be suﬃciently
large that it pays workers to work rather than to take the risk of being caught
shirking.103
Given that in competitive equilibrium—let alone imperfect markets—involuntary
unemployment exists, workers are not indiﬀerent to losing their jobs. Accordingly,
the threat of dismissal turns out to be credible and the employer is able to impose
sanctions that the employee, by contrast, cannot impose. Thus, Bowles and Gintis
are in a position to say that the employment relationship between employer A and
employee B is a relation of power even in competitive equilibrium. And that, for
three reasons:
(C1) In competitive equilibrium there are unemployed workers who would like
to take B’s job, so A’s threats of dismissal are credible.
(C2) Accordingly A can impose sanctions on B and, in particular, can threaten
B with applying them to obtain from B the desired level of eﬀort and
promote her (A’s) interests.
(C3) B lacks the ability to impose similar sanctions on A.
(C4) Employer A has power over employee B.
7.3.5.3. Objections
Bowles and Gintis theory of contested exchange has been criticized, among other
things, for the narrowness of their motivational assumptions; for not taking into
account contextual factors—say, the unemployment rate, the economic cycle or the
role of unemployment beneﬁts—that dramatically inﬂuence bargaining positions in
the employment relationship, for not distinguishing between large and small and
medium businesses; for not considering additional endogenous enforcement mecha-
nisms; or for failing to identify power relations when contested elements are absent
or marginal to the relationship. The remainder of the section addresses all these
102 C. Shapiro and J. Stiglitz, “Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device,” American Eco-
nomic Review 74 (1982): 433-444.
103 Shapiro and Stiglitz, “Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device,” p. 433.
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criticisms and argues that the theory of contested exchange remains incomplete and
probably mistaken. On the one hand, it falls sort of capturing a number of very
relevant instances of power relations in the workplace and, on the other hand, it
includes a number of them that need not be power relations.
A. Motivational assumptions. It can be objected that the theory of contested ex-
change is grounded on over-simplistic motivational assumptions—namely, that both
employees and employers are self-interested utility-maximizers, so that the former
are only interested in maximizing proﬁt and the latter would shirk unless properly
constrained. Of course, it may be replied that Bowles and Gintis are exclusively
aimed at internally refuting the neoclassical view of the employment relationship as
non-political. That is, that even if we assume the neoclassical framework—including
the assumption of economic agents as self-interested—it is possible to show that the
employment relationship is a power relationship. However, Bowles and Gintis not
only aim at internally refuting that corollary. They also want to develop a theory
that can account for the way in which actual power relations evolve and surplus is
obtained in a capitalist economy.
Now, a central assumption of the theory of contested exchange is that employ-
ees will only work at the desired level of eﬀort when they have incentives to do
so—namely, not to be dismissed. However, by doing so the theory leaves uncovered
a number of forms of endogenous enforcement, such as when the employee perceives
the contract as legitimate or just. Bowles and Gitis assume that the parties behave
strategically, that they have conﬂicting interests and, accordingly, that employees
will work hard only under commands, supervision, threats of dismissal and eﬀective
sanctions. However, employees often identify with the company because they fear
that it may go bankrupt or consider that they are well treated and paid. Under these
circumstances, the threat of dismissal is still present, it plays a secondary role.
Hence, even if we accept the assumption of self-interest, Bowles and Gintis do
not take into account those cases in which workers—even if they may consider that
the terms of the relationship are unjust—are interested in the survival of the ﬁrm in
which they work. In these cases, as Wright and Burawoy put it, “given these shared
interests, it is possible some degree of real reciprocity in the relationship between
workers and capitalists.”104 On the other hand, once we relax the assumption of
self-interest, they do not explain those cases in which workers perceive the employ-
ment relationship as just and in which the threat of dismissal plays a minor role in
the process of endogenous enforcement. In these two cases, the employment exchange
can still be said to be contested, for B possesses an attribute that is valuable to A,
costly for B to provide, yet is not adequately speciﬁed in an exogenously enforceable
contract. However, it is at least questionable whether it can be said to be a power
relationship (at least, in all cases), for B supplies the contested attribute not because
she fears being ﬁred but because she considers that the terms of the relationship are
104 E. O. Wright and M. Burawoy, “Coercion and Consent in Contested Exchange,” Politics
and Society 18 (1990): 251-266, p. 79.
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just or at least in her beneﬁt.105
B. Context-dependency. It may be also objected that, even if we accept that employ-
ees are self-interested utility maximizers and that the threat of dismissal is the main
endogenous enforcement mechanism, the costs that the employee assumes in case of
being ﬁred—and therefore the employer’s capacity to credibly use it as a disciplinary
device—depends on a number of contextual factors that Bowles and Gintis do not
take suﬃciently into account.
These factors are both objective and subjective. On the one hand, even if the
labor market cleared, personal investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital may lock-in
the employee. And there are further subjective costs, such as those linked to loosing
the current job and seeking a new one. As pointed out by Elster and Moene Ove, “A
job change may involve a change of residence, with all the attendant psychological
costs. On the other hand, lead to the breakdown of speciﬁc business friends, imposes
similar costs of divorce.”106
On the other hand, when assessing the inﬂuence of involuntary unemployment on
the costs assumed by the worker in case of dismissal, Bowles and Gintis do not take
into account two outstanding contextual factors. First, the economic cycle, that can
dramatically increase or reduce the unemployment rate and thus the costs assumed
by the employee in case of dismissal. And, second, the sum and duration of unem-
ployment beneﬁts, along with additional public services, such as public schooling or
health care, that dramatically aﬀect the bargaining position of the worker.
The existence of these factors open the door for an scenario in which there is invol-
untary unemployment, the employment relationship is very contested (say, because
the tasks to be performed by the employee are diﬃcult to measure and monitor)
and, nevertheless, the existence of a strong welfare system—including generous un-
employment beneﬁts and public housing, health care and schooling—balance the
bargaining asymmetries between employers and employees. Put diﬀerently, one can
think of circumstances in which the conditions stipulated by Bowles and Gintis obtain
and in which, nevertheless, we can hardly say that the employment relationship is
a power relationship, or at least not to the same extent as when the worker lacks
a strong welfare system. As noted by Wright and Burawoy, “more important than
the shortage of labor demand is the issue of public welfare provision. [It is] in the
absence of real public welfare provision [when] the workers face a situation of extreme
necessity if they lose their jobs.”107
105 Of course, it can be argued that these sorts of relationships still involve power, only that
more subtle. Hence, according to Wright and Burawoy “This is precisely what the concept of
hegemony is meant to convey: a system in which the conﬂicting interests of workers and capitalists
are coordinated in such a way that workers spontaneously consent to their own exploitation.” Wright
and Burawoy, “Coercion and Consent in Contested Exchange,” p. 79. However, this is too fast a
conclusion, for it rules out the possibility of the relationship being actually just, a condition that
may often obtain.
106 Elster and Ove Moene, Alternatives to Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), p. 21).
107 Wright and Burawoy, “Coercion and Consent in Contested Exchange,” p. 82.
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C. Uncontested exchange. Finally, it may be called into question the actual im-
portance of the contested elements in the employment relationship and the extent
to which it can be said that, when these elements are absent or they turn out to be
marginal, the relationship between the employer and the worker cannot be said to be
a power relationship. As noted above, the scientiﬁc organization of work character-
istic of Taylorism was, among other things, an attempt to eliminate the presence of
contested elements from the employment relationship by trying to specify ex ante the
terms of the relationship through the standardization of the tasks to be performed.
It may be the case that, during the last decades, the post-Fordist organization has in
many ways replaced classical Taylorism, giving more weight to contested elements,
such as the initiative of the worker or his “productive intelligence.”
Now, on the one hand, it is not clear whether Taylorism has been actually re-
placed or whether it has lost its predominant position in the management of ﬁrms.
As noted by Boltanski and Chiapello, Taylorism may have been reduced in certain
sectors, especially in the continuous process industries, such as petrochemistry or
steel. But it does coexists in other sectors, such as clothing industry or construc-
tion, in which Taylorism would have not only not disappeared but would have been
strengthened, along with additional pre-Taylorist cases such as small businesses. In
short, even though post-Fordism may have expanded during the last decades due
to the introduction of quality circles, schedule ﬂexibility or just-in-time production,
“the dominant tendency is the reproduction of previous Taylorist forms of organi-
zation.”108 Moreover, the introduction of ISO 9000 family of management quality
standards and procedures developed to meet such standards, has led some to talk
about “participatory Taylorism.”109
To be sure, these trends do not call into question the soundness of the theory
of contested exchange, but only its relevance. However, this is not irrelevant, for
Bowles and Gintis theory may leave important instances of employment relationships
involving power uncovered and cover some instances that may not involve the exercise
of power at all.
108 L. Boltanski and È. Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism (London: Verso, 2005), p.
218.
109 See A. Lahera, La participación de los trabajadores en la democracia industrial (Los Libros
de la Catarata: Madrid, 2004), ch. 4.
Chapter 8
Republicanism at work
8.1. Introduction
All the arguments analyzed in the previous chapter, along with some others, need
to be taken into account if a conclusive case for WD is to be made. The aim of this
chapter is more humble though. It draws upon republican political philosophy, as
presented in chapter 1 and revitalized during the last three decades, and analyzes
whether WD turns out to be necessary to ensure workers’ freedom from arbitrary
interference within the ﬁrm.1 A two-step argument is defended. First, it is argued
that a republican case can be made not only for the availability of an exit option from
the ﬁrm and for workplace constitutionalism (i.e. the regulation of the workplace
by setting clear and speciﬁc standards to which managers have to conform in the
exercise of their authority), but also for WD. Second, it is further claimed that
WD requires, from a republican standpoint, not only workers’ participation but also
workers’ ownership of the ﬁrm.
The chapter is in ﬁve sections. Section 8.2 provides the republican framework
used throughout the chapter. Section 8.3 shows the forms of arbitrary interference
that are likely to appear in the ﬁrm and the problems of two competing views to
WD in addressing them—namely, (a) that the availability of an exit option from
the ﬁrm suﬃces to prevent workers from arbitrary interference and (b) that ensuring
republican freedom within the ﬁrm requires workplace regulation but not workplace
democracy. Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 show, respectively, that costless exit from ﬁrms
is neither possible nor desirable both in perfect and imperfect labor markets and
that exhaustive workplace regulation is neither possible nor desirable due to the
incompleteness of labor contracts.
Section 8.4, in turn, presents the republican case for WD as straightforward as
possible, and addresses a number of relevant objections. Finally, section 8.5 dis-
cusses whether WD requires worker ownership or not from a republican standpoint.
Bargaining power asymmetries and moral hazard problems arising from the formal
separation between ownership and control rights are analyzed and the ceteris paribus
desirability of cooperativism over other forms of WD in which control rights and
ownership are separated, such as co-determination, is defended.
1 For previous discussions of WD from a republican standpoint, see N. Hsieh, “Rawlsian Justice
and Workplace Republicanism,” Social Theory and Practice 31 (2005): 115-142; and B. H. McDon-
nell, “Employee Primacy, Or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work,” Stanford Journal of
Business and Finance 13 (2008): 334-393.
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8.2. Republican freedom
As we have seen above in chapter 1, the republican tradition of political thought
is concerned with freedom as non-domination as a central political value.2 According
to this conception, a free person is a person without a master, i.e. a person who does
not live under the arbitrary will or dominium of others. In addition, as we shall see
in sections 3 and 4, both political participation and material independence are taken
to be necessary, though not suﬃcient, conditions of freedom as non-domination. As
for now, let us focus on the deﬁnition of republican freedom.
Its historical priority notwithstanding, the republican conception of freedom is
usually analyzed in comparison to its liberal counterpart. Consider the latter, accord-
ing to which an individual or collective agent is free as long as she is not interfered
with in her choices and actions—be it through actions, coercitive threats or manip-
ulation. In Berlin’s (1958: 7), famous words, “I am normally said to be free to the
degree to which no human being interferes with my activity.”3 Two counterintuitive
implications follow from the liberal conception. First, we ought to accept that a
slave with a benign master is to some extent free as long as her master forbears
from interfering in her choices and leaves her do her own thing. Second, we ought
to accept, as Hobbes and Bentham did, that any form of legal interference, however
apparently justiﬁed, reduces by deﬁnition the freedom of the agent on whom the
interference is visited. In Bentham’s words, “As against the coercion applicable by
individual to individual, no liberty can be given to one man but in proportion as it is
taken from another. All coercive laws, therefore ... are, as far as they go, abrogative
of liberty.”4
By contrast, republican freedom is deﬁned as non-domination rather than as
non-interference. And domination, in turn, is deﬁned as the capacity to interfere
arbitrarily in the choices and actions of another agent. Thus republicanism is a
stricter principle in one dimension—there must not even be any potential interfer-
ence—but a weaker principle in the other dimension—actual or potential interference
is allowed as long as it is not arbitrary. The classic instance of someone who lacks
freedom as non-domination is a slave, for she lives under the ever-present threat of
being interfered with by her master arbitrarily, that is, without having to take into
account the slaves’ interests whatsoever. From a republican standpoint, the capacity
of the master to interfere arbitrarily diminishes the ability of the slave to deﬁne and
pursue her ends with self-conﬁdence and raises the likelihood of the slave’s choices
conforming to the preferences of the master. This is so because the slave is aware that
her master enjoys an ever-present position to interfere whenever the slave deviates
from her master’s preferences. According to Pettit, the impact of such a position
2 For careful and exhaustive analysis of the republican tradition, see among many others P.
Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Q. Skinner, Liberty Before Liber-
alism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); A. Domènech, El eclipse de la fraternidad
(Barcelona: Crítica, 2004); and F. Lowett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
3 I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 7.
4 J. Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies,” in Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: William
Tait), p. 503.
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over the slave’s choices can occur in three diﬀerent ways. First, it may impact on the
latter’s deliberative choices themselves, so she decides not to make them altogether.
Second, it may impact on the set of options that the latter sees as available to her
by removing some of the options from that set. And third, it may replace a subset of
her options by another subset of options that she considers to conform better with
her master’s tastes. 5
Just to be clear, from a republican standpoint, the freedom of the slave is di-
minished both by the capacity of the master to interfere arbitrarily in her choices
and actions and by the extent to which such an ability is exercised. Here I take
the stand of Skinner (1999) rather than of Pettit (2002). For the former, republican
(or neo-Roman) freedom depends both on actual and possible interference, while
for the latter it depends predominantly on the possibility of being interfered with.
I do not discuss which account is historically more accurate. The intuitive idea is
that the slave’s freedom is indeed diminished by the very possibility of her being
interfered with, as both Skinner and Pettit believe. But, pace Pettit, her freedom is
also and dramatically diminished when she is actually interfered with arbitrarily, or
when such interference is more likely to happen. In turn, the extent and likelihood
of actual arbitrary interference, and not only its possibility, will raise the likelihood
of the slave conforming to the preferences of her master.6
To illustrate the diﬀerence between the liberal and the republican accounts of
freedom, consider the two cases mentioned above. In the ﬁrst case, the republican
tradition argues that, even if the slave is not actually interfered with, she is still
unfree because her master enjoys the capacity to arbitrarily interfere in her choices
and actions, which, in turn, will raise the likelihood of the slave conforming to the
preferences of her master. Consider the case of a woman who depends on her husband
as her only source of income. Further assume that the husband agrees to share his
income with her and to make all the household decisions on a parity basis. Now,
if the husband used his economic position to impose his interests, by doing so he
would diminish his wife’s freedom indeed. But even if he does not use that position
to advance his interests, his economic position will in all likelihood aﬀect the wife’s
behavior as for those decisions involving spending—such as whether to buy a house
or rent one, whether to take kids to a public or a private school or even whether to
get divorced. From a republican standpoint, the wife’s liberty is aﬀected even when
she is not actually interfered with by her husband.7
5 P. Pettit, “Republican Liberty: Three Axioms, Four Theorems,” in Republicanism and Polit-
ical Theory, ed. Cecile Laborde and John Maynor (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), pp. 106-107.
6 See Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism; and P. Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom Simple.
On A Diﬀerence with Quentin Skinner,” Political Theory 30 (2002): 339-356.
7 Here it is worth mentioning the social experiments with the negative income tax (NIT) in
ﬁves cities in America and Canada between 1968 and 1980. Since in practice the NIT provided a
source of income for many women who had lacked it hitherto, one of its side-eﬀects was that the
divorce rate raised (for the Canadian case see D. Hum and S. Choudry, “Income, Work and Marital
Dissolution: Canadian Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 23 [1992],
249-265). Now, it is reasonable to think that most of the women who decided to get divorced
used their newly gained economic autonomy to satisfy a preference they already had. But it is not
unreasonable to think that the NIT could have made some women change their minds about their
own marriage and open a new option to them or replace other options they could have seen as the
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As for the second case, in contrast to the liberal view, from a republican stand-
point laws need not diminish the freedom of those against whom they are enforced
as long as they are not arbitrary.8 Consider the following example:9
Tanya lives in a small, newly created country in Eastern Europe. Perhaps
the most important issue in the region is the treatment of a disenfranchised
minority that lives throughout the country. Tanya truly dislikes the minority
and wants to further damage them if she can. While public opinion concerning
the minority varies greatly, the government has taken the side of the minority.
Consequently, a ban has been placed on any action or public speech that is
intended to hurt the disenfranchised minority. In other words, the government
has made laws against hurting the minority, but Tanya wishes she could hurt
them.
Jonathan Phillips presented subjects with this case and asked them whether they
considered that the ban diminished Tanya’s freedom or not. Interestingly, rather
than saying that Tanya’s freedom was completely diminished by the ban, the mean
response was more close to “Not at all” than to “Completely.” Phillips’ ﬁnding is in
line with the republican conception of freedom (though he analyzes it in diﬀerent
terms). According to this conception, legal interference can occur without substantial
loss of liberty when it prevents agent A (say, Tanya) from interfering the choices and
actions of agent B (say, the disenfranchised minority) in an arbitrary manner, i.e.
without being forced to track the interests of B.10 In that case, the law may diminish
to some extent A’s freedom, for it actually interferes in her choices and actions. But
it does not do so completely, for it makes compulsory for A to track the interests of B
and thus interferes in A’s choices and actions in a non-arbitrary and non-dominating
way.
Of course, law can turn into arbitrary itself, as it will become clear in section
4. However, it need not be so as long as it does track the interests of those against
whom it is enforced. Moreover, from a republican standpoint law turns out to be the
guarantee of freedom from arbitrary interference itself because—and as long as—it
ensures that the interests of the interferee are adequately tracked. Law ensures that
such interests are adequately tracked not only when they are taken into account, for
if someone is looking for a way to hurt someone else (as in the case of Tanya), she
might keep track of what her victim prefers and systematically attempt to thwart
each of her goals. It does ensure that such interests are adequately tracked when
forces the interferer (say, Tanya) to take the interests of the interferee as having
only ones available to them. Just to be clear, what is important from a republican standpoint is
that, whether they changed their minds or not and whether they eventually divorced or not, the
women who had been dependent on the income of their husbands hitherto had also been (only in
case they lacked other meaningful alternatives) under the latter’s ability to interfere them at will,
and thus dominated. I thank B for pressing me to clarify this point.
8 Pettit, “Republican Liberty: Three Axioms, Four Theorems”; and “Law and Liberty,” in Law
and Republicanism, ed. S. Besson and J. L. Martí (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
9 J. Phillips, “Freedom: Morality and Folk Intuitions,” unpublished manuscript, Yale University,
2010, p. 16.
10 “Republican Liberty: Three Axioms, Four Theorems,” p. 117.
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the same normative weight as her own interests. In Harrington’s words, republican
freedom is not deﬁned as ‘immunity from the law,’ but rather as “immunity by the
laws.”11
Now, even if we accept this conception of the law, it is still an open question which
laws would better ensure freedom from arbitrary interference in the workplace. In
the next two sections I turn to the forms of arbitrary interference that are likely to
appear in the workplace and the possible ways of addressing them.
8.3. Republicanism in the workplace
Put brieﬂy, in the liberal conception a person is free if and only if she is not
actually interfered with in her choices. By contrast, according to the republican
conception,
Freedom as non-domination. X is free iﬀ she enjoys immunity against the
possibility of being interfered arbitrarily.
Now, what forms of arbitrary interference are to appear within the ﬁrm and how are
they to be addressed from a republican standpoint? In contrast to self-employment,
the very point of the employment relationship is the voluntary subordination of
the worker to the command and supervision of the employer regarding the material
details of the job. It is thus inevitable for the employer to interfere continuously in
the employee’s performance in the form of commands and supervision. Now, such
interference need not be arbitrary as long as it is adequately checked, that is, as long
as the she is forced to track the interests of the employee on which the interference
is visited. As we shall discuss immediately below, there are number of ways in which
the employer may be forced to track the interests of the employee, such as the em-
ployee’s ever-present ability to quit in case her interests are not taken into account,
the legal regulation of the employment relationship, or workers’ control rights over
the decision-making of the ﬁrm. To be sure, none of these means is intended to
prevent the employer from issuing commands and supervising the employee’s per-
formance. But they may prevent such commands and supervision from becoming
arbitrary. The most obvious instances of workers subject to arbitrary interference
are those of forced labor and child work, which are involuntary by deﬁnition.12 But
arbitrary interference, either actual or possible, may also take place in non-forced
but inadequately checked working environments.
Nien-hê Hsieh has listed three levels of decision-making in which arbitrary in-
terference can occur: (a) decisions directing a worker to perform certain task or to
limit her performance, such as favoritism in allocating work and overtime or verbal
and physical abuse in the supervision (including sexual harassment); (b) decisions
aﬀecting not the particular actions of the worker but the conditions under which such
11 J. Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics, ed. J. G. A. Pocock
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 20.
12 They include violations of two of the fourfold set of fundamental labor rights included in the
ILO 1998 “Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,” the major international
consensus document on the issue.
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actions are performed, such as capricious rescheduling of working hours, discrimina-
tion in promotion and compensation or assignment of tasks involving hazardous
performance;13 and (c) decisions that are neither made directly about the worker
nor about her working conditions, but nevertheless aﬀect her as a side-eﬀect, such
as investment policies, production planning or relocations.14
Arbitrary decisions can be and are often made by shareholders, directors and
managers at these levels. Since they occur in the setting where people spend one
third of their lives and can dramatically aﬀect them and their families, it is reasonable
to take them seriously indeed. Now, what is it to be done about them? As we have
seen, from a republican standpoint adequate protection from arbitrary interference
ought to be aimed at eliminating not only actual decisions of this sort, but also the
very possibility of their being made.15 And adequate protection, in turn, will be
ensured as long as it forces the actual or potential interferer to track the interests of
the interferee. However, this aim can be achieved in a number of possible ways. Let
us consider two of them in this section and turn to a third one—namely, WD—in
section 4.16
8.3.1. Exit option
A ﬁrst response is that, in free labor markets, workers can always quit their
job. As a consequence of this, employers are forced to track the interests of their
employees and arbitrary interference turns out to be impossible. As Arneson puts it,
the freedom of the individual on a modern labor market willy-nilly confers
on each person a considerable degree of control in the form of exit rights ...
One can generally escape the reach of ... unwanted policies by quitting one’s
job and taking another.17
Consider two versions of this response—a strong version and a weaker one. According
to the former, in free and competitive labor markets little is to be done apart from
ensuring that they remain competitive and workers can freely enter and exit their
jobs. Arbitrary interference could have been the norm in nineteenth-century Eng-
land, when Master and Servant Acts were still in force and employees were prosecuted
13 As Hodson points out, arbitrariness can happen at this level not only due to the employer’s
actions but also due to her forbearance in the maintenance of the technical viability of produc-
tion, including job safety and security conditions. See R. Hodson, Dignity at Work (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 93.
14 Hsieh, “Rawlsian Justice and Workplace Republicanism,” p. 122, and “Justice in Produc-
tion,” p. 91.
15 To illustrate how the ability to interfere arbitrarily can aﬀect workers decisions, Stuart White
gives the example of a worker who says to himself, “I had better not go to those gay clubs any more
because if my boss ﬁnds out he might sack me, and I will then be destitute. Instead, I had better
go to the Young Conservative’s Association to impress him”. See S. White, The Civic Minimum
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 47.
16 Just to be clear, even if we accept that the interests of workers are to be tracked in order
to prevent their being interferred arbitrarily, this does not carry us all the way to an argument for
WD. Sure, the paper will attempt to show that WD is in a better position to do this. But such a
rationale for WD is far from being obvious and has still to be provided. I thank D for pressing me
to clarify this point.
17 “Democratic Rights at National and Workplace Levels,” p. 139.
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for quitting their jobs. And it is so, nowadays, in black markets of prostitution and
forced labor, in monopsonistic labor markets or in cases in which illegal immigrants
decide not to quit under the threat of being reported and repatriated. These are
all instances of compulsory or quasi-compulsory labor, in which workers are in a
permanent position to be interfered by their bosses with not much more restraint
than their capricious will. However, this need not be the case in free, competitive
and full-clearing labor markets as long as they are kept free and competitive. In such
markets, or so the argument goes, workers freely enter their jobs and can use their
right to quit as an ever-present threat against any ex post managerial decision—i.e.
not contractually speciﬁed at the outset of the employment relationship—that could
lead to arbitrary interference and abuse, ruling out the possibility of arbitrary inter-
ference taking place.18
A weaker version of the exit option argument assumes that power asymmetries
between employees and employers can arise in free labor markets and argues for
making the exit option as costless as possible through welfare provision of unem-
ployment beneﬁts, health care or a basic income. According to Brian Barry, for
example, a basic income “is the most practicable (perhaps the only practicable) way
of counteracting the excessive power of employers over workers.”19
Now, even though the availability of an exit option is a necessary and vital con-
dition to prevent forced or quasi-forced labor and to ensure that employers and
managers have to track workers’ interests (for they can otherwise decide to quit), it
turns out to be insuﬃcient, at least, for three reasons. First, imperfect labor mar-
kets do have involuntary unemployment, which has disciplinary eﬀects over employed
workers by making it costly for them to quit (since they would not be in a position to
ﬁnd another job easily). It is thus mistaken to say that employees are in a symmetric
bargaining position to contest managerial decisions or that they can use the right to
quit as an ever-present credible threat against any attempt of arbitrary interference.
As long as this is the case, employers remain unforced to track the interests of their
workers and are eo ipso able to make arbitrary decisions aﬀecting their employee’s
choices and actions.
Second, even if labor markets cleared, there are additional exit costs that workers
have to bear when they quit their job and can lock-in employees.20 Three stand out:
First, workers’ investment in developing ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital (the so-called
too-much-invested-to-quit eﬀect); second, the searching and transition costs from one
18 As Alchian and Demsetz’s famously put it, “What ... is the content of the presumed power
to manage and assign workers to various tasks? Exactly the same as one little consumer’s power
to manage and assign his grocer to various tasks ... Telling an employee to type this letter rather
than to ﬁle that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather than that
brand of bread”. A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization,” American Economic Review 62 (1972): 777–795, at p. 777. This is not Arneson’s
position, though, for whom “the right of the manager [to command] involves power or dominion
over the lives of others, whereas the right of the subordinate to quit does not”. R. J. Arneson,
“Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy,” p. 125.
19 B. Barry, Why Social Justice Matters (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 212.
20 See J. Elster and K Ove Moene, “Introduction,” in Alternatives to Capitalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 6; Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise, p. 71; and
Hsieh, “Rawlsian Justice and Workplace Republicanism,” pp. 129 ﬀ.
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job to another; and, third, the psychological costs in quitting work altogether—work
being a relevant source of self-respect in itself in our capitalist economies.21
Of course, all these costs vary enormously both within and across ﬁrms, as well as
across time and place. For example, while an experienced surgeon in Rotterdam may
be able to ﬁnd a similar job just by walking across the street, an unskilled worker in
Detroit may ﬁnd it very diﬃcult to do the same. Accordingly, employers may have
an uneven capacity to interfere arbitrarily with the various subsets of employees
under diﬀerent circumstances. Now, even though employees who possess scarce and
valued skills, such as a surgeon in Rotterdam, may be de facto immune to arbitrary
interference, employees who lack such skills are not, as Dahl has pointed out.22
Hence, additional means to exit rights may not be necessary for the former—just as
Warren Buﬀet may not need voting rights to de facto inﬂuence the political process—,
yet they are necessary to ensure the immunity from arbitrary interference of the
latter.
Third, even if exit were completely costless, it could happen that job alternatives
for workers were as despotic, unregulated and arbitrary as their current job. In that
case, exit option would be of little value. Consider as an analogy an archipelago of
countries that enforced open borders policies despite their being all dictatorships.
Would the fact that citizens could costlessly exit their countries turn the power of
their dictators into any less arbitrary?23 Adam Michnick, the Polish democratic
dissident, was once presented with a similar counterfactual, to which he replied the
following: “If forced to choose between General Jaruzelski and General Pinochet, I
would choose Marlene Dietrich. The alternative is absurd and irrational. It oﬀers
me the choice, as I ﬁght for democracy in a dictatorial system, of sitting in prison
either as a Communist or as an anti-Communist.”24 In a nutshell, though probably
necessary, it appears that the availability of an exit option alone is not a suﬃcient
condition to prevent arbitrary interference.25
21 The intrinsic value of work as a source of self-respect has been widely noticed at least
since Max Weber. Marx and Peeters have recently studied the eﬀects of the Belgian Win for
Life—a lottery game where winners are granted a periodically unconditional lifelong income of 1,000
euros—over its winners. Although acknowledging the obvious limitations of a study of this kind,
they found out that no single winning person out of fourteen reduced the amount of working hours
and most of the winning households did the same. See A. Marx and H. Peeters, “An Unconditional
Basic Income and Labor Supply: Results From a Pilot Study of Lottery Winners,” The Journal of
Socio-Economics, 37 (2008), 1636-1659, at p. 1648.
22 R. Dahl, “A Right to Workplace Democracy? Response to Robert Mayer,” The Review of
Politics 63 (2001): 249-253, p. 252.
23 Pettit makes a similar point in “Law and Liberty,” at p. 52. As we have seen above,
the analogy between ﬁrms and states I use here—the so-called parallel case argument (Cohen,
“The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy”)—has not gone without controversy. See Clau-
dio López-Guerra, “Against the Parallel Case for Workplace Democracy,” Revue de philosophie
économique, 8 (2008), 11-28. The main criticism is that ﬁrms and states are diﬀerent enough for any
analogy between them to work out. (For example, unlike states, ﬁrms are primarily proﬁt-seeking.)
However, even if it is true that the analogy hardly applies all things considered, it does apply once
the exercise of domination in each sphere is isolated from other variables, since forms of arbitrary
interference are likely to appear in both states and ﬁrms unless adequately checked. And that is
enough for the present case as long as we assume that any conclusion reached from the standpoint of
republican freedom is inconclusive unless properly balanced with the rest of the relevant variables.
24 Quoted in A. S. Kirshner, “Proceduralism and Popular Threats to Democracy,” Journal of
Political Philosophy, 18 (2010), 405-424, at p. 411.
25 To be fair to republican authors arguing for a basic income, it has to be noted that none
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8.3.2. Workplace constitutionalism
An additional response to the ﬁrst one is that workplace regulation, but not
democracy, is required in order to protect workers from abuses and arbitrary deci-
sions of their employers—call it workplace constitutionalism.26 This is the sort of
regulation we currently ﬁnd, somehow or other, in our advanced economies in the
forms of international labor standards, such as those settled by the International La-
bor Organization; workers’ rights, such as those included in domestic constitutional
documents and labor legislation; or professional and craft standards, such as those
established at the sectorial level. From a republican standpoint such regulations
are properly settled as long as they reduce managerial discretion and, accordingly,
managers’ ability to make arbitrary decisions, including sexual harassment, racial
discrimination in compensation and promotion, capricious distribution of overtime,
assignment of hazardous tasks and so forth.
Like the exit option argument, workplace constitutionalism (henceforth, WC)
is concerned with the forms of arbitrary interference that can appear at the three
levels of managerial decision-making mentioned above. Yet, unlike the exit option
argument, it does not attempt to grant workers the right to costlessly quit, so they
can use it as an ever-present threat in their day-to-day individual relation with the
management. Rather, it deals with arbitrary interference by trying to set clear
and speciﬁc standards to which managers have to conform in the exercise of their
authority, reducing thus their discretion. This appears to be a much better means if
arbitrary interference is to be prevented since, as Hodson has reported, the likelihood
of arbitrary interference is much lower when command and/or supervision is indirect
and standardized (e.g., through bureaucratic rules or craft and professional criteria)
rather than direct and personal.27 In short, the aim of WC is not to balance bargain-
ing power asymmetries between employers and employees, but to reduce managers’
discretion as much as possible and thus rule out their ability to make arbitrary
decisions.
Just to be clear, under WC employees’ and managers’ authority is not ruled out,
for they still have ample margin to run the ﬁrm in one way or another, say, when there
are changes in demand or new product strategies have to be implemented. However,
they have to conform to a number of standards that reduce their discretion in the
exercise of their authority. For example, under WC employers and managers can of
course decide whether employee A will transport some merchandise to Philadelphia
of them ever said otherwise. Raventós, for instance, argues for a basic income just as part of a
set of six necessary but not independently suﬃcient conditions for republican freedom. See Daniel
Raventós, Basic Income: The Material Conditions of Freedom (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp.
62-63. Even Barry’s statement is clearly more grounded in realpolitik than principled.
26 Domènech, El ecplise de la fraternidad ; and Hsieh, “Rawlsian Justice and Workplace Repub-
licanism.” Bottomley uses the term “corporate constitutionalism” in a diﬀerent sense, just to point
out the political nature of ﬁrms and to “suggests that there are values and ideas in our public political
life that can provide useful insights when considering the legal regulation of corporate governance
and decision-making.” S. Bottomley, The Constitutional Corporation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007),
p. 12.
27 R. Hodson, Dignity at Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 88, table
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or rather to Pittsburgh and whether employee B rather than employee C will be
promoted. But they cannot require employee A to drive above the number of hours
permitted by the health and safety regulation statute, just as they cannot violate
the anti-discrimination law in promoting employee B rather than C.
Since republicanism is concerned with workers’ immunity from arbitrary inter-
ference as a necessary and suﬃcient condition of their freedom and WC appears to
provide such an immunity through workplace regulation, it might seem that WC
turns out to be suﬃcient to ensure republican freedom within the ﬁrm. A number
of problems regarding WC arise though (which are analyzed in the next section in
relation to WD). For now, they can be summarized in two main points:
1. WC does not prevent workplace regulation from being arbitrary itself, for it does
not guarantee that the interests of workers are taken into account in its drafting
and passing.
2. WC does not prevent workplace regulation from being arbitrarily enforced to
particular cases and unforeseeable contingencies typical of the economic activity
in a complex ﬁrm, since it does not guarantee that the interests of workers are
taken into account in the process of enforcement.
Before turning to analyze these two reasons, consider the following counterintuitive
implication of WC. Let us assume that properly designed legal protections alone
could ensure immunity from arbitrary interference within the ﬁrm. And let us
turn next from the workplace to the political sphere. Then, why should we have
a quarrel with non-parliamentary constitutional monarchy à la Bismarck—where
citizens’ rights are entrenched in a constitutional text that constraints the monarch
but, nonetheless, citizens are disenfranchised or the parliament lacks any meaningful
legislative force?28 Now, that is the situation we have in most Western ﬁrms and the
one WC recommends—a situation in which, somehow or other, workers enjoy civil
rights (e.g., they cannot be discriminated on grounds of religion, race or gender)
and social rights (e.g., they enjoy paid holidays or a minimum wage) but, unlike
in a constitutional democracy, lack the right to have a binding say in managerial
decisions. In most of these ﬁrms shareholders and their managers act, thus, as
non-democratic constitutional monarchs.29 To the reasons why democracy and not
only constitutionalism is as much needed in the ﬁrm as it is in the political sphere
is that we turn now.
28 Following the Uniﬁcation of Germany in 1871, Otto von Bismarck rejected the British model.
In the kind of constitutional monarchy established under the Constitution of the German Empire
which Bismarck inspired, the Kaiser retained considerable actual executive power, and the Prime
Minister needed no parliamentary vote of conﬁdence and ruled solely by the imperial mandate.
29 It might be objected that the analogy does not hold, for the constitution in a constitutional
monarchy is not the result of citizens’ political participation while workers do participate, be it
through their representatives in the parliament or at the sectorial level, in the making of the
regulation in WC. However, the analogy still holds if we consider the case of an unelected town
council constrained by the legislation passed at the state level by elected representatives, as it will
become clear in section 8.4.
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8.4. Workplace democracy
Freedom from arbitrary interference is not an all-or-nothing matter and the mea-
sures presented in the section above might well be necessary to ensure it in the
workplace. This section aims to show that, however necessary, they turn out to be
insuﬃcient in achieving this aim. To see why WD is also required to ensure this,
consider one of the preconditions for republican freedom, according to which
Political participation. X enjoys immunity against arbitrary interference only
if she is granted and regularly exercises a set of political rights that allow her
to inﬂuence and contest the decisions aﬀecting her.
Contrary to what some contemporary commentators have written, the reason why,
within the republican tradition, political participation has been taken as a necessary,
though not suﬃcient, condition for freedom is not that participation is intrinsically
valued as part of a broader conception of the good life, as it is the case in the case
of civic humanism. As Skinner recalls regarding classic republicanism, “the writers I
am considering never suggest that there are certain speciﬁc goals we need to realise
in order to count as being fully or truly in possession of our liberty.” “[They] merely
argue that participation (at least by way of representation) constitutes a necessary
precondition of maintaining individual liberty.”30
On the contrary, the main rationale for political participation within the repub-
lican tradition is that, since the immunity against arbitrary interference can only be
ensured institutionally (by the law), participation in its elaboration by those against
whom the law is enforced turns out to be a necessary means—among other ones, such
as the division of powers and the rule of law—to prevent that the law itself becomes
arbitrary.31 This is so for two reasons. First, only political participation can ensure
that all citizens’ interests are taken into account on an equal footing in the legislative
process, even if only those of the majority are eventually turned into law. And second,
active participation is required not only at the outset of the legislative process, but
also during its implementation, as to ensure that citizens’ interests are adequately
tracked and to prevent arbitrary enforcement and interpretation of the legislation
when applied to particular cases and unforeseeable contingencies. Even if the ﬁrst
reason were satisﬁed through citizens’ consent to a constitutional text, constitutional
provisions are unavoidably to be applied to particular cases and contingencies that
are not foreseeable ex ante—i.e., not fully speciﬁable in a constitutional document.
That is why active and continuous participation of the citizenry is needed both in
the law-making process and also in the day-to-day enforcement and interpretation
of the law. As Rawls thoughtfully explained,
Unless there is widespread participation in democratic politics by a vigor-
ous and informed citizen body ... even the best-designed political institutions
30 Quentin Skinner, “The Paradoxes of Political Liberty,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human
Values, VII (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 1986), 233; and Liberty Before Liberal-
ism, pp. 74-75.
31 Pettit, “Law and Liberty,” pp. 53 ss.
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will eventually fall into the hands of those who hunger for power and military
glory or pursue narrow class and economic interests ... If we are to remain
free and equal, we cannot aﬀord a general retreat into private life.32
The drafting and enforcement of workplace regulation is not very diﬀerent. Consider
the ﬁrst reason, according to which employees ought to take part in the elaboration of
the norms regulating their workplaces. Otherwise, it is likely that such norms would
turn into arbitrary themselves. As an instance of this, consider the case of guest
workers that lack political rights in their host countries. For example, Philippine
domestic workers have to sign a two-year employment contract to migrate to Hong
Kong. Further, the law also requires that they must leave the country within two
weeks after being ﬁred and that they cannot sign another contract in case they quit.33
As Hodson points out, these legal requirements are among the major reasons why
Philippine maids accept continuous abuses, including those of the children they take
care of. However, as we have seen in section 3, from a republican standpoint the
freedom of these workers is diminished by the very fact of their being at the mercy
of their employers, and not only by them being actually interfered. An adequate
protection against the possibility of them being arbitrarily interfered should thus
include workplace regulation. However, this regulation can turn into arbitrary itself
unless those against whom it will be enforced also enjoy and exercise the right to
inﬂuence its drafting, either directly or through their elected representatives, as it
happens in the case of the Philippine maids. (To put it in a rather Schumpeterian
fashion, since they lack voting rights, they also lack political purchasing power and,
accordingly, is unlikely to emerge a political oﬀer to meet their demand.) In short,
there is a clear republican case not only for workplace regulation but also for workers’
rights to take part in the elaboration of that regulation.
Consider now the second reason, according to which active and continued partic-
ipation is required in order to prevent arbitrary enforcement of the legislation. To
be sure, many of the ways in which employers can arbitrarily interfere in the choices
and actions of their employees are speciﬁable ex ante and are thus possible to legally
prevent at the outset of the employment relationship. However, employment con-
tracts are unavoidably incomplete, i.e. they do not specify “precisely what each of
their obligations is in every conceivable state of the world.”34 On the one hand,
it would be impossible or prohibitively costly for the parties to the agreement to
make their contract complete—much more so in large ﬁrms and complex and unpre-
dictable economic environments. On the other hand, some ﬂexibility is desirable as
to adequately address day-to-day unforeseen eventualities. For that reason, workers
32 J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2001), p. 141. It might seem somewhat odd to quote Rawls at this point. Yet it should be recalled
that Rawls (Justice as Fairness, p. 144) himself cosidered classic republicanism and justice as
fairness as fully consistent with each other. The idea is deeply rooted in the republican tradition.
For example, according to Price: “If those in government are subject to no control from their
constituents, the very idea of liberty will be lost.” And according to Prestley: “The more political
liberty a people have, the safer is their civil liberty.” Both quoted in Pettit, Republicanism, p. 29.
33 Hodson, Dignity at Work, pp. 96-97.
34 O. Hart, “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of Law, economics
and Organizations, 4 (1988), 119-139, p. 121.
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agree to subordinate to the command of the employer and the latter is given resid-
ual decision-making rights, that is, the ﬁnal say over decisions that have not been
speciﬁed at the outset of the relationship. But the exercise of these rights opens
the possibility of discretionary abuses taking place. WC attempts to reduce such
abuses by means of regulation. However, exhaustive regulation is neither possible
nor desirable given the very nature of the employment contract in large ﬁrms and
complex economies. By contrast, WD attempts to reduce such abuses and arbitrary
interferences by giving workers a say in the drafting of the decisions that aﬀect
their lives in the workplace and also in the enforcement and interpretation of such
decisions, which include managerial decisions at the three levels stated in section
3 and the more general labor legislation passed at the international, national or
industry-wide levels, which no less than other pieces of law are often vague in their
deﬁnition and uncertain in their implementation.35
Note that the reason for giving workers a binding say over the decisions made in
the ﬁrm is not necessarily that there is a clash of interests between shareholders and
workers in need to be balanced, so the latter’s interests are taken into account when
decisions are to be made. Even if such a conﬂict did not arise, participation would
still be necessary to track workers’ private knowledge and expertise and to close the
epistemic gap between managers and workers. In ﬁrms in which division of labor
and technical expertise are the norm, workers inevitably retain private information
not only about their interests but also about how to improve their tasks and the
overall functioning of the ﬁrm. To be sure, devices diﬀerent from binding partici-
pation, such as surveys or quality circles, can help track this knowledge. But, as
theorists of descriptive representation often point out, those who are in the position
of making decisions tend to understate this epistemic gap and take the interests
and beliefs of those against whom decisions are enforced for granted (Phillips, 1995;
Mansbridge, 1999). Binding participation in the decision-making process corrects
that bias by forcing directors and managers to take such interests and beliefs into
account. Further, it does so not only at the outset of the economic activity but also
as the economic activity goes along, leaving room for unforeseeable contingencies to
be addressed with ﬂexibility.
Consider now two possible objections. First, it might be objected that WD
adds little to WC, for in WC workers already enjoy control rights at the political
level, having a say in the making and enforcement of workplace regulation. Put
diﬀerently, it might be argued that the set of rights mentioned above—the right
to inﬂuence and contest labor legislation, to bargain collectively or to unionize—are
already included in the very idea of WC. Now, even if that were the case, a diﬀerence
of scope between WC and WD would still exist. Consider as an analogy the diﬀerence
between democratic rights at the state and municipal levels. It seems obvious that
enjoying democratic rights at the state level is not a suﬃcient reason to prevent
citizens from enjoying such rights at the municipal level as well, as long as there
are decisions made at the latter level that aﬀect them. The same applies to the
35 See Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, chap. 2.
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diﬀerence between WC and WD. Workers may well enjoy democratic rights at the
political level, but that does not make democratic rights within the ﬁrm any less
relevant, for there are decisions made in the ﬁrm whose potential arbitrariness cannot
be prevented unless workers’ interests are properly tracked through their having
a say in their making and enforcement. Further, given that people spend most
of their daytime in the workplace, it is unreasonable to think that participation
in the political sphere can replace participation in the workplace. Even further,
participation might be more eﬀective in the workplace than in the political sphere,
being the impact of each vote 1/n (where n = the number of participants in the
decision) and being n much larger in the political sphere than in the workplace. In
short, WD is to be seen as a multi-level arrangement, being the decisions made within
democratic ﬁrms constrained by the decisions made at the industry-wide, legislative,
constitutional and international levels, just as the decisions made at the municipal
level are constrained by those made at the state and international levels.
Secondly, it might be objected on pragmatic grounds that institutional devices
other than workers’ participation in the ﬁrm might often better ensure in practice
that their interests are rightly tracked and arbitrary interference ruled out. Consider
judicial litigation and unionism as salient instances of such devices.36 To be sure, this
is a complex and empirical issue that cannot be conclusively addressed independently
of the background on which ﬁrms, courts and unions operate. The proper balance
between the functions of democratic procedures in the ﬁrm, judicial litigation and
unionism is thus inevitably context-dependent, as Nien-hê Shieh has pointed out.37
However, two responses may be advanced. As for judicial litigation, it presents two
diﬃculties in contrast to WD. First, it addresses workers’ concerns ex post rather
than incorporating them into the decision-making procedure itself. Second, it is
carried out before courts, which, unlike boards in democratic ﬁrms, are not elected
by workers and thus have fewer incentives to track their interests adequately. As for
unionism, even though trade-oﬀs between WD and strong unionism can indeed arise,
WD need not be inconsistent with the presence of strong unions. Actually, unions
may be necessary for the proper functioning of WD, for their absence or weak pres-
ence may turn workers’ participation into ineﬀective, specially in large democratic
ﬁrms, in which time-consuming decisions have to be made about complex issues such
as investment policies, production engineering or budgetary planning.38 Further,
unions are often the catalysts for the creation of workplace democracy when they
buy failing conventional ﬁrms and re-organize them under the control of employees.
8.5. Ownership
Assume, for the sake of the argument, that everything said so far is correct
and that a republican case for WD can be made. If that were the case, many
questions would still remain unanswered. Just to mention a few, from a republican
36 See Hsieh, “Rawlsian Justice and Workplace Republicanism.”
37 See Hsieh, “Rawlsian Justice and Workplace Republicanism.”
38 See Sarryn Kasmir, The Myth of Mondragon (Albany, SUNY Press, 1997), esp. ch. 5.
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standpoint, on which issues and levels should workers be able to make decisions?
By which procedures? Should workers participate directly or through their elected
representatives? What status should part-time and temporary workers have in the
decision-making process? What sort of input, if any, should stakeholders such as
suppliers, consumers or the citizenry at large have? These are diﬃcult and important
questions that are not addressed here. This last section focuses on another core issue
regarding WD—namely, the ownership of the ﬁrm, which is deﬁned here as the
ownership of non-human assets, such as ﬁnancial wealth or physical assets.
Two models stand out in this regard, depending on whether ownership and control
rights are separated or not. On the one hand, democratic ﬁrms in which capital is
supplied by external investors but workers have control rights over the ﬁrm’s deci-
sions. On the other hand, democratic ﬁrms in which workers have control rights but
capital is also supplied by workers themselves, who ﬁnance collective asset owner-
ship through debt contracting or by drawing upon their own savings. Thus, while
ownership and control rights over the ﬁrm’s decisions are separated in the former
case, they are kept together in workers’ hands in the latter case. I will take the
German co-determination system (see section 5.2 below) and cooperativism as the
most outstanding instances of the former and the latter, respectively.
Now, which model is preferable from a republican point of view? The separation
between ownership and control rights has been widely assumed in the literature
on WD and has been put in practice extensively, as the German co-determination
system has proven ever since 1976.39 However, this section attempts to show that
cooperativism turns out to be preferable to co-determination due to bargaining power
asymmetries and moral hazard problems arising from the formal separation of prop-
erty and control rights. Let us ﬁrstly consider the republican conception of ownership
as a source of material independence though.
8.5.1. Material independence
Apart from slavery, republicanism has been traditionally concerned with many
other forms of domination that, during the American colonial and early republican
period (when republicanism was the mainstream political theory) had been referred
to with the euphemism of relationships of “friendship.” Fathers were “friends” with
their sons, men were “friends” with their wives and patrons were “friends” with their
journeymen.40 Unlike the latter, the former were in a position to arbitrarily interfere
in the choices and actions of the latter. As Sir Robert Filmer had declared in the
seventeenth century regarding marriage and fatherhood, “The father of a family
governs by no other law than by his own will.”
What made the former dominate the latter is that, unlike the latter, the former
owned property, which was seen as the main source of domination. “Domination”
comes from “dominium,” which in classical Latin means both “property” and “the
39 See e.g. Hsieh, “Justice in Production,” p. 82.
40 See G. S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books,
1991), p. 58.
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ability to make free use of this property.”41 Thus it is hardly surprising that it
was believed that those lacking property or dominium were in all likelihood to be
dominated by those on whom they depended to make a living. Slavery, parenthood,
marriage and wage labor were relationships where those who lacked property (slaves,
children, wives and journeymen) were considered to be dominated by those on whom
they depended materially (masters, fathers, husbands and patrons, respectively).
Put brieﬂy, according to the republican tradition,
Material independence. X enjoys immunity against the possibility of being
interfered arbitrarily only if she is materially independent.
Republicans continuously used this condition to refuse granting full citizenship to
those who lacked property. In Kant’s famous words, “The only justiﬁcation required
by a citizen ... is that he must be his own master (sui iuris), and must have some
property ... to support himself.”42 It was thus argued that
Requirement for full citizenship. X is to be granted full citizenship only if
she is materially independent.
A number of reasons were provided to justify these two conditions. Two stand out.
The ﬁrst and main one was that the have-nots were taken to be easily inﬂuenced by
those on whom they depended. Had the propertyless been granted full citizenship,
the only beneﬁciaries would have been those on whom they depended.43 The second
reason was that (real estate) property served as a proxy for having stable interests
in the community—a ‘stake in the society’—and thus an incentive to use political
rights responsibly. This was so because owners had to feel directly the consequences
of the laws passed, given that they were those over whom taxes were imposed.
Two caveats are in order before seeing what these reasons have to do with the
relationship between WD and ownership. First, it is certainly the case that tra-
ditionally most republicans used such reasons to exclude the majority from being
granted full citizenship. However, a democratic branch can also be found within
the republican tradition. The members of this branch argued for full citizenship
without giving up neither the two conditions above nor the two reasons given to
support them. Rather than defending that not everyone ought to be granted full
citizenship due to widespread dependency, they argued the other way around—since
everyone ought to be granted full citizenship, everyone should be granted material
41 See A. Domènech and D. Raventós, “Property and Republican Freedom: An Institutional
Approach to Basic Income,” Basic Income Studies, 2 (2007), 1-8, at p. 3; and F. Lowett, A General
Theory of Domination and Justice, Appendix 1.
42 I. Kant, Political Writings, ed. Hans S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1970), p. 78. Hence, being propertyless was used as a suﬃcient condition for excluding someone
from full citizenship, but not a necessary one, for many single women did own property and could
meet property qualiﬁcations yet not enjoyed voting rights. Harrington had already expressed this
non-biconditionality when he stated that “The man that cannot live upon his own must be a servant;
but he that can live upon his own may be a freeman” (The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System
of Politics, p. 269).
43 For example, according to Petty, a leveller spokesman in the Putney debates, “the reason why
we exclude apprentices, servants and beggars is because they depend on the will of other men and
they would be fearful of disgusting them,” quoted in Andrés de Francisco, Ciudadanía y democracia
(Madrid, La Catarata: 2007), p. 139.
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independence as well.44 The second caveat is that few would nowadays accept that
material independence relies on the ownership of real estate—rather than on enjoying
a set of economic, cultural and social resources, as current neo-republicans often do.45
Neither would anyone consider nowadays wage labor as a relationship of domination
per se.46
With these two caveats in mind, the remainder of the section attempts to show
that the two reasons used to justify the requirement for full citizenship still apply
nowadays, at least, regarding the possibility of formally separating ownership and
control in the democratic ﬁrm.
8.5.2. Bargaining power asymmetries
As we have seen above, republicans have traditionally taken those who lack ma-
terial independence to be easily inﬂuenced by those on whom they depend. Within
the ﬁrm, this can happen due to the inﬂuence of property ownership over bargain-
ing power and, thus, over the actual exercise of rights. Put brieﬂy, if shareholders
retain the ownership of the ﬁrm, it is very likely that ﬁnal decisions will be heavily
inﬂuenced by their advantageous bargaining power. Consider the case of a ﬁrm in
which control rights are extended to workers but, nonetheless, shareholders retain
the right to sell their stocks and to collectively terminate the ﬁrm. In this instance,
it is very likely that shareholders will determine workers’ decisions decisively through
the ever-present threat of selling their shares en masse or terminating the ﬁrm. To
be sure, bargaining power is to great extent determined by contextual factors such as
the dependence of the ﬁrm on equity capital, the strength of unions or the unemploy-
ment rate. However, as long as they retain the ownership of the ﬁrm, shareholders
will still enjoy a considerable bargaining power that workers, despite their formal
control rights, will lack. And if, on the contrary, the right to terminate the ﬁrm is
also transferred to—or, more precisely, shared with—workers, then it seems unclear
whether we could still say that shareholders own the ﬁrm in any meaningful sense.47
Axel Gosseries has suggested that this problem could be avoided by using secret
ballot, for it enables workers to freely express their actual will without being co-
erced.48 However, without neglecting its importance, secret ballot cannot by itself
44 As for the Early American Republic, some wings of the Jeﬀersonian Republican party are
to be mentioned within this branch, e.g. the so-called Aurora-men of Pennsylvania. See Andrew
Shankman, Crucible of American Democracy: The Struggle to Fuse Egalitarianism and Capitalism
in Jeﬀersonian Pennsylvania (Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press, 2004). The distinction
between democratic and elitist republicanism is present, with diﬀerent terminologies, in Pettit,
Republicanism; Domènech, El eclipse de la fraternidad ; and De Francisco, Ciudadanía y democracia.
For a contemporary critique of democratic republicanism as for the independence condition, see
Robert E. Goodin, “Independence in Democratic Theory: A Virtue? A Necessity? Both? Neither?,”
Journal of Social Philosophy, 24 (1993), 50-57.
45 See Pettit, Republicanism; and Domènech and Raventós, “Property and Republican Free-
dom.”
46 For two notable exceptions, see Pateman, “Self-Ownership and Property in the Person:
Democratization and a Tale of two Concepts,” pp. 20-53; and D. Ellerman, “Translatio versus
Concessio: Retrieving the Debate About Contracts of Alienation with an Application to Today’s
Employement Contract,” Politics and Society 33 (2005): 449-480.
47 See López-Guerra, “Against the Parallel Case for Workplace Democracy,” pp. 20-21.
48 A. Gosseries, “Taking Workplace Democracy Seriously,”
www.politika.lv/topics/civil_society/15968/ (accessed August 13, 2010).
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prevent the inﬂuence of bargaining power asymmetries over actual decision-making.
If workers are aware that a decision x against decision y can make shareholders sell
their shares en masse or even terminate the ﬁrm, it is very likely that many of them
will change their mind and vote for y. Secret ballot will serve for little in this case.
Note that bargaining power asymmetries also arise from asymmetries in human
capital among workers. Hence, even if the shares of the ﬁrm were equally distributed
among workers and shareholders, the most skilled workers would still enjoy a powerful
bargaining position due to their ever-present ability to quit and ﬁnd another job
easily. Two responses to this problem stand out. First, the problem applies not only
to democratic ﬁrms but in fact to all type of ﬁrms, to the point that it is often the
case that top managers and most skilled workers rather than shareholders end up
controlling decisions made in the ﬁrm. Second, the problem can be partially overcome
by oﬀering eﬃciency wages to the most skilled workers, in order to provide them
with disincentives to quit and curb their ability to successfully threaten shareholders
and fellow workers when decisions are to be made. (It might also be argued that
the necessity and eﬀectiveness of such wages depend on many additional factors,
including the greater degree of commitment of highly skilled workers in cooperative
ﬁrms, as it is frequently argued.)
The closest actual model to formal separation between ownership and control is
the German co-determination law. As we have seen above in section 7.2.1, the act,
in force since 1976, makes compulsory for every ﬁrm with over 2,000 workers to have
a two-tier board structure. In the management board, which directly runs the ﬁrm,
only shareholders’ executives are represented, while in the supervisory board, which
makes the more general decisions (such as the ratiﬁcation of important investments or
the approval of the annual budget), both shareholders and workers are represented on
a near-parity basis. The literature on co-determination, however, shows that it does
not make a real comparative diﬀerence regarding, among other issues, its economic
performance and workers’ wages.49
This of course could be so just because the German model is not completely
paritarian, or because supervisory boards have always been rather weak in Germany.
For these reasons, any conclusion as for this matter should be cautiously taken with
a grain of salt, even if consistent with the concerns raised here.
8.5.3. Moral hazard
Assume that bargaining power asymmetries were balanced due to a shortage of
labor supply or the existence of the above-mentioned basic income. Now, even if
that were the case, moral hazard problems would still arise from the separation of
ownership and control rights. As we have seen above, republicanism has traditionally
tended to impose the requirement of property for citizenship not only in order to
49 Benelli et al.’s study of co-determination in Western Germany showed, for example, that
its implementation did not lead to less risky investments, smaller dividends, reduced ﬁrm leverage,
higher and more stable salaries or more capital-intensive production. See G. Benelli, C. Loderer
and T. Lys, “Labor Participation in Corporate Policy- Decisions: West Germany’s Experience with
Codetermination,” Journal of Business 60 (1987): 553-575. For a summary of the ﬁndings, see
Dow, Governing the Firm, pp. 86 ss.
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prevent the participation of those who can be easily inﬂuenced. But also because
of owners’ tendency to have stable interests in their community and thus behave
responsibly in their political decisions. This argument can be applied to the present
context as follows.
Consider again the case of a ﬁrm in which control rights but not ownership
are transferred to or shared with workers. Further assume, not unrealistically, that
information asymmetries exist between shareholders and workers, who now enjoy the
opportunity to raise their concerns and proposals and have them taken into account
through a binding procedure. Since workers do not have a share in proﬁts, they
will have an incentive to use their control rights, in combination with their private
information, opportunistically. To be sure, workers will still have, as employees in
non-democratic ﬁrms do, a long-term interest in the survival of the ﬁrm—namely,
not to get unemployed due to its bankruptcy. Contrary to the latter, however, these
workers will also have a say in the running of the ﬁrm, thus having an incentive to
free-ride and use their private information to make decisions in their own interests
when such a possibility is available to them. As Hansmann points out, ‘”if those
with control had no claim over the ﬁrm’s residual earnings, they would have little
incentive to use their control to maximize those earnings, or perhaps even to pay
out the earnings received.”50 To put it clearly: by separating control rights and
ownership, workers are given further rights to control the ﬁrm but not the proper
incentives to use such rights in the ﬁrm’s best interests.
In short, even though the possibility to formally separate ownership and con-
trol rights is often assumed, serious doubts arise about its feasibility. One solution
to these problems is to put ownership and control rights together in shareholders’
hands. Another one, though, is to put them together in workers hands by promoting
cooperatives—where workers retain both control and ownership—instead of other
forms of WD such as co-determination. However, since many other normative and
pragmatic considerations also need to be taken into account, this can only be a prima
facie argument for cooperativism.
50 Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise, p. 12.

Concluding remarks to Part III
Part III of the dissertation has analyzed the extension of democratic decision-making
to the workplace, a sphere that is usually taken to be beyond the scope of democ-
racy. To be sure, workplace democracy is less pressing an issue if we compare it to
constitutionalism, which expansion in the last decades has been astonishing. Even
though workplace democracy was a central research topic in the 1970s and 1980s, it
is without doubt that the topic has attracted less and less attention ever since the
early 1990s (something that, as it has been said above in section 7.3.1, could change
with the current economic crisis). That said, the democratization of the workplace
is worth studying for present purposes because it provides a crystal-clear case-study
of the limited scope of democracy for it is usually taken to be beyond the reach of
democracy. The goal of Part III has been to analyze the main arguments for and
against the extension of democratic decision-making to the workplace and to provide
an original, republican case for WD.
Chapter 7 has introduced and deﬁned the main forms of WD and has reviewed
in some detail the core arguments for and against WD regarding its feasibility and
eﬃciency, along with the so-called “epistemic” and “propertarian” arguments against
WD and Bowles and Gintis’ theory of contested exchange, which they use to make
a case for WD.
Chapter 8, in turn, has put forward a novel, republican case for WD and has
analyzed whether WD implies, from a republican standpoint, not only workers’ con-
trol rights but also workers’ ownership of the ﬁrm. It has been argued that neither
the availability of an exit option from the ﬁrm nor workplace constitutionalism (i.e.
regulation) are suﬃcient to ensure workers’ freedom from arbitrary interference in
the workplace. From a republican standpoint, citizens’ active and continued politi-
cal participation in the ﬁrm’s decision-making is required for two reasons—because
workplace regulation can turn into arbitrary itself unless those against whom it
is enforced also enjoy and exercise the right to inﬂuence its drafting and because
workplace regulation can be arbitrarily enforced unless those against whom it is
enforced also enjoy and exercise the right to inﬂuence its enforcement. Put simply,
since it would be impossible or prohibitively costly for the parties of the employment
relationship to make their contract complete and some ﬂexibility is also desirable as
to adequately address day-to-day unforeseeable eventualities, workplace regulation
turns out to be insuﬃcient. Workers are thus to be given a say not only at the outset
of the employment relationship but also as the relationship goes along. Finally, it is
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argued that WD requires, from a republican standpoint, not only workers’ control
but also workers’ ownership of the ﬁrm due to bargaining power asymmetries and
moral hazard problems arising from the formal separation of ownership and control
rights. It is thus shown that cooperativism is ceteris paribus preferable to other
forms of WD in which ownership and control rights, such as co-determination.
The republican case for WD is connected to the previous parts of the dissertation
in three ways. First, republicanism was the mainstream political though in the Early
American Republic. Thus chapter 8 draws heavily upon Part I of the dissertation.
Second, Part I shows how the employment relationship, which had been traditionally
seen as a form of “limited slavery,” as Aristotle put it, turned out be seen as a free and
voluntary exchange among juridical and how, as a consequence of this, the workplace
turned out to be seen as a sphere in which power relations are absent and that is,
accordingly, beyond the scope of politics, including democratic politics. 1.3.3. Third,
even though Part II of the dissertation has shown that constitutionalism faces serious
problems from a democratic point of view, it has not shown why democracy ought to
trump other sorts of considerations and why it is legitimate at all as a decision-making
procedure. Of course, there are many reasons why democracy may be legitimate as
a decision making procedure. Chapter 8 precisely provides a republican rationale
among the many available justiﬁcations of democracy.
General conclusion
The dissertation has analyzed the limits and scope of democracy both historically
and normatively. First, it has explained historically how democracy turned from
being despised into being cherished in less than half a century, and how this shift went
hand-in-hand with another shift, according to which a number of institutional devices
that had been traditionally seen as limits on the scope of democracy turned out to
be seen as necessary for a good-working democratic system. Second, it has analyzed
normatively two outstanding instances of such limits—namely, (a) constitutional
constraints on legislative action and (b) decision-making in the workplace, a domain
that is usually considered to be beyond the scope of democracy—, and has shown
that there are good grounds to call into question the justiﬁcation of those limits from
a democratic standpoint.
The ﬁrst, and arguably most striking, problem I have addressed in the disser-
tation is strictly historical—namely, to explain the reasons why democracy, a form
of government that had been despised for more than two thousand years, turned to
be unanimously cherished in less than half a century. Part I of the dissertation has
focused on the Early American Republic, a period in which the shift is outstandingly
acute and which world-wide political inﬂuence has been enormous. Two trends are
found behind the shift. First, an increasing acceptance of the idea of democracy due
to the crisis of the theory of virtual representation and the acceptance of the fact
of disagreement as a legitimate political phenomenon. Second, a shift in the very
concept of democracy, which would come to accommodate elements that had been
traditionally seen as constraints on democracy. These two trends help to explain why
democracy, traditionally despised for being unstable, unfeasible, and incompatible
with property rights and the division of powers, turned into a buzzword which legit-
imacy is nowadays rarely contested. Likewise, they help explain the reason why the
constraints on the scope of democracy that have been analyzed in Part II and Part
III are nowadays seen as perfectly consistent with democracy. As William Duane
wrote to Jeﬀerson as early as 1824, “Democratic government is no longer Jacobinism;
and those who formerly reprobated now use the language and profess the doctrine
they reviled twenty four years ago.” A “revolution in speech,” as Duane labeled it,
had been produced.51
Chapter 1 has shown that the idea of democracy gained increasing support as soon
51 W. Duane, “Letter to Jeﬀerson, October 19, 1924,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Histor-
ical Society 20 (1906-1907): 381-383, p. 382.
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as ordinary people assumed the fact of disagreement as an unavoidable and legitimate
feature of the American society and the theory of virtual representation—including
the organicist conception of the society as an entity with a “general will” that is
beyond political struggle and partisanship— gradually lost its credibility and po-
litical eﬃcacy. Accordingly, some of the institutional devices traditionally attached
to the idea of democracy were increasingly demanded and suﬀrage was eventually
extended. Of course, the theory of virtual representation was not left aside once
and for all and, in fact, its inﬂuence is still there nowadays. Thus, governments
rarely admit that their actions beneﬁt some citizens at the expense of others, and
open declarations of partisanship—such as the one by President Salvador Allende,
who declared that “I am not the President of all the Chileans,” or the one by the
former British Prime Minister Edward Heath, who openly declared to represent
class interests—tend not to be without political costs.52 However, as the nineteenth
century progressed, the use of the theory would lose its former credibility and the
fact of disagreement would be increasingly assumed, giving way to the acceptance of
political struggle and democracy as the legitimate means to make decisions in the
face of deep disagreements. In a nutshell, democracy was called for only as long as
the fact of disagreement was assumed as an unavoidable and legitimate feature of
the American society. While the organicist conception of the society remained intact
and no disagreement was acknowledged, no democratic decision-making mechanism
was required and decisions could be made by an elite that allegedly represented the
shared interests of the society.
Chapter 2, in turn, has shown that, besides its increasing acceptance, the idea
of democracy also went through a notable semantic shift in the ﬁrst half of the
nineteenth century. Although some features of the concept remained the same,
some others changed. Likewise, a number of institutional devices that had been
traditionally taken to be constraints on democratic decision-making (e.g. represen-
tation, judicial review of legislation, the protection of property rights) turned out
to be seen not only as consistent with democracy but actually as necessary for any
good-working democratic system. This helps explain why the Federalists believed
that the representative government they were putting forward was not only diﬀerent
from democracy but in fact a very check against it. As Bernard Manin puts it,
“for Madison, representative government was not one kind of democracy; it was an
essentially diﬀerent and furthermore preferable form of government.”53
The institutional upshot of these two trends is what we usually label as liberal
democracy, a form of government in which sovereignty rests on the people and is
exercised by the people—as a general rule, through their elected representatives—yet
the scope of democratic decisions is heavily constrained by a number of issues that
are removed from majority rule and protected by non-majoritarian bodies, such as
52 Allende and Heath are both quoted in B. Manin, A. Przeworski, and S. Stokes, “Introduc-
tion,” in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, B. Manin, ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 6-7.
53 B. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997), p. 2.
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constitutional courts and independent central banks. Hence, democratic institutions
have expanded over the last two centuries, but only as much as such constraints on
democratic decision-making—which have in fact turned to be seen as necessary for a
well-functioning democracy—have also expanded. (See, for example, the much-used
indicators of the quality of democracy elaborated by agencies such as Freedom House,
the Economist Democracy Index, or Polity IV).54
In short, the main contribution of Part I of the dissertation has been to explain the
origins and rise of liberal democracy by analyzing historically the above-mentioned
two trends. On the one hand, the way democracy, which had been traditionally
despised, turned out to be unanimously cherished and demanded as the nineteenth
century progressed. On the other hand, the way a number of institutional devices
that had been traditionally seen as limits on democracy turned out to be included in
the very concept of democracy, so that no well-functioning democratic system could
go without them.
Part II and Part III of the dissertation, by contrast, are less historical. They
have normatively analyzed two outstanding instances of the limits on the scope of
democracy and have called into question their justiﬁcation from a democratic point of
view. Thus Part II has analyzed the justiﬁcation of constitutional constraints on leg-
islative action—and, more precisely, constitutional rigidity and judicial review—from
a democratic point of view. This is a very pressing issue, given the recent world-wide
expansion of constitutionalism (to the point that nowadays three-quarters of the
world’s states have some form of judicial review). Further, since judicial review
originated in the Early American Republic as a check on democracy that only later
turned out to be considered democratic, it provides a ﬁrst-rate case-study of the
democratic legitimacy of the limits on the scope of democracy.
Three prominent attempts to justify constitutionalism on democratic grounds
have been analyzed—pure instrumentalist theories, precommitment-based theories,
and proceduralist theories. According to pure instrumentalist theories, constitution-
alism need not be at odds with democracy because constitutional constraints are
necessary if democratic procedures are to bring about just outcomes (chapter 4).
According to precommitment-based theories, constitutional constraints need not be
at odds with democracy because they are the upshot of precommitments made by
the people in constitutional moments (chapter 5). Finally, according to proceduralist
theories, constitutional constraints need not be at odds with democracy because they
set up the procedural rules and preconditions required for the proper functioning of
the democratic system (chapter 6).
A number of problems of these theories have been raised. However, one problem
that is common to all of them is that they do not address adequately the fact of
disagreement that, as we have seen in Part I, turns out to be a necessary condi-
54 See among others the Freedom of the World Reports by Freedom House, the yearly Economist
Democracy Index, the United Nations Development Program Human Development Report 2002,
Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2002), or Polity IV reports, such as M, G. Marshall and B. R. Cole, Global Report 2009: Conﬂict,
Governance, and State Fragility (Vienna: Center for Systemic Peace, 2009).
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tion of democratic legitimacy. They all assume or end up assuming that there are
a number of political issues that are beyond dispute and can be entrenched in a
constitutional text and advanced by constitutional means. However, as it is care-
fully shown throughout Part II, even though constitutions tend to be introduced as
complete contracts that are beyond dispute, they are inevitably pervaded by the fact
of disagreement at a number of levels—e.g. their drafting, their ratiﬁcation, their
interpretation, and their enforcement. Even further, the fact of disagreement is a
necessary condition of politics, for if all citizens agreed on what ought to be done
across the board no political means for decision-making would be required in the
ﬁrst place. As Hannah Arendt put it, there is politics because “not man, but men
inhabit the world.”55 And we all disagree with one another—including constitutional
judges, who use majority rule to reach their decisions as much as parliaments do.
Even though this problem does not rule out the possibility of these theories being
justiﬁed on non-democratic grounds, it shows that it is very problematic to do so
on democratic grounds. This is the only point that I have tried to make in Part II,
and of course it is far from being a completely novel point, for Waldron and Bellamy
have argued similarly well before me. However, I hope that Part II has contributed
to summarize and clarify the main theories that attempt to reconcile democracy and
constitutionalism, to show why they fail to achieve this goal, and to add a number
of original arguments to the cause, such as the application of Wollheim’s paradox to
the critique of pure instrumentalism (section 4.3.2), or the use of path dependence
theories to show the informal asymmetry between the constitutional founding and
the constitutional amendment (section 5.4.4).
Finally, Part III of the dissertation has addressed another outstanding instance
in which the scope of democracy is heavily constrained—namely, decision-making in
the workplace. In a liberal democracy there are number of spheres that tend to be in-
sulated from political decision-making and enacted by non-majoritarian institutions
such as constitutional courts and independent central banks. Consider, for example,
the family and monetary policy. Even though for very diﬀerent reasons—the former
for being purely private; the latter for being purely technical—, both of them tend
to be considered unpolitical and, accordingly, tend to be insulated from ordinary
politics. Now, the workplace oﬀers a ﬁrst-rate example of a domain that is usually
taken to be beyond the scope of democratic decision-making precisely because it is
seen as a sphere of voluntary relations among free and equal individuals. Accordingly,
the democratization of the workplace would be redundant at best—for “persons may
form their own democratically-run cooperative ﬁrms,” as Nozick put it—and an il-
legitimate interference in the contractual conditions which employers and employees
have freely and voluntarily agreed upon at worst.56
After having addressed the most prominent arguments for and against workplace
democracy, and having called into question the conclusiveness of the main arguments
against extending democracy to the workplace, the main contribution of Part III
55 H. Arendt, Men in Dark Times (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1968), p. viii.
56 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basick Books, 1974), p. 250.
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is to have provided a partly original—though only partly, for Nien-hê Hsieh has
argued similarly—, republican argument for workplace democracy. Borrowing the
normative deﬁnition of freedom from the republican tradition of political philosophy
and thus heavily drawing upon Part I of the dissertation (for republicanism was the
mainstream political thought in the Early American Republic), chapter 8 has shown
that neither the availability of an exit option nor workplace regulation alone can
ensure immunity from arbitrary interference in the workplace.
The critique of the insuﬃciency of workplace regulation is key to the republican
case for workplace democracy. Using ideas partly borrowed from incomplete contract
theory, it has been shown that workplace regulation can become arbitrary itself un-
less those against whom it is enforced also enjoy and exercise the right to inﬂuence
both its elaboration and enforcement. Put simply, since it would be impossible or
prohibitively costly for the parties of the employment relationship to make their
contract complete, or for the authorities to completely regulate the relationship, and
since some ﬂexibility is also desirable as to adequately address day-to-day unfore-
seeable eventualities, discretion in the workplace is not only unavoidable but also
desirable. Now, the existence of discretion in the enforcement of the employment
contract and workplace regulation opens the door to disagreement among parties
and to the possibility of arbitrary interference taking place. Thus, if immunity from
arbitrary interference is to be ensured in the workplace, workers are to be given a say
not only at the outset of the employment relationship but also as the relationship
goes along. In short, the insulation of the workplace from democratic decision-making
may be justiﬁed on a number of grounds (e.g. economic eﬃciency), but not because
it is an unpolitical sphere in which the parties can settle the terms of the relationship
in a complete contract, or the authorities regulate it completely through labor legis-
lation. Just as allegedly complete constitutions turn out to be willy-nilly pervaded
by the fact of disagreement, employment contracts and workplace regulation are also
incomplete and thus equally pervaded by the fact of disagreement among parties.
As it has been pointed out in the Introduction of the dissertation, the three parts
of the dissertation are intended to be self-standing and independent from each other.
However, the sources, role, and pervasiveness of the fact of disagreement and its
relationship with democratic decision-making and democratic legitimacy is common
to all of them. Thus Part I of the dissertation has historically shown how the fact of
disagreement came to be acknowledged in early nineteenth-century America, and how
this acknowledgment gave way to the crisis of the theory of virtual representation and
to an increasing acceptance of democracy as a means to address such disagreement.
In short, the demand for democracy only triggered once the fact of disagreement
had turned to be seen as an unavoidable and legitimate feature of the American
society. As it is put more analytically in Part II (sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2), the fact of
disagreement is a necessary condition of democracy being called for, for if all citizens
agreed on what ought to be done across the board, no decision-making procedure
would be required at all. In turn, Part II has focused on how constitutions, which
are often presented as being beyond dispute, turn out to be unavoidably pervaded
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by the fact of disagreement and has argued that, accordingly, there is no reason to
insulate them from democratic decision-making. Finally, Part III has shown that
the workplace, a sphere that is usually taken to be beyond the scope of politics,
is equally pervaded by the fact of disagreement and has provided an argument for
its democratization based on the republican notion of freedom as immunity from
arbitrary interference.
Resumen en castellano
Durante las últimas décadas se han producido dos tendencias políticas aparente-
mente opuestas. Por una parte, la extensión global de las instituciones democráticas,
así como de la ideología democrática, y por otra, la proliferación de instituciones
no-mayoritarias, tales como bancos centrales independientes y tribunales constitu-
cionales, con la consecuente limitación del alcance de la toma de decisiones democráti-
cas. En suma, las instituciones democráticas se han extendido recientemente tanto
como el alcance de la toma democrática de decisiones se ha visto limitado. Estas
dos tendencias han ido de la mano de dos tendencias paralelas, si bien más ﬁlosóﬁcas
y de más largo alcance. Por una parte, la crisis de la concepción metafísica de la
sociedad como una entidad orgánica con una “voluntad general”, con la consiguiente
aceptación del pluralismo y la confrontación política como fenómenos legítimos y,
por otra, la crecientemente inﬂuyente idea de que hay un conjunto de cuestiones que
han de ser extraídas a la política ordinaria y transferidas a organismos no electos,
ya sea porque han de quedar fuera de la negociación política cotidiana (por ejemplo,
los derechos humanos), o porque son puramente técnicos (por ejemplo, la política
monetaria), o incluso porque son estrictamente privadas (por ejemplo, las relaciones
familiares) y no deben ser sometidas a la decisión mayoritaria.
Consideremos brevemente las dos primeras tendencias. Por una parte, la democ-
racia se ha extendido rápidamente desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial, como muestra
la ﬁgura 1 con respecto a la proporción de países con sufragio universal. Mientras
que en 1900 sólo 6 de los 43 estados existentes eran mínimamente democrático, y
sólo uno tenía sufragio universal, en 1946 20 de los 71 estados independientes eran ya
democráticos. Y a principios de la década de 1990 la cifra pasó de 48 estados en 1989
a 77 en 1994, una cifra que aumento hasta 92 estados en 2009 y que es probable que
continúe aumentando tras la llamada “primavera árabe”.57 La ideología democrática
se ha extendido con igual rapidez. Hasta el punto de que es frecuente que gobiernos
abiertamente no democráticos se reﬁeran a sí mismos como “democráticos” de man-
era oportunista, siendo los ejemplos más obvios el de la República Democrática de
Alemania, la República Popular Democrática de Corea, la “democracia orgánica” de
57 Véase R. A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 14; D.
Potter, “Explaining Democratization,” en Democratization, ed. D. Potter, D. Goldblatt, M. Kiloh
y P. Lewis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997); y M, G. Marshall y B. R. Cole, Global Report 2009:
Conﬂict, Governance, and State Fragility (Vienna: Center for Systemic Peace, 2009), pp. 10-11.
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Franco, o el intento de Pinochet de “dar a la democracia una dimensión auténtica-
mente representativa”.58
Por otra parte, el alcance de las decisiones democráticas ha sido limitado tanto
como las instituciones democráticas se han visto extendidas. No sólo debido a la
creciente presencia de facto de actores internacionales, como las empresas multina-
cionales o los llamados “gnomos de Zurich”, como el exprimer ministro británico
Harold Wilson se reﬁrió célebremente a los especuladores ﬁnancieros. Sino tam-
bién por la transferencia de iure de competencias parlamentarias a instituciones
no-mayoritarias (es decir, instituciones cuyos miembros no son directamente elegidos
por la ciudadanía, ni por los cargos electos), tales como el Banco Central Europeo
en el ámbito supranacional, o los tribunales constitucionales a nivel nacional. Mark
Tatcher y Alec Stone Sweet han descrito este proceso en el contexto europeo del
siguiente modo:
En campos como la regulación de los servicios, las telecomunicaciones, la
competencia económica, y el pluralismo mediático, e incluso en la prestación
de servicios sociales y sanitarios, se han creado un sinnúmero de organismos
reguladores independientes que se han convertido en lugares en los que se crea
nueva regulación, o se aplica la ya existente a nivel nacional. En el ámbito
supranacional, los bancos centrales, aislados del control político directo, ﬁjan
la política monetaria. En Bruselas, funcionarios de la Comisión Europea
elaboran la legislación y la hacen cumplir en el ámbito cada vez más amplio
de la Unión Europea. En Luxemburgo, el Tribunal de Justicia controla el
cumplimiento del derecho europeo por parte de los Estados miembros con,
incluyendo a los parlamentos nacionales, los gobiernos y las administraciones.
Figura 1. Proporción de países con sufragio universal por año.59
58 A. Pinochet, “Chile should Not Fall into the Vices of the Past,” in The Politics of Antipolitics,
B. Loveman y D. Thomas, eds. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997), pp. 248-249.
59 A. Przeworski, “Conquered or Granted? A History of Suﬀrage Extensions,” British Journal
of Political Science 39 (2008): 291-321, p. 292.
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Estas dos tendencias han ido de la mano de dos tendencias paralelas, si bien más
ﬁlosóﬁcas y de más largo alcance. Por una parte, la aceptación del desacuerdo y la
confrontación política como fenómenos inevitables y legítimos frente a la concepción
clásica de la sociedad como una entidad orgánica con intereses comunes que los
partidos y la contienda política sólo podían socavar. Como veremos en el capítulo
1, la concepción orgánica de la sociedad había sido predominante hasta ﬁnales del
siglo XVIII. Se trata de una concepción que puede ser divida en dos ideas básicas.
La primera idea es que la sociedad es un cuerpo orgánico con un conjunto común de
intereses y valores que están más allá de los intereses particulares. La analogía con el
cuerpo apareció en la época medieval, pero incluso cuando el contractualismo llegó a
ser dominante, las partes contractuales continuaban siendo vistas como partes de un
todo. No es por casualidad que “el pueblo” siempre haya aparecido en singular, como
le peuple, el pueblo, das Volk, el poble, herria, etc.: como una entidad orgánica con
una voluntad uniﬁcada.60 La segunda idea es que las facciones sociales y políticas
deﬁenden sus intereses particulares y, al hacerlo, ponen en peligro la unidad social.
Como lo expreso Rousseau con claridad, “[c]uando los intereses particulares comien-
zan a hacerse sentir y las partes de la sociedad comienzan a ejercer una inﬂuencia (...)
el interés común queda corrompido.”61 En esta visión organicista la democracia queda
descartada, ya que implica el desacuerdo político y la confrontación parlamentaria y
éstos, a su vez, amenazan los intereses prepolíticos y orgánicos de la sociedad. Como
lo expresó Hans Kelsen en 1929,
[E]l ideal de un interés general superior y que trasciende los intereses de los
grupos, y de los partidos, el ideal de una solidaridad de intereses de todos los
miembros de la colectividad, sin distinciones de religión, nacionalidad, clase,
etc. es una ilusión metafísica y, más exactamente, una ilusión metapolítica,
expresada habitualmente en la forma (...) de una colectividad “orgánica” o
una estructura “orgánica”.
Ahora bien, según avanzó el siglo XIX, esta concepción organicista fue dando paso
a una aceptación cada vez mayor del pluralismo y la discrepancia tanto al nivel de
los intereses como de los valores y, por lo tanto, a una mayor aceptación de la con-
frontación política y el partidismo como medios inevitables y legítimos para la real-
ización de dichos intereses y valores. Por supuesto, el reconocimiento de la existencia
del desacuerdo y el partidismo es tan antiguo como Aristóteles, quien célebremente
aﬁrmó que “los ricos y los pobres se consideran partes de una ciudad-estado. Además
... entre las partes de la ciudad-estado estos dos son opuestos”.62 Sin embargo, la
oposición política y el partidismo no pasarían a ser tomados como políticamente
legítimos —en lugar de como enemigos de la cohesión social— hasta mucho más
60 Véase A. Przeworski, “Consensus and Conﬂict in Western Thought on Representative Gov-
ernment,” Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010): 7042–7055, p. 7046; y Democracy and
the Limits of Self-Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 19.
61 J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social, in Oeuvres complètes, vol. 3, B. Gagnebin and M. Ray-
mond, eds. (Paris: Gallimard, 1961). Citado a partir de J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, M.
Cranston, trans. (New York: Penguin, 1968), p. 99.
62 Aristóteles, Politics, C. D. C. Reeve, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1948), 1291b.
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recientemente. Incluso Marx y Engels, quienes célebremente deﬁnieron “la historia
de toda sociedad existente hasta el presente [como] la historia de la lucha de clases”,
aún conﬁaban en “la fundación de una nueva sociedad sin clases”.63 Ahora bien, por
razones que quedarán claras en el capítulo 1 de la tesis, la presencia del pluralismo y el
desacuerdo social, económico, político y cultural se haría más acuciante a medida que
avanzó el siglo XIX, de modo que la concepción organicista ya no podría defenderse
con la credibilidad anterior. Ya a mediados del siglo XX, Schumpeter llevaría esta
tendencia hasta el extremo al aﬁrmar que “[n]o hay tal cosa como un bien común
en el que todas las personas puedan ponerse de acuerdo o sobre el que ponerse de
acuerdo mediante la fuerza de la argumentación racional”.64 En consecuencia, la
confrontación política y el partidismo ganarían legitimidad y la democracia, tradi-
cionalmente despreciada por ﬁlósofos de todo tipo, conseguiría ﬁnalmente un pedigrí
ﬁlosóﬁco respetable. Como lo ha expresado Habermas más recientemente, en “condi-
ciones de pensamiento postmetafísico” no existen objetivos prepolíticos sustantivos;
éstos sólo pueden deﬁnirse como resultado del proceso democrático, que es la única
fuente de legitimidad de la autoridad política.65
Por otra parte, según la concepción orgánica fue quedando atrás y el desacuerdo y
la confrontación política característicos de la política democrática ganaron aceptación,
también se extendió una idea aparentemente opuesta. La idea de que existe un
conjunto de cuestiones que no debe ser sometido a la regla de la mayoría, ya sea
porque dichas cuestiones están fuera de discusión, o porque son puramente técnicas
o porque son estrictamente privadas y deben ser protegida frente a la “tiranía de la
mayoría”, en la célebre formulación de J. S. Mill.66 Consideremos los derechos de
propiedad como un ejemplo de este desplazamiento. A pesar de que “las democracias
[habían] sido consideradas incompatibles con la seguridad personal, o los derechos
de propiedad”, como lo expresó James Madison, la protección de los derechos de
propiedad ha pasado a ser considerada en la actualidad no sólo como compatible
con la democracia, sino de hecho como necesaria para el correcto funcionamiento de
todo sistema democrático.67 Como lo ha descrito John Dunn, “[n]adie en 1750 vio o
pudo haber visto la democracia como un nombre apropiado o una forma institucional
apta para la protección efectiva de la riqueza productiva. Pero hoy sabemos que no.
Ante la probabilidad percibida ex ante, esto es exactamente lo que la democracia
representativa ha demostrado a la larga”.68 Y, como veremos en el capítulo 2 de la
63 K. Marx y F. Engels, “Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei,” en Werke, vol. 4 (Berlin:
Dietz Verlag, 1971). Citado a partir de K. Marx y F. engels, The Communist Manifesto, S. Moore
y F. Engels, trans. (London: Pluto Press, 2008), p. 33; and “Rules of the Communist League,” art.
1.
64 J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1942), p. 250.
65 Véase J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechtes und des
demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992).
66 J. S. Mill, “On Liberty,” en Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 18, J. Robson, ed.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
67 J. Madison, “The Federalist no. 10,” en The Federalist, G. W. Carey y J. McCleallan, eds.
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), p. 67.
68 J. Dunn, “Democracy before the Age of the Democratic Revolution,” conferencia presentada
en Columbia University, 2003, p. 10.
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tesis, este cambio en el alcance y los límites de la toma democrática de decisiones ha
afectado también a muchos otros temas, incluida la representación, el constitucional-
ismo, la división de poderes o el empleo. En resumen, cuanto más se ha extendido
la democracia y más legitimidad han adquirido las instituciones democráticas, más
limitado se ha visto su alcance por todo un conjunto de restricciones institucionales
que habían sido tradicionalmente consideradas como incompatibles con la democracia
y que han pasado a ser incorporadas a la idea misma de democracia.
El resultado de estas dos tendencias, tanto en el nivel político como en el ﬁlosóﬁco,
es lo que solemos denominar como democracia liberal. Un sistema político en el que
la soberanía reside en el pueblo y es ejercida por el pueblo, ya sea directamente
o a través de sus representantes electos, y en que, no obstante, el alcance de las
decisiones democráticas se encuentra fuertemente limitado por una serie de cuestiones
que quedan extraídas a la decisión mayoritaria y son protegidas por institutciones
no-mayoritarias, como los tribunales constitucionales o los bancos centrales. Los dos
objetivos principales de esta tesis son explicar históricamente la aparición y difusión
de estas dos características de la democracia liberal en el caso de la Joven República
Norteamericana (Parte I) y analizar más normativamente dos tipos de limitaciones al
alance de la toma de decisiones políticas en una democracia liberal: señaladamente,
los límites constitucionales impuestos sobre la actividad legislativa (Parte II) y la
toma de decisiones en las empresas, un ámbito que se considera ajeno al alcance de
la democracia (Parte III).
La Parte I se centra en la Joven República Norteamericana, un período en el
que las dos tendencias mencionadas son especialmente acusadas y cuya inﬂuencia
política posterior difícilmente puede ser exagerada. Tiene dos objetivos principales,
a los que están dedicados el capítulo 1 y el capítulo 2, respectivamente. En primer
lugar, mostrar cómo la democracia, una forma de gobierno que había sido criticada
de manera generalizada durante más de dos mil años, ganó legitimidad y fue cre-
cientemente demandada en la medida en la que el desacuerdo político fue aceptado
como una característica inevitable y legítima de la sociedad estadounidense (debido,
entre otras causas, al desarrollo de la economía de mercado y el surgimiento del
primer y el segundo sistemas de partidos, como veremos en la sección 1.3.1). En
segundo lugar, mostrar que la misma idea de democracia también sufrió un notable
cambio semántico que hizo que incluyese una serie de elementos que habían sido
tradicionalmente considerados como limitaciones a la democracia. Este cambio per-
mite explicar un fenómeno bien conocido y aún así llamativo: que los fundadores
del sistema constitucional estadounidense se reﬁriesen a éste como un sistema clara-
mente no democrático y que, apenas medio siglo después, la gran mayoría de los
norteamericanos —los herederos de los Federalistas incluidos— se reﬁriesen al mismo
sistema constitucional como un sistema plenamente democrático. En pocas palabras,
lo que los Federalistas entendían por "democracia" en 1787 no coincide con lo que
el término pasaría a signiﬁcar medio siglo después. Asimismo, el cambio permite
explicar por qué toda una serie de límites al alcance de la democracia que serán
analizados en la Parte II y Parte III, y que habían sido tradicionalmente vistos como
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incompatibles con la democracia, pasaron a ser vistos (y son vistos hoy en día) no
sólo como compatibles con la democracia sino, de hecho, como necesarios para el
correcto funcionamiento de todo sistema democrático.
La Parte II y la Parte III analizan de modo más normativo dos ejemplos especial-
mente relevantes de dichos límites, y muestran que hay buenas razones para poner en
duda su justiﬁcación desde un punto de vista democrático. A pesar de que las democ-
racias liberales se caracterizan por el gran número de ámbitos que quedan aislados al
alcance de la toma de decisiones políticas (por ejemplo, la religión, la sexualidad, la
política monetaria, los derechos de propiedad), la Parte II y la Parte III analizan dos
ejemplos especialmente relevantes de estos límites: las restricciones constitucionales
impuestas a la acción legislativa y la toma de decisiones en las empresas. Estos dos
casos son relevantes tanto en el contexto actual como históricamente. En el contexto
actual, puesto que tanto la rigidez constitucional y revisión judicial, por un lado,
como el carácter no democrático y apolítico de la toma de decisiones empresariales,
por el otro, han pasado a ser vistos como características perfectamente naturales y
legítimas de nuestras democracias liberales. Históricamente, puesto que ambos están
estrechamente relacionados con el período de la historia de Estados Unidos estudiado
en la Parte I. Por un lado, la revisión judicial de la acción legislativa se originó en los
primeros años de los Estados Unidos —a partir de la decisión Marbury c. Madison
tomada por la Corte Suprema en 1803— como un freno a la democracia que sólo más
tarde resultó ser considerado democrático, como veremos en la sección 1.2.2.2. Por
otro lado, el trabajo asalariado, que había sido considerado tradicionalmente como
una forma de “esclavitud limitada”, tal como lo expresó Aristóteles, pasó a ser visto
como un intercambio libre y voluntario entre iguales en la medida en que la economía
de mercado —y el trabajo asalariado— se extendió a lo largo del siglo XIX en los
Estados Unidos y en otros países, como veremos en la sección 1.3.3.69
Así, la Parte II analiza las principales teorías normativas de las restricciones con-
stitucionales impuestas sobre la actividad parlamentaria —y, más concretamente, la
rigidez constitucional y la revisión judicial de las leyes— desde un punto de vista
democrático. Ésta es una tarea de gran urgencia, dada la reciente expansión global
del constitucionalismo, que se ha visto extendido tanto como la democracia (y de
hecho más que ésta, como muestra la ﬁgura 2) y dado que, como ha aﬁrmado Cass
Sunstein, sobre las razones empleadas para la constitucionalización de los mecanis-
mos institucionales y los derechos sustantivos, “la teoría constitucional se encuentra
en un estado sorprendentemente primitivo”.70 Se analizan los tres tipos principales
de teorías empleadas para justiﬁcar la rigidez constitucional y la revisión judicial
desde un punto de vista democrático: teorías puramente instrumentalistas, teorías
basadas en el precompromiso y teorías procedimentalistas. Según estas teorías, el
constitucionalismo no tiene por qué estar reñido con la democracia, y de hecho es
necesario para el correcto funcionamiento del sistema democrático, bien porque las
restricciones constitucionales resultan necesarias para garantizar que los procedimien-
69 Aristóteles, Politics, 1260a-b.
70 C. Sunstein, Designing Democracy. What Constitutions Do (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), p. 97.
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tos democráticos producen resultados adecuados (capítulo 4), o porque los límites
constitucionales son el resultado de compromisos adoptados democráticamente por
la ciudadanía (capítulo 5), o porque dichos límites establecen las reglas y precondi-
ciones necesarias para el correcto funcionamiento del sistema democrático (capítulo
6). Como aﬁrmó Cherie Booth, esposa del exprimer ministro británico Tony Blair,
La responsabilidad de un compromiso sustantivo con la democracia des-
cansa en gran medida en los jueces (...) Los jueces en las democracias con-
stitucionales son deﬁnidos como los guardianes de los derechos individuales
(...) y se les otorga la oportunidad y el deber de hacer justicia a todos los
ciudadanos mediante su compromiso con normas universales de decencia y
humanidad (...) de un modo que nos enseña a los ciudadanos y el gobierno
sobre las responsabilidades éticas de los participantes que en una verdadera
democracia.71
Figura 2. Número aproximado de países con constitución escrita (A) comparado
con el número aproximado de democracias constitucionales (B).72
A pesar de que la Parte II analiza toda una serie de problemas de cada una de
estas teorías, un problema común a todas ellas es que no abordan adecuadamente el
hecho del desacuerdo que, como se muestra en la Parte I en el caso estadounidense, es
condición necesaria de la legitimidad democrática. Todos ellas asumen, o terminan
por asumir, que hay una serie de cuestiones políticas que están fuera de discusión
y que pueden ser aseguradas mediante su incorporación a un documento constitu-
cional cuya supremacía es garantizada mediante la revisión judicial de las leyes. Sin
71 C. Booth, “The Role of the Judge in a Human Rights World,” Speech to the Malaysian Bar
Association, July 26, 2005. Citado en R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalim. A Republican Defence
of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 1.
72 D. S. Lutz, Principles of Constitutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), p. 4.
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embargo, como se muestra detalladamente en la parte II, a pesar de que las constitu-
ciones suelen ser presentadas como contratos completos cuyo contenido queda fuera
de toda disputa, éstas están inevitablemente atravesadas por el hecho del desacuerdo
a todos los niveles (por ejemplo, en la etapa de su redacción, así como durante su
ratiﬁcación, interpretación y aplicación). Y al dejar de lado el hecho del desacuerdo,
estas teorías A pesar de que este problema no evita que el constitucionalismo pueda
ser justiﬁcado por otros motivos, sí que muestra la diﬁcultad de ser justiﬁcado por su
carácter democrático puesto que, como se analiza en detalle en las secciones 4.3.1 y
4.3.2, el hecho del desacuerdo es una condición necesaria para que surja la necesidad
de establecer una autoridad política, ya sea democrática o no.
La Parte III de la tesis aborda otro caso notable en el que el alcance de la
democracia se encuentra fuertemente restringido: la toma de decisiones en el lugar
de trabajo. La posibilidad de extender la democracia a las empresas es especial-
mente relevante para esta tesis porque en las democracias liberales las empresas son
frecuentemente vistas como un ámbito de relaciones contractuales voluntarias entre
individuos jurídicamente iguales y que, en consecuencia, queda fuera del ámbito de
la política, incluida la política democrática. Y también es relavante porque esta
concepción del empleo —como un ámbito en el que las relaciones de poder están
ausentes y empleadores y empleados entran en relaciones contractuales en las que la
coerción se halla ausente— no surgió hasta que la economía de mercado se extendió
en los Estados Unidos y en otros países a lo largo del siglo XIX, como veremos en la
sección 1.3.3, concepción que ha pasado a ser dominante desde entonces. Ésta es la
famosa descripción que hicieron Alchian y Demsetz de la relación laboral:
Es común ver la empresa caracterizada por el poder de resolver los proble-
mas mediante órdenes, autoridad, o medidas disciplinarias superiores a las del
mercado convencional. Pero se trata de una ilusión (...) La empresa (...) no
tiene ningún poder de ordenar, ninguna autoridad, ninguna capacidad disci-
plinaria diferente en lo más mínimo a los contratos del mercado convencional
entre dos personas (...) Decirle a un empleado que escriba esta carta en lugar
de presentar ese documento es como decirle a mi tendero que me venden esta
marca de atún en lugar de esa marca de pan.73
El capítulo 7 de esta parte de la tesis analiza los principales argumentos a favor y en
contra de extender la democracia a las empresas. Sin embargo, la principal contribu-
ción de la Parte III es presentar un argumento original, de base republicana, a favor
de la democracia en las empresas en el capítulo 8. Dado que el republicanismo fue la
teoría política dominante durante el período revolucionario y posrevolucionario de los
Estados Unidos (a pesar de tratarse de una tradición que se remonta a Aristóteles,
Cicerón, Maquiavelo y Harrington, entre muchos otros), este capítulo se apoya en
gran medida en la Parte I de la tesis al elaborar y emplear la noción republicana de
libertad como inmunidad frente a la interferencia arbitraria. La principal cuestión
de este capítulo es si la democracia en el lugar de trabajo resulta ser una condición
73 Alchian and Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” Amer-
ican Economic Review 62 (1972): 777-795, p. 777.
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necesaria para garantizar la inmunidad frente a la interferencia arbitraria en el lu-
gar de trabajo. Se emplea la teoría de los contratos incompletos para mostrar que
los contratos de trabajo, así como los intentos públicos por regular las relaciones
laborales por medio de la legislación laboral, resultan incompletos y por lo tanto
permiten la interferencia arbitraria. Dicho en pocas palabras, puesto que sería im-
posible o prohibitivamente costoso para las partes de la relación laboral elaborar
contratos completos anticipando todas las posibles contigencias futuras —así como
para los organismos públicos regular exhaustivamente dicha relación contractual— y
puesto que cierta ﬂexibilidad resulta conveniente para atender adecuadamente dichas
contigencias, la discrecionalidad en el lugar de trabajo no sólo resulta inevitable sino
también deseable. Ahora bien, la discrecionalidad en la aplicación de los contratos
laborales y de la regulación laboral abre la puerta al desacuerdo entre las partes y
a la interferencia arbitraria en el ejercicio de tal discrecionalidad. Ello justiﬁca que,
a ﬁn de garantizar la inmunidad frente a la interferencia arbitraria, los trabajadores
dispongan de derechos de participación sobre la aplicación de los términos de la
relación contractual y su regulación legislativa en el día a día de la relación laboral.
Para ﬁnalizar, es preciso indicar que, a pesar de que el principal objetivo de la tesis
es analizar el alcance y los límites de la democracia histórica y normativamente, las
tres partes en que se divide son en gran medida autónomas e independiente las unas
de las otras. Sin embargo, el hecho del desacuerdo y su relación con la legitimidad
democrática y la toma de decisiones democrática es común a todas ellas y recorre el
conjunto de la tesis. En el siguiente sentido. La Parte I de la tesis muestra cómo
el hecho de desacuerdo llegó a ser aceptado en Norteamérica del siglo XIX, y cómo
dicha aceptación dio paso a la crisis de la teoría de la representación virtual y a una
creciente aceptación de la democracia como un medio para la toma de decisiones
en condiciones de desacuerdos profundos sobre qué cursos de acción tomar a nivel
político. Dicho de otra manera, muestra que la demanda de la democracia sólo
surgió una vez que el hecho del desacuerdo fue reconocido como una característica
inevitable y legítima de la sociedad estadounidense. Como se analiza de modo más
analítico en la Parte II (secciones 4.3.1 y 4.3.2), el hecho del desacuerdo resulta ser
una condición necesaria de la toma de decisiones democráticas, ya que si todos los
ciudadanos estuviesen de acuerdo en qué curso de acción tomar, no sería necesario
emplear procedimiento alguno de toma de decisiones. Así, la segunda parte se centra
en cómo las constituciones, que a menudo se presentan como contratos completos
cuyo contenido se halla fuera de discusión, se hallan inevitablemente atravesados por
el hecho de desacuerdo a diversos niveles. En consecuencia, se argumenta que no
hay razones sólidas para sustraer las normas constitucionales al alcance del proceso
democrático ordinario por medio de la rigidez constitucionales y la revisión judicial.
Finalmente, la Parte III muestra que la relaciones laborales en el lugar de trabajo,
una esfera generalmente considerada apolítica y sustraída al alcance de la toma de
decisiones democrática, se halla igualmente atravesado por el hecho de desacuerdo.
Y, sobre este supuesto, proporciona un argumento a favor de la democratización
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de la toma de decisiones en las empresas sobre la base de la noción republicana de
libertad como inmunidad frente a la interferencia arbitraria.
En el resto de este resumen se presentan los principales argumentos de las tres
partes de la tesis de manera sintética.
Parte I: Democracia
La Parte 1 analiza históricamente el concepto de democracia, y su alcance, en
los Estados Unidos de América en el periodo revolucionario y posrevolucionario. Se
halla un doble desplazamiento. Primero, un incremento en la aceptación de la idea
de democracia debido a la aceptación del desacuerdo político como un fenómeno
legítimo y la consiguiente crisis de la teoría de la representación virtual, según la
cual la sociedad es una entidad orgánica con un conjunto de intereses compartidos
que deben ser aislados de la política democrática y el partidismo. Segundo, un
desplazamiento del concepto de democracia, según el cual muchos de los mecanismos
institucionales que habían sido tradicionalmente vistos como límites al alcance de la
democracia pasaron a ser considerados no sólo consistentes con la democracia sino de
hecho necesarios para su correcto funcionamiento. Se divide en dos capítulos en los
cuales se analizan estos dos desplazamientos, respectivamente. El capítulo 1 analiza
el incremento en la aceptación de la idea de democracia, junto a los mecanismos
institucionales tradicionalmente asociados a ésta. Por su parte, el capítulo 2 muestra
que, además de la creciente aceptación de la idea de democracia, el concepto mismo
de democracia y su alcance también se vieron modiﬁcados, y reconstruye el concepto
original y posterior de democracia.
Una característica notable del sistema constitucional norteamericano es que sus
fundadores se reﬁrieron abiertamente a él como un sistema no-democrático. Los Fed-
eralistas no sólo culparon a “la democracia: una bestia sin cabeza (...) el gobierno
del populacho”. También concibieron la Constitución federal como un medio “para
contener” y “para mantener bajo control la turbulencia de la democracia”.74 No
menos sorprendente es que, sólo unas pocas décadas después de la ratiﬁcación de la
Constitución, la práctica totalidad de los americanos —los herederos de los Feder-
alistas incluidos— pasó a referirse al mismo sistema constitucional como un sistema
plenamente democrático. Así, Jeﬀerson podría concluir en 1826 que “Nosotros, los
norteamericanos somos (...) constitucionalmente y conscientemente demócratas”.75
Pues bien, ¿qué sucedió para que un sistema constitucional que había sido elaborado
como no democrático pasase a ser considerado como el sistema democrático por
excelencia en apenas medio siglo?
La Parte I de la tesis muestra que, una vez que analizamos el signiﬁcado peyora-
tivo del término "democracia" en la década de 1780, no debería sorprender que los
Federalistas fueran reticentes a caliﬁcar de democrático el sistema político que dis-
eñaron. Asimismo, no debería sorprendernos el hecho de que el término se emplease
74 W. Hooper, quoted in F. Dupuis-Deri, The Political Power of Words: The Birth of
Pro-Democratic Discourse in the 19th century in the United States and France (PhD diss., Uni-
versity of British Columbia, 2001); R. Morris, in M. Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), vol. 1, pp. 58 and 517.
75 Quoted in Dupuis-Deri, The Political Power of Words, p. 227.
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de manera generalizada para caliﬁcar el mismo sistema cincuenta años más tarde,
cuando éste pasó a tener un sentido abiertamente positivo y fue utilizado de manera
propagandística por Andrew Jackson primero y el Partido Whig después. Así, la
Parte I se centra en las causas principales detrás de este cambio, que se analizan en
detalle en el capítulo 1 y en el capítulo 2, respectivamente.
El capítulo 1 muestra que, a pesar de su sentido peyorativo en el período colonial
e inmediatamente posterior a la Guerra de Independencia, la idea de democracia,
junto con algunos de los mecanismos institucionales tradicionalmente asociados a
ella, pasó a recibir un apoyo cada vez mayor en las décadas posteriores. Esto sucedió
en la medida en que los ciudadanos tomaron conciencia de la pluralidad de intereses
y valores en la sociedad americana, se organizaron para defender dichos intereses
y valores y la teoría de la representación virtual utilizada por los Federalistas en
la década de 1780 perdió su anterior eﬁcacia política. De acuerdo con la teoría de
la representación virtual, la sociedad era un cuerpo orgánico con un conjunto de
intereses y valores compartidos anteriores a los intereses particulares de las partes de
la sociedad. Por ello, se consideraba que aquellos ciudadanos que estaban excluidos
de la toma de decisiones políticas (por ejemplo, del sufragio activo y pasivo), estaban
no obstante representados, si no realmente, virtualmente mediante su participación
en los intereses y valores compartidos de la comunidad. Ahora bien, a lo largo del
siglo XIX, la ciudadanía tomo conciencia de la pluralidad de intereses y valores en
la sociedad americana, se organizó para dichos intereses y valores, y la teoría de la
representación virtual perdió gran parte de su credibilidad anterior. En consecuencia,
la representación real a través de la extensión del sufragio y otros mecanismos tradi-
cionalmente asociados a la idea de democracia fueron crecientemente demandados y
el término "democracia" perdió parte de su anterior sentido peyorativo.
El capítulo se divide en dos secciones. La sección 1.2 analiza en detalle la teoría
de la representación virtual, que fue hegemónica durante el período colonial, rev-
olucionario e inmediatamente posrevolucionario. La teoría puede ser divida en tres
principios: un principio organicista, un principio elitista y un principio de inde-
pendencia material, que son analizados en detalle. En primer lugar, se analiza el
principio organicista y su uso generalizado durante la guerra de independencia, el
llamado "período crítico" y la Convención Federal de 1787. En segundo lugar, se
analiza el principio de la élite gobernante, según la cual las decisiones políticas deben
ser tomadas por aquellas personas con el conocimiento experto y la imparcialidad
necesarias para dejar de lado sus intereses particulares y representar el interés gen-
eral de la comunidad. Se analizan las razones alegadas para justiﬁcar dicho principio,
junto con los principales medios institucionales propuestos a ﬁn de ponerlo en prác-
tica. En tercer lugar, se analiza el principio de independencia material, según el cual
sólo aquellos que eran materialmente independientes (que en el período estudiado se
identiﬁcaba con la posesión de bienes inmuebles) gozan de la imparcialidad necesaria
para representar los intereses de la comunidad en detrimento de sus intereses par-
ticulares. Se identiﬁcan tres razones principales para justiﬁcar este requisito: (a) la
ausencia de inﬂuencia de aquellos en quienes de lo contrario era inevitable depender
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para vivir, (b) la disponibilidad del tiempo necesario para participar en política de
manera informada, y (c) la posesión de una “participación en la sociedad” a ﬁn de
tener los incentivos adecuados para participar en política de manera responsable. En
la misma época, Kant lo expresaría aﬁrmando que "[l]a única justiﬁcación requerida
por un ciudadano (...) es que debe ser su propio amo (sui iuris), y debe tener alguna
propiedad (...) para mantenerse a sí mismo”.76
Por su parte, la sección 1.3 analiza la crisis de estos tres principios de la teoría
de la representación virtual y cómo ello afectó al sentido peyorativo de la idea de
democracia. En primer lugar, se hallan tres causas principales detrás de la crisis del
principio organicista: (a) el desarrollo de la economía de mercado, (b) la inﬂuencia
de la Revolución Francesa y la posterior creación de sociedades democráticas a lo
largo y ancho del país y (c) la aparición del primer y el segundo sistema de partidos.
En segundo lugar, se analiza la crisis del principio de la elite gobernante, que fue
sustituido en gran medida por la idea de que la gente común representa mejor los
intereses de la ciudadanía que una élite de expertos, junto a los mecanismos institu-
cionales necesarios para garantizar que los representantes respondan a los intereses
de sus electores. Por último, se hallan dos causas tras la crisis del principio de inde-
pendencia material. En primer lugar, los trabajadores asalariados —cuyos salarios
habían sido tradicionalmente considerados como “una promesa de su esclavitud”, en
la expresión de Cicerón—, pasaron a ser considerados como materialmente indepen-
dientes —y por tanto dignos de ser concedidos la ciudadanía plena— ya que pasaron
a ser considerados como propietarios: propietarios de su propia fuerza de trabajo,
que podían intercambiar libremente en el mercado como si fuese una mercancía
más.77 En segundo lugar, se extendió la idea —ampliamente difundida gracias a la
Declaración de Independencia de Jeﬀerson— de que todos los miembros de la comu-
nidad política eran dignos de ser concedidos la ciudadanía plena, con independencia
de que gozaran de independencia material o no. En resumen, la combinación de todos
estos factores hicieron que la teoría de la representación virtual perdiese su credibil-
idad anterior y la democracia, en consecuencia, fuese crecientemente demandada y
ganase respetabilidad.
El capítulo 2, por su parte, muestra que, además de su creciente aceptación, la
idea de democracia también sufrió un notable cambio semántico durante las décadas
posteriores a la ratiﬁcación de la Constitución federal. Aunque algunas de las carac-
terísticas del concepto de democracia —y algunos de los mecanismos institucionales
asociados a él— se mantuvieron estables, otros cambiaron. Esto permite explicar por
qué los Federalistas creían que el gobierno representativo que diseñaron no sólo era
diferente de la democracia sino, de hecho, un límite a ésta. En palabras de Bernard
Manin, “para Madison, el gobierno representativo no era un tipo de democracia,
76 I. Kant, “Über den Gemeinspruch: das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht
für die Praxis,” in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, Königlichen Preußischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, ed. (Walter De Gruyter: Berlin, 1923). Quoted from I. Kant, “On the Common
Saying: ’This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice’,” Political Writings, H.
S. Reiss, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 78.
77 Cicero, De Oﬁciis, W. Miller, trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913), I.
XLII.
287
sino que era una forma esencialmente diferente y, además, preferible de gobierno”.78
Asimismo, permite explicar por qué el mismo sistema pudo ser caliﬁcado de manera
generalizada como perfectamente democrático apenas unas décadas más tarde. En
pocas palabras, lo que los Federalistas entendían por “democracia” en la década de
1780 no coincide con lo que el término pasó a signiﬁcar medio de medio siglo después.
Del mismo modo, los mecanismos institucionales asociados al concepto clásico no co-
inciden con los asociados a este último concepto. Lo que es más, un gran número
de mecanismos institucionales que habían sido tradicionalmente considerados como
limitaciones a la democracia pasaron a ser vistos no sólo como compatibles con la
idea de democracia, sino de hecho necesarios para el correcto funcionamiento de toda
sistema democrático.
El capítulo se divide en dos secciones. La sección 2.2 traza la evolución del
concepto desde la década de 1780 y a lo largo de los cincuenta años posteriores. Lo
hace mediante el análisis de tres pasos clave. En primer lugar, muestra la inﬂuencia
del republicanismo clásico de Aristóteles, Polibio y Cicerón —tradición en la que
los Founders habían crecido intelectualmente— en su concepción de la democracia.
En segundo lugar, la presidencia de Jeﬀerson y el debate explícito entre los jeﬀer-
sonianos de Pensilvania sobre el signiﬁcado y las implicaciones institucionales de
la democracia. Y, por último, la democracia jacksoniana y el segundo sistema de
partidos, en el que la democracia fue utilizada de manera abiertamente elogiosa e
incluso propagandística por primera vez. A continuación, la sección 2.3 compara los
conceptos original y posterior de democracia en relación a cinco cuestiones especial-
mente relevantes: la representación y la soberanía popular, la viabilidad política,
los derechos individuales y de propiedad, la estabilidad política y la división de
poderes. Como veremos, el cambio en la idea de democracia en relación a estas
cuestiones permite explicar por qué, apenas unas décadas después de la ratiﬁcación
de la Constitución federal, el mismo sistema constitucional pasó a ser considerado
de manera generalizada como perfectamente democrático. Como William Duane
escribiría a Jeﬀerson en 1824: “El gobierno democrático ya no es el jacobinismo, y
los que anteriormente lo habían reprobado ahora utilizan dicho lenguaje y profesan
la doctrina que maldecían veinticuatro años atrás”. Se había producido, tal como lo
caliﬁcó Duane, “una revolución lingüística".79
Parte II: Constitucionalismo
La Parte I de la tesis muestra, entre otras cosas, cómo algunos de los mecanis-
mos que fueron originalmente diseñados como límites a la democracia —y, en con-
secuencia, como incompatibles con ésta— pasaron a ser considerados no sólo como
compatibles con ésta sino, de hecho, como necesarios para el correcto funcionamiento
de todo sistema democrático. La Parte II se centra en dos de estos mecanismos: la
rigidez constitucional y la revisión judicial de las leyes, así como en la noción misma
78 B. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), p. 2.
79 William Duane, “Letter to Jeﬀerson, October 19, 1924,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts
Historical Society 20 (1906-1907), 381-383, p. 382.
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de constitucionalismo, cuya reciente expansión global ha sido notable. Así, mientras
que en 1802 no existía ningún sistema propiamente constitucional en el mundo y en
1978 sólo el 26% de las constituciones incorporaban alguna forma de revisión judicial,
de las 106 constituciones ratiﬁcadas entre 1985 y 2008 101 han incluido un tribunal
constitucional con poderes ﬁnales de revisión sobre la acción legislativa.80
Esta parte se divide en cuatro capítulos, que analizan en detalle las principales
teorías normativas de la democracia constitucional. Según estas teorías, el constitu-
cionalismo, incluyendo la rigidez constitucional y la revisión judicial de las leyes, no
necesita entrar en contradicción con la democracia, puesto que las restricciones con-
stitucionales resultan necesarias para garantizar que los procedimientos democráti-
cos produzcan resultados adecuados, como la protección de los derechos humanos o
la estabilidad ﬁscal (capítulo 4), o porque dichas restricciones son el resultado de
compromisos adoptados democráticamente por los ciudadanos (capítulo 5), o porque
dichas restricciones establecen los procedimientos y precondiciones previas necesarias
para el correcto funcionamiento del propio sistema democrático (capítulo 6).
Antes de pasar a analizar estas teorías, el capítulo 3 proporciona el marco analítico
e histórico empleado a lo largo de la parte II. El constitucionalismo se deﬁne como
la limitación de los poderes del órgano legislativo mediante la incorporación de di-
chos límites a un documento rígido y su aplicación mediante la revisión judicial
de las leyes. La sección 3.2 presenta brevemente la historia del constitucionalismo,
comparándolo con el constitucionalismo absolutista, el modelo de Westminster de
soberanía parlamentaria y los llamados modelos “new commonwealth” de constitu-
cionalismo, y distinguiendo entre restricciones sustantivas y procedimientales. A su
vez, la sección 3.3 analiza brevemente la diferencia entre constituciones escritas y
convenciones constitucionales, junto con el papel de éstas en el constitucionalismo.
El resto del capítulo analiza los dos principales mecanismos institucionales del
constitucionalismo, a saber: la rigidez constitucional y la revisión judicial de las
leyes. La sección 3.4 deﬁne la rigidez constitucional, presenta los mecanismos es-
pecíﬁcos empleados para aplicar dicha rigidez y analiza con cierto detalle el clásico
problema ﬁlosóﬁco de si realmente un soberano puede limitarse a sí mismo puesto
que, como lo expresó Hobbes, “quien puede atarse, puede liberarse”.81 Se argumenta
que en condiciones no ideales, las limitaciones constitucionales imponen costes sobre
el legislador, por lo que resulta tan ingenuo creer que no impongan costes como
considerar que la inclusión de ciertas restricciones en un documento constitucional
garantiza su cumplimiento eo ipso. Finalmente, la sección 3.5 analiza la revisión
judicial de las leyes y distingue entre revisión judicial fuerte y débil, entre modelos
americano y europeo de revisión, y analiza su efectividad a la luz de la evidencia
empírica que muestra que, en la práctica, los tribunales constitucionales tienden a
no tomar decisiones contrarias a la opinión pública.
80 The ﬁgures come from D. L. Horowitz, “Constitutional Courts: A Primer for Decision Mak-
ers,” Journal of Democracy 17 (2006): 125-137; and A. Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Rights,
and Judicial Power,” in Comparative Politics, D. Caramani, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008).
81 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, R. Tuck, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 184.
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El capítulo 4 analiza las teorías instrumentalistas de la legitimidad democrática
y su justiﬁcación de las restricciones constitucionales. Dichas teorías actualizan la
visión organicista analizada en la Parte I, de modo que deﬁnen la autoridad legí-
tima en base a su capacidad para alcanzar un conjunto de objetivos sustantivos y
previos al proceso político, tales como la protección de los derechos fundamentales,
el crecimiento económico o la estabilidad política. Así, el constitucionalismo y la
legitimidad democrática no tiene por qué entrar en conﬂicto, puesto que la legitim-
idad de la instituciones democráticas se basa exclusivamente en su capacidad para
alcanzar una serie de objetivos que son consagrados en un documento constitucional
y realizados por medios constitucionales. El capítulo analiza la estrctura del instru-
mentalismo en la sección 4.2, así como las dos teorías instrumentalistas principales
del constitucionalismo, según las cuales el constitucionalismo (a) permite asegurar
la protección de los derechos fundamentales y (b) produce resultados económicos
superiores. Finalmente, se presentan tres problemas a los que se enfrenta el instru-
mentalismo.
La sección 4.3.1 muestra que el instrumentalismo es incapaz de acomodar la
llamada paradoja de Wollheim, que presenta la situación, habitual en las sociedades
democráticas, en las que un ciudadano X está convencido tanto de que la política
A debe ser aprobada (porque A es su opción preferida) como de que la política B,
que es incompatible con A, debe ser aprobada (puesto que X es un demócrata y
B es la opción respaldada por la mayoría).82 Se analizan las principales soluciones
anteriores a la paradoja y se elabora una solución en dos niveles. De acuerdo con esta
solución, X puede estar comprometido con ambas creencias puesto que proporcionan
una respuesta a dos preguntas normativas muy diferentes: respectivamente, a "”qué
se debe hacer” y a “qué se debe cuando discrepamos sobre qué hacer y, sin embargo,
hemos de tomar un curso de acción común”. A continuación, se muestra que, una vez
que aceptamos dicha solución, el instrumentalismo resulta ser una teoría normativa
incompleta de la autoridad política, puesto que se muestra incapaz de acomodar la
paradoja de Wollheim al reducir la segunda cuestión a la primera.
Primero, la sección 4.3.2, por su parte, profundiza en las críticas presentadas al
ﬁnal de la sección anterior, a saber: que las teorías instrumentalistas de la autoridad
democrática resultan incompletas, puesto que no abordan adecuadamente las di-
vergencias que precisamente hacen que sea necesario el recurso a una autoridad. Se
divide en cinco parágrafos. Los cuatro primeros parágrafos deﬁnen las circunstancias
de la política —que surgen cuando (a) hay una necesidad de un acuerdo vinculante
colectiva sobre un curso de acción uniﬁcado pero (b) las partes discrepan sobre qué
curso de acción tomar—, junto con el alcance, las causas y las implicaciones de
tales circunstancias. El último parágrafo explica por qué el instrumentalismo resulta
incapaz de acomodar las circunstancias de la política y, de hecho, termina por refu-
tarse a sí mismo. Como lo ha expresado Waldron, “cualquier teoría que hace que la
autoridad dependa de la corrección de los resultados políticos se refuta a sí misma,
82 R. Wollheim, “A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy,” en Philosophy, Politics and Society,
Peter Laslett y Runciman, eds. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962).
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puesto que es precisamente porque las personas no están de acuerdo acerca de qué
resultados son correctos que necesitan establecer y reconocer una autoridad”.83
Finalmente, la sección 4.3.3 muestra que el instrumentalismo resulta ser una
teoría normativa de la autoridad política excesivamente radical cuando lo consider-
amos desde el punto de vista de los ciudadanos reales, que tienden a tener en cuenta
no sólo los resultados de las decisiones políticas, sino también la imparcialidad de
los procedimientos empleados para alcanzar dichos resultados. La sección revisa la
literatura en psicología social sobre el tema, que converge en la centralidad de la
imparcialidad procedimental para la percepción de la legitimidad de la autoridad
política.
El capítulo 6 analiza las teorías constitucionales basadas en el precompromiso,
que justiﬁcan las restricciones constitucionales por ser el resultado de un compro-
miso adoptado democráticamente por los propios ciudadanos. Como aﬁrmó Hayek,
“Sólo un demagogo puede presentar como ‘antidemocráticas’ las limitaciones que
imponen sobre las mayorías temporales las decisiones a largo plazo y los princip-
ios generales celebradas adoptados por el pueblo”.84 El capítulo se divide en tres
secciones. En primer lugar, se describe la estructura de los precompromisos insti-
tucionales democráticos. En segundo lugar, se analiza la democracia dualista de
Ackerman como el ejemplo más elaborado e inﬂuyentes de un enfoque basado en el
precompromiso.85 Por último, se presentan cinco problemas de este enfoque.
La sección 5.4.1 sostiene que las teorías constitucionales basadas en precom-
promisos incurren en una confusión categorial, puesto que los arreglos políticos,
incluyendo los arreglos constitucionales, no se convierten en democráticos por el
hecho de haber sido adoptados por medios democráticos, puesto que una mayoría de
ciudadanos podría aprobar legislación abiertamente antidemocrática sin que dicha
legislación pasase a ser democrática por esa razón.
La sección 5.4.2 analiza la analogía entre los compromisos colectivos con normas
constitucionales y los compromisos individuales con normas personales. Esta es una
analogía con gran fuerza normativa, puesto que las decisiones que regulan el com-
portamiento propio tienden a ser vistas como más autónomas que las desreguladas.
Como aﬁrmó célebremente Montesquieu, “la libertad política no consiste en hacer lo
que uno quiere (...) la libertad no puede ser otra cosa que ser capaz de hacer lo que
uno debe querer”.86 Sin embargo, la analogía no se sostiene porque, a diferencia de
los compromisos individuales, los compromisos colectivos adoptados en momentos
constituyentes están atravesados por el hecho de desacuerdo, por lo menos, por tres
razones. En primer lugar, porque si realmente existiese un consenso en el período
constituyente, entonces podrían emplearse mayorías cualiﬁcadas como requisito de
los procedimientos de ratiﬁcación constitucional. Sin embargo, se suele emplear un
83 J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 253.
84 F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp.
106-107.
85 B. Ackerman, We the People. Foundations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1991).
86 C.-L. Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, Laurent Versini, ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), p.
325.
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requisito de mayoría simple, lo que indica que los compromisos constitucionales no
disfrutan necesariamente de consensos más amplios que las leyes adoptadas durante
los momentos de política ordinaria. En segundo lugar, porque las circunstancias en
que las constituciones son aprobadas o modiﬁcadas (por ejemplo, transiciones desde
regímenes autocráticos, crisis económicas, guerras civiles) no suelen ser las mejores
para que los ciudadanos dejen de lado sus desacuerdos. Y en tercer lugar, porque
el riesgo es demasiado alto, dado al enorme impacto y la diﬁcultad de enmendar las
disposiciones constitucionales, como para que las partes dejen de lado sus intereses
particulares y actúen sosegadamente. En lugar de amplios consensos en los que
la ciudadanía habla con una sola voz, los momentos constitucionales pueden ser
mejor descritos como procesos de negociación y las constituciones, a su vez, como el
equilibrio resultante de la fuerza negociadora de las partes.
La sección 5.4.3 muestra que, si bien las constituciones son equilibrios entre partes
en desacuerdo, éstas aún pueden ser descritas como precompromisos democráticos
siempre y cuando los equilibrios resultantes sean adoptados por una mayoría de ciu-
dadanos. Sin embargo, se muestra que esta condición es incumplida con frecuencia
tanto de manera sincrónica como diacrónica. Se presentan tres tipos de diﬁcul-
tades para satisfacer esta condición. En primer lugar, cuando una minoría de los
ciudadanos consigue imponer sus intereses en contra de los intereses de la mayoría
de sus conciudadanos. En segundo lugar, cuando una mayoría de los ciudadanos
—incluso una cualiﬁcada— pretende modiﬁcar la Constitución y, sin embargo, es
incapaz de hacerlo debido a que la enmienda no es llevada a cabo o es bloqueada por
las élites políticas. Y en tercer lugar, cuando un agente externo es capaz de imponer
sus intereses en la constitución frente a los de la ciudadanía en su conjunto, como
ocurrió en Japón tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial.
A su vez, la sección 5.4.4 analiza diﬁcultades adicionales para cumplir con los
criterios antes mencionados, sólo que en esta ocasión temporalmente, entre genera-
ciones. Según el desiderátum de Thomas Paine, “Cada época y generación deberían
ser tan libres para actuar por sí mismas, y en todos los casos, como las edades y
generaciones que las precedieron”.87 Por consiguiente, para que una constitución sea
plenamente democrática, los costes de ratiﬁcación y enmienda entre generaciones
deben ser simétricos. Es decir, las disposiciones vigentes deben ser modiﬁcables
por las generaciones siguientes, siempre que la enmienda cuente con el apoyo de la
mayoría. Sin embargo, hay una asimetría entre los procedimientos de adopción y en-
mienda constitucional, tanto formal como informalmente. Formalmente, pues, como
regla general, las constituciones sólo requieren mayorías simples para su ratiﬁcación
pero mayorías cualiﬁcadas para su enmienda. De manera informal, puesto que las
constituciones suelen ser mucho más resistentes al cambio de lo que formalmente se
especiﬁca debido, entre otras causas, a fenómenos como la llamada dependencia de
la senda, la preferencia por el statu quo o la función expresiva de la ley, que son
analizados.
87 T. Paine, “The Rights of Man,” Political Writings, B. Kuklick, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), p. 63.
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Finalmente, el capítulo 6 analiza las teorías procedimentalistas de las restric-
ciones constitucionales. Según dichas teorías, para ser realmente democráticas, las
instituciones políticas han de satisfacer un conjunto de condiciones constitutivas
(por ejemplo, “elecciones generales, libertad de prensa, libertad de reunión y liber-
tad de expresión”, como aﬁrmó Rosa Luxemburgo en su crítica a la suspensión de
las libertades civiles por los bolcheviques rusos) y de precondiciones (por ejemplo,
“salarios dignos y alfabetización universal”, en palabras de John S. Mill).88 Y, a
menos que sean incorporadas a una constitución rígida y protegidas por un tribunal
constitucional, dichas condiciones y precondiciones pueden resultar manipuladas por
eventuales mayorías parlamentarias que pueden modiﬁcar los distritos electorales en
su favor, socavar los derechos políticos de las minorías o prohibir partidos y medios
de comunicación opositores. En resumen, a menos que sean protegida constitucional-
mente, las democracias pueden acabar por ser destruidas desde dentro por mayorías
parlamentarias temporales.
El capítulo se divide en cuatro secciones. La sección 6.2 analiza brevemente el
ejemplo más citado de un sistema democrático supuestamente destruido por medios
democráticos: la caída de la República de Weimar a manos del NSDAP. Como a
Goebbles mismo le gustaba decir, “será siempre uno de los mejores chistes de la
democracia que proporciona a sus enemigos mortales los medios para destruirla.”89
La sección 6.3 analiza las teorías procedimentalistas basadas en precondiciones y,
más especíﬁcamente, el argumento estándar de Holmes y Sunstein y el más peculiar
de Habermas, según el cual “la Corte Constitucional regida por una interpretación
procedimental de la constitución no tiene por qué hacer peligrar su crédito de legitim-
idad”. La sección 6.4 presenta la toería puramente procedimentalista de John H . Ely,
así como la de Stephen Holmes, si bien más brevemente.90 El principal argumento
de Ely es que los tribunales cuentan con una mejor posición institucional que los
parlamentos a la hora de garantizar la imparcialidad del proceso político, puesto
que los cargos electos incurren en un conﬂicto de intereses a la hora de garantizar
la imparcialidad y competitividad del mercado político, dado que tienen un claro
incentivo para utilizar su posición de poder para incrementar su poder político. Por
el contrario, los jueces son menos propensos a conﬂictos de intereses de este tipo
debido a que su permanencia en el cargo es independiente del ciclo político (más aún
cuando gozan de cargos vitalicios).
A continuación se presentan cuatro problemas de las teorías procedimentalistas.
La sección 6.5.1 muestra que las teorías basadas en precondiciones incurren en la
paradoja de las precondiciones señalada por Carlos Nino.91 A continuación, la sección
88 Luxemburgo es citada en C. E. Schorske, German Social Democracy, 1905-1917: The De-
velopment of the Great Schism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 324. Mill es
citado en Przeworski, Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, p. xiii.
89 J. Goebbles, citado en A. S. Kirshner, “Proceduralism and Popular Threats to Democracy,”
Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2010): 405-424, p. 405.
90 J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust. A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard
University Press, 1980); S. Holmes, “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy,” en Consti-
tutionalism and Democracy, J. Elster and R. Slagstad, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988).
91 C. S. Nino, La constitución de la democracia deliberativa (Barcelona: Gedisa, 1997).
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6.5.2 muestra que el hecho del desacuerdo atraviesa los supuestos acuerdos relativos
a las condiciones y precondiciones de la democracia tanto como las disposiciones con-
stitucionales sustantivas. La sección 6.5.3 analiza la concepción de las constituciones
como reglas constitutivas. Según Holmes, mientras que las normas sustantivas son
reguladoras y pueden ser limitantes de las decisiones democráticas, las normas de
procedimiento son meramente constitutivas, puesto que posibilitan y organizan la
propia toma de decisiones democrática. No es posible tomar decisiones democráticas
sin reglas sobre cómo tomar dichas decisiones, al igual que no es posible jugar al
ajedrez sin las reglas del ajedrez. Se muestra, sin embargo, que el argumento de
Holmes incurre en un non sequitur. En pocas palabras, a pesar de que las normas de
procedimiento —por ejemplo, las reglas electorales— son ciertamente necesarias para
tomar decisiones democráticas, no hay ninguna razón por la cual esas normas deben
ser incorporadas a una constitución rígida y protegidas por tribunales con capacidad
para derogar leyes aprobadas en sede parlamentaria. Por último, la sección 6.54
cierra el capítulo analizando el argumento acerca de la mejor posición institucional
de los tribunales en comparación a los parlamentos. Se analiza la decisión de la
Corte Suprema de los EE. UU. en el caso Bush c. Gore y se concluye que, como
parte integrante del sistema político, los jueces constitucionales se ven tan afectados
como los parlamentos por la manera en que se organiza el sistema político y se
distribuye el poder, como muestra el hecho de que estén tan en desacuerdo entre sí
como los representantes en los parlamentos y los ciudadanos en la calle, y de que
hagan uso de la regla de la mayoría para tomar decisiones tanto como éstos.
Parte III: Las empresas
La Parte III de la tesis analiza la extensión de la toma de decisiones democrática
al lugar de trabajo, una esfera que es frecuentemente considerada ajena al alcance
de la democracia. Está dividida en dos capítulos. El capítulo 7 introduce y deﬁne
las principales formas de democracia en la empresa (DE), y revisa los principales
argumentos a favor y en contra de esta forma de organización empresarial. El capítulo
8, por su parte, presenta un argumento original, de base republicana, en favor de
la DE. Dado que el republicanismo era la ﬁlosofía política dominante durante la
Joven República Norteamericana (a pesar de que se remonta a Aristóteles, Cicerón,
Maquiavelo y Harrington, entre muchos otros ﬁlósofos), este capítulo se apoya en
gran medida en la Parte I de la tesis.
El capítulo 7 proporciona el marco analítico y normativo empleado a lo largo de
esta parte. La sección 7.2 deﬁne la DE y distingue entre los derechos de control por
el capital y por el trabajo y entre la propiedad pública y privada de la empresa. Esta
parte de la tesis se centra únicamente en las empresas privadas democráticas, que
son controlados por los trabajadores (en lugar de por el capital) y son de propiedad
privada (en lugar de pública). A continuación, se establece una nueva distinción
entre aquellas empresas democráticas que son propiedad de inversores externos o de
los propios trabajadores. El modelo alemán de codeterminación y el cooperativismo
son presentados como las formas más representatives del primer y el segundo caso,
respectivamente, y son cuidadosamente deﬁnidos en las secciones 7.2.1 y 7.2.2. La
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sección analiza con cierto detalle los principales argumentos a favor y en contra de la
DE. La sección 7.3.1 analiza su viabilidad, y la sección 7.3.2, su eﬁciencia. Las sec-
ciones 7.3.3 y 7.3.4 analizan, respectivamente, los llamados argumentos “epistémico” y
“propietarista” en contra de la DE y, por último, la sección 7.3.5 analiza críticamente
la teoría de Bowles y Gintis del intercambio disputado.
El capítulo 8 se centra exclusivamente en el caso republicano en favor de la DE.
La sección 8.2 deﬁne la noción republicana de libertad, en contraste con su noción
liberal: es decir, como inmunidad frente a la interferencia arbitraria. La siguiente
sección muestra las formas de interferencia arbitraria habituales en el contexto laboral
y las formas principales de enfrentarlas. Se analizan dos enfoques. Según el primero,
la disponibilidad de una opción de salida garantiza —al menos en los mercados libres
y competitivos— la libertad de los trabajadores frente a la interferencia arbitraria;
según el segundo, la interferencia arbitraria puede ser atajada por la vía de la regu-
lación laboral. Se presentan tres objeciones al primer enfoque. En primer lugar, los
mercados laborales tanto imperfectos como perfectos tienen desempleo involuntario
—un “ejército industrial de reserva”, por usar la célebre expresión de Marx—, lo cual
hace que sea costoso para los trabajadores abandonar su empleo (ya que no estarían
en condiciones de encontrar otro trabajo con facilidad). En segundo lugar, incluso si
los mercados de trabajo se vaciasen, existen costes de salida adicionales, tales como
la inversión de los trabajadores en capital humano especíﬁco de la empresa de, la
búsqueda y costes de transición o el coste psicológico. En tercer lugar, aunque la
salida sin coste fuera viable, las alternativas de trabajo podrían ser tan despóticas,
desreguladas y arbitrarias como el trabajo actual, en cuyo caso la opción de salida
sería de poco valor.
Por su parte, la sección 8.3.2 analiza el constitucionalismo laboral, y muestra
por qué la regulación laboral resulta insuﬁciente a la hora de garantizar la inmu-
nidad frente a la interferencia arbitraria en las empresas. A su vez esta crítica es
fundamental para entender el argumento republicano a favor de la DE. Veámoslo
brevemente. Empleando la teoría de los contratos incompletos, se muestra que los
contratos laborales, así como los intentos públicos por regular las relaciones laborales
por vía legislatival, resultan incompletos y por lo tanto permiten la interferencia ar-
bitraria en su aplicación a casos concretos y contigencias futuras que resultan, por
deﬁnición, no anticipables.92 Dicho en pocas palabras, puesto que sería imposible
o prohibitivamente costoso para las partes de la relación laboral elaborar contratos
completos anticipando todas las posibles contigencias futuras —así como para los
organismos públicos regular exhaustivamente dicha relación contractual— y puesto
que cierta ﬂexibilidad resulta conveniente para atender adecuadamente dichas con-
tigencias, la discrecionalidad en el lugar de trabajo no sólo resulta inevitable sino
también deseable. Ahora bien, la discrecionalidad en la aplicación de los contratos
laborales y de la regulación laboral a casos concretos y contigencias no anticipables
abre la puerta al desacuerdo entre las partes y a la posible interferencia arbitraria
92 Véase, por ejemplo, O. Hart, “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal
of Law, economics and Organizations, 4 (1988), 119-139.
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en el ejercicio de tal discrecionalidad. Como aﬁrmó célebremente el Conde de Ro-
manones, “que otros hagan la ley, que yo escribiré los reglamentos”. Ello justiﬁca que,
a ﬁn de garantizar la inmunidad frente a la interferencia arbitraria, los trabajadores
dispongan de derechos de participación sobre la aplicación de los términos de la
relación contractual y su regulación legislativa en el día a día de la relación laboral.
Por último, la sección 8.5 analiza la separación formal entre derechos de control
y derechos de propiedad en las empresas democráticas desde un punto de vista re-
publicano. Se analizan las asimetrías negociadoras y los problemas de riesgo moral
derivados de dicha separación y se deﬁnde que el cooperativismo resulta, ceteris
paribus, preferible a otras formas de DE en el que los derechos de propiedad y de
control son formalmente separados, como en el caso de la codeterminación alemana.
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